Quieting of Title. Case 1
Quieting of Title. Case 1
187633
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated February 19, 2009 and Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026, which reversed and set aside the
Decision4 dated July 6, 2007 of Branch 5, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5560 for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and
Damages.
The Facts
In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot
No. 3341, having been issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-
69103) on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. 10 Delfin
allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses
Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious,
exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 11
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963
Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta
Angoluan. 14 The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It
further stated that one-half (Yz) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the
whole property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.
Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341
by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970
1
executed by Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. 15 After
the sale, Calabazaron entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property
taxes. 16 He remains in possession up to this date. 17
Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters
of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by
Pantaleon in his favor. 18 After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his
porcion of propeny and paid the real property taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to
this date. 20
Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as
heir of Irene.21
Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of
them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from Spouses
Tappa.22
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and
intimidation.23 Bacud and Malupeng denied this allegation.24
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court
hereby orders:
1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793 and unqualifiedly vests in them
the full and untrammeled rights of ownership:
2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of portions of the lot in issue,
convey the same to the plaintiffs;
3. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
The R TC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on quieting of title under Article
447 of the Civil Code was met, thus:
Delfin and Maria's title is clear and unequivocal, and its validity has never been
assailed by the defendants – nor has any evidence been adduced that
successfully overcomes the presumption of validity and legality that the title of
Delfin and Maria enjoys.27 (Emphasis in the original.)
The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and
persuasive as the title in the name of the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents'
claim of ownership and Irene's antecedent ownership.28 The RTC stated that the 1963
Affidavit contains nothing more than the allegations of the affiants and does not, by
itself, constitute proof of ownership of land, especially as against documents such as
titles.29
2
Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following arguments:
First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently applied for, and were issued
a free patent over Lot No. 3341, and eventually OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18,
1992.30 They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in
possession of the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a
free patent under the law. 31
Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both
extinctive and acquisitive prescription have already set in.32 Respondents claimed that
both ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription of 30 years in claiming ownership of immovable property apply in the
case.33 They argued that more than 30 years have already lapsed from the time they
entered possession of the subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of the complaint on
September 9, 1999.34 They also pointed out that Spouses Tappa admitted in their
complaint that respondents were in possession of the lot since 1963. 35
Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1134
of the Civil Code applies to him by virtue of the two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his
favor. 36 It was never alleged that he had any participation in the alleged duress, force
and intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit.37 Hence, he is a purchaser in
good faith and for value. Calabazaron entered possession of the lot after the sale to him
in 1970, thus, the prescriptive period of l0 years had long lapsed. 38
Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the execution of the 1963
Affidavit was attended with force and intimidation, the complaint against them should
have been dismissed because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive period of 30
years under Article 1137 of the Civil Code applies to them.39 They also argued that the
action for quieting of title had already prescribed since the possession of Bacud and
Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by Spouses Tappa in their
complaint.40 Thus, Spouses Tappa had only until 1993 to file a complaint, which they
failed to do.
All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real
taxes on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3) have continued to possess the lot in the
concept of owners. 41
Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the
subject lot because they cannot rely on the certificate of title issued to them on
September 18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa
fraudulently obtained the free patent on Lot No. 3341 by concealing material facts;
specifically the fact of not being in possession of the lot since 1963. 43
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.44 The relevant dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
3
SO ORDERED.45
On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and explained that
their possession over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription.46 The CA noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that
they have not been in possession of the lot, and that respondents have been
continuously occupying portions of it since 1963. 47 It explained:
The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of filing of the present
complaint on September 9, 1999, which is more than 30 years, should be considered
against [S]pouses Tappa, and in favor of defendants-appellants. Settled is the rule that
an uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could ripen into
ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription, which is a mode of acquiring
ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Hence, appellants'
possession of the land has ripened into ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.48 (Citation omitted.)
On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two indispensable requisites for an
action to quiet title under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code were not met. 49
The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable
title to or an interest in the property. The CA explained that the free patent granted to
Spouses Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land,
thus:
The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over
the property, and were able to register it under the Torrens system, they have not
become its owners. The CA said that "[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring
ownership over immovable prope1ty---it does not create title nor vest one but it simply
confirms a title already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible."51
The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity is likewise unavailing. The CA ruled that no other
evidence (aside from Delfin's own testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of
fraud and intimidation, making the testimony self-serving.52 The CA further noted that
Delfin's own sister, Fermina, one of the signatories of the 1963 Affidavit, belied his
testimony. Fermina testified that they went to the house of one Atty. Carag to sign the
affidavit and they did so, on their own. 53
4
Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,54 which the CA denied.55
Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review on certiorari before this court, raising
the following issues:
II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title
cannot be collaterally attacked in this case;57 and
III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property
through acquisitive prescription. 58
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 59 an action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and 477 of the Civil Code,
which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
5
From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61
First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent
and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The
certificate of title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194.
We agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341
had already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the
coverage of the Public Land Act,62 which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects. whatsoever.1awp++i1 Private ownership of land-as when
there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information
or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present
or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same
land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The
Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be
public in character and have passed to private ownership.63
In Magistrado v. Esplana, 64 we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after
finding that the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent
that purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time
of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65
In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has
been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed.
After the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions
of the property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo
had been occupying the lot since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in
1934.66
Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as
1948, and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts
in the name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses Tappa were
likewise shown to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000. 68 Similarly,
respondents also declared their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their
names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to
2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. 70
6
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and
Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property,
while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.71 The
complaint stated further that since 1963. the respondents "continuously occupied
portion of the subject land." 72
In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been
segregated from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the certificate of title
were issued in 1992, Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession, at least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were also in
possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land
already segregated from the public domain.
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from the public domain
and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent
covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are
void.75
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents' possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to
obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some
of its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are
void not only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently
included76 respondents' portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar, 77 we held that "[i]f a
person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight
land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the
said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included."78
In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership. 79 As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title
issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.
The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although
an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses
Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses
Tappa's rights to the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or
claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but
is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or
terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the
title.80
7
The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated
and appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also
notarized by a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described,
and that one-half (l/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary
to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's. Respondents' argue that this
affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and
effectively, theirs.81
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription.
The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation in the
execution of the 1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated." 82 The CA pointed out that,
"[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove
the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the 1963
Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys
the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution.
Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are
wanting in this case.84
Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot
No. 3441 when they raised the issue of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same
argument against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal
effect. 85
Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally
attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529,86 provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case.
We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals,87 where we stated that,
"[ w ]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title,
the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document." 88 Ownership is
different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land. 89 Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably
used.90
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may
have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
8
title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.93
In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa's
claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed
that Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot since it was originally
owned by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo
and Irene became ipso facto co-owners of the lot. 95 Thus, respondents claim that, by
virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over
portions of Lot No. 3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions.96 Malupeng and Calabazaron claim
ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims
ownership and title by virtue of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of
Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as
the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.
Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is
indefeasible.97 We have already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not
apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of
the property.98 This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is
imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be
barred by the one-year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.