THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BONIFACIO BALANSI
alias "BAN-OS", defendant-appellant.

1990-07-19 | G.R. No. 77284

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J.:

The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January 30, 1982 at
Balinciagao, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he, armed with a Garand rifle, went
inside the house of the victim, then allegedly fast asleep, where he shot him twice and killed him.
Treachery was held to be present, and so were evident premeditation and employment of means to
weaken the defense of the victim. 1

The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, and
a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while the victim was the Provincial Development
Officer of Kalinga-Apayao. 2 The incident took place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao Sur,
Pasil, at or about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The prosecution presented eight witnesses. The
defense placed two on the stand.

The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to die and to pay a total of
P590,000.00 in actual (P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning capacity) and moral damages, plus
costs. 3

It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then sleeping at the house of his parents
located opposite the house where the wedding celebration was being held. At or about 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, Beatrice Canao, a Balinciagao resident, saw the accused, her uncle, standing at the door
of the house of the victim's parents, also her relatives, armed with a gun.

She inquired what he was doing there and he allegedly replied that he was waiting for the victim. She
then entered the premises to locate an old newspaper with which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she
saw the victim asleep. When she left, she saw the accused at the doorway. After disposing of her rice
cake (which she gave to a certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots, fired at an interval of two or
three seconds, emanating apparently from the house, to which she shortly rushed. She allegedly met the
accused at the steps leading to the second floor, brandishing his rifle. 4

She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!" 5 She then reported the matter to the police.

Yulo Asbok, a fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao resident, also heard two
gunshots ring that afternoon. He said that he was three meters from the house where the gunshot
sounds seemed to have originated. He allegedly proceeded there but was met by the accused at the
steps. They allegedly grappled for possession of the rifle, which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked
of gunpowder. He was able to wrest possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran away and fled to
Pogon, also in Balinciagao. He later learned that the victim had been shot and that he died at Lubuagan
Hospital. 6

Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the wedding celebration when she heard two gunshots.
She made inquiries subsequently and was informed that the victim was her husband. She claimed that
she saw the accused standing at the entrance of her parents-in-law's house prior thereto. 7
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Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at that celebration when he heard the shots. He
then went to the victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang out from. He did not allegedly have
in mind that somebody had actually been fired upon but thought that may be there had been a burglary.

He ascended the steps of the house where the accused earlier met Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok,
and entered the second floor. He saw the victim lying in his room, whom he initially believed to be merely
sleeping, but who was, in fact, dead. 8

The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal of Pasil Central School, and Artemio Dalsen,
the victim's brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of the victim, a motive they imputed to
the accused.

Valera testified that revenge was supposedly a tradition among Kalingas (of which both the accused and
victim were members), which, however, could be prevented by the dusa, meaning, apparently,
intervention and mediation by community elders. 9 Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the accused had
nursed along-standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of delaying on alleged award for the
construction of a bridge in Balinciagao in 1979. 10

After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its evidence. It presented two witnesses, the
accused himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana, Balinciagao.

The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration on that fateful afternoon when he too
heard two gunshots break in the air. As a member of the CHDF, he allegedly took it upon himself to
investigate the matter. He said that he went to the direction where the shots came from and was on his
way to the entrance of the house when Yulo Asbok allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed
the firearm he was carrying. He did not allegedly know at that time that the victim had been shot and
allegedly learned of it only on the following day. He admitted having ran away but allegedly because he
had been implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily turned himself in to the police. Masadao Jose
corroborated his statement. 11

In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed: "While there is no eye witness who testified to
having seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the circumstances pointed to him as
the perpetrator of the crime." 12

The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the lips of Yulo Asbok and Beatrice Candao,
as well as the accused himself, who admitted having been at the scene of the crime. Obviously, the
judge did not lend credence to the accused's defense.

The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first, in appreciating circumstantial evidence,
second, in appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting his defense of alibi.

We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.

While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion
than that the accused was guilty of shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen, to death in the afternoon of
January 30, 1982. These circumstances are as follows: (1) He was seen standing by the entrance of the
house where the victim had sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots were heard.
Three witnesses saw him: Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen. (2) Moments later, two
shots rang out, one after the other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok, Dalsen and Nicolas
Balais. (3) Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw him
there, whom he wrestled for the possession of the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
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Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 13

As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant, who could have
perpetrated the offense.

The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely, to investigate the
matter, and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo Asbok. His protests notwithstanding,
we too must reject this defense. Two reasons persuade us. First, he has not ascribed any motive to Yulo
Asbok as to why he, Asbok, should testify falsely against him. Second, he admits having fled
immediately thereafter. If he were truly innocent, he would not have done so. We have held time and
again that flight is a silent admission of guilt. 14

As aptly put: "The righteous is brave as a lion, but the wicked man fleeth." 15

If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to do with the killing
and who had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an inquiry, it would have been he, the
accused, to be the first to make a report to the authorities so that Asbok could be brought to the bar of
justice. If the latter did try to prevent him from performing his duties, as he claimed, 16 he should have
gone to lengths to implicate Asbok, because that too was his duty.

We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, notably Asbok, who
stated that he was the first to be in the victim's house after the shooting (aside from the accused), in the
face of Canao's testimony that she also had been there. The Court is not convinced that an
inconsistency exists. For obviously, Asbok had been mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.

The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to the
accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even without any successful showing of a motive,
the circumstantial evidence on hand nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising from
treachery, evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken the defense of the victim. As to
treachery, jurisprudence is ample that the manner of attack must be shown. While there are testimonies
to the effect that the victim was "fast asleep", we can not safely presume that he was still in that
condition when the accused sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not
justifiably say that the victim was still actually still asleep at that time. 17

Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident premeditation, it is

necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and execution. 18 The prior determination of the accused to do away with the
victim has not been sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.
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That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim's defenses is likewise missing in this case.
As we said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we can not say for sure, based on
the evidence before us, that the appellant did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.

We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the victim was not shot in
his house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the dwelling place need not be owned by the victim.
19 In that case, it was held:

La circunstancia agravante de morada, aunque no fuese la casa propia de los occisos, debe estimarse
porque segun el Tribunal Supremo de España "no solo por el respeto que el domicilio ajeno merece,
como especie de complemento de la personalidad, y por el que es debido al hogar de la familia, sino por
el no menor de que es digna la residencia privada de cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de
malicia que revela quien busca a su victima alli en donde se encuentra con la confianza y abandono
propios del lugar elegido para el descanso y las intimidades de la vida: razon por la cual habla el Codigo
penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en sentido legal, sino de morada en su acepcion real, que no es otra
que la del paraje en donde una persona hace estancia de asiento. . . . a titulo de nuesped, o por otro
cualquiera." (S. de 25 de Junio de 1886, 2 Viada., 5 ed., 329.) 20

In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the house of another. Dwelling there
was held to be aggravating.

According to earlier cases, including U.S. v. Bredejo, 21 our ruling was that the dwelling place must be
owned by the offended party. In another decision, People v. Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where
he was killed. In People v. Guhiting, 23 morada was not likewise considered for the same reasons.

However, more recent cases have since followed the lead of Basa, notably People v. Galapia 24 and
People v. Sto. Tomas. 25

"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of
respect" 26 and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than if he who offends
him elsewhere. However, one does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the house of
another because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by
the same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment, "home" to
him. He is entitled to respect even for that short moment.

It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his very parents, who
raised him until he could be on his own.

Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the accused-appellant
responsible for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable for simple homicide aggravated by
dwelling. Under the Revised Penal Code, he must suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period, there
being no mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance. 27

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate

penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal. The grant of damages is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

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Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Original Records, 1.
2. Rollo, 64.
3. Id., 79-80.
4. Id., 67-68.
5. Original Records, id., 9.
6. Rollo, id., 66-67.
7. Id., 64.
8. Id., 65-66.
9. Id., 68-70.
10. Id., 71-72.
11. Id., 74-76.
12. Id., 76.
13. RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 5, now sec. 4 of the REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE.
14. See People v. Espinosa, No. 62613, January 17, 1986, 141 SCRA 110.
15. See People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 65017, November 13, 1989.
16. T.s.n., Session of July 18, 1985, 177.
17. People v. Antugop, 94 Phil. 1046 (1954), (Unrep.).
18. 1 AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 352 (1987 ed.).
19. People vs. Basa, 83 Phil. 622 (1949).
20. Supra, 624-625.
21. 21 Phil. 23 (1911).
22. 82 Phil. 399 (1948).
23. 88 Phil. 672 (1951).
24. Nos. L-39303-05, August 1, 1978, 84 SCRA 526.
25. Nos. L-40367-69, August 22, 1985, 138 SCRA 306.
26. AQUINO, id., 315.
27. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 64, par. 3.

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