G.R. No.

79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and
TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.

COURTS, J.:

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and
another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of
its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which
was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations;
and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87
with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose
Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred
to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging
operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition;
Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which
were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE

REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE
REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF
LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE
RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT
PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition;
Rollo, p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed
to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in
support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of
the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly
covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under
TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged
by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda
issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber
license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege
which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was
not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses
were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been
denied in view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva
Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of
conservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic]
in respect to forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to
ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the
future generations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are
well documented. Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well
known. The government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of
sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty
and democratic way of life of its people.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request
that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied
this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA
No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be
declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of
reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted,
issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as
 the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them
when the national interest so requires.

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and
authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the
order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others,
where movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an
order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the
portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or
superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986,
the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a
resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President
ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the
MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a
supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their
respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May
22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which
militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative
orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview
of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule
of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA
72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2,
1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation
of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of
Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after
1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the
MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as
far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959);
Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R.
No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which
petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53],
seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be
pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In
the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and
reforestation practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to
have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became
apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other
entities in that year.

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present
case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public
respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet,
what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and
granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier
administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its
cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a
"reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained
of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761,
November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a
reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of
laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27,
1982, 119 SCRA 392).

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-
21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156
SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an
alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the
laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.
Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity
to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari
requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from
departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR
which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which
effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent
administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of
timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing
global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in
sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's
forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the
region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The
delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been
triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's
immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos
of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the
government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is
expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v.
Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R.
No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No.
L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27,
1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115;
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so
where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of
the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties
who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No.
L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the
Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the
previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the
issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of
the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department
officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use
and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to
a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the
part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public
policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of
judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of
the affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 186739-960, 2013-04-17
Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004... he organized a Multi-
Sectoral Consultative Assembly... in view of regulating and monitoring the... transportation
of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar.
During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the... salvaged forests
products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after
payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.[2]
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport
salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore
the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by
his co-accused
Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.[3]
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for
violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed
against Ruzol and Sabiduria
As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue
permits to transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only
express powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers...
expressly granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the
LGU's efficient and effective governance.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan... acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue
transport permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved
to the local... government of General Nakar.[9] To the graft court, Ruzol's issuance of the
subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.
Issues:
whether the authority to monitor and regulate the... transportation of salvaged forest product
is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as Municipal Mayor
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid... the LGU also has, under the
LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor
and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that... the parameters set forth by law for
their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the
mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with
such... authority.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word
"primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither
the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its
bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of all other government
instrumentalities, i.e.,... LGUs.
the claim of DENR's supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of
local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a
manifestation of usurpation of DENR's authority but rather an additional measure which was
meant to complement DENR's duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the
LGU's territorial jurisdiction.
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to
confer the subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power
to levy fees or charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through
the... enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the
fees are prescribed.[24] Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal
administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly... authorized
by law or ordinance."[25]
Ruzol's insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU's devolved function to "manage
and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-30[29] is specious.
Although We recognize the LGU's authority in the management and control of... communal
forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised
and enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its
effective and efficient execution.
Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to transport
salvaged forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being
lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly... belonging to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
he Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant in the present
case because the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the
DENR.[35]
We rule otherwise.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution's
theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to
transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the
official... functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with
the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products,
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such
authority.
Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to
complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014 CRISOSTOMO B.
AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, 
v.
 MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, Respondent.
VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision 1 and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper
remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10),
ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.

FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever
taken by the respondent mayor.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order
was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion

Contentions of West Cove:

1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million
peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings

The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the
issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, certiorari will not lie.

ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance  per  se which can therefore
be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident, its location and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is
not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance  per accidens

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance  per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise
of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local
Government Code authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives,
to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments.

FALLO:

Petition is denied