Gandionco vs Penaranda Case Digest ***(4)  The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent

ing spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse
Gandionco vs. Peñaranda  by intestate succession.  Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the
G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987  will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law." * * * 

Facts: Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the RTC If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights
concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a and claims would necessarily remain unborn. 
complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for
the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge
Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite. 
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should 107 Phil 35
be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage. 
FACTS:
Issue: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of
concubinage.  Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938.  They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff.  In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that
Ruling: Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.  Having found
proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one
legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense.  year.  Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas.  In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the lived separately.  In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support pendente lite, with Nelson Orzame.  He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to
as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
of the judge.  criminal action.  Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, REPRESENTED BY HER SUBSTITUTE MACARIO LAPUZ VS. EUFEMIO S.
EUFEMIO ALIAS EUFEMIO SY UY
HELD:

FACTS: Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, alleging that they were
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
married; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until her husband
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of
abandoned her, that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage;
judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code.  What is prohibited is a confession of
and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese.   She prayed for the issuance
judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading.  Where there is evidence of the
of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio
adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff.  What the law prohibits is a judgment based
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff before final decree abate the action and if such
exclusively on defendant’s confession.  The petition should be granted based on the second
abatement will apply if the action involves property rights. 
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

RULING: An action for legal separation is purely personal in character, hence, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.
"Art. 106.  The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: 
 No.The court below correctly held that the appellant’s action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife’s adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.Appellant’s brief does
not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by
Brown v. Yambao either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.”

G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957

In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned law, wherein
Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be granted.

FACTS:
Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that:“An action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.”
legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she In the case at bar, Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after
begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release he learned of his wife’s adultery.
from internment and that they have lived separately thereafter.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts
Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or
issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such
and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

The court subsequently declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due time, Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy
despite service of summonsand directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate, sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it
in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, if collusion exists between the parties. becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown’s inaction for ten
years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation
would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
During the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was found
out that after the liberation,Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten
children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail
on the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a with them. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil
Code.

ISSUE: Matubis v. Praxedes

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent agreed to separate.  Petitioner filed a complaint for legal
Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted?
separation and change of surname.  In January 1955, respondent begun cohabitating with
another. Petitioner instituted the complaint in April 1956.
RULING: Issues:
1. Whether or not the action had not yet prescribed.
2. Assuming it had not yet prescribed, WON the agreement amounts to consent precluding  Plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos’ report from defendant so as
the action for legal separation. not to anger/drive defendant away
Held:  Elena also heard rumors that Cesar was seen with a woman on the way
1. No, it aready prescribed. to Dasmariñas St
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:  She was happy that defendant went home that he desisted from
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date discussing the matter. Cesar would only stay for 2-3 days.
on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date  Elena received reports that Lily had given birth to a baby. She sent Mrs Antioquia
when cause occurred. her father’s employee to verify reports. Then, she was driven by Lubos to
2. Yes, there was are already an express consent. Singalong the she saw defendant carrying a baby in his arms.
The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil  Then Mrs Antioquia went to parish priest to Singalong and inquired about the child
Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, of Cesar Macaraig and Alcala, and given a copy of baptismal certificate of Maria
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Vivien Mageline Macaraig
Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's  Plaintiff entreated his father-in-law to intercede with defendant to convince him to
sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413). return to his family. Macaraig said he could not do anything.
 Then, she requested cooperation of the older sister of Macaraig and arranged a
meeting (Elena and Lily) at Buendia (home of Older sister of Macaraig)
 Lily said she is willing to give up Cesar because she doesn’t want to be
ELENA CONTRERAS V. CESAR MACARAIG accused criminally but it was Cesar who refused to break their relationship
Posted by Y V . V . on J U N E 4 , 2 0 1 9  Dec 1963, Elena with 2 children talked to defendant at work
NATURE: petition for LEGAL SEPARATION  Pleaded to give up Lily to return to conjugal home and she was willing
to forgive him
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:  Macaraig said he could no longer leave Lily and refused to return to
legal family
 Dec 14, 1963, action for legal separation was instituted
 TC- DISMISSED, ART 102 LEGAL SEPARATION CANNOT BE INSTITUTED EXCEPT
WITHIN 1 YR AFTER PLAINTIFF BECAME COGNIZANT OF THE CAUSE
ISSUE:

FACTS:
When will the 1-yr prescription start (September 1962/ December 1963?)/ WON the plaintiff’s
action for legal separation has prescribed
 Elena and Cesar married on March 16, 1952 in Quiapo, Manila
 3 children:
 Eusebio C. Macaraig, Jan 11 1953 RULING:
 Victoria C. Macaraig, Mar 26, 1956
 Alexander C. Macaraig, Aug 4, 1958 1. Dec 1963- became cognizant, only on occasion when her husband admitted to her
 1958- couple- lessee and purchaser in a Conditional Sale Agreement that she was living with and would no longer leave Lily to return to them. This was
 House and lot the time that she deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue/not to
 Transferred in favor of 3 children sue for legal separation. It is only then that the legal period of 1 yr have
 Installment Payments- made by Plaintiff’s father commenced.
 Spouses have no other conjugal property
 Cesar- manager of printing establishment (MICO Offset) owned by Plaintiff’s father
 Cesar met Lily Ann Alcala who placed orders with MICO Offset for propaganda RATIONALE:
materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña
 He resigned after elections to be a special agent of Malacañang Sept 1962, heard rumors but no proof. Hearsay information would not have been legally
 Began to be away often and come home very late because of sufficient as a basis for legal separation.
confidential mission
Pacete v. Carriaga
 RUMORS:
G.R. No. 53880
 In 1962, Lubos, the driver of their family car told Elena that Cesar was
March 17, 1994
living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala
Facts: Held:
Enrico Pacete and Concepcion Alanis were married in 1938. Pacete contracted another
marriage to Clarita de la Concepcion, which Alanis knew about only on August 1, 1979. During
the marriage, Pacete acquired properties that he registered either under his name or Clarita Yes, the alleged adultery adultery of the wife is a valid defense if there is a good chance that
or in the names of his children with Clarita or with other dummies. Thus, on October 29, 1979, this adultery can be proved. And this is true, whether what is asked is support from the
Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Pacete and de la husband’s capital or from the conjugal partnership property, because even in the latter case
Concepcion as well as for legal separation between her and her husband. where conjugal partnership assets are involved, the right to a separate maintenance is
The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for granted only if there is justifiable cause for it, not when the person asking is, to all apperance,
extension of 20 days, which the court granted. On December 18, 1979, the defendants again guilty of adultery.
filed a motion for extension through a new counsel. The court granted the motion, setting the
deadline to January 9, 1980. Although the court’s order was mailed to the defendants’ counsel
on January 11, 1980, they again filed a motion for extension on February 5, 1980. The next Laperal vs Republic
day, the court denied the motion for extension and granted petitioner Alanis’ motion to Laperal vs. Republic
declare the defendants in default. GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
The Court of First Instance, in its decision on March 17, 1980, decreed the legal separation of
Pacete and Alanis as well as declared null and void ab initio the marriage between Pacete and FACTS:
de la Concepcion.
Issue:Did the Court of First Instance commit grave abuse of discretion? The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Ruling: Santamaria on March 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the
Yes. A petition for certiorari is applicable when grave abuse of discretion attended the spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique.  During their marriage, she
declaration of the decision. Article 101 of the Civil Code, which was later reproduced in Article naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using
60 of the Family Code, provides her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the
No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her
confession of judgment. married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to conjugal assets.
inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
the plaintiff is not fabricated specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated
The court did not follow the procedure mandated by the said procedure. Furthermore, Article from his husband.   
3 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, mandates that an action for legal
separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the HELD:
petition to allow the parties to have a cooling-off period.
In addition, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, severance of the vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
The State is interested in the integrity of marriage as evidenced by the provisions of law liquidated.  Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
mentioned. There is no excuse for non-compliance with the procedures required by statute. conjugal assets.
ACTS:
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
Husband Teodoro Lerma sued his wife and a certain Teddy Ramirez for adultery. Sometime provision of Art. 372.
later, the wife sued Lerma for legal separation with an urgent motion for support pendente
lite. Lerma opposed the motion setting up the wfie’s alleged adultery as a defense. Petition was dismissed.
#28 MEDINA v KOIKEG.R. No. 215723
IV. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED, IV.B.2. JUDICIAL NOTICEFACTS:
Issue: is the adultery a valid defense?
Medina was married to Koike on on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,Philippines. Theirunion bore The recognition may be made in an actioninstituted specifically for the purpose or in another
two children. On June 14, 2012, Medina and Michiyuki,pursuant to the laws ofJapan, filed for action where a partyinvokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
divorce before the Mayor of IchinomiyaCity, Aichi Prefecture, Japan.They were divorced on defense.Moreover, in
even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the samewas duly recorded in the  
Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.Seeking to have the saidDivorce Certificate Garcia v. Recio,
annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the LocalCivil Registrar of Quezon City,  
Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicialrecognition of foreign divorce and it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtainedabroad by the alien spouse to be
declaration of capacity to remarry. At the hearing,no one appeared to oppose the petition. recognized in our jurisdiction,
Medina presented several foreign documents,namely, it must be shown that thedivorce decree is valid according to the national law of
 "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" the foreigner. Both the divorcedecree and the governing personal law of the alien
 and spouse who obtained the divorce mustbe proven
"FamilyRegister of Michiyuki Koike" .
 etc.  
The RTC denied Medina's petition Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, ourlaw on
, ruling that the foreign divorce decree and thenational law of the alien recognizing his or her evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alienmust
capacity to obtain a divorce must be provenin accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 be alleged and
of the Revised Rules onEvidence.The RTCruled that while the divorce documents presented  
were successfully proven to be public orofficial records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proven like any other fact
proving the national law of herhusband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. .Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, aswell as
Medina’s the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual thatcalls for a re-
 testimony wasinsufficient since she failed to present a qualified expert witness nor was evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in theinstant appeal is
shown to have one. obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petitionfor review.The
ISSUE: resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings onthese
WoN the documents presented by Medina would suffice to grant the petition for judicial matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certainexceptions. In this
recognition of foreign divorce regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final ordersrendered by RTC in the
  exercise of its srcinal jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixedquestions of fact and law
Ruling: The SC rendered a decision referring the case to the CA for appropriate action should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance withRule 41 of
todetermine the pertinent factual issues in the case. Considering that the validity of the Rules of Court.
thedivorce decree between Medina and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws
ofJapan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the
evidencepresented before the RTC.Under Art.26 of the Family Code, the law confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts toextend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial todetermine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.The SC cited the case of
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
,
where the Court had the occasion to rule that:The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is theacknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereignis bound
to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by atribunal of another country."
 
This means that the foreign judgment and itsauthenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together
 
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment Republic v. Orbecido
 
on the alien himself or herself.
 
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
FACTS:

Republic v. Manalo (Case Digest)

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the S EP T E MB ER 1 6, 20 18  ~  PI N G T H I N G LA W
United States to work. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been Republic v. Manalo
naturalized as an American citizen, obtained a divorce decree and married another man. G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
Facts:
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
reconsideration but it was denied.
2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and
Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
ISSUE:

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
recognized in the Philippines
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
RULING:

Issues:
Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include 1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
lattertoremarry.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Orbecide that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
evidence in his favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate
as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse.
Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce
proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such
interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that
even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not
be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection The District Court dismissed the action for failure of the complaint to state a claim, upon the
clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, ground (among others) that Appellees are immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act.
and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown
We agree.2  Accordingly we do not reach the question whether the acts of which Appellant
by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and
complains violated federal civil rights.
Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce
proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as Affirmed.
regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and  1
unjustly discriminate against the other. Appellant and his cousin were convicted of narcotics offenses and sentenced to state prison.
The cousin's testimony had established Appellant's involvement. Both were subsequently
deported to Mexico. The cousin then executed an affidavit before the United States Consul at
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Tijuana, Mexico, conceding that he had committed perjury at trial and absolving Appellant of
Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection all criminal culpability. There is no contention that the Prosecuting Attorney or the Superior
from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their Court Judge knew of the perjury
development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the  2
Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse. To reach the District Court's ground we assume arguendo that Appellees are suable entities
and as such are the parties properly chargeable with the acts of which Appellant complains.
We simply extend sovereign immunity to the People and judicial immunity to the Court
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

Tan vs. Trocio

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited TAN vs. TROCIO
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

FACTS:
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that Tan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Trocio for allegedly raping
the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. her and as a result, she bore a son named Jewel. She gave birth to
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. Jewel during her marriage with Tal Lee Pok.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and ISSUE:
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce. Whether or not Jewel is the illegitimate son of Atty. Trocio.

David C. Marcus, Los Angeless, Cal., for appellant.

RULING:
Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her
husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jack K. Weber, Deputy Atty.
Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees. physical access between the couple was impossible. From the
evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by
Before BARNES and MERRILL, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR, District Judge.
adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his
birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and her
husband, Tan Le Pok.
PER CURIAM.
.
Appellant has brought suit under 28 U.S.C. 1343 (1964), to recover for deprivation of federal
civil rights alleging that upon suit by Appellee People he was, in Appellee Court, convicted of
crime upon perjured testimony.1 
Benitez-Badua vs CA
Benitez-Badua vs. CA in favor of private respondent Aguilar. Petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994 she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his

FACTS: estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal
postures. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. However, the Decision of
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in
Laguna.  Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989.  Vicente’s sister and nephew filed the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the
nephew, herein private respondent.  The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and
cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor ISSUE:
legally adopted.  The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses
submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code is applicable in
reflected as her parents.  She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter.  On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses favor of the petitioner.
were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child.  Trial
court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses. 
HELD:
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
HELD:

The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit.  The mere registration of a child in his or her RATIO:
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption.  It does not confer
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights.  Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
document.
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra- husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter.  In the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”.  In is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the
petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioner’s father. physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that
Benitez-Badua vs. C.A. [G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994] for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3)
that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
05OCT
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
Ponente: PUNO, J.:
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading
FACTS:
as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
[S]pouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially
heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
in Laguna both died intestate. The fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued.
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.
Private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente’s sister
For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
and nephew, respectively) instituted a Special Proceeding before the RTC of San
that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner
Pablo City. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate
was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Concepcion vs CA  Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of
Concepcion vs. CA wedlock.
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005  Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document
(autobiography) was unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing
FACTS: Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states that:
 “Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were he expressly recognizes paternity”
married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990.  The  Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any
husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of express recognition of paternity.
bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom
according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC.  Trial court ruled
that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
was granted visitation rights.  Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity
“visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”.  She further wanted to
have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since
an illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname.  After the requested oral argument, trial RULING: YES.
court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario.  Hence, the
child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.           
RATIONALE:
HELD:

Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
the former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child.  must be signed by putative father. It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and
Theresa’s contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and 172. It is therefore implied.
Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo.  In this case, the mother has no right to disavow
a child because maternity is never uncertain.  Hence, she is not permitted by law to question
the son’s legitimacy.  Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered Special circumstances to the case:
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress”.  Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of
his legitimacy was upheld by the Court.  As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to  Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on  Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
surnames.  Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes  Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment by father and brother who
of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.     stand to be affected by their hereditary rights
San Juan Dela Cruz vs Gracia, GR 177728 (Case Digest)
The Court then adopted the ff. rules:
Posted on September 4, 2016
FACTS:
1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
 Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent
Jenie got pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie 2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
gave birth. relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
 Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
surname, Aquino. acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence
 When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
 Certificate of Live Birth
 AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
 Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and
brother