Digested Manahan

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In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan.

TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,

-versus-

ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. 38050 1933 September 22

Ponente: IMPERIAL, J:

Nature of the case:

This is an appeal taken by the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, from the order of the
Court of First Instance Manahan, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan dated
July 1, 1932, in the matter of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, special proceedings No.
4162, denying her motion for reconsideration and new trial filed on May 11, 1932.

Facts:

Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of
the deceased Donata Manahan. The petitioner is the niece of the testatrix, was named the
executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by
law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition filed and,
after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as
prayed for. The will was probated. The trial court appointed the petitioner executrix with a bond
of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committee on claims and appraisal. One year and seven
months later, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the
order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void
ab initio. The motion was denied.

Issues:

1. Whether or not appellant was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and
entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will.

2. Whether or not the court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will.

3. Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external
formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with.

Held:

The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable. She was not
entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it,
inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the
probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did
not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in
which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not
acquire any successional right.
The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication and probate
of the will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in
order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law. In the
phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of
a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case. All the law requires is that the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the
essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document,
as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a will has
been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more
be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof
and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceeding.

The SC dismissed the appeal.

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