Bixler v. Scientology: Danny Masterson Demurrer Ruling
Bixler v. Scientology: Danny Masterson Demurrer Ruling
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See the May 3, 2019 First Amended General Order “In re Los Angeles Superior Court
– Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil”, page 4, par. 6(a), which states “” Electronic
documents must be electronically filed in PDF, text searchable format when
technologically feasible without impairment of the document’s image.”
2Except Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala, who is the husband of Plaintiff Chrissie Carnell
Bixler.
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by Defendant Daniel Masterson, a “field staff member” or recruiter for Church of
Scientology and Religious Technology, which organizations are allegedly led by
Defendant David Miscavige (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants’ conduct was
allegedly to retaliate against Plaintiffs for reporting the alleged sexual assaults to the
Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”).
Plaintiffs allege that at various times between 2002 and 2004 Masterson drugged
and sexually assaulted Plaintiff Marie Bobette Riales (“Riales”). In April 2017, Riales
reported the assaults by Masterson to the LAPD. Following her April 2017 report, Riales
suffered stalking, stalking of her children, harassing phone calls, text messages, and
social media messages, invasive surveillance, property damage, various trespasses,
identity theft, defamation, sexual harassment, threats of violence, arson, destruction of
property – particularly pets, and wire taping; all purportedly from agents of the
Defendants.
Plaintiffs allege that some time before 2004 Masterson drugged and sexually
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assaulted Plaintiff Jane Doe #2. In 2017, Jane Doe #2 reported the assault by
Masterson to the LAPD. Following her 2017 report, Jane Doe #2 suffered wire taping,
harassing phone calls, text messages, and social media messages, property damage,
invasive surveillance, stalking, threats of violence, defamation, and identity theft; all
purportedly from agents of the Defendants. Plaintiffs allege this conduct is designed to
dissuade Jane Doe #2 from, and punish Jane Doe #2 for, cooperating with law
enforcement.
Procedural History
On August 22, 2019, Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler (“Bixler”), Cedric Bixler-
Zavala (“Bixler-Zavala”), Jane Doe #1, Marie Bobette Riales (“Riales”), and Jane Doe
#2 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Church of Scientology
International and Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre International (collectively,
“Church of Scientology”), Defendant Religious Technology Center (“Religious
Technology”), Defendant Daniel Masterson (“Masterson”), Defendant David Miscavige
and Does 1-25 (collectively, “Defendants”) for (1) stalking in violation of Civ. Code §
1708.7, (2) physical invasion of privacy in violation of Civ. Code § 1708.8, (3)
constructive invasion of privacy in violation of Civ. Code § 1708.8, (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and (5) loss of consortium.
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not allege the information that leads Plaintiffs to form the alleged belief. The only
individuals (Miller, Seidler, Macgregor, Gold, Rinder, Miskovich) allegedly harassing
Plaintiffs are not named as defendants. The allegations against, variously, Masterson’s
attorney, publicist, business partner, and friend do not amount to a cause of action.
Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to allege that all Scientologists are agents of each other by failing
to allege the requisite degree of control over the actions of other Scientologists.
Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient for their First Cause of Action for stalking
because Plaintiffs lack allegations that Masterson personally engaged in any conduct or
made any threat to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient for their Second
Cause of Action for physical invasion of privacy. Jane Doe #2 fails to allege any
instance of being photographed or recorded on her property. Bixler and Jane Doe #1
allege being photographed and recorded but only in public or near their houses, but not
on their properties. Riales fails to allege photography or recording that occurred in
California or captured Riales engaging in private, personal or familial activity. Plaintiffs
fail to sufficiently allege their Third Cause of Action for constructive invasion of privacy
because Plaintiffs do not allege being recorded in a way that could not have been
achieved without a trespass. Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege their Fourth Cause of
Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiffs do not allege the
nature or extent of any mental suffering. Plaintiff Bixler-Zavala’s loss of consortium
claim fails with Plaintiff Bixler’s first through fourth causes of action.
Plaintiffs’ claims are improperly joined because the first amended complaint
details discrete events experienced by each individual plaintiff at different times and
places. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions. The improper joinder is prejudicial to Masterson by allowing Plaintiffs to
allege Masterson masterminded and coordinated a campaign of harassment, which
evokes an emotional bias against Masterson as an individual with very little effect on the
issues, maligning Masterson by association.
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services. Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages is based on (1) the inapplicable
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and (2) Civil Code § 1708.5(3)(b) detailing damages for
a sexual battery, when Plaintiffs fail to allege a cause of action for sexual battery.
Plaintiffs’ prayer for attorney fees similarly cites the inapplicable Consumer Legal
Remedies Act and Civil Code § 1708.5(3)(b), as well as CCP § 1021.5 (important right
affecting public interest) and Civil Code §§ 51.7 (Ralph Civil Rights Act), 51 (Unruh Civil
Rights Act), and 52.4 (gender violence). However, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a
violation of civil rights or an important right affecting the public interest. The parties do
not have a contract creating a right to attorney fees. Lastly, Plaintiffs’ request for treble
damages are based on two statutes addressing human trafficking, another cause of
action Plaintiffs do not allege.
THE DEMURRER
Masterson argues all Plaintiffs’ claims are improperly joined in the first amended
complaint because each Plaintiffs’ claims arise from different alleged actions at different
times and in different locations from the other Plaintiffs.
a. Legal Standard
CCP § 378(a) allows all persons to join one action as plaintiffs if: (1) they assert
any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
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Masterson spends much time discussing matters outside of the complaint, impugning
Plaintiffs’ methods and motives.
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question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or (2) they
have a claim, right, or interest adverse to the defendant in the property or controversy
which is the subject of the action.
The requirement that the right to relief arise from the same transaction or series
of transactions is construed broadly. It is sufficient if there is any factual relationship
between the claims joined. (Petersen v. Bank of America (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 238,
249.) 950 plaintiffs were properly joined in a suit against their mortgage lender because
they alleged their homes were overvalued in appraisal and they were misled into taking
out loans they could not repay, which established common issues of liability–whether
the lender encouraged high appraisals and concealing or misleading the plaintiffs about
the loans’ terms. (Id. at pp. 250-253.)
In a civil suit alleging sexual battery by a doctor and brought by multiple patients
against a doctor and the doctor’s employer, permissive joinder was improper as to the
allegations against the doctor because the plaintiffs did not allege a single transaction
when they alleged separate and distinct sexual batteries at different times and did not
allege a related series of transactions when they failed to allege these batteries were
committed in the same manner. (Moe v. Anderson (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 826, 833-
834.) On the related series of transactions question, the court distinguished between
allegations that the doctor touched the breasts and vagina of both plaintiffs–which was
insufficient for a series of transactions–and hypothetical allegations that the doctor’s
sexual batteries were “exactly similar in kind and manner of operation”–which would
have constituted a series of transactions. (Id. at p. 834 (quoting Aldrich v.
Transcontinental Land Etc. Co. (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 788).)
A common question of law or fact alone is likely not sufficient grounds for joinder.
In dicta, the Court of Appeals in David v. Medtronic, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 734
stated multiple plaintiffs claiming injury from the same medical device did not allege a
series of transactions because the plaintiffs had “different surgeries, performed by
different surgeons, with different knowledge and exposure to different representations
by [the device manufacturer].” (237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 740-741.) Additionally, CCP §
378(a)(1) allows joinder where the action arise out the same transaction or “series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these
persons will arise in the action. CCP § 378(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The Court is of the view that Plaintiffs can join their claims, because they arise
from a related “series of transactions” that raise common questions of fact, and present
at least one common question of law.
All four plaintiffs allege facts which follow a similar pattern. All allege that they
were victims of sexual abuse by Masterson in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s and
reported his acts to the LAPD. They all allege that they reported these acts to the LAPD.
They all allege asking the LAPD to reopen the matters in 2016 or 2017. After doing so,
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they were each subjected to a campaign of severe harassment, as detailed above. They
allege that the campaign was orchestrated by the Church of Scientology. They allege
that Masterson and others were involved in the orchestration.
Several common factual issues come to mind. Did persons of authority at the
Church of Scientology become aware of Plaintiffs’ reports to the LAPD? Was a decision
made to retaliate against Plaintiffs for the reporting? Who was involved in the decision?
Was Masterson involved? What decision was made? What was the plan? What
methods were to be employed? Were there substantial similarities among the methods
used that would evidence the existence of a plan? Were there any actors who can be
identified as committing acts towards one or more of the plaintiffs?
There are common legal issues as well. If it can be proved that one or more
persons were involved in creating and executing a common plan, to what extent can the
Church be held liable? To what extent can various actors be considered agents of the
others?
There are practical considerations as well. There may be evidence that may be
relevant to claims of all the Plaintiffs. If each Plaintiff had their own case, the evidence
would need to be adduced four times. If the testimony of each Plaintiff were admissible
in the other cases, each Plaintiff would need to testify four times. This would be a poor
use of judicial resources.
The Court finds that the claims of the Plaintiffs are not improperly joined.
c. Agency Relationships
Here, Plaintiffs allege their tormenters are agents of the Scientology Defendants,
Miscavige, and Masterson. (FAC ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs allege Miscavige controls the
Scientology Defendants, including two subsets of agents–called the Sea Organization
and the Office of Special Affairs–allegedly ordered to undertake criminal actions beyond
their religious practices. (FAC ¶¶ 19-23.)
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Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff’s tormentors are also agents of Masterson.
Plaintiffs fail to allege that Masterson has the power to direct the actions by other
members of Scientology, the Sea Organization, or the Office of Special Affairs. Although
Plaintiffs’ opposition to Masterson’s demurrer refers to “common agents”, Plaintiffs do
not allege Masterson shares control over other members of Scientology, the Sea
Organization, or the Office of Special Affairs with Scientology Defendants or Miscavige,
nor that Scientology Defendants or Miscavige instructed any agents to follow
Masterson’s orders. Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations that (1) all the Defendants are agents of
each other and (2) the unidentified harassers and the harassers identified merely as
“Scientologists” or “agents of Defendants” are agents of Masterson are contradicted by
Plaintiffs’ more specific factual allegations that Scientology Defendants and Miscavige
control the Sea Organization, the Office of Special Affairs, and the subset of
Scientologists tormenting Plaintiffs.
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Under Garton, these allegations and the general allegation that the persons
allegedly stalking, recording, and distressing each Plaintiff were agents of Defendants
are sufficient to plead the ultimate fact that an agency relationship existed between
Masterson and his publicist, his friend, his former personal assistant, his attorney, his
other friend, and his business partner. (See Garton, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 376.)
These allegations are not contradicted by Plaintiffs’ allegations that Scientology
Defendants and Miscavige control the Sea Organization, the Office of Special Affairs,
and the subset of Scientologists tormenting Plaintiffs, because these allegations are
directed at specific people based on their personal relationships to Masterson instead of
their relationships to the Scientology Defendants. Therefore, Masterson’s demurrer
based on improper joinder of parties is OVERRULED. In that same vein, Masterson’s
argument that the demurrer should be sustained because Plaintiffs fail to allege that
Masterson personally engaged in any wrongful conduct is unavailing, because Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged facts that their tormentors were acting as agents of Masterson
to survive demurrer.
Defendant Masterson argues that Plaintiffs Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 must
be forced to proceed using their legal names because there are no “exceptional
circumstances” justifying the use of a fictious name.
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A general demurrer may be taken to a complaint where “[t]he pleading does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).)
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.
(Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.)
Plaintiffs have the right to plead in the alternative (Mendoza v. Continental Sales
Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.)
A person is liable for the tort of stalking when the plaintiff proves all of the
following elements of the tort:
(1) The defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was
to follow, alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff. In order to
establish this element, the plaintiff shall be required to support his or her
allegations with independent corroborating evidence.
(2) As a result of that pattern of conduct, either of the following occurred:
(A) The plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety, or the safety of an
immediate family member. . . .
(B)The plaintiff suffered substantial emotional distress, and the pattern of
conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress.
(3) One of the following:
(A) The defendant, as a part of the pattern of conduct specified in paragraph
(1), made a credible threat with either (i) the intent to place the plaintiff in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of an immediate family
member, or (ii) reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff or that of an
immediate family member. In addition, the plaintiff must have, on at least
one occasion, clearly and definitively demanded that the defendant cease
and abate his or her pattern of conduct and the defendant persisted in his
or her pattern of conduct unless exigent circumstances make the plaintiff’s
communication of the demand impractical or unsafe.
(B) The defendant violated a restraining order. . . .
Masterson argues that Plaintiffs’ first cause of action fails because Plaintiffs fail to
allege that Masterson personally engaged in any conduct to be liable for stalking under
Civil Code Section 1708.7. However, as discussed previously, under Garton, Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged that the persons stalking, recording, and distressing each
Plaintiff were agents of Defendants, and are sufficient to plead the ultimate fact that an
agency relationship existed between Masterson and his publicist, his friend, his former
personal assistant, his attorney, his other friend, and his business partner. (See Garton,
supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 376.) In addition, it is alleged that Masterson worked with
the Scientology Defendants to keep his sexual assault victims from reporting their
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abuse by participating in a “Fair Game” campaign against the victims once the sexual
assaults had been disclosed. (FAC, ¶ 58.) The demurrer to the first cause of action is
OVERRULED.
“A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the person knowingly
enters onto the land or into the airspace above the land of another person without
permission or otherwise commits a trespass in order to capture any type of visual
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a
private, personal, or familial activity and the invasion occurs in a manner that is
offensive to a reasonable person.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.8, subd. (a).) “A person who
directs, solicits, actually induces, or actually causes another person, regardless of
whether there is an employer-employee relationship, to violate any provision of
subdivision (a), (b), or (c) is liable for any general, special, and consequential damages
resulting from each said violation.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.8, subd. (e).)
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“A person liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the person attempts to
capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type of visual image,
sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private,
personal, or familial activity, through the use of any device, regardless of whether there
is a physical trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could
not have been achieved without a trespass unless the device was used.” (Civ. Code, §
1708.8., subd. (b).)
All Plaintiffs allege that they were placed under surveillance under circumstances
falling within the statute. See ¶¶ 282, 283. The demurrer to the third cause of action is
OVERRULED.
“The elements of a prima facie case of intentional infliction of mental distress are
(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of
the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” (Bogard v. Employers
Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 616.) The complained-of conduct must be
outrageous, that is, beyond all bound of reasonable decency. (Cervantez v. J.C.
Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593.) Defendant must intend to cause emotional
distress or recklessly disregard the probability of causing it. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46
Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered
severe emotional distress. (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946.) Severe
emotional distress means emotional distress of such quantity or enduring quality that no
reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. (Fletcher v.
Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)
Defendant Masterson argues that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action fails to allege
intentional infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiffs do not include facts
indicating the nature or extent of any of their alleged mental suffering. The argument is
well taken. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct caused them to suffer
“severe emotional distress, suffering, anguish, anxiety, humiliation, and shame.” (FAC,
¶ 291.) Plaintiffs also points out in their opposition that they have alleged that each
plaintiff “continues to be in fear for her life and the safety of her family.” (FAC, ¶ 233.)
Fear for one’s life and the safety of one’s family can constitute severe emotional
distress.
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“A cause of action for loss of consortium is, by its nature, dependent on the
existence of a cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 746.) A cause of action for loss of consortium “stands or calls based
on whether the spouse of the party alleging loss of consortium has suffered an
actionable tortious injury.” (Id.)
Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not
challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words, phrases, prayers for damages, etc.). (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 436-437.) A motion to strike lies only where the pleading has irrelevant, false
or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading
or by way of judicial notice.
Defendant Masterson argues that the court must strike all portions of the First
Amended Complaint consisting of allegations of sexual assault by Masterson and the
subsequent police investigation because those allegations are immaterial to the causes
of action asserted in this lawsuit. The factual allegations at issue are Paragraphs 1, 15,
58, 64, 67-75, 78-82, 84-86, 88-89, 91, 104, 106, 126, 137-139, 141-154, 156-161, 164,
165, 169, 170, 175-177, 179, 191, 205-216, 240-244, 246-248, 251, 258-270, 273, 279,
285, and 293.
The parties do not dispute that this case is about alleged harassing and stalking
by Defendants. Defendant Masterson argues that allegations of his sexual assault
against the Plaintiffs, therefore, are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ causes of action for stalking,
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium.
However, according to the first amended complaint, Defendants systematically stalked,
harassed, invaded the privacy of Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ families, and intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiffs, who are four women4 sexually assaulted by
Defendant Masterson, allegedly to silence Plaintiffs’ about their alleged sexual assaults
4 Except Plaintiff Cedric Bixler-Zavala, who is the husband of Plaintiff Chrissie Carnell Bixler.
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by Masterson, and to intimidate them in retaliation for Plaintiffs reporting the alleged
sexual assaults. (See FAC, ¶¶ 1, 15.) As Plaintiffs argue, the sexual assaults are,
therefore, relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations as to why Masterson and the other
Defendants began to allegedly stalk and torment the Plaintiffs. The alleged conduct by
Defendants only began after Masterson allegedly sexually assaulted some of the
Plaintiffs, and those Plaintiffs reported the said misconduct to the police. Therefore, the
allegations at issue are relevant.
Defendant Masterson also moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief
pursuant to Civil Code Sections 1770 and 1780; Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages
pursuant to Civil Code Section 1782(2); attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections
51.7 (Ralph Civil Rights Act), 51 (Unruh Civil Rights Act), 52.4 (gender violence), and
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5; and treble damages pursuant to Penal Code
Section 236.1 and Civil Code 52.5. Defendant moves on the ground that Plaintiffs’
requests are not supported by any of the causes of action brought by Plaintiff.
the motion is granted, as they are not supported by the allegations of the
complaint. The motion is denied as to the prayer for injunctive relief and punitive
damages generally. While punitive damages pursuant to the specific Civil Code sections
is unsupported, the allegations of the complaint support punitive damages generally per
Civil Code § 3294.
The demurrer to the first through fifth causes of action are OVERRULED, with
the exception of the second cause of action against Riales, which is SUSTAINED
without leave to amend.
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