American National Standard For Financial PDF
American National Standard For Financial PDF
ANS X9.24-1:2009
Secretariat
Foreword
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consensus, and other criteria for approval have been met by the standards developer.
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has been reached by directly and materially affected interests. Substantial agreement means much more than a
simple majority, but not necessarily unanimity. Consensus requires that all views and objections be considered,
and that a concerted effort be made toward their resolution.
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anyone, whether he has approved the standards or not from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using
products, processes, or procedures not conforming to the standards.
The American National Standards Institute does not develop standards and will in no circumstances give an
interpretation of any American National Standard. Moreover, no person shall have the right or authority to issue an
interpretation of an American National Standard in the name of the American National Standards Institute.
Requests for interpretation should be addressed to the secretariat or sponsor whose name appears on the title
page of this standard.
CAUTION NOTICE: This American National Standard may be revised or withdrawn at any time. The procedures
of the American National Standards Institute require that action be taken to reaffirm, revise, or withdraw this
standard no later than five years from the date of approval.
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Contents
Foreword ...................................................................................................................................................................... i
Figures........................................................................................................................................................................ iv
Tables .......................................................................................................................................................................... v
Introduction................................................................................................................................................................ vi
1 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................................ 17
2 Scope ............................................................................................................................................................ 17
2.1 Application ................................................................................................................................................... 17
3 References ................................................................................................................................................... 18
4 Terms and Definitions................................................................................................................................. 18
5 Standard Organization ................................................................................................................................ 24
6 Environment................................................................................................................................................. 24
6.1 General ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
6.2 Cardholder and Card Issuer ....................................................................................................................... 24
6.3 Card Acceptor .............................................................................................................................................. 24
6.4 Acquirer ........................................................................................................................................................ 25
7 Key Management Requirements ................................................................................................................ 25
7.1 General ......................................................................................................................................................... 25
7.2 Tamper-Resistant Security Modules (TRSM) used for Key Management.............................................. 26
7.3 A Secure Environment ................................................................................................................................ 28
7.4 Key Generation ............................................................................................................................................ 28
7.5 Symmetric Key Distribution........................................................................................................................ 28
7.5.1 Manual Distribution ..................................................................................................................................... 28
7.5.2 Key Initialization Facility ............................................................................................................................. 29
7.5.3 Key Loading Device..................................................................................................................................... 29
7.6 Key Utilization .............................................................................................................................................. 29
7.7 Key Replacement......................................................................................................................................... 30
7.8 Key Destruction and Archival..................................................................................................................... 30
7.9 Key Encryption/Decryption......................................................................................................................... 30
8 Key Management Specifications................................................................................................................ 30
8.1 General ......................................................................................................................................................... 30
8.2 Methods of Key Management..................................................................................................................... 31
8.2.1 Key Management Methods Requiring Compromise Prevention Controls............................................. 31
8.2.2 Key Management Method Requiring Compromise Detection Controls................................................. 32
8.3 Key Identification Techniques.................................................................................................................... 32
8.3.1 Implicit Key Identification ........................................................................................................................... 32
8.3.2 Key Identification by Name......................................................................................................................... 32
8.4 Security Management Information Data (SMID) Element ........................................................................ 32
8.4.1 Notations, Abbreviations and Conventions.............................................................................................. 34
8.4.2 Representation............................................................................................................................................. 35
8.4.3 Key Naming .................................................................................................................................................. 37
8.5 Method: Fixed Transaction Keys ............................................................................................................... 38
8.5.1 SMID.............................................................................................................................................................. 38
Figures
Figure 1 – DUKPT at Receiving TRSM ....................................................................................................................42
Figure A-1 – Key calculation for PIN-encrypting key and MAC keys ........................................................................56
Tables
Table A-1 - Variant constants for transaction keys .................................................................................................. 56
Table C-1 – Example of Pair-wise XOR Combination of Key components for DEA................................................ 85
Introduction
Today, billions of dollars in funds are transferred electronically by various communication methods. Transactions
are often entered remotely, off-premise from financial institutions, by retailers or by customers directly. Such
transactions are transmitted over potentially non-secure media. The vast range in value, size, and the volume of
such transactions expose institutions to severe risks, which may be uninsurable.
To protect these financial messages and other sensitive information, many institutions are making increased use
of the American National Standards Institute Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). Specific examples of its
use include standards for message authentication, personal identification number encryption, other data
encryption, and key encryption.
The TDEA is in the public domain. The security and reliability of any process based on the TDEA is directly
dependent on the protection afforded to secret numbers called cryptographic keys. This part of this standard deals
exclusively with management of symmetric keys using symmetric techniques. ANS X9.24-2 addresses
management of symmetric keys using asymmetric techniques.
A familiar analogy may be found in the combination lock of a vault. The lock design is public knowledge. Security
is provided by keeping a number, the combination, a secret. Secure operation also depends on protective
procedures and features which prevent surreptitious viewing or determination of the combination by listening to its
operation. Procedures are also required to ensure that the combination is random and cannot be modified by an
unauthorized individual without detection.
Suggestions for the improvement of this standard will be welcome. They should be sent to the ASC X9 Secretariat,
Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc., 1212 West Street, Suite 200, Annapolis, MD 21401.
The standard was processed and approved for submittal to the American National Standards Institute by the
Accredited Standards Committee X9 - Financial Services. Committee approval of the standard does not
necessarily imply that all committee members voted for its approval. At the time it approved this standard, the X9
Committee had the following members:
Marie
SWIFT/Pan Americas James Wills
SWIFT/Pan Americas Jamie Shay
TECSEC Incorporated Ed Scheidt
The Clearing House Vincent DeSantis
U.S. Bank Brian Fickling
U.S. Bank Gregg Walker
University Bank Stephen Ranzini
University Bank Michael Talley
VeriFone, Inc. David Ezell
VeriFone, Inc. Dave Faoro
VeriFone, Inc. Allison Holland
VeriFone, Inc. Doug Manchester
VeriFone, Inc. Brad McGuinness
VeriFone, Inc. Brenda Watlington
VISA Brian Hamilton
VISA John Sheets
VISA Richard Sweeney
Wells Fargo Bank Andrew Garner
Wells Fargo Bank Mike McCormick
Wells Fargo Bank Mike Rudolph
Wells Fargo Bank Mark Tiggas
Wincor Nixdorf Inc Ramesh Arunashalam
XBRL US, Inc. Mark Bolgiano
At the time it approved this standard, the X9F Subcommittee on Data and Information Security had the following
members:
Howgrave-
NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc. Nick Graham
Johan
VISA (Hans) Van Tilburg
The X9F6 working group that revised this standard consisted of the following members:
1 Purpose
This key management standard, utilized in conjunction with the American National Standard Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) (see Reference 2), is used to manage symmetric keys that can
be used to protect messages and other sensitive information in a financial services environment.
The security and reliability of any process based on the TDEA is directly dependent on the
protection afforded to secret parameters called cryptographic keys.
This standard establishes requirements and guidelines for the secure management and
application-level interoperability of keying operations. Such keys could be used for authenticating
messages (see Reference 5), for encrypting Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) (see
Reference 4), for encrypting other data, and for encrypting other keys.
2 Scope
This part of this standard covers both the manual and automated management of keying material
used for financial services such as point-of-sale (POS) transactions (debit and credit), automated
teller machine (ATM) transactions, messages among terminals and financial institutions, and
interchange messages among acquirers, switches and card issuers. This part of this standard
deals exclusively with management of symmetric keys using symmetric techniques. This part of
this standard specifies the minimum requirements for the management of keying material.
Addressed are all components of the key management life cycle including generation, distribution,
utilization, storage, archiving, replacement and destruction of the keying material. An institution's
key management process, whether implemented in a computer or a terminal, is not to be
implemented or controlled in a manner that has less security, protection, or control than described
herein. It is intended that two nodes, if they implement compatible versions of:
the same secure key identification technique approved for a particular method, and
in accordance with this part of this standard will be interoperable at the application level. Other
characteristics may be necessary for node interoperability; however, this part of this standard does
not cover such characteristics as message format, communications protocol, transmission speed,
or device interface.
2.1 Application
This part of this standard is applicable for institutions implementing techniques to safeguard
cryptographic keys used for authentication and encryption of messages and other sensitive data.
Specifically, this applies to institutions in the financial services industry implementing References 4
and/or 5.