epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. AC 4762             June 28, 2004

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant, 

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint 1 with the then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo,
charging respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis
Oriental Chapter, for "having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late
husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00." According to complainant, respondent’s
unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband, who died "disillusioned and
embittered."2 The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr.
Espino and complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amount represented by
the eight checks which had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquito’s refusal to pay may be
due to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC (Cagayan de Oro), and
of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).

The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to complainant’s late husband, Mr.
Virgilio M. Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of
Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis
Oriental. The discussion between Mr. Espino and the respondent resulted in the sale of the property to
respondent.3 Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent, 4 the purchase price of the land
was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments. 5 Pursuant to the terms of payment in the
agreement, respondent issued eight post-dated checks, totaling P736,060.00.6 Respondent then entered into a joint
venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and
its development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. 7 The land was eventually titled in
the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.

Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated
demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow,
complainant, then tried to collect from respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerous
pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.

In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that
he had employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. The
complaint, according to respondent, stemmed from complainant’s lack of knowledge as to "the real story" of the
transaction between complainant’s husband and respondent. He also vehemently took exception to the imputation
that he was banking on the influence of his father-in-law and uncle-in-law.

Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims, however, is that the
nonpayment was justified by the unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have with respect to the right-of-way of the
land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made assurances that the land had a right-of-way required for its development,
but respondent later found out that such road-right-of-way required the consent of four other land owners, and the
expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe. According to respondent, he and Mr. Espino
had agreed that the latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of the same until the right-of-way
problem of the land had been resolved.8 Respondent’s position is that until the problem of obtaining a right-of-way to
the land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be "very
unfair and unjust" for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed and sold. 9

Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino or his heirs from the
purchase of the land, the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr.
Espino’s son in a criminal case. He later on manifested that he has fully paid the portion of the land which had been
titled in his name through the same advances and incurred expenses. 10

In a resolution dated November 26, 1997, 11 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation/decision, and assigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,12 Investigating Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found that "the
facts and credible evidence made available in this case indubitably establish respondent’s failure to live up to the
demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics." For having
failed to act with candor and fairness toward complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and ordered to immediately account with complainant
regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business
partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution adopting/approving the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay, finding that "respondent’s lack of fairness and candor and honesty
[was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent was wanting in fairness,
candor and honesty demanded of him by the Lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. We find, however, the recommended penalty of six (6) months suspension too light considering
respondent’s gross misconduct.

Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an agreement between
respondent and complainant’s late husband for the sale of the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight
checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land
sold had an existing road-right-of-way. Complainant’s exhibits were formally offered as early as January 6,
1999,13 and were admitted without objections from respondent. 14

In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal excuse or defense for
nonpayment of the eight checks.

Respondent utterly failed in this regard.

From the termination of complainant’s presentation of evidence on December 1998 until Commissioner Dulay’s
report on November 12, 2002, the records show that respondent was unable to present evidence - either testimonial
or documentary - to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation.
Even respondent’s own statements - which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations -
fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or for clarificatory questions
by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his comment, but only went so far as to
mark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the
partnership agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than his own
allegations.

Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,15especially in the light of the numerous postponements and resettings he requested for and was
granted with, on the ground that he needed more time to prepare his evidence. We note that respondent was first
scheduled to present his evidence on December 14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orders submitting
the case for resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary evidence.

Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to
spend for travel expenses of his witnesses.16 We are not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial
constraints could have prevented respondent from presenting the originals of the documents attached to his
comment, proving, among others, the alleged advances and costs on Mr. Espino’s behalf. The originals of these
documents are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the absence of testimony, respondent could
have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done himself in Cagayan de Oro to
keep down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this option. 17 But he did neither.

All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could not present evidence
because there really was none to justify his nonpayment.18

Even if we were to excuse respondent’s procedural lapse and consider his written pleadings as testimony, we agree
with Commissioner Dulay that respondent’s problems with respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs.
Ares do not excuse his nonpayment. As stated in the IBP-CBD report:

[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of respondent….We note that
respondent has already taken title over the property together with Guadalupe Ares by making complainant’s
late husband, sign over the property by way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondent’s position vis-
à-vis the widowed complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has assumed responsibility
for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of the problem. To [sic] our mind he has used
the alleged road-right-of-way problem only as an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the
complainant payment of what is due her. Respondent also alleges and blames the deceased husband of
complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bare allegations and remain
unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in the business venture and are now the titled
owners of the property. The seller cannot be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondent’s actuations
in the whole transaction is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of the bar.
Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he has unreasonably delayed
and failed to account with complainant for a long time and the fact of his having allowed the checks he
issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable and censurable behavior for a member of the bar. 19 [citations omitted]
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondent’s indifference to
complainant’s entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court.
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
towards complainant and her late husband, 20 first by allowing the eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by
ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally by
deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the property of complainant
and her late husband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares’ name, the injustice of respondent’s different
maneuvers to evade payment of the eight checks - due and unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.

It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without regard to its deleterious
effects to public interest and public order. We have already declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel,21that the
issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious
doubt, though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. 22 He not only sets himself liable for a
serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.

It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. 23 A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 24 Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless checks - Lao v.
Medel,25 Co v. Bernardino,26 and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,27 - we find respondent’s reprehensible conduct warrants
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately account with complainant regarding
the sale of the piece of land, which has been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner.

Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing*, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5161             April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to
advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and
the canons of legal and judicial ethics.

The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are
Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.;
and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:

a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 43,908 square
meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite;

b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square meters, more or
less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;

c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square meters, more or
less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used
his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal,
unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his
wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses
Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document
to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and
Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and
received by, Felicisima and Miriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he
knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the
falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife
Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603
to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy and Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite, filed by complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made
gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only
children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a
new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent,
 Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from
the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the
reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of
profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for
Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew
that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August
1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of
which he was an employee.

In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not take advantage
of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.

Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not motivated by any
desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All
the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever
complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.

The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No. 5964 for the
reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the
only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clear
oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His
conformity through his signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and
his wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by
the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro
Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by courts.

Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with numerous
lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of Documents, Titles, and
Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.

In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother and allegedly
implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden
death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the
latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondent’s wife
herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina,
and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive
onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.

On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation or decision.3

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. 4

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted
Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The
respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge
as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:

LAWYER'S OATH

I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice
is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath,
they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of
justice.6 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

...

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

...

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent took the oath
as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant,
respondent miserably failed.

The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November
1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the
exclusion of their other siblings. 7 There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the
estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to
complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while
she was in the Philippines.8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias,
Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.

It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted 9 regarding the falsification of complainant’s signature in the
Extrajudicial Settlement10 dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the
complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that
document.11 Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public document. 12

Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing falsification, he
presented13 such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his
wife.14 He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the
complainant and her other co-heirs.15 Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared
the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must have
kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.17 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and
belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 18 As
such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. 19 He should not, therefore, engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.20 He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits
any such unbecoming act or conduct.21

Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the other siblings in
LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere oversight does not deserve credence
in view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the
petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot. 22 Second, during the hearing of said
case when the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter
said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:

ATTY. TORRES:

Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting, Jr. and Julita
Reynante?

WITNESS:

A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.

Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?

A None, sir.23

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony 24 in court, and he never corrected the
same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case. 25 Moreover, in knowingly offering in
evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony. 26

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good
faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice."27 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he
permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such
testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on
his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary
action against him.28

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit of Loss,
which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina
admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she was never in
possession of the title29 and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the
release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong
that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be
released within the month.30 Respondent’s information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12
August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter. 31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on
the part of the respondent.

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the
primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.32 While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our
sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar.33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove
an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. 34 Verily, given the
peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the
severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657             February 23, 2004

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY,1respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO SR., J.:

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the
disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.

The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the
notarial law, thus:

Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still
subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January
1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th
1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after December
31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.

b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his commission in December
1989.2

...

WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:

1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.

2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.

3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.

5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any
agency and or public servants involved in this administrative case.

6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.

and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the premises. 3

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:

THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this office, the following data appear:

1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in the following years:

a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985

b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987

2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial
reports in the ff. years:

a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980

b             February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980

c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980

d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission

e. November to December 1980-no entry

f. January to February 1981 - no entry

g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission

h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission

i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984

j. July to December 1983 - no entry

k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986

l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986

4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos
after December 1985.

5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on January 6,
1988 until December 31, 1989. 4

In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also
submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial
register. The respondent further averred as follows:

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the respondent before the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of
the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;

That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al.
versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The
undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs. 6

Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-blown
investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10,
2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation. 7

In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held
at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter
was forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002. 8 The complainant
presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo. 9

In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:

It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law
by (a) notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-
forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these
infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both
for one year, and his present commission, if any, be revoked. 10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his defense, while the
complainant presented documentary evidence to support the charges:

It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording
of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial
Register." And, as already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary public for
1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.

On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record Books available in the notarial
section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial
Commission contains items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary
public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982."

If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose so (at least, for the years
1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of
Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law,
such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General,
together with the oath of office of the notary public. 11

Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the complainant, that the
respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being commissioned as a notary public therefor,
considering that his earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984. 12

The Procedural Issues

Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.

On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC

On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who
were likewise members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases
against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that
it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the
respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.

Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment
on June 13, 2001.

The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He Was
Still A Practicing Lawyer

The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his
disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a
practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts
committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:

Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals
and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided,
further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.14

The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance
with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14,
thus:

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence
adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall
submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the record
and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court.

It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement
to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the
Solicitor General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final
action.15

Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as
such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 16of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court,
the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court. 17

The Substantive Issues

The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge
Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the
Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary
authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact
that the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would
be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public
official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.19

However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members
of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC 20 which took effect on November 3,
2003. It reads in part:

1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative
complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts
filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to
harass the respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and recommendation of the Office of
the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may
be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he
may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively sanctioned as a
member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
 2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b)
for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that
it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the
case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10)
days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later than 30
days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of
compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date
without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be
withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and,
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.

In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or
on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to harass the
respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.

A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The Judiciary

It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. 22 In fact, even
the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition
and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense.

Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent
judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent
therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was
appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as
a judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an officer of the court. 25

In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We
ratiocinated, thus:

...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral
righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond
information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know,
that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. ...27

The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by substantial evidence. 28 The
complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing
lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to
present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.

The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in
this Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys,
which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.30

Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of
Falsification Of Public Documents

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.31 Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. 32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.35

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents
and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 37

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public
faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function. 38

The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record

The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to
decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. 39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public
for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in his
answer that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the
submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the
respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof
of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register. 40

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against
him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny
the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. 41

The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such
was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or
of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 42 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There
can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the
public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 43

An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe

The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but
its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because
his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.45

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen: 47

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.
Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee 49 the Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s recommendation that
the charge for immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce
evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct, the
respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that her
paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit
affair ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses do not prescribe. 51

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape
the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of
the matter involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.

Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without
the requisite authority therefor.

At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability

Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. 52 By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such
standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 54 In representing that he was
possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the commission of the act
complained of;56 that there was no private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely
affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired judge who
deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits. 57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00
is justified in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-

SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in the Result)

VITUG, J.:

Allow me to express, very briefly, my views on the various scenarios appurtenant to the subject of inquiry.

In A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, respondent Judge, now retired, has been charged on 21 March 2001, while still an
incumbent judge, with having transgressed, prior to his appointment to the judiciary, the Notarial Law.
A. Exceptionally, a judge may be held administratively accountable for acts committed before his
appointment to the Judiciary.

Generally, a judge is not made to account administratively for acts committed prior to his appointment. In
Sevilla v Salubre,1 respondent judge was charged with misappropriating for his own benefit money entrusted
to him by his client while he was still a practicing lawyer. He, however, continued to ignore, even after his
appointment in the judiciary, his previous client’s demand for restitution. The Court explained: “Being the
visible representation of law, and more importantly, of justice, the people see in the respondent the
intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. If while still in active litigation practice lawyers do
not know how to (so) uphold this kind of justice to their clients previous to their appointment as Judges, how
then could people expect them to render judgments in the cases before them?” In the earlier case of Alfonso
v. Juanson2 where respondent judge was simply admonished for “appearance of impropriety,” the Court said
that he could not be disciplined for immoral acts committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary absent
showing that he continued to engage in these acts after his appointment.

B. The retirement or resignation of a judge could preclude the filing thereafter of an administrative charge
against him for an infraction committed during his incumbency.

The filing of an administrative proceeding against a judge is predicated on the holding of his office or
position in the judiciary; thus, his resignation or retirement from office could bar an administrative case 3from
being initiated. An administrative charge already pending upon resignation or retirement is not necessarily
rendered moot since the penalty that can still be imposed, if the respondent is found guilty, goes beyond just
dismissal from the service. Noteworthy is A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which provides that if a complaint against a
judge is filed within six months before his compulsory retirement for an alleged infraction occurring at least a
year before such filing, and shown prima facie to be intended to harass the judge, the complaint must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

C. A judge, already retired, may, but only under certain conditions, be subject to disciplinary action for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.

A judge, already retired, may yet be subject to disciplinary sanction for an act committed prior to his
appointment in the judiciary if (a) the judge has persisted, even after his appointment to the judiciary, in his
assailed act, and (b) the administrative charge is filed while still an incumbent in the judiciary.

D. If, such as in the instant administrative case, the two conditions, above, are not shown, respondent judge
may still be disciplinarily dealt with for his misconduct not as a judge but as a lawyer.

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis; neither purely civil nor purely criminal. It is not -
and it does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit; it is rather an investigation into the conduct of an officer
of the court. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. Interest in the service of the profession is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney may still be a fit person to continue
enjoying his privileges as such.4 It may thus be concluded that the administrative complaint can still be
pursued.

While the cause of action does not prescribe, it is to be assumed, however, that the complaint must be filed
within a reasonable time. What may or may not be a reasonable time is determined by circumstances
peculiar and pertinent to the case.5 The administrative charge for alleged violation of the Notarial Law in this
instance is said to have been committed more than twenty years ago by respondent judge prior to his
appointment in the judiciary, filed several years after that appointment and just about a year prior to his
retirement. No specific injury or damage has been shown for the alleged violation. The circumstances are
enough, in my view, to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, and I so vote.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. CA-04-38. March 31, 2004

FRANCISCO GALMAN CRUZ, appellee, 

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a verified Complaint-Affidavit dated September 29, 2002, Francisco Galman Cruz charged Court of Appeals
Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos of the Court of Appeals, four presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan, namely: Judge Victoria Fernandez-Bernardo (Branch 18), Judge Caesar A. Casanova (Branch
80), Judge Renato C. Francisco (Branch 19) and Judge Manuel D. J. Syciangco (Branch 6); and Judge Ester R.
Chua-Yu of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan (Branch 1) with Grave Misconduct and Gross
Ignorance of the Law.

It appears that complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. 94-98 for ejectment before the MTC of Malolos,
Bulacan involving a parcel of land owned by the Province of Bulacan. 1 The complaint was filed by the then
"provincial attorney", now respondent RTC Judge Syciangco, under a special power of attorney executed by then
Governor Roberto Pagdanganan in favor of the Provincial General Services Officer, Engr. Romeo S. Castro. 2Initially,
the case was assigned to Branch 2 but when the presiding judge of said court was transferred to another court,
respondent, then MTC, Judge Syciangco was appointed in his stead. Respondent Judge Syciangco immediately
recused himself because he was the former counsel for the plaintiff. Civil Case No. 94-98 was then assigned to
Branch 1, presided by Judge Mario Capellan who also inhibited himself on motion of the complainant. In view
thereof, Executive Judge Natividad Dizon of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, designated respondent Judge Chua-Yu
of the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan, to try and decide said ejectment case.3 On September 5, 1997, respondent Judge
Chua-Yu rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of complainant. 4

Complainant filed an appeal with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as RTC Case No. 884-M-97. The case
was assigned to Branch 80 presided by respondent Judge Casanova. On March 3, 1999, respondent Judge
Casanova affirmed the decision rendered by respondent Judge Chua-Yu. 5

Dissatisfied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
52309.6 On February 28, 2000, respondent Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, as ponente affirmed the judgment of
the lower court.7

Undaunted, complainant further appealed to this Court but the same was dismissed for having been filed out of
time.

On October 15, 2001, complainant filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 689-M-2001. 8 The case was raffled to Branch 19 presided by respondent Judge
Francisco. On October 22, 2001, respondent Judge Francisco denied the prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction.9

On October 29, 2001, complainant filed a motion for inhibition of respondent Judge Francisco. 10 He also filed a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of the prayer for TRO. On November 5, 2001, respondent Judge Francisco
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. The case was transferred to Branch 18 presided by respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo. On January 3, 2002, respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo denied the motion for
reconsideration.11 On September 10, 2002, complainant filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo. On October 1, 2002, respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo denied the motion for inhibition. 12

On September 30, 2002, complainant filed the complaint-affidavit against the above-named respondents 13 with the
following allegations:

Respondent Judge Syciangco, as the then "provincial attorney", acted in connivance with then Governor
Pagdanganan in filing the complaint for ejectment which did not have the sanction of the Provincial Board.
Respondent Judge Chua-Yu tried and decided the ejectment case although she did not have jurisdiction considering
she was a not a judge of Malolos, Bulacan where the property was located. Respondent Judge Casanova affirmed
the judgment of respondent Judge Chua-Yu. Respondent Justice Aliño-Hormachuelos affirmed the judgment of
respondent Judge Casanova. Respondent Judge Francisco refused to grant a temporary restraining order (TRO).
Respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo refused to issue a TRO based on his motion for reconsideration. All the
respondents committed "misconduct and corruption, inefficient (sic) and gross inexcusable negligence; and simple
violation of law on jurisdiction and fraud on administrative law; and knowingly rendering unjust judgment – void
judgment."14

Required to comment, each of the respondents filed separate comments denying the allegations leveled against
them. Respondent Judge Syciangco alleges that he is being charged for acts he performed when he was the
Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan. The other respondents aver that they acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence in deciding the case before them. All the respondents submit that the complaint is baseless and
complainant should be sanctioned for filing an unfounded complain which robbed respondents of precious time
which could otherwise have been devoted to the cases in court.

In its Evaluation Report dated January 29, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit inasmuch as complainant questions the correctness of the decisions or
orders issued by respondents which is not within the province of an administrative case. The OCA further
recommended that complainant be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 15

Approving the recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in a Resolution dated February 24, 2003, dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit and required complainant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 16

On March 21, 2003, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint. 17 The Court
denied the same in a Resolution dated July 8, 2003 and reiterated the Resolution dated February 24, 2003 requiring
complainant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 18

On August 4, 2003, complainant filed his compliance. He strongly reiterates that, with all honesty and belief, his
complaint contains "full of proof of pieces of evidentiary facts" that would show a prima facie case against
respondents which the Court should investigate. Complainant points out that it was former Governor Roberto
Pagdanganan who ordered the filing of ejectment case against him in the sala of Judge Syciangco who used to be
the Legal Counsel of the Province of Bulacan. Complainant submits that this fact proves connivance, fraud and
deception between Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan which he made as one of his basis in filing
the administrative case.19

In his Memorandum Report dated February 12, 2004, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends
that complainant be cited for contempt of court for filing an unfounded or baseless complaint. He opines:

Complainant’s explanation is lacking in substance, and his theory of conspiracy is based on mere suspicion and
speculation. The connection which complainant seeks to establish from the order to file ejectment case against him
and the decision reached in said case is tenuous, and that the conclusion he seeks to draw that there was
conspiracy is without any basis.

.........

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to obstruct, embarrass or influence the court in
administering justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful
purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the
lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the canons of professional ethics, for which a lawyer like complainant may be
administratively disciplined.

It is therefore appropriate to enjoin herein complainant and other members of the bar who file administrative
complaints against members of the bench that they should do so after proper circumspection so as not to unduly
burden the Court in the discharge of its function of administrative supervision over judges and court personnel.

The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary measures against erring judges, including dismissal and
suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest efforts of the Bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers like
complainant should also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to courts as well as to their clients and that the filing of
unfounded or frivolous charges against judges such as the one at hand as a means of harassing them whose
decisions have not been to their liking will subject them to appropriate disciplinary action as officers of the court.

The Court finds the recommendation of the Court Administrator to be well taken.

The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in
their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be
inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position unbearable.20 Much less can a judge be so held accountable where to all indications, as in
this case, the judgment complained of is far from erroneous. The judgment in the ejectment case has gone through
all the levels of review, it is high time that any doubts on the validity of the decision be laid to rest.
Furthermore, there is no cogent reason to delve into the allegations of connivance, fraud and deception between
Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan as they are not sustained by an iota of evidence but are only
based on the unfounded perception of complainant. Familiarity between Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of
Bulacan is insufficient proof, as connivance or conspiracy transcends companionship. This Court can not give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. 21 It is well settled that in administrative proceedings,
the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. 22 In the absence
of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondents have regularly performed their official
duties,23 as in this case.

A thorough review of the record also reveals that complainant has the penchant for calling for the inhibition of judges
when he perceives the judge is partial or when he receives an unfavorable order or decision from a judge. In fact,
the ejectment case passed through more than five different judges due to complainant’s proclivity to file motions for
inhibition. In doing so, complainant has shown that he was avidly shopping for judges favorable to his cause. His
actuations caused needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant
loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Complainant may strongly disagree with the decisions of the respondents but unsubstantiated allegations of grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law serve no purpose other than to harass judges and cast doubt on the
integrity of the entire judiciary. As a member of the bar for half a century, 24 complainant should know better than to
file an unfounded administrative complaint.

Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although the Court will never tolerate or condone any
act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples’ faith in the
judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. 25

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer 26 are
enlightening:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out
one such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is
the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against `unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be `with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
‘can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold.’

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is other’s lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court’s decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility. 27

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,28 Justice Sanchez further elucidated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts
so essential to the proper administration of justice."

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client.
A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always
keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society,
their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." As
rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks
the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the
judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course
be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen
that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the
court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the
orderly administration of justice."
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the
language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice —
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. 29 (Citations omitted)

In fine, the administrative case against respondents is utterly devoid of factual and legal basis. It is frivolous,
calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast a groundless aspersion on respondents’ integrity and reputation.
Complainant’s unfounded imputations against respondents is malicious and offends the dignity of the entire
judiciary. For this, complainant is guilty of contempt of court and must be sentenced to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

WHEREFORE, complainant lawyers Francisco Galman Cruz is found guilty of Contempt of Court and is FINED in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.