Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give 2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument
priority to education, science and technology, that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism amended, offend against the constitutional principle
and nationalism, accelerate social progress which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power,
and to promote total human liberation and by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
development. " followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical
Education. The general principle of non-delegation of
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces
protect and promote the right of all citizens to the more fundamental rule of the separation and
quality education at all levels and take allocation of powers among the three great
appropriate steps to make such education departments of government, 1 must be applied with
accessible to all. " circumspection in respect of statutes which like the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen complex and technical as medical education and the
has a right to select a profession or course of practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr.
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago
admission and academic requirements." in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public
Service Commission:2
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its
second half certain "State policies" which the One thing, however, is apparent in the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The development of the principle of separation of
petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus
demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the non potest delegare or delegate potestas non
statute and the administrative order they assail collide potest delegare, adopted this practice
with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by
17. They have not, in other words, discharged the G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922,
burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
heavy enough where the constitutional provision principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has
invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. modern government, giving rise to the
That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier adoption, within certain limits of the principle
where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
the second portion of Article II is cast, in language United States and England but in practically all
descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal
objectives of State policy and therefore highly and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939].
generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
compelled to speculate and to imagine how the governmental regulation and the increased
legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
could possibly offend the constitutional provisions constantly growing tendency toward the
pointed to by the petitioners. delegation of greater power by the legislature,
and toward the approval of the practice by the that public order is the health and physical safety and
courts." 3 well being of the population, the securing of which no
one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the effort and regulation.7
exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by whether there is some reasonable relation between the
then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 — prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
The standard may be either expressed or securing of the health and safety of the general
implied. If the former, the non-delegation community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps
objection is easily met. The standard though most usefully approached by recalling that
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
could be implied from the policy and purpose of branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector method of protecting the health and safety of the
Law, clearly the legislative objective is public public.8 That the power to regulate and control the
safety. What is sought to be attained as in practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
roads. 5 medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the
standardization and regulation of medical education" establishment of minimum medical educational
and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed
the statute itself, and that these considered together are courses in a recognized medical school — for admission
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non- to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
delegation principle. legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in closely related: the regulation of access to medical
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier,
and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify improvement of the professional and technical quality
just what factors or features of the NMAT render it of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
"unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They quality of those admitted to the student body of the
appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
unnecessary requirement when added on top of the in the process of admission, selectivity consisting,
admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the among other things, of limiting admission to those who
Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
established by internal regulations of the various studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
medical schools, public or private. Petitioners maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom standards in our professional schools in general, and
or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our
constitutionality is essentially a question of power or social and economic development, are widely known.
authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe
or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
regulation. Those questions must be address to the achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
political departments of the government not to the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
courts. of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country." Given the widespread use today of such
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the
must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions United States of America (the Medical College
impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The countries with far more developed educational
police power, it is commonplace learning, is the resources than our own, and taking into account the
pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
sovereign to secure and promote an the important prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT
interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end
the general community.6 An important component of of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
Footnotes
3
the cutoff score for the successful applicants, 70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied.
based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 4
35 SCRA 481 (1970).
11 Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. 5
(Emphasis supplied) 35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At
this point, Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a
useful footnote of the following tenor:
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They
assert, in other words, that students seeking admission
during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when "This Court has considered as
subjected to a different cutoff score than that sufficient standards, "public welfare,"
established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are Municipality of Cardona v.
discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (I 917);
Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this "necessary in the interest of law and
argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff order," Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39
scores for different school years may be dictated by Phil. 660 (1919); "public interest,"
differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328
the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a (1939); and "justice and equity and
function of such factors as the number of students who substantial merits of the case,"
have reached the cutoff score established the preceding International Hardwood v. Pangil
year; the number of places available in medical schools Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602
during the current year; the average score attained (1940). "
during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test
given during the current year, and so forth. To establish In People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125
a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of (1957), Mr. Justice J.B. L. Reyes said:
changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen
result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language "It is well established in this
in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or jurisdiction that, while the making of
capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with laws is a non-delegable activity that
the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances corresponds exclusively to Congress,
as they change. nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring and promulgate rules and
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for regulations to implement a given
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not legislation and effectuate its policies,
constitute an unconstitutional imposition. for the reason that the legislature
often finds it imprac ticable (if not
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED impossible) to anticipate and provide
and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the for the multifarious and complex
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is situations that may be met in
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should
be germane to the objects and
SO ORDERED. purposes of the law," that the
regulation be not in contradiction
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, with it, but conform to the standards
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, that the law prescribes-." (101 Phil.
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. at 1129; underscoring supplied).
6
E.G., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910);
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA
849 (1967) and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424
(1968).
7
E.G., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256
(1913); People vs. Witte, 146 NE 178 (1925)
and Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595
(1927).
8
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 98
L.Ed. 829, 74 SCT. 650 (1954); Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La.
1, 55 So2d. 761 (1951) and Reisinger v. Com.,
State Board of Medical Education and
Licensure, et al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).
9
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed.
623, 9 SCt. 231 (1889); State v. Bair, 112 Jowa
466,84 NW 532 (1900).
10
People v. Love, 298 Ill 304, 131 NE 809, 16
ALR 703 (1921); Collins v. Texas, 223 US 288,
56 L.Ed. 439, 32 SCt. 286 (1912).
11
See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, et al., 92
Wash. 431, 598 P. 2d. 707 (1979).