Guinhawa V People

9/9/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 468
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guinhawa vs. People
*
G.R. No. 162822. August 25, 2005.
JAIME GUINHAWA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real

nature of the offense charged is to be ascertained by the facts alleged in the
body of the information and punishment provided by
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
279
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 279
Guinhawa vs. People
law, not by the title or caption given by the Prosecutor.—Section 6, Rule

110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the Information must
allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense: SEC.
6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information. The real nature of the offense
charged is to be ascertained by the facts alleged in the body of the
Information and the punishment provided by law, not by the designation or
title or caption given by the Prosecutor in the Information. The Information
must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017472e1a56d0cc3ee31003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/27
Criminal Law; Other Deceits; The false or fraudulent representation

by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new, when in fact, it is not, is
not one of those deceitful acts envisaged under paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.—As can be gleaned from its averments, the
Information alleged the essential elements of the crime under paragraph 1,
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The false or fraudulent
representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in
fact, it is not) is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads: Art. 318. Other
deceits.—The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other
deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
Same; Same; Elements; Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code includes
any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Articles 315
to 317—it is a catchall provision for that purpose with all its broad scope
and intendment.—For one to be liable for “other deceits” under the law, it is
required that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
(a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the
preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; and (c) as a
280
Guinhawa vs. People
result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that

such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property. The
provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended
as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment.
Same; Same; Estafa; Art. 315, par. 2(a), Revised Penal Code; Statutory
Construction; Ejusdem Generis; Under the principle of ejusdem generis,
where a statement ascribes things of a particular class or kind accompanied
by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to
things of similar nature.—The petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision
reads: 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a)
By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
or by means of other similar deceits. The fraudulent representation of the
seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new, is not the deceit
contemplated in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a
statement ascribes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words
of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of
a similar nature with those particularly enumerated unless there be
something in the context to the contrary.
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Batas Pambansa Bilang 129; Section 32 of

BP 129 provides that the Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive
jurisdiction over the offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six years, irrespective of the amount of fine; The MTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense of other deceits since it is punishable by arresto
mayor.—Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be
conferred by the will of the parties, nor diminished or waived by them. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the
criminal complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provides
281
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 281
Guinhawa vs. People
that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of the fine.
* * * Since the felony of other deceits is punishable by arresto mayor, the
MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense lodged against the
petitioner.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Representation may be in form of

words, or conduct resorted to by an individual to serve as an advantage
over another.—On the merits of the petition, the Court agrees with the
petitioner’s contention that there is no evidence on record that he made
direct and positive representations or assertions to the private complainant
that the van was brand new. The record shows that the private complainant
and her husband Ralph Silo were, in fact, attended to by Azotea. However,
it bears stressing that the representation may be in the form of words, or
conduct resorted to by an individual to serve as an advantage over another.
Indeed, as declared by the CA based on the evidence on record: Petitioner
cannot barefacedly claim that he made no personal representation that the
herein subject van was brand new for the simple reason that nowhere in the
records did he ever refute the allegation in the complaint, which held him
out as a dealer of brand new cars. It has thus become admitted that the
petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles—a fact which, up to now,
petitioner has not categorically denied. Therefore, when private complainant
went to petitioner’s showroom, the former had every right to assume that
she was being sold brand new vehicles there being nothing to indicate
otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private complainant get a
defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier figured in a road
accident when driven by no less than petitioner’s own driver.
Same; Same; Fraud or deceit may be committed by omission.— The

CA is correct in ruling that fraud or deceit may be committed by omission.
As the Court held in People v. Balasa: Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed
to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an
undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over
another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all sur-
282
Guinhawa vs. People
prise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Concealment; Mere silence is not in

itself concealment—the concealment which the law denounces as fraudulent
implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party sought to
know; Fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the
same genre.—It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment.
Concealment which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or
design to hide facts which the other party sought to know. Failure to reveal a
fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be
classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive.
Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to
disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover, a representation is
not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of deeds,
acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the
fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage. Fraudulent nondisclosure and
fraudulent concealment are of the same genre. Fraudulent concealment

presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that disclosure was not made
when opportunity to speak and inform was presented, and that the party to
whom the duty of disclosure, as to a material fact was due, was induced
thereby to act to his injury.
Same; Same; Sales; If, in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly

allowed the vendee to be deceived as to the thing sold in a material matter
by failing to disclose an intrinsic circumstance that is vital to the contract,
deceit is accomplished by the suppression of the truth.—Article 1389 of the
New Civil Code provides that failure to disclose facts when there is a duty
to reveal them constitutes fraud. In a contract of sale, a buyer and seller do
not deal from equal bargaining positions when the latter has knowledge, a
material fact which, if communicated to the buyer, would render the
grounds unacceptable or, at least, substantially less desirable. If, in a
contract of sale, the vendor knowingly allowed the vendee to be deceived as
to the thing sold in a material matter by failing to disclose an
283
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 283
Guinhawa vs. People
intrinsic circumstance that is vital to the contract, knowing that the vendee is
acting upon the presumption that no such fact exists, deceit is accomplished
by the suppression of the truth.
Same; Same; Same; Where a vendee only made a partial investigation

and relies in part upon the representation of the vendor, and is deceived by
such representation to his injury, he may maintain an action for such deceit.
—The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful
concealment of material facts, even if the private complainant made a visual
inspection of the van’s interior and exterior before she agreed to buy it and
failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has it that where the vendee
made only a partial investigation and relies, in part, upon the representation
of the vendee, and is deceived by such representation to his injury, he may
maintain an action for such deceit. The seller cannot be heard to say that the
vendee should not have relied upon the fraudulent concealment; that
negligence, on the part of the vendee, should not be a defense in order to
prevent the vendor from unjustifiably escaping with the fruits of the fraud.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of Caveat Emptor; The principle of

caveat emptor only requires the purchaser to exercise care and attention
ordinarily exercised by prudent men in like business affairs, and only
applies to defects which are open and patent to the service of one exercising
such care.—On the petitioner’s insistence that the private complainant was
proscribed from charging him with estafa based on the principle of caveat
emptor, case law has it that this rule only requires the purchaser to exercise
such care and attention as is usually exercised by ordinarily prudent men in
like business affairs, and only applies to defects which are open and patent
to the service of one exercising such care. In an avuncular case, it was held
that: . . . The rule of caveat emptor, like the rule of sweet charity, has often
been invoked to cover a multitude of sins; but we think its protecting mantle
has never been stretched to this extent. It can only be applied where it is
shown or conceded that the parties to the contract stand on equal footing and
have equal knowledge or equal means of knowledge and there is no relation
of trust or confidence between them. But, where one party undertakes to sell
to another property situated at a distance and of which he has or claims to
have personal knowledge and of which the buyer knows nothing except as
he is informed by the seller, the buyer may rightfully rely on the truth of
284
Guinhawa vs. People
the seller’s representations as to its kind, quality, and value made in the
course of negotiation for the purpose of inducing the purchase. If, in such
case, the representations prove to be false, neither law nor equity will permit
the seller to escape responsibility by the plea that the buyer ought not to
have believed him or ought to have applied to other sources to ascertain the
facts. . . .
Same; Same; Same; Agency; Where the doing of a certain act or the
transaction of a given affair, of the performance of certain business is
confided to an agent, the authority to so act will carry with it by implication
the authority to do all the collateral acts which are natural and ordinary
incidents of the main act or business authorized.—The petitioner cannot pin
criminal liability for his fraudulent omission on his general manager,
Azotea. The two are equally liable for their collective fraudulent silence.
Case law has it that wherever the doing of a certain act or the transaction of
a given affair, or the performance of certain business is confided to an agent,
the authority to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred
to, carry with it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral acts
which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or business
authorized.
Same; Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103); The

Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply if the maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year—if the trial court opts to impose
penalty of imprisonment less than one year, it should not impose
indeterminate penalty but straight penalty of one year or less instead; An
indeterminate sentence may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one

year or less, and the maximum exceeds one year.—The MTC sentenced the
petitioner to suffer imprisonment of from two months and one day, as
minimum, to four months of arresto mayor, as maximum. The CA affirmed
the penalty imposed by the trial court. This is erroneous. Section 2 of Act
4103, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
provides that the law will not apply if the maximum term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year: * * * In this case, the maximum term of
imprisonment imposed on the petitioner was four months and one day of
arresto mayor. Hence, the MTC was proscribed from imposing an
indeterminate penalty on the petitioner. An indeterminate penalty may be
imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one year or less, and the
maximum exceeds one year. For example, the
285
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 285
Guinhawa vs. People
trial court may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto

mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional,
as maximum, since the maximum term of imprisonment it imposed exceeds
one year. If the trial court opts to impose a penalty of imprisonment of one
year or less, it should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but a straight
penalty of one year or less instead. Thus, the petitioner may be sentenced to
a straight penalty of one year, or a straight penalty of less than one year, i.e.,
ten months or eleven months. We believe that considering the attendant
circumstances, a straight penalty of imprisonment of six months is
reasonable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Benjamin B. Bulalacao for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new

motor vehicles, including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name
of Guinrox Motor Sales. His office and display room for cars were
located along Panganiban Avenue, Naga City. He employed Gil
Azotea as his sales manager.
On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new
Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van with Motor No. 4D56A-C8929 and
Serial No. L069WQZJL-07970 from the Union Motors Corporation
(UMC) in Paco, Manila. The van bore Plate No. DLK 406.
Guinhawa’s driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the van from Manila to
Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway
in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The
van went out of control, traversed the highway onto the opposite
lane, and was
286

Guinhawa vs. People
1
ditched into the canal parallel to the highway. The van was
damaged, and the left front tire had to be replaced.
The incident was reported to the local police authorities and was
2
recorded in the police blotter. The van was repaired and later
3
offered for sale in Guinhawa’s showroom.
Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo
wanted to buy a new van for their garment business; they purchased
4
items in Manila and sold them in Naga City. They went to
Guinhawa’s office, and were shown the L-300 Versa Van which was
on display. The couple inspected its interior portion and found it
beautiful. They no longer inspected the under chassis since they
5
presumed that the vehicle was brand new. Unaware that the van had
been damaged and repaired on account of the accident in Daet, the
couple decided to purchase the van for P591,000.00. Azotea
suggested that the couple make a downpayment of P118,200.00, and
pay the balance of the purchase price by installments via a loan from
the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Naga Branch, with the
L-300 Versa Van as collateral. Azotea offered to make the necessary
arrangements with the UCPB for the consummation of the loan
transaction. The couple agreed. On November 10, 1995, the spouses
6
executed a Promissory Note for the amount of P692,676.00 as
payment of the balance on the purchase price, and as evidence of the
chattel mortgage over the van in favor of UCPB.
On October 11, 1995, the couple arrived in Guinhawa’s office to
take delivery of the van. Guinhawa executed the deed of sale, and
the couple paid the P161,470.00 downpayment, for which they were
7
issued Receipt No. 0309. They were fur-
_______________
1 Exhibit “B.”
2 Exhibit “D.”
3 TSN, 1 June 2000, pp. 16-17.
4 TSN, 3 August 2000, p. 5.
5 TSN, 6 October 1999, p. 18.
6 Exhibit “DD-1.”
7 Exhibit “FF.”
287
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 287

Guinhawa vs. People
8
nished a Service Manual which contained the warranty terms and
conditions. Azotea instructed the couple on how to start the van and
to operate its radio. Ralph Silo no longer conducted a test drive; he
and his wife assumed that there were no defects in the van as it was
9
brand new.
On October 12, 1995, Josephine Silo, accompanied by Glenda
Pingol, went to Manila on board the L-300 Versa Van, with Glenda’s
husband, Bayani Pingol III, as the driver. Their trip to Manila was
uneventful. However, on the return trip to Naga from Manila on
October 15 or 16, 1995, Bayani Pingol heard a squeaking sound
which seemed to be coming from underneath the van. They were in
10
Calauag, Quezon, where there were no humps along the road.
Pingol stopped the van in Daet, Camarines Norte, and examined the
11
van underneath, but found no abnormalities or defects. But as he
drove the van to Naga City, the squeaking sound persisted. Believing
that the van merely needed grease, Pingol stopped at a Shell gasoline
station where it was examined. The mechanic discovered that some
parts underneath the van had been welded. When Pingol complained
to Guinhawa, the latter told him that the defects were mere factory
defects. As the defects persisted, the spouses Silo requested that
Guinhawa change the van with two Charade-Daihatsu vehicles
within a week or two, with the additional costs to be taken from their
downpayment. Meanwhile, the couple stopped paying the monthly
amortization on their loan, pending the replacement of the van.
Guinhawa initially agreed to the couple’s proposal, but later changed
his mind and told them that he had to sell the van first. The spouses
then brought the vehicle to the Rx Auto Clinic in Naga City for
examination. Jesus Rex Raquitico, Jr., the mechanic, examined the
van and discovered that it was the left front stabilizer that was
producing the annoying
_______________
8 Exhibit “J.”
9 TSN, 6 October 1999, p. 18.
10 TSN, 29 January 1998, pp. 5-7.
11 Exhibit “F.”
288

Guinhawa vs. People
12
sound, and that it had been repaired. Raquitico prepared a Job
Order containing the following notations and recommendations:
1. CHECK UP SUSPENSION (FRONT)

2. REPLACE THE ROD END
3. REPLACE BUSHING
NOTE: FRONT STEP BOARD HAS BEEN ALREADY DAMAGED

AND REPAIRED.
NOTE: FRONT LEFT SUSPENSION MOUNTING IS NOT ON
13
SPECIFIED ALIGNMENT/MEASUREMENT
Josephine Silo filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale and the
refund of their money before the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). During the confrontation between her and Guinhawa,
Josephine learned that Guinhawa had bought the van from UMC
before it was sold to them, and after it was damaged in Daet.
Subsequently, the spouses Silo withdrew their complaint from the
DTI.
On February 14, 1996, Josephine Silo filed a criminal complaint
for violation of paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
against Guinhawa in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City.
After the requisite investigation, an Information was filed against
Guinhawa in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City. The
inculpatory portion reads:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City accuses Jaime

Guinhawa of the crime of OTHER DECEITS defined and penalized under
Art. 318, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
“That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being a motor vehicle dealer
using the trade name of Guinhawa Motor Sales at Panganiban Avenue,
_______________
12 Exhibits “K” to “K-1.”

13 Exhibit “AA.”
289
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 289

Guinhawa vs. People
Naga City, and a dealer of brand new cars, by means of false pretenses and
fraudulent acts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
private complainant, JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as follows: said accused by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to said private complainant,

as brand new, an automobile with trade name L-300 Versa Van colored beige and the
latter paid for the same in the amount of P591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact, the
same was not brand new because it was discovered less than a month after it was
sold to said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van had defects in the
underchassis and stepboard and repairs had already been done thereat even before
said sale, as was found upon check-up by an auto mechanic; that private complainant
returned said L-300 Versa Van to the accused and demanded its replacement with a
new one or the return of its purchase price from said accused but despite follow-up
demands no replacement was made nor was the purchase price returned to private
complainant up to the present to her damage and prejudice in the amount of
P591,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus other damages that may be proven in
14
court.”
Guinhawa testified that he was a dealer of brand new Toyota,

Mazda, Honda and Mitsubishi cars, under the business name
Guinrox Motor Sales. He purchased Toyota cars from Toyota
15
Philippines, and Mitsubishi cars from UMC in Paco, Manila. He
bought the van from the UMC in March 1995, but did not use it; he
16
merely had it displayed in his showroom in Naga City. He insisted
17
that the van was a brand new unit when he sold it to the couple.
The spouses Silo bought the van and took delivery only after
18
inspecting and taking it for a road tests. His sales manager, Azotea,
informed him sometime in November 1995 that the spouses Silo had
complained
_______________
14 Records, p. 1.
15 TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 6.
16 Exhibit “4-A.”
17 TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 19.
18 Id., at p. 7.
290

Guinhawa vs. People
about the defects under the left front portion of the van. By then, the
19
van had a kilometer reading of 4,000 kilometers. He insisted that
he did not make any false statement or fraudulent misrepresentation
to the couple about the van, either before or simultaneous with its
purchase. He posited that the defects noticed by the couple were not
major ones, and could be repaired. However, the couple refused to
have the van repaired and insisted on a refund of their payment for
the van which he could not allow. He then had the defects repaired
20
by the UMC. He claimed that the van was never involved in any
accident, and denied that his driver, Olayan, met an accident and
sustained physical injuries when he drove the van from Manila to
21
Naga City. He even denied meeting Bayani Pingol.
22
The accused claimed that the couple filed a Complaint against 23
him with the DTI on January 25, 1996, only to withdraw it later.
The couple then failed to pay the amortizations for the van, which
caused the UCPB to file a petition for the foreclosure of the chattel
24
mortgage and the sale of the van at public auction.
Azotea testified that he had been a car salesman for 16 years and
25
that he sold brand new vans. Before the couple took delivery of the
vehicle, Pingol inspected its exterior, interior, and underside, and
26
even drove it for the couple. He was present when the van was
brought to the Rx Auto Clinic, where he noticed the dent on its front
27
side. He claimed that the van never figured in any vehicular
accident in Labo, Daet,
_______________
19 Exhibit “4-A.”
20 TSN, 1 June 2000, p. 19; Exhibits “4” to “4-C.”
21 Exhibit “4.”
22 Exhibit “8.”
23 Exhibit “11.”
24 Exhibits “DD” and “EE.”
25 TSN, 23 November 2000, p. 11.
26 TSN, 3 August 2000, pp. 6-7.
27 Id., at p. 10.
291
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 291

Guinhawa vs. People
28
Camarines Norte on March 17, 1995. In fact, he declared, he found
no police record of a vehicular accident involving the van on the
29
said date. He admitted that Olayan was their driver, and was in
charge of taking delivery of cars purchased from the manufacturer in
30
Manila.
On November 6, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting Guinhawa. The fallo of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring the accused, JAIME GUINHAWA, guilty of the crime of Other
Deceits defined and penalized under Art. 318(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment from 2
months and 1 day to 4 months of Arresto Mayor and a fine of One Hundred
Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred and Eleven Pesos (P180,711.00) the total
amount of the actual damages caused to private complainant.
As to the civil aspect of this case which have been deemed instituted
with this criminal case, Articles 2201 and 2202 of the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
“In case of fraud, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.”
“Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.”
_______________
28 Id., at p. 14.
29 Id., at p. 13.
30 Id., at pp. 13-14.
292

Guinhawa vs. People
Thus, accused is condemned to pay actual damages in the amount of One

Hundred Eighty Thousand Seven Hundred and Eleven Pesos
(Php180,711.00), which represents the 20% downpayment and other
miscellaneous expenses paid by the complainant plus the amount of
Nineteen Thousand Two Hundred Forty-One (Php19,241.00) Pesos,
representing the 1st installment payment made by the private complainant to
the bank. Accused is, likewise, ordered to pay moral damages in the amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) in view of the moral pain
suffered by the complainant; for exemplary damages in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00) to serve as deterrent for those
businessmen similarly inclined to take undue advantage over the public’s
innocence. As for attorney’s fees, the reasonable amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) is hereby awarded.
31
SO ORDERED.”
The trial court declared that the accused made false pre-tenses or
misrepresentations that the van was a brand new one when, in fact, it
had figured in an accident in Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, and
sustained serious damages before it was sold to the private
complainant.
Guinhawa appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, in which he alleged that:
1. The lower court erred in its finding that the repair works on
the left front portion and underchassis of the van was the
result of the accident in Labo, Camarines Norte, where its
driver suffered an attack of hypertension.
2. The lower court erred in its four (4) findings of fact that
accused-appellant made misrepresentation or false
pretenses “that the van was a brand new car,” which
constituted deceit as defined in Article 318, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code.
3. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant civilly
liable to complainant Josephine Silo. But, even if there be
such
_______________
31 Records, pp. 641-642.
293
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 293

Guinhawa vs. People
liability, the action therefor has already prescribed and the amount awarded
32
was exhorbitant, excessive and unconscionable.
Guinhawa insisted that he never talked to the couple about the sale
of the van; hence, could not have made any false pretense or
misrepresentation.
33
On August 1, 2002, the RTC affirmed the appealed judgment.
Guinhawa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
(CA), where he averred that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE

CRIME OF OTHER DECEITS AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT OF TWO MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO FOUR
MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND TO PAY FINE IN THE AMOUNT
OF P180,711.00.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT P180,711.00 AS DOWNPAYMENT,
P19,241.00 AS FIRST INSTALLMENT WITH UCPB NAGA, P100,000.00
AS MORAL DAMAGES, P200,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

34
AND P100,000.00 AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.
On January 5, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with

modification the decision of the RTC. The fallo of the decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby partially

granted insofar as the following are concerned: a) the award of moral
damages is hereby REDUCED to P10,000.00 and b) the award of attorney’s
fees and exemplary damages are hereby DELETED for lack of factual basis.
In all other respects, We affirm the decision under review.
_______________
32 Records, p. 575.
33 Id., at pp. 588-592.
34 Id., at p. 606.
294

Guinhawa vs. People
Costs against petitioner.

35
SO ORDERED.”
The CA ruled that the private complainant had the right to assume
that the van was brand new because Guinhawa held himself out as a
dealer of brand new vans. According to the appellate court, the act
of displaying the van in the showroom without notice to any would-
be buyer that it was not a brand new unit was tantamount to deceit.
Thus, in concealing the van’s true condition from the buyer,
Guinhawa committed deceit.
The appellate court denied Guinhawa’s motion for
reconsideration, prompting him to file the present petition for review
on certiorari, where he contends:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE

INFORMATION CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER DID NOT
INFORM HIM OF A CHARGE OF OTHER DECEITS.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER

EMPLOYED FRAUD OR DECEIT AS DEFINED UNDER ARTICLE 318,
REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE

CIRCUMSTANCES POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE
36
PETITIONER.
The issues for resolution are (1) whether, under the Information, the
petitioner was charged of other deceits under paragraph 1, Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
_______________
35 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices

Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; CA Rollo, p. 100.
36 Rollo, p. 9.
295
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 295

Guinhawa vs. People
whether the respondent adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of

the petitioner’s guilt for the crime charged.
The petitioner asserts that based on the allegations in the
Information, he was charged with estafa through false pre-tenses
under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering the allegation that the private complainant was
defrauded of P591,000.00, it is the RTC, not the MTC, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The petitioner maintains that he
is not estopped from assailing this matter because the trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction can be assailed at any time, even on appeal,
which defect cannot even be cured by the evidence adduced during
the trial. The petitioner further avers that he was convicted of other
deceits under paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a
crime for which he was not charged; hence, he was deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against
him. And in any case, even if he had been charged of other deceits
under paragraph 1 of Article 318, the CA erred in finding him guilty.
He insists that the private complainant merely assumed that the van
was brand new, and that he did not make any misrepresentation to
that effect. He avers that deceit cannot be committed by
concealment, the absence of any notice to the public that the van
was not brand new does not amount to deceit. He posits that based
on the principle of caveat emptor, if the private complainant
purchased the van without first inspecting it, she must suffer the
consequences. Moreover, he did not attend to the private
complainant when they examined the van; thus, he could not have
deceived them.
The petitioner maintains that, absent evidence of conspiracy, he

is not criminally liable for any representation Azotea may have
made to the private complainant, that the van was brand new. He
insists that the respondent was estopped from adducing evidence
that the vehicle was involved in an accident in Daet, Camarines
Norte on March 17, 1995, because such fact was not alleged in the
Information.
296

Guinhawa vs. People
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General

avers that, as gleaned from the material averments of the
Information, the petitioner was charged with other deceits under
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. The petitioner was correctly
charged and convicted, since he falsely claimed that the vehicle was
brand new when he sold the same to the private complainant. The
petitioner’s concealment of the fact that the van sustained serious
damages as an aftermath of the accident in Daet, Camarines Norte
constituted deceit within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 318.
The Information filed against the petitioner reads:
“That on or about October 11, 1995, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being a
motor vehicle dealer using the trade name of Guinhawa Motor Sales at
Panganiban Avenue, Naga City, and dealer of brand new cars, by means of
false pretenses and fraudulent acts, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud private complainant, JOSEPHINE P. SILO, as
follows: said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations, sold to said private complainant, as brand new, an
automobile with trade name L-300 Versa Van colored beige and the latter
paid for the same in the amount of P591,000.00, when, in truth and in fact,
the same was not brand new because it was discovered less than a month
after it was sold to said Josephine P. Silo that said L-300 Versa Van had
defects in the underchassis and stepboard and repairs have already been
done thereat even before said sale, as was found upon check-up by an auto
mechanic; that private complainant returned said L-300 Versa Van to the
accused and demanded its replacement with a new one or the return of its
purchase price from said accused but despite follow-up demands no
replacement was made nor was the purchase price returned to private
complainant up to the present to her damage and prejudice in the amount of
P591,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus other damages that may be proven
in court.
37
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
_______________
37 Records, p. 1.
297
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 297

Guinhawa vs. People
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that

the Information must allege the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information.
The real nature of the offense charged is to be ascertained by the

facts alleged in the body of the Information and the punishment
provided by law, not by the designation or title or caption given by
38
the Prosecutor in the Information. The Information 39 must allege
clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged.
As can be gleaned from its averments, the Information alleged
the essential elements of the crime under paragraph 1, Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he
offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact, it is not) is one of those
deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code. The provision reads:
Art. 318. Other deceits.—The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less
than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
_______________
38 Buhat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119601, 17 December 1996, 265 SCRA 701; People
v. Escosio, G.R. No. 101742, 25 March 1993, 220 SCRA 475; Buaya v. Polo, G.R. No. 75079,
26 January 1989, 169 SCRA 471.
39 Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148769, 28 January 2003, 396 SCRA 443.
298
Guinhawa vs. People
defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the

preceding articles of this chapter.
This provision was taken from Article 554 of the Spanish Penal
Code which provides:
El que defraudare o perjudicare a otro, usando de cualquier engaño que no

se halle expresado en los artículos anteriores de esta sección, será
castigado con una multa del tanto al duplo del perjuicio que irrogare; y en
caso de reincidencia, con la del duplo y arresto mayor en su grado medio al
máximo.
For one to be liable for “other deceits” under the law, it is required
that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a)
false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the
preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party
40
suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that such false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or
the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than
those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal
41
Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with
42
its broad scope and intendment.
Thus, the petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision reads:
_______________
40 . . . 1. que exista realmente una defraudacion, un perjuicio ejectivo; (2) que este
se haya causado mediante engaño, esto es, con el empleo de medios fraudulentos
puestos en juego por el estafador para conseguir su mal proposito. (Viada, CODIGO
PENAL, 6th ed., Vol. 6, p. 570).
41 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 2001 ed., Vol. II, p. 815.
42 Regalado, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 1st ed., p. 592.
299
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 299

Guinhawa vs. People
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts

executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van
to be sold is brand new, is not the deceit contemplated in the law.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes
things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things
of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated unless there
43
be something in the context to the contrary.
Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It cannot
be conferred by the will of the parties, nor diminished or waived by
them. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of
the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the
time of the filing of the criminal complaint or Information, and the
penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
commission.
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, provides that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years,
irrespective of the amount of the fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
_______________
43 Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118552, 5

February 1996, 253 SCRA 241.
300

Guinhawa vs. People
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or

municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Since the felony of other deceits is punishable by arresto mayor, the

MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense lodged against the
petitioner.
On the merits of the petition, the Court agrees with the
petitioner’s contention that there is no evidence on record that he
made direct and positive representations or assertions to the private
complainant that the van was brand new. The record shows that the
private complainant and her husband Ralph Silo were, in fact,
attended to by Azotea. However, it bears stressing that the
representation may be in the form of words, or conduct resorted to
by an individual to serve as an advantage over another. Indeed, as
declared by the CA based on the evidence on record:
Petitioner cannot barefacedly claim that he made no personal representation

that the herein subject van was brand new for the simple reason that
nowhere in the records did he ever refute the allegation in the complaint,
which held him out as a dealer of brand new cars. It has thus become
admitted that the petitioner was dealing with brand new vehicles—a fact
which, up to now, petitioner has not categorically denied. Therefore, when
private complainant went to petitioner’s showroom, the former had every
right to assume that she was being sold brand new vehicles there being
nothing to indicate otherwise. But as it turned out, not only did private
complainant get a defective and used van, the vehicle had also earlier
figured
301
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 301

Guinhawa vs. People
44
in a road accident when driven by no less than petitioner’s own driver.
Indeed, the petitioner and Azotea obdurately insisted in the trial

court that the van was brand new, and that it had never figured in
vehicular accident. This representation was accentuated by the fact
that the petitioner gave the Service Manual to the private
complainant, which manual contained the warranty terms and
conditions, signifying that the van was “brand new.” Believing this
good faith, the private complainant decided to purchase the van for
her buy-and-sell and garment business, and even made a
downpayment of the purchase price.
As supported by the evidence on record, the van was defective
when the petitioner sold it to the private complainant. It had ditched
onto the shoulder of the highway in Daet, Camarines Norte on its
way from Manila to Naga City. The van was damaged and had to be
repaired; the rod end and bushing had to be replaced, while the left
front stabilizer which gave out a persistent annoying sound was

repaired. Some parts underneath the van were even welded together.
Azotea and the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts from the
private complainant when she bought the van, obviously so as not to
derail the sale and the profit from the transaction.
The CA is correct in ruling that fraud or deceit may
45
be committed
by omission. As the Court held in People v. Balasa:
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to

deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach
of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means
which human ingenuity can
_______________
44 Rollo, p. 34.
45 G.R. No. 106357, 3 September 1998, 295 SCRA 49 (Emphasis supplied).
302

Guinhawa vs. People
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage

over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is
cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
46
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment. Concealment

which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or design
47
to hide facts which the other party sought to know. Failure to
reveal a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may
generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity
48
to deceive. Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in
49
good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation.
Moreover, a representation is not confined to words or positive
assertions; it may consist as well of deeds, acts or artifacts of a
nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow the fraud-feasor
50
to obtain an undue advantage.
Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the
same genre. Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose
the truth and that disclosure was not made when opportunity to
speak and inform was presented, and that the party to whom the duty
of disclosure, as to a material fact was due, was induced thereby to

51
act to his injury.
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 71-72.

47 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Daniel Motors Co., 149 S.W.2d 979 (1941).
48 Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 83 A.L.R., 3rd ed., p. 680 (1976); 554
P.2d 349.
49 Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79, 12 S.Ct. 340, 36 L.Ed. 82.
50 Lindberg Cadillac Company v. Leonard Aron, 371 S.W.2d 651 (1963).
51 Lovell v. Smith, 169 So. 280 (1936).
303
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 303

Guinhawa vs. People
Article 1389 of the New Civil Code provides that failure to disclose
facts when there is a duty to reveal them constitutes fraud. In a
contract of sale, a buyer and seller do not deal from equal bargaining
positions when the latter has knowledge, a material fact which, if
communicated to the buyer, would render the grounds unacceptable
52
or, at least, substantially less desirable. If, in a contract of sale, the
vendor knowingly allowed the vendee to be deceived as to the thing
sold in a material matter by failing to disclose an intrinsic
circumstance that is vital to the contract, knowing that the vendee is
acting upon the presumption that no such53 fact exists, deceit is
accomplished by the suppression of the truth.
In the present case, the petitioner and Azotea knew that the van
had figured in an accident, was damaged and had to be repaired.
Nevertheless, the van was placed in the showroom, thus making it
appear to the public that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was
mandated to reveal the foregoing facts to the private complainant.
But the petitioner and Azotea even obdurately declared when they
testified in the court a quo that the vehicle did not figure in an
accident, nor had it been repaired; they maintained that the van was
brand new, knowing that the private complainant was going to use it
for her garment business. Thus, the private complainant bought the
van, believing it was brand new.
Significantly, even when the petitioner was apprised that the
private complainant had discovered the van’s defects, the petitioner
agreed to replace the van, but changed his mind and insisted that it
must be first sold.
The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful
concealment of material facts, even if the private complainant made
a visual inspection of the van’s interior and exterior before she
agreed to buy it and failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has
it that where the vendee made
_______________
52 Supra, at note 47.

53 Lindbergh Cadillac Company v. Aron, 371 S.W.2d 651 (1963).
304

Guinhawa vs. People
only a partial investigation and relies, in part, upon the

representation of the vendee, and is deceived by such representation
54
to his injury, he may maintain an action for such deceit. The seller
cannot be heard to say that the vendee should not have relied upon
the fraudulent concealment; that negligence, on the part of the
vendee, should not be a defense in order to prevent the vendor from
unjustifiably escaping with the fruits of the fraud.
55
In one case, the defendant who repainted an automobile,
worked it over to resemble a new one and delivered it to the plaintiff
was found to have warranted and represented that the automobile
being sold was new. This was found to be “a false representation of
an existing fact; and, if it was material and induced the plaintiff to
accept something entirely different from that which he had
contracted for, it clearly was a fraud which, upon its discovery and a
tender of the property back to the seller, [it] entitled the plaintiff to
56
rescind the trade and recover the purchase money.”
On the petitioner’s insistence that the private complainant was
proscribed from charging him with estafa based on the principle of
caveat emptor, case law has it that this rule only requires the
purchaser to exercise such care and attention as is usually exercised
by ordinarily prudent men in like business affairs, and only applies
to defects which are open and patent to the service of one exercising
57
such care. In an avuncular case, it was held that:
. . . The rule of caveat emptor, like the rule of sweet charity, has often been
invoked to cover a multitude of sins; but we think its protecting mantle has
never been stretched to this extent. It can only
_______________
54 Burnett v. Boyer, 285 S.W. 670; Madton v. Norton, 238 N.W. 686.
55 Kraus v. National Bank of Commerce of Mankato, 167 N.W. 353.
56 Snellgrove v. Dingelhoef, 103 S.E. 418 (1920).
57 Judd v. Walker, 89 S.W. 558.
305
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 305
Guinhawa vs. People
be applied where it is shown or conceded that the parties to the contract

stand on equal footing and have equal knowledge or equal means of
knowledge and there is no relation of trust or confidence between them. But,
where one party undertakes to sell to another property situated at a distance
and of which he has or claims to have personal knowledge and of which the
buyer knows nothing except as he is informed by the seller, the buyer may
rightfully rely on the truth of the seller’s representations as to its kind,
quality, and value made in the course of negotiation for the purpose of
inducing the purchase. If, in such case, the representations prove to be false,
neither law nor equity will permit the seller to escape responsibility by the
plea that the buyer ought not to have believed him or ought to have applied
58
to other sources to ascertain the facts. . . .
It bears stressing that Azotea and the petitioner had every

opportunity to reveal to the private complainant that the van was
defective. They resolved to maintain their silence, to the prejudice of
the private complainant, who was a garment merchant and who had
no special knowledge of parts of motor vehicles. Based on the
surrounding circumstances, she relied on her belief that the van was
brand new. In fine, she was the innocent victim of the petitioner’s
fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment.
The petitioner cannot pin criminal liability for his fraudulent
omission on his general manager, Azotea. The two are equally liable
for their collective fraudulent silence. Case law has it that wherever
the doing of a certain act or the transaction of a given affair, or the
performance of certain business is confided to an agent, the authority
to so act will, in accordance with a general rule often referred to,
carry with it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral
acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main act or
59
business authorized.
_______________
58 Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, et al., 173 N.W. 255 (1919).

59 Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273 (1952).
306

Guinhawa vs. People
The MTC sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of from

two months and one day, as minimum, to four months of arresto
mayor, as maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the
trial court. This is erroneous. Section 2 of Act 4103, as amended,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides that

the law will not apply if the maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one year:
SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision
of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to
those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended
by Act No. 4225.)
In this case, the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on the

petitioner was four months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence, the
MTC was proscribed from imposing an indeterminate penalty on the
petitioner. An indeterminate penalty may be imposed if the
minimum of the penalty is one (1) year or less, and the maximum
exceeds one (1) year. For example, the trial court may impose an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, since the maximum term of
imprisonment it imposed exceeds one (1) year. If the trial court opts
to impose a penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year or less, it
should not impose an indeterminate penalty, but a straight penalty of
one (1) year or less instead. Thus, the petitioner may be sentenced to
a straight penalty of one (1) year, or a straight penalty of less than
one (1) year, i.e., ten (10) months or eleven (11) months. We believe
that considering the attendant circumstances, a
307
VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 307

Guinhawa vs. People
straight penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months is reasonable.

Conformably with Article 39 in relation to paragraph 3, Article
38 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner shall suffer subsidiary
imprisonment if he has no property with which to pay the penalty of
fine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Considering the surrounding
circumstances of the case, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to
suffer a straight penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. The

petitioner shall suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed with

modification.
Notes.—The elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused

defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit,
and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. (Santos vs.
Sandiganbayan, 347 SCRA 386 [2000])
Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious
name, or by falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or by imaginary
transactions or similar forms of deceit executed prior to or
simultaneous with the fraud. (People vs. Lapis, 391 SCRA 131
[2002])
——o0o——
308
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Guinhawa V People

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Guinhawa V People

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/9/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 468

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JAIME GUINHAWA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 279

Guinhawa vs. People

law, not by the title or caption given by the Prosecutor.—Section 6, Rule

Criminal Law; Other Deceits; The false or fraudulent representation

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guinhawa vs. People

result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that

By using ﬁctitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, inﬂuence,

Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Batas Pambansa Bilang 129; Section 32 of

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 281

Guinhawa vs. People

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Representation may be in form of

Same; Same; Fraud or deceit may be committed by omission.— The

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guinhawa vs. People

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Concealment; Mere silence is not in

fraudulent concealment are of the same genre. Fraudulent concealment

Same; Same; Sales; If, in a contract of sale, the vendor knowingly

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 283

Guinhawa vs. People

Same; Same; Same; Where a vendee only made a partial investigation

Same; Same; Same; Principle of Caveat Emptor; The principle of

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guinhawa vs. People

Same; Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103); The

indeterminate sentence may be imposed if the minimum of the penalty is one

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 285

Guinhawa vs. People

trial court may impose an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 287

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guinhawa vs. People

1. CHECK UP SUSPENSION (FRONT)

NOTE: FRONT STEP BOARD HAS BEEN ALREADY DAMAGED

The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor of Naga City accuses Jaime

12 Exhibits “K” to “K-1.”

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 289

false manifestations and fraudulent representations, sold to said private complainant,

Guinhawa testiﬁed that he was a dealer of brand new Toyota,

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 291

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Thus, accused is condemned to pay actual damages in the amount of One

Guinhawa appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court

31 Records, pp. 641-642.

VOL. 468, AUGUST 25, 2005 293

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY

AS MORAL DAMAGES, P200,000.00 AS EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

On January 5, 2004, the CA rendered judgment afﬁrming with

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby partially

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Costs against petitioner.