Republic of the Philippines defendant's adverse claim, insofar as one of the abovementioned

SUPREME COURT properties — that covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20338 of
Manila the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila and located at the
intersection of Sto. Cristo and M. de Santos streets, San Nicolas,
Manila — upon the ground that said property belonged already to the
EN BANC
corporation which wanted to sell it, and that there were other properties
of the estate of Margarita David which sufficed to answer for said
G.R. No. L-11268             January 28, 1961 adverse claim. The motion was granted by an order of the same date,
"provided that should any objection be interposed later on", the movant
"obligates itself to file the corresponding bond to satisfy" what may be
CARLOS M. SISON, plaintiff-appellee, due to the adverse claimants. On September 26, 1951, defendant
vs. herein filed in said cadastral proceedings, on his behalf and that of
GONZALO D. DAVID, defendant-appellant. Jose Teodoro, Sr., a "Petition for Bond", praying that the sale of the
property at Sto. Cristo street be disapproved "and/or a bond of
Teodoro R. Dominguez for plaintiff-appellee. P12,000 be forthwith furnished" by the Priscila Estate, Inc. In support
Jesus Ocampo and Gonzago D. David for defendant-appellant. of this petition, which led to the institution of the case at bar, defendant
alleged, in paragraphs 2 to 7 thereof :
CONCEPCION, J.:
2. That the movants herein object to the urgent petition ex-
parte on the ground that the property to be sold herein is one
In his amended complaint, herein plaintiff, Carlos Moran Sison, seeks of the few properties inherited from Da. Margarita David
to recover P50,000 by way of damages, and P5,000.00 as attorney's which is not encumbered, because practically all of the
fees, in addition to costs. Defendant Gonzalo D. David answered properties of the heiress Priscila F. de Sison are mortgaged,
admitting some allegations of the amended complaint, denying other and the Priscila Estate, Inc., is operating on an overdraft,
allegations thereof, alleging some special and affirmative defenses, which is the reason why these properties are to be sold;
and setting up a counter-claim. In due course, on December 10, 1954,
the Court of First Instance of Manila gave judgment for the plaintiff in
the sums of P5,000, as moral damages, and P1,000 as attorney's fees, 3. That the reason there is an overdraft is that new buildings
besides the costs. Subsequently, the court motu proprio rendered an or improvements have been made as conjugal properties of
amended decision, dated December 29, 1954, finding no merit in Carlos Sison and Priscila de la Fuente, and now, the
defendant's counterclaim and increasing the award in plaintiff's favor to paraphernal properties inherited from Da. Margarita David is
P15,000 as moral damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees, aside from being sold to pay for the obligations of these conjugal
costs. Defendant appealed from this amended decision to the Court of properties;
Appeals, which, considering that the sum awarded in said decision
plus the amount claimed in the first three (3) causes of action set forth 4. That if the movants were informed or served copy of this
in defendant's counterclaim aggregated P173,000.00, forwarded the petition to sell the property, they would because it is in
records to this Court, pursuant to section 17 of Republic Act No. 296. contravention of the provisions of the Last Will and
Although this Act was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. Testament of the late Da. Margarita David to the effect that if
2613 to increase the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Priscila de la Fuente dies without descendants, then the
Appeals, insofar as civil cases decided by courts of first instance are inheritance will go to Narcisa de la Fuente, and vice versa,
concerned, to those in which the value in controversy does not exceed and if both of them die, then all the properties of the late Da.
P200,000.00, we retain such appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, for Margarita David will be divided as follows: One-half of all the
the pertinent facts are not disputed, and the issues raised in the appeal properties would go to the legatees on her father's side and
hinge on the conclusions deducible from said facts and the law the other half of all the properties would go to the legatees
applicable thereto (Section 17, subparagraph (61, of Re. public Act No. on her mother's side;
296). It appears that on December 20, 1938, Margarita David executed
a will constituting several legacies in favor of specified persons and
naming her grandnieces Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro and her 5. That of course, the incidental remedy would be to show
sister Priscila de la Fuente de Sison — hereafter referred to as Mrs. where the said properties or the proceeds thereof went in
Teodoro and Mrs. Sison, respectively — as heirs of the residue of her case the above conditions should occur, and what properties
estate, subject however, to the condition that, if Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. were acquired in lieu of the same, considering the earning of
Sison should die leaving no descendants, the properties inherited by the properties and the expenses therein;
these sisters shall pass one-half to the heirs of the father of the
testatrix and the other half to the heirs of her mother. Herein defendant
6. That answering the statement of petitioner that there are
Gonzalo H. David is one of such heirs of the parents of Margarita
other valuable properties of the estate, still annotated with
David. On October 21 1939, Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison were legally
the adverse claim, it is respectfully offered that the said
adopted by Margarita David as her children. Soon later, or on
properties are mortgaged and in case of foreclosure, the
September 6, 1940, Margarita David, donated to said sisters practically
adverse claim is relegated to a subsequent position as
the same properties bequeathed to them in her aforementioned will.
posterior to the mortgages inscribed on the back of the
UPON the demise of Margarita David, in Manila, on February 24, 1941,
aforesaid titles;
Special Proceeding No. 58881 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
was instituted for the settlement of her estate, and Jose Teodoro, Sr.,
was originally appointed executor of the aforementioned will, whereas 7. That the properties mentioned in par. 4 of the ex parte
Gonzalo D. David, who is a member of the Bar, acted as his counsel. petition, namely, One-half pro-indiviso interest of the lands in
Subsequently, Mr. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison extrajudicially partitioned OCT Nos. 21063, Pampanga, composed of 3 lots, are
among themselves the properties bequeathed and donated to them by assessed at P3,748.31, and 12861, Pampanga, composed
Margarita David. Plaintiff herein, Carlos Moran Sison, is the husband of of 2 lots, are assessed at P1,614.39 and TCT No. 12829,
Mrs. Sison. On or about May 9, 1950, defendant herein caused to be Pampanga, composed of 2 parcels, are assessed at
annotated on the titles of several lands acquired by Mrs. Sison as P12,677.58, and the Manila property (land only) in TCT No.
above stated a notice of adverse claim, for the fees of Jose Teodoro, 60851, composed of 2 lots in Tondo, are assessed at
Sr., as executor of the will of Margarita David, and his (defendant's) P846.00, so that all in all the said properties actually are
fees as counsel for said executor. It turned, however, that on or about assessed at P9,020.14 plus P846.00 for Manila or
February 28, 1949, said properties were assigned by Mrs. Sison to P9,866.14, and are insufficient to meet the P17,000.00 claim
Priscila Estate, Inc. — a corporation organized on that date by her and of the Estate of Sideco, the Executor's fee of P4,000.00 with
plaintiff herein, aside from some nominal parties — in exchange for interest, and the attorney's fees of P5,000.00, which may still
shares of stock thereof. Hence, on September 8, 1951, said be increased on appeal.
corporation filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, in G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 99, an "Urgent Petition Ex-Parte" to lift
Soon later, or on October 6, 1951, plaintiff commenced the present for the party in interest in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 99, in which
action. In his amended complaint therein, he alleged that the averment said petition had been filed, was Priscila Estate, Inc., not plaintiff
in the above-quoted paragraph 2 was made with malice and evident herein.
intent to put him in ridicule, for defendant knew him (plaintiff) to be the
president of Priscila Estate, Inc. and, by the statements contained in
Defendant further set a counterclaim, with four (4) causes of action.
said paragraph, the defendant, "in effect, implied with clear
The first was bared upon the fact that, in an "opposition" filed by the
malevolence and malignity that plaintiff is incompetent and unfit to
plaintiff, through his counsel, in the aforementioned Special
manage the affairs of the Priscila Estate, Inc."; that in paragraph 3 of
Proceeding No. 58881, on March 31, 1951, the following allegedly
defendant's petition for bond, he alleged that plaintiff "has been
"impertinent "false" and "scandalous" statements were "maliciously and
converting the paraphernal properties of his wife into conjugal, thus
illegally" made:
clearly implying that he, the plaintiff, has been and still is, scheming to
enrich himself at the expense of his spouse", which allegation is
"utterly false and completely irrelevant and immaterial to the point at "Why, if we do not watch out, some day we shall again be
issue"; that the clear implication of the above-quoted paragraph 4 is confronted with another petition for additional counsel's fees
that the aforementioned urgent petition ex-parte of Priscila Estate, Inc. by Gonzalo David for filing his present SUPPLEMENTAL
"was inspired by the condemnable desire of the plaintiff as president of PETITION FOR COUNSEL'S FEES. And if this goes on, we
Priscila Estate, Inc., to avoid the supposed fideicommissary provision might hear the end of this Testate Estate but, surely, never
of the Last Will and Testament of the late Margarita David so that he the end of David's claim for attorney's fees."
could enrich himself at the expense of the relatives of Margarita David,
who might eventually inherit the properties of Priscila de la Fuente de
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sison"; that the allegations in said paragraph 4 were "irrelevant to the
point raised" in defendant's "Petition for Bond"; that as a lawyer,
defendant knew that said allegations were "unfounded in law", the "Merely to read the foregoing relation of alleged legal
aforementioned fideicommissary provision having been nullified and services rendered by Gonzalo David is to laugh. One gets
rendered inoperative when Margarita David adopted Mrs. Teodoro and the impression that David's time is more precious than gold
Mrs. Sison and, thereafter, donated to them "practically ill the and that for him to merely read or receive anything
properties" disposed of in said will; that said allegations in defendant's pertaining to this Testate Estate must cost some money.
"Petition for Bond" were "clearly uncalled for and unnecessary"; and What a man!"
that, on account of the allegations made in the three (3) paragraphs
above mentioned, plaintiff "suffered, and is still suffering, from mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feeling, moral shock and social xxx     xxx     xxx
humiliation", for which he should be indemnified in the sums stated at
the beginning of this decision. "This claim for associate attorney's fees is ridiculous. It
betrays an unpardonable ignorance of the law on the part of
In his answer, defendant denied that his aforementioned allegations Attys. Gonzalo David and Jesus Ocampo who claim to have
were tainted with malice and the intent of slandering the plaintiff and 'a well-established law office in Escolta, Manila'.
averred that they were proper and necessary to protect his interests
and those of his client Jose Teodoro, Sr.; that the petition for bond, in "It might be purely coincidental, but the amount of ten (10%)
which said allegations were contained, is an absolutely privileged percent being asked for by Gonzalo David sounds very
communication; and that plaintiff has no cause of action against him, familiar. Is it possible that ten percenters

have arrived even in the halls

of justice? Some people, it would seem, need the reminder Defendant's last cause of action is premised upon the allegation that,
that our courts have no similarity whatsoever with the Import owing to the unjustified and unjustifiable complaint filed in this case, he
Control Administration." (defendant) had to avail himself of the services of counsel at an
expense of P10, 000.00, which plaintiff should be made to pay.
By way of second cause of action, defendant asserted that, in a motion
filed, on August 7, 1951, in said special proceeding, plaintiff, through The amendment motu proprio made by the lower court on December
his counsel, made the following "malicious, scurrilous, scandalous, 29, 1954, of its decision dated December 10, 1954, is assailed by the
false . . . and irrelevant" allegation: defendant as a nullity, upon the ground that none of the parties had
filed any motion or petition therefor, and that said amendment did not
involve a correction of mere clerical mistakes, but a substantial
"Surely, there must be a limit to judicial generosity,
modification, not only of the award for the plaintiff, but, also, of the
especially if such generosity would inevitably jeopardize the
findings of fact and the reasons for said award. There is no merit in this
interest of the heirs who are entitled to protection by this
pretense, for the amended decision was rendered nineteen (19) days
Court from lawyers who already had been overpaid. If this
after the promulgation of the original decision, or within the
present tendency continues, Gonzalo David, the frustrated
reglementary period to appeal therefrom, and before any appeal had
heir, might yet blossom into a forced one."
been taken by the parties herein, so that the lower we court still had
jurisdiction and control over the case. Moreover, said amendment is
As third cause of action, defendant alleged that on September 28, authorized by Rule 124, section 5, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
1951, plaintiff "without any basis or reason, whatsoever, maliciously which every court shall have power x x x to amend and control its
and illegally filed a criminal complaint for libel" against the defendant in processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
the office of the City Fiscal of Manila who dismissed the charge justice."
because it was "wanting in basis, reason and merit."
Defendant has made several assignments of error, contesting the
In each one of the aforementioned three (3) causes of action, propriety of the conclusions made in the decisions appealed from on
defendant alleged also, that, in consequence of the plaintiff's acts the merits of plaintiff's amended complaint and the demerits of
therein described, he (defendant) has suffered and continues to suffer defendant's defenses. In this connection, we note that the lower court
from mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded sustained the former and rejected the latter, upon the ground that the
feelings, moral shock and social humiliation, because of which he allegations in defendant's petition for bond "are based on malicious
prayed for judgment against the plaintiff in the sum of P50,000.00 for and unfounded grounds"; that said petition is a qualifiedly privileged
each cause of action. communication, because the privilege exists only if the allegations
therein are pertinent or relevant to the case; that said allegations "were
impertinent and irrelevant to the issue then under inquiry, for all he
(defendant) wanted in said petition was the filing of a bond"; and that communication or statement, in the law of libel and slander,
the defendant went out of his way; to harass and cause damage to the is one which, except for the occasion on which or the
plaintiff, for the former had caused his adverse claim to be annotated circumstances under which it is made, would be defamatory
on property worth much more than the amount of said claim, for which and actionable.
reason said annotation is "Presumed" to have been made it with
malice."
Privileged communications are divided into two general
classes, namely: (1) those which are absolutely privileged;
At the outset, it should be noted that the pertinency or relevancy and (2) those which are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged,
essential to the privilege enjoyed in judicial proceedings, does not as defined in subsequent sections. (33 Am. Jur., p. 123.)
make it a "qualified privilege" within the legal connotation of the term.
Otherwise, all privileged communications in judicial proceedings would
An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of
be qualified, and no communications therein would be absolutely
which, by reason of the occasion on which or the matter in
privileged, for the exemption attached to the privilege in said
reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a
proceedings never extends to matters which are patently unrelated to
civil action, however hard it may bear upon a person who
the subject of the inquiry. The terms "absolute privilege" and "qualified
claims to be injured thereby, and even though it may have
privilege" have established technical meanings, in connection with civil
been made maliciously. (33 Am.. Jur., pp. 123-124.)
actions for libel and slander.

A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged where

In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum:
circumstances exist, or are 'reasonably believed by the
defendant to exist, which cast on him the duty of making a
For the sake of clearness of application privileged communication to a certain other person to whom he makes
communications are often divided into two classes: Absolute such communication in the performance of such duty, or
privilege; and conditional or qualified privilege, the second where the person is so situated that it becomes right in the
sometimes being called 'quasi privilege.' In cases of interests the person of society that he should tell third
absolutely privileged communications, the occasion is an persons certain facts, which he in good faith proceeds to do.
absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of conditionally This general idea has been otherwise expressed as follows:
or qualifiedly privileged communications, the law raises only A communication made in good faith on any subject matter
a prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the in which the person communicating has an interest, or in
former class the freedom from liability is said to be absolute reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a
or without condition, regardless of the existence of express person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though
malice, as contrasted with such freedom in the latter class it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be
where it is said to be conditioned on the want or absence of actionable, and although the duty is not a legal one, but only
express malice. (53 C.J.S., 141- 142.) a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation. The essential
elements of conditionally privileged communication may
accordingly be enumerated as a good faith, an interest to be
An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, by
upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a
reason of the occasion on which it is made, no
proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to
remedy is provided for the damages in a civil action for
proper parties only. (33 Am. Jur., pp. 124-125.)
slander or libel. It is well settled that the law recognizes this
class of communications which is so absolutely privileged
that even the existence of express malice does not destroy Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the
the privilege although there are some dicta denying the rule, following language:
and some eminent judges, in dealing with particular
applications of the rule, have doubted or questioned the
Absolute Privilege — In this class of cases it is considered in
rationale or principle of absolutely privileged
the interest of public welfare that all persons should be
communications. As to absolutely privileged
allowed to express their sentiments and speak their minds
communications, a civil action for libel or slander is
fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and
absolutely barred. (53 C.J.S., p. 142.) .
all actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden,
even of it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken
Qualified privilege exists in a larger number of cases than falsely, knowingly and with express malice. (Section 350, pp.
does absolute privilege. It relates more particularly to private 387388.)
interests, and comprehends communications made in good
faith, without actual malice, with reasonable or probable
In the less important matters, however, the interests and
grounds for believing them to be true, on a subject matter in
welfare of the public do not demand that the speaker should
which the author of the communication has an interest, or in
be freed from all responsibility, but merely require that he
respect to which he has a duty, public, personal, or private,
should be protected so far as he is speaking honestly for the
either legal, judicial, political, moral, or social, made to a
common good. In these cases the privilege is said not to be
person having a corresponding interest or duty. Briefly
absolute but qualified; and a party defamed may recover
stated, a qualifiedly privileged communication is a
damages notwithstanding the privilege if he can prove that
defamatory communication made on what is called an
the words were not used in good faith, but that the party
occasion of privilege without actual malice, and as to such
availed himself of the occasion wilfully and knowingly for the
communications there is no civil liability, regardless of
purpose of defaming the plaintiff. (Section 389, p. 415; italics
whether or not the communication is libelous per se or
supplied.)
libelous per quod. (53 C.J.S., pp. 143-144.)

Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it

In the case of communications qualifiedly privileged, there
is made, what distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication
must be both an occasion of privilege and the use of that
from one which is only qualifiedly privileged is, therefore, that the latter
occasion in good faith. (53 C.J.S., p. 145.)
is actionable upon proof of "actual malice", whereas its existence does
not affect the exemption attached to the former, provided that, in the
To the same effect is the American Jurisprudence, from which we case of judicial proceedings, the derogatory statements in question are
quote: pertinent, relevant or related to or connected with the subject matter of
the communication involved. Under peculiar situations, a few decisions
have required probable cause for the enjoyment of the absolute
On the ground of public policy, the law recognizes certain
privilege, but such decisions not only do not reflect the view of the
communications as privileged and, as such, not within the
clear weight of authority, but, also, have acknowledged the wisdom of
rules imposing liability for defamation. A privileged
such view, although its non-application was sought to be justified by overdraft is due to new buildings or improvements x x made as
the special conditions obtaining in each case (See Harshaw vs. conjugal properties" of plaintiff herein and his wife; (4) that the
Harshaw, 136 ALR, 1411, 1413). paraphernal properties inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita David
are being sold to pay obligations of said conjugal properties; and (5)
that the sale contemplated to be made by Priscila Estate, Inc., will
The reason underlying the general rule on absolutely privileged
defeat the fideicommissary provision in the last will and testament of
communications is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
the late Margarita David, to the effect that the properties transmitted by
her to Mrs. Teodoro and Mrs. Sison should, in the event of their death
"The class of absolutely privileged communications is narrow without any surviving descendant, pass to the other persons indicated
and is practically limited to legislative and judicial in said will.
proceedings and other acts of state, including, it is said,
communications made in the discharge of a duty under
Obviously, these allegations are, not only pertinent, but material to the
express authority of law, by or to heads of executive
relief prayed for by the defendant. They indicate clearly that, unless the
departments of the state, and matters involving military
annotation of the adverse claim of Jose Teodoro, Sr. and defendant
affairs. The privilege is not intended so much for the
herein is maintained or a bond is filed by the plaintiff, it will become
protection of those engaged in the public service and in the
harder and still harder to trace the paraphernal properties of Mrs. Sison
enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of
and because, even if traced, there is a likelihood that said adverse
the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the
claim may be defeated either by subsequent obligations contracted by
legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses
the conjugal partnership of Mr. & Mrs. Sison, or by Priscila Estate, Inc.,
may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
or by rights thereafter acquired by third parties acting in good faith and
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution
for value. Whether or not the reasons given sufficed to justify the
or an action for the recovery of damages." (33 Am. Jur., 123-
granting of the relief sought by the defendant and Jose Teodoro, Sr. is
124.)
of no moment. Nothing but relevancy to said relief was necessary for
defendant's petition to have the benefits of the absolute privilege
It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial including conferred by judicial proceedings. Such privilege is unaffected, either
all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of by actual malice or by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances
communications that are absolutely privileged (Newel on The Law of made in the course of said proceedings.1
Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp. 388, 391-392, 407; 53 C.J.S. 165, 167,
173; 33 Am Jur., 142-143, 144-145, 147; Tupas vs. Parreno, L-12545
At any rate, the allegations in question in defendant's petition for bond
[April 30, 19591). As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has put it:
were neither malicious nor unfounded. Thus, it is a fact that most, or at
least, several of the most valuable properties transmitted by Margarita
"For reasons of public policy which looks to the free and David to Mrs. Sison were mortgaged. Those subsequently assigned by
unfettered administration of justice, it appears to be the Mrs. Sison to Priscila Estate, Inc. were encumbered altogether for
prevailing rule in the United States that statements made in P397,717.00. In order to construct the Priscila Building No. 3 on a
a pleading in a civil action are absolutely privileged and no paraphernal land of Mrs. Sison, it had been necessary to borrow ONE
action for libel may be founded thereon when pertinent and MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) from the RFC. The Priscila Estate,
relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false and Inc., of which plaintiff is the president began its operations with an
malicious such statements may be. 33 Am. Jur. 144, 145, overdraft line of P236,517.00. Most of the paraphernal properties of
Libel and Slander 149; 16 ALR 746, supplemented in 42 Mrs. Sison were transferred to said corporation. In fact, the same
ALR 878 and 134 ALR 483." (Hayslip vs. Weliford, 195 asked that the annotation, on the certificate of title of one of those
Tenn. 621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42 ALR 2d 820.) properties, of the adverse claims of the defendant and Jose Teodoro,
Sr., be cancelled, upon the ground that said property now belongs to
the corporation, not to Mrs. Sison.
Hence, the "Petition for bond" of defendant herein is absolutely
privileged, and no civil action for libel or slander may arise therefrom,
unless the contents of the petition are irrelevant to the subject matter What is more, plaintiff and his wife organized a corporation, entitled C
thereof. M S Estate, Inc., to which some properties of Priscila Estate, Inc. (most
of which had been originally inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita
David) were transferred. The C M S Estate, Inc. had a capital stock of
In this connection, the lower court appears to have labored under the one million pesos (P1,000,000.00), divided into 1,000 shares of the par
impression that the only remedy therein sought was "the filing of a value of P1,000 each, of which 950 non-voting preferred shares, and
bond". However, defendant specifically prayed in said petition that the 50 are common voting shares. All of these common voting shares, in
sale intended to be made by Priscila Estate, Inc. be disapproved addition to 50 non-voting preferred shares, were subscribed by the
"and/or the bond of P12,000 be forthwith furnished by" said plaintiff, whereas his wife had 96 non-voting preferred shares and no
corporation. Moreover, the body of the petition clearly indicates that common shares. Four (4) other persons had each a nominal holding of
said prayer for disapproval of the sale was merely a subtle and tactful one (1) non-voting preferred share. As the sole holder of all the voting
way of seeking a reconsideration of the order of September 8, 1951 common shares, plaintiff had absolute, exclusive and permanent
granting plaintiff's urgent petition ex-parte of the same day, copy of control over the management of this new corporation. In fact, the
which was served on the defendant two days after the filing of said letters "C M S", which are the initials of his name, Carlos Moran Sison,
urgent petition and the issuance of said order. Indeed, it is alleged in appear in the corporate name "C M S Estate, Inc.," for the seeming
the petition for bond of defendant herein and Jose Teodoro, Sr. that purpose of representing to the public that plaintiff was, for all intents
they "object to the urgent petition ex-parte on the ground that the and purposes, the corporation itself.
property to be sold herein is one of the few properties inherited from
Da. Margarita David, which is not encumbered." In other words, they
were opposed to said urgent petition, which was granted by the order Considering that plaintiff is, also, president of the Priscila Estate, Inc.,
of September 8, 1951, and hence, they wanted this order reconsidered most of the properties of which had come from Margarita David, and
and set aside, and this would be the result, if the lower court the antagonism that had arisen between him and the defendant in the
disapproved the sale contemplated by Priscila Estate, Inc. The filing of course of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Margarita
a bond was evidently intended to be pressed only if the first part of the David — which antagonism was crystallized and sharpened in several
prayer was denied. litigations and many acrid, if not virulent incidents between the same
parties — it is understandable, as well as natural and logical for
defendant to be apprehensive about the fate of his aforementioned
Now, the reasons adduced in support of the petition for disapproval of adverse claim and that of Jose Teodoro, Sr., if the order directing the
the sale and implied reconsideration of the order of September 8, cancel at on of the annotation thereof were not reconsidered and set
1951, or for the filing of a bond, were: (1) that practically all of the aside, or plaintiff were not required to file a bond for guaranty the
properties of Mrs. Sison were mortgaged; (2) that the Priscila Estate, payment of said adverse claims.
Inc. (to whom said properties had been assigned) is operating on an
overdraft, and this is why said properties are to be sold;(3) that said
The alleged gross disparity between the amount thereof and the value "That on page 18 of the Decision, it was erroneously stated
of said properties is immaterial to the case at bar. To begin with, the P1,000,000.00 was borrowed from the RFC to construct
properties were heavily encumbered. Besides, the transfer thereof to Priscila Building No. 3 when the undisputed fact was: only
Priscila Estate, Inc., the subsequent assignment of some to C M S P100,000.00 was borrowed."
Estate, Inc. and, then, the sales that had been made and the one
sought to be made in favor of third persons, tended to place said
It is interesting to note that plaintiff has not cited any evidence of
properties beyond the reach of said claimants. Then too, bad faith
record in support of his claim. In fact the same is refuted by his own
should not, and cannot be imputed to creditors, much less "presumed",
testimony. We quote from pages 128-129 of the transcript of the
merely because they seek the maximum possible guaranties for the
stenographic notes:
protection of their rights. At any rate, the alleged bad faith in
the annotation of the adverse claims does not warrant an inference of
bad faith in the allegations of the petition for bond. "DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DOMINGUEZ .

The lower court erred, therefore, in rendering judgment for the plaintiff Q. Will you please state, Mr. Sison, why 'Building Priscila 3'
under his amended complaint and said judgment should be reversed. located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Ronquillo was
your Conjugal property with your wife, Mrs. Sison?
We will now consider defendant's Counterclaim. The first two (2)
causes of action therein are based upon allegations, made by counsel A. It was conjugal property because when we decided to
for the plaintiff, in pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings, construct that building, we borrowed from the RFC
which, as such, are absolutely privileged. Considering that said P1,000,000.00 and the condition of that loan was payment
allegations — although sarcastic, to the point of being, perhaps, on installment plan of 120 installments. The RFC gave us
unnecessarily pungent and harsh, as well as tending to detract from the loan and we constructed the building and the loan is
the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice — being paid from the rentals of the building, which, under the
were relevant to the subject-matter of the aforementioned pleadings, law, is conjugal."
the causes of action predicated thereon are necessarily untenable.
The second ground refers to the following paragraph of our decision:
So is the third cause of action under defendant's counterclaim. The
dismissal, by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila, of the complaint for
"What is more, plaintiff and his wife organized a corporation,
estafa therein filed by the plaintiff is insufficient to warrant a judgment
entitled CMS Estate, Inc., to which some properties of
for damages in defendant's favor, there being no competent evidence
Priscila Estate, Inc. (most of which had been originally
that, in filing said complaint, plaintiff had acted in bad faith, knowing
inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita David) were
that the charge was groundless.
transferred. The CMS Estate, Inc. had a capital stock of one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00), divided into 1,000 shares of
As regards the fourth cause of action in said counter-claim, it should be the par value of P1,000 each, of which 950 are non-voting
noted that plaintiff is a member of the bar. As such, he must have preferred Shares, and 50 are common voting shares. All of
known that the petition for bond in question is an absolutely privileged these common voting shares, were subscribed by the
communication, and that the allegations therein made were pertinent plaintiff, whereas his wife had 96 non-voting preferred
and relevant to the remedy sought in said petition. More important still, shares and no common shares Four (4) other persons had
he knew that the basic facts therein stated were true. Aside from this, each a nominal holding of one (1) non-voting preferred
some of the inferences drawn by him therefrom are purely his, not share. As the sole holder of all the voting common shares,
necessarily deducible from said facts, and although he allegedly plaintiff had absolute, exclusive and permanent control over
suffered injury to his reputation in consequence thereof, there has the Management of this new corporation. In fact the letters
been not even an attempt to prove that it had adversely affected either 'CMS', which are the initials of his name, Carlos Moran Sison
his credit, or any of his business transactions, or his social or domestic appear in the corporate name 'CMS Estate, Inc.,' for the
relations. In other words, aside from the fact that plaintiff's complaint is seeming purpose of representing to the public that plaintiff
clearly unfounded, the record strongly indicates that it was filed with a was, for all intents and purposes, the corporation itself." .
harassing purpose. In view of the circumstances surrounding this case,
plaintiff should pay the defendant a reasonable amount for attorney's
Plaintiff admits the facts set forth in this paragraph, but he alleges that
fees and expenses of litigation (Article 2208 [4], Civil Code of the
the last sentence therein places him "unjustly in bad light"; (1)
Philippines).
because, in using his initials in the corporate name "C M S Estate, Inc."
he was "just following the trend of the time", as illustrated by the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and examples set by "Andres Soriano and Company", "Puyat Steel
another one shall be entered dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint, Company and "Soriente-Santos Company"; and (2) because his
as well as the first three causes of action in defendant's counterclaim, alleged purpose in organizing "C M S Estate, Inc." was noble, namely,
and sentencing plaintiff to pay to the defendant, by way of attorney's to protect the interest of his wife and their seven (7) children should
fees and expenses of litigation, the sum of P3,000, with interest she contract a subsequent marriage with an irresponsible man, in case
thereon it the legal rate, from the date on which this decision shall plaintiff predeceased her.
become final, aside from the costs. It is so ordered.
It is obvious, however, that the corporate names, "Andres Soriano and
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Company", "Puyat Steel Company," and "Soriente-Santos Company",
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur. indicate that the corporations concerned are owned and controlled by
Soriano, Puyat and Soriente-Santos, respectively.

As regards petitioner's alleged purpose in creating the "C M S Estate,

Inc.," suffice it to say that:
RESOLUTION

(a) Said alleged purpose has no connection whatsoever with the

CONCEPCION, J.:
choice of the corporate name.

Plaintiff-appellee seeks a reconsideration of the decision of this Court,

(b) Said purpose does not appear in the record before us, no evidence
promulgated on January 28, 1961, upon several grounds. The first is to
having been introduced or offered in connection therewith.
the effect
(c) The paragraph above-quoted merely tends to indicate that it was assessed value of said immovables in 1956 were P1,661,000.00, as
only natural for a creditor or claimant, like defendants herein, to feel estimated by plaintiff in his brief, without any evidence in support
that, under the facts given, the properties of the estate of Margarita thereof. Besides, the communication complained of was filed five (5)
David were being placed beyond his reach and under the complete years before, and it is a matter, of which we may take judicial
control of plaintiff herein, who, he believes, was not friendly to him. cognizance, that there has been a sharp increase in the value of real
estate in the City of Manila during the last decade. Again, although
good faith on the part of the defendant was unnecessary for his
The third ground of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration refers to the
absolute privilege, his justification in making the allegations
following paragraphs of our decision:
complained of is certainly material to the determination of the question
whether plaintiff had a seasonable ground to believe that he had a
At any rate, the allegations in question in defendant's petition cause of action against said defendant.
for bond were neither malicious nor unfounded. Thus, it is a
fact that most, or at least, several of the most valuable
Lastly, plaintiff maintains that the following paragraph of our decision is
properties transmitted by Margarita David to Mrs. Sison were
"obviously unfair" and should be set aside:
mortgaged. Those subsequently assigned by Mrs. Sison to
Priscila Estate, Inc. were encumbered altogether for
P397,717.00. In order to construct the Priscila Building No. 3 As regards the fourth cause of action in said counterclaim, it
on a paraphernal land of Mrs. Sison, it had been necessary should be noted that plaintiff is a member of the bar. As
to borrow ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) from the such, he must have known that the petition for bond in
RFC. The Priscila Estate, Inc., of which plaintiff is the question is an absolutely privileged communication, and that
president, began its operations with an overdraft line of the allegations therein made were pertinent and relevant to
P236,517.0. Most of the paraphernal properties of Mrs. the remedy sought in said petition. x x x In other words,
Sison were transferred to said corporation. In fact, the same aside from the fact that plaintiff's complaint is clearly
asked that the annotation, on the certificate of title of one of unfounded, the record strongly indicates that it was filed with
those properties, of the adverse claims of the defendant and a harassing purpose. In view of the circumstances
Jose Teodoro, Sr., be cancelled, upon the ground that said surrounding this case, plaintiff should pay the defendant a
property now belongs to the corporation, not to Mrs. Sison. reasonable amount for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation (Article 2208 [4), Civil Code of the Philippines).
(Decision, pp. 21-22).
xxx     xxx     xxx

He says that the decision of the lower court in his favor proves that he
Considering that plaintiff is, also, president of the Priscila
was reasonably justified in believing that the allegations complained of
Estate, Inc., most of the properties of which had come from
were irrelevant to the issues before said court. This conclusion does
Margarita David, and the antagonism that had arisen
not necessarily follow from the aforementioned premise. Otherwise,
between him and the defendant, in the course of the
our statutes and Rules of Court would not have established the writ
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Margarita
of certiorari to nullify or modify, inter alia, judicial decisions or orders
David — which antagonism was crystallized and sharpened
rendered or issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar,
in several litigations and many acrid, if not virulent incidents
the surrounding circumstances lead, to our mind, to the conclusion
between the same parties — it is understandable, a well as
reached in the paragraph above quoted, the opinion of the lower court
natural and logical for defendant to be apprehensive about
to the contrary notwithstanding.
the fate of his aforementioned adverse claim and that of
Jose Teodoro, Sr., if the order directing the cancellation of
the annotation thereof were not reconsidered and set aside, WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
or plaintiff were not required to file a bond to guaranty the
payment of said adverse claims.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
The alleged gross disparity between the amount thereof and
the value of said properties is immaterial to the case at bar.
G.R. No. L-12592            March 8, 1918
To begin with, the properties were heavily encumbered.
Besides, the transfer thereof to Priscila Estate, Inc., the
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
subsequent assignment of some to CMS Estate, Inc., and,
vs.
then, the sales that had been made and the one sought to
be made in favor of third persons, tended to place said FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
properties beyond the reach of said claimants. Then too, bad
Kincaid and Perkins for appellants.
faith should not, and cannot be imputed to creditors, much
leas 'presumed', merely because they seek the maximum Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee.
possible guaranties for the protection of their rights. At any
rate, the alleged bad faith in the annotation of the adverse MALCOLM, J.:
claims does not warrant an inference of bad faith in the
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the
allegations of the petition for bond. (Decision, pp. 18-21).
defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Plaintiff maintains that these paragraphs are irrelevant and inaccurate Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger question of the attitude
and should be deleted, because: (1) the amount borrowed from the which the judiciary should take interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law
RFC was P100,000.00, not P1,000.000.00; (2) the properties in in connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom of speech and
question were not heavily encumbered; and (3) lack of malice on the
press, and of assembly and petition. For a better understanding, the
part of the defendant was, according to our decision, unnecessary for
facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in the order of their
the enjoyment of the absolute privilege accorded to the communication
upon which plaintiffs action is based. occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the rights of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are
interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally,
As pointed out above, the first premise is belied by the plaintiffs own judgment is rendered.
testimony. With respect to the second premise, it should be noted that
the immovables assigned to Priscila Estate, Inc., were originally First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the
subject to liabilities aggregating P397,770.00. According to said Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition
testimony of the plaintiff, a P1,000,000.00 loan was secured from the to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and
RFC, so that the aggregate encumbrance reached P1,397,770.00,
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman
which, by all standards, is a heavy one, even if we assume that the
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga,
with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and
O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to positive manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating
the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these attorneys which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no
was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, less serious, but which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for
including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and the sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of
contained the statements set out in the information as libelous. Briefly your Honor and due to lack of sufficient proof to substantiate them.
stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano this town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and
de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he interests of its inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest
would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this
which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant town will not be administered in accordance with law.
and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which conducts as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some
was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to
the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice present an administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan
of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case
this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was there were made against him various charges which were true and
informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the certain and of different characters.
justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he
could still win if he would pay P50; That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the
peace, far from charging his bad and despicable conduct, which has
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against roused the indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently
four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his performed the acts abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits
house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show
complaint was thereupon shelved. his mistaken valor and heroism.'

The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first All of this has been written and published by the accused with
instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the
proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing
denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.
proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge,
the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition
is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the
be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and affidavits upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive
Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the Secretary, through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien."
proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive
Secretary." The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the
exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10
first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary
were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense,
six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, file on
peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of
auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal which was to retire the objection interposed by the then counsel for the
reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the entire
charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino
whether the papers were forwarded to the Governor-General as appealed making the following assignments of error:
requested the record does not disclose.
1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, for a new trial.
was instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following
information: 2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the
objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation
Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, in this case arose.
and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of 3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the
the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which
and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman
4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement
Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the
was unqualifiedly privileged.
following:
5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this
was on the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements
town of Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him
were true and free from malice.
heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office which he holds, is
found to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently 6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.
immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy
of the office. 7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the
defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes.
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
administrative and judicial, were properly before this court. As a matter assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
of fact counsel for defendants in the lower court made an improvident
objection to the admission of the administrative proceedings on the The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones
ground that the signatures were not identified and that the same was Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic
immaterial, which objection was partially sustained by the trial court. acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are
Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason of which the attorney not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the
for the defense attempted to destroy through his objection the very counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
foundation for the justification of his clients, we shall continue to States, which the American people demanded before giving their
consider all the proceedings as before us. Not indicating specifically approval to the Constitution.
the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The
administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial. We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be
These proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and
the evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be parcel of the Organic Law — of the Constitution — of the Philippine
understood without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more unjust Islands.
could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not
themselves and unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all
threadbare verbiage. The language carries with all the applicable
knowledge of facts which would justify these words, to convict the
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases.
accused. The records in question are attached to the rollo, and either
(Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204
on the ground that the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to
U. S., 470.) And what are these principles? Volumes would
the introduction of the administrative proceedings by the prosecution,
inadequately answer. But included are the following:
or that a new trial should have been had because under section 42 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be reopened on account The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to
court to call in such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or finally, speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official action in officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
basis action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
the trial for libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
it. To this action, the Government can not explain for it was the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
prosecution which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into the record. criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual
is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain
common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the
principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel
Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all
warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and
the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant
general discussion of freedom of speech and press and assembly and
source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of
petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus
Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F.
to clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place these
and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)
basic rights in their proper light.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public
de Cien Años" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.)
officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
upon, said: "
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a
The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to
declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipinos assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
delegates. official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part
and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the
people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations." facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
(See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to
work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of
guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition. their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but
only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y.,
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition 510.)
that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so
dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one would The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself. republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person
Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
to the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the assume responsibility for the charges made.
Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the
inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged.
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further,
although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith
'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of
of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.) a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they
abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them
are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a
a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue
thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J. publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the
and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a
proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is
duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest
sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the
or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this
Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-
privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E.
General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on
and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E.
the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action
C. L., 344.)
took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs.
character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B.,
a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the 344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
The present facts are further essentially different from those
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the
established in other cases in which private individuals have been
statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-
convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood,
seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339;
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged
U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29
is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
Phil., 595.)
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690).
law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the
made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more
some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the
various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of
the privilege. Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge
against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact,
Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then
made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons who
lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and
not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we
the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See
invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil.,
White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather
White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12
commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and
Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street
appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander
and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.) Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to
the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute
must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic
Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position Separate Opinions
to test the facts of this case with these principles.
CARSON, J., concurring:
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
I concur. I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
Attorney-General is entirely correct when he says that this case is
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of
substantially identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States
a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
vs. Bustos, 13 Phil. Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our
justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
decisions in these cases is sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested
is that the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case
in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and
has long since been abandoned by this court; and in my opinion it
vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated
would make for the more efficient administration of the Libel Law in proceedings belong to a class of communications that are
these Islands to say so, in so many words. (Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, absolutely privileged. Stated otherwise. the privilege is
[1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil. granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of
Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 595; and U. S. vs. justice.
Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI;
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS, NOT PROPER SUBJECT THEREOF;
EXCEPTION. — Certiorari does not lie to question the
FIRST DIVISION propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial court.
Interlocutory orders ordinarily should be reviewed when an
[G.R. No. L-58681. May 31, 1982.] appeal is taken from the trial court’s judgment. Not every
procedural error or erroneous legal or factual conclusion
ALFREDO P. MALIT, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE amounts to grave abuse of discretion. However, as the Court
PHILIPPINES, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, in ruled in Sanchez, Et. Al. v. . Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, Et Al., (L-
his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the City Court of 27043, November 28, 1975) ‘when a grave abuse of
Caloocan City, Branch IV, Respondents. discretion was patently committed, or the lower court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court
Mercedes M. Respicio for Petitioner. in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority
and to correct the error committed which, in such case, is
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.’’
Solicitor General Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Solicitor
Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo for Respondents.
DECISION
SYNOPSIS

During the trial of an administrative case filed by Dr. RELOVA, J.:

Macaspac against Ruth Fernandez, Dr. Macaspac on cross-
examination by petitioner, counsel for the respondent, was
asked if she knew the person who "made" a certain exhibit.
Evading the question, Dr. Macaspac stated that she did not Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of
understand the word "made." After explaining that the word respondent Judge, dated February 20, 1981, denying
means "prepared," Dr. Macaspac, instead of answering, asked petitioner’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 126521,
for clarification, prompting the petitioner to utter the words "I entitled: "People of the Philippines v. Atty. Alfredo Malit", as
doubt how did you become a doctor." Based on this well as the order of same respondent, dated May 5, 1981,
utterance, an information for Unjust Vexation was filed in which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
respondent’s court. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information but this, and a subsequent motion for It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of
reconsideration were denied. Petitioner filed the present Miss Ruth Fernandez in an administrative case filed against
petition for certiorari and prohibition which respondent Judge her by Dr. Macaspac. At the hearing of the case on January
claims is not the proper remedy to assail an mierlocutory 17, 1980, Dr. Macaspac identified certain exhibits on the
order. witness stand. On cross-examination by herein petitioner,
Atty. Malit, if she knew the person who "made" a certain
The Supreme Court held that the utterance made in the exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question by saying she did
course of a judicial or administrative proceedings belongs to not understand the word "made." Petitioner tried to explain
the class of communications that are absolutely privileged; by saying that it means "prepared." Notwithstanding, Dr.
and that although interlocutory orders ordinarily are Macaspac would not answer and, instead, asked petitioner for
reviewable only on appeal, it maybe the subject clarification. This prompted Atty. Malit to say: "I doubt how
of certiorari where grave abuse of discretion was patently did you become a Doctor." As a consequence, Dr. Macaspac
committed or the lower court acted capriciously. instituted a complaint for slander against herein petitioner
with the Fiscal’s Office of Caloocan
Order assailed, reversed and set aside. City.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On February 28, 1980, an information for unjust vexation

docketed as Criminal Case No. 126521 was filed by Special
SYLLABUS
Counsel Apolinario A. Exevea which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED "That on or about the 17th day of January, 1980 in Caloocan
COMMUNICATIONS; PARTIES AND COUNSEL EXEMPT FROM City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
LIABILITY IN LIBEL OR SLANDER CASES. — Parties, counsel Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any
and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in feloniously vex and annoy one Corazon I. Macaspac, by then
the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements and there uttering the following remarks directly addressed to
are pertinent or relevant to the case. the latter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS DEEMED "I DOUBT HOW DID YOU BECOME A DOCTOR’.
PRIVILEGED. — As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency
necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the to her great annoyance, vexation and disgust."cralaw
courts are inclined to be liberal. The master to which the virtua1aw library
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in
relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that "the
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety facts charged do not constitute an offense."cralaw virtua1aw
(People v. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046). It is thus clear that library
utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative
 observed in Sison v. David (Supra):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the
motion for reconsideration raising the ground that the court ". . . The privilege is not intended so much for the protection
has no jurisdiction because the facts charged in the of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment
information are privileged communication. and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public
welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature,
It is the position of petitioner that the statement "I doubt how judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak
did you become a doctor" does not constitute an offense as it their minds freely and exercise their respective functions
was uttered at the time he was conducting the cross- without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
examination of Dr. Macaspac; that utterances made in the action for the recovery of damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124)"
course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings
and motions belong to the class of communication that are Generally, certiorari does not lie to question the propriety of
absolutely privileged. an interlocutory order of the trial court. Interlocutory orders
ordinarily should be reviewed when an appeal is taken from
On the other hand, respondents maintain that an order the trial court’s judgment. Not every procedural error or
denying a motion to quash cannot be the subject erroneous legal or factual conclusion amounts to grave abuse
of certiorari which is a remedy to keep an inferior court within of discretion. However, as this Court ruled in Sanchez, et al v.
the limits of its jurisdiction; that the delimitation of the Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, Et Al., (L-27043, November 28, 1975),
correctness, if at all, should be brought on appeal, after the "when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or
trial of the case and not in certiorari; that petitioner’s the lower court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
contention that the act complained of does not constitute an devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise
offense because it is protected by the mantle of privilege is its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed
strictly a matter of defense. which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner’s contention should be sustained. Well settled is the
rule that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from WHEREFORE, the trial court’s orders of February 20, 1981
liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise and May 5, 1981 are reversed and set aside. Respondent is
defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial hereby ordered to desist and refrain from proceeding with the
proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or trial of Criminal Case No. 126521.
relevant to the case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
"Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the
course of judicial proceedings are connected with, or relevant, Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
inquiry, the same may be considered privileged
communication and the counsel, parties, or witnesses therein
are exempt from liability. (See 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas v.
Parreño, Et. Al. G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and
authorities cited therein). (Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil.
1010)"

And, as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to

make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are
inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does
not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the
subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its irrelevance and impropriety. (People v. Andres, 107
Phil. 1046).

In the case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt

how did you become a doctor" when Dr. Macaspac would not
answer the question as to who prepared the document
presented to her, and when the witness repeatedly evaded
the question by saying that she did not understand the word
"made."cralaw virtua1aw library

Newel, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed.,
uses the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Absolute Privilege. — In this class of cases it is considered in

the interest of public welfare that all persons should be
allowed to express their sentiments and speak their minds
fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all
actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even if
it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken falsely,
knowingly and with express malice." (Section 350, pp. 387-
388).

It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial

or administrative proceedings belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged. Stated
otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and for the
advantage of the administration of justice. As this Court