BORLONGAN V.

BDO
G.R. No. 217617. April 5, 2017.*
 
CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, petitioner, vs. BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK),
respondent. 
G.R. No. 218540. April 5, 2017.*
 
ELISEO C. BORLONGAN, JR., petitioner,   vs.   BDO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly EQUITABLE PCI
BANK), respondent.
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.—On the propriety of CA’s
refusal to issue a TRO/WPI, it is worthy to note that Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the
grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, viz.: Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary
injunction.—A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: (a) That the applicant is
entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for
a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation
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*  SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION.

would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably
in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there
exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate   an
established right.—It is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an
established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI,
it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Same; Service of Summons; Due Process; The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much
an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.—In its classic formulation, due process means that any
person with interest to the thing in litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that
interest. Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense,   she must be properly served the
summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of
due process as it is of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it would seem that the
Constitutional right of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified has been
disregarded by the officers of the trial court.
Same; Same; Substituted Service of Summons; Service of Summons by Publication; When summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be resorted to.
Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant’s “whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”—As a rule, summons should be personally served on a
defendant. When summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted
service may be resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant’s
“whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.”
Same; Same; Same; The impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that
efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed before
substituted service may be availed.—It is, therefore, proper to state that the hierarchy and rules in the
service of summons are as follows: (1) Personal service; (2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes
the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time; and (3) Service by publication, whenever the
defendant’s whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Simply put, personal
service of summons is the preferred mode. And, the rules on the service of summons other than by
personal service may be used only as prescribed and only in the circumstances authorized by statute.
Thus, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been
made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed before substituted service may be
availed. Furthermore, their rules must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully as they are extraordinary in
character and considered in derogation of the usual method of service.
Foreclosure of Mortgage; Auction Sales; In Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563
(1987), the Supreme Court (SC) explained that the expiration of the redemption period does not
automatically vest in the auction purchaser an absolutely possessory right over the property.—In Cometa
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 563 (1987), we explained that the expiration of the
redemption period does not automatically vest in the auction purchaser an absolutely possessory right
over the property, viz.: From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the writ of possession may issue
in favor of a purchaser in an execution sale when the deed of conveyance has been executed and delivered
to him after the period of redemption has expired and no redemption has been made by the judgment
debtor. A writ of possession is complementary to a writ of execution (see Vda. de Bogacki v. Inserto, 111
SCRA 356, 363), and in an execution sale, it is a consequence of a writ of execution, a public auction
sale, and the fulfillment of several other conditions for conveyance set by law. The issuance of a writ of
possession is dependent on the valid execution of the procedural stages preceding it. Any flaw afflicting
any of its stages, therefore, could affect the validity of its issuance. In the case at bar, the validity of the
levy and sale of the properties is directly put in issue in another case by the petitioners. This Court
finds it an issue which requires preemptive resolution. For if the respondent acquired no interest in the
property by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled to its possession. The respondent
appellate court’s emphasis on the failure of the petitioner to redeem the properties within the period
required by law is misplaced because redemption, in this case, is inconsistent with the petitioner’s
claim of invalidity of levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of the sale
and would estop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on that ground. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, even given the expiration of the redemption period, a TRO and/or WPI is still obtainable and
warranted where the validity of the acquisition of the possession is afflicted by Constitutional and
procedural infirmities.
Conjugal Debts; In Buado v. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 397 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) had
the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it must first be determined whether the debt had
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the
suit who can file an independent separate action, distinct from the action in which the writ was issued.—
The poser then is this: is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property was
executed on account of the other spouse’s debt, a “stranger” to the suit? In Buado v. Court of Appeals, 586
SCRA 397 (2009), this Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it must first be
determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. In the
negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can file an independent separate action, distinct from the
action in which the writ was issued. We held, thus: A third party claim must be filed [by] a person other
than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third party
claim. This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
“stranger?” x x x x Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further
be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership or not.
Conjugal Partnership; Security; In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356 (2004), the
Supreme Court (SC) elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited
when a spouse enters into a contract of surety.—In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal
property was attached on the basis of a surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in behalf
of Tancho Corporation. In our 2004 Decision in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356
(2004), we elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited when a
spouse enters into a contract of surety.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
   J.C. Yrreverre Law Firm for Carmelita T. Borlongan.
   Karaan and Karaan Law Office for Eliseo C. Borlongan, Jr.
   Martinez, Vergara, Gonzales & Serrano for respondent Banco de Oro in G.R. No. 217617.
   Isip, San Juan, Guirnalda & Associates for respondent Banco de Oro in G.R. No. 218540.
RESOLUTION
 
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 
Nature of the Case
 
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions invariably assailing the foreclosure sale of a property
without properly serving the summons upon its owners.
 

Factual Antecedents
 
Sometime in 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property
located at No. 111, Sampaguita St., Valle Verde II, Pasig City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 0421 (the subject property). In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to
obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise,
the title contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in
Civil Case (CC) No. 03-0713 pending before Branch 134 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(Makati RTC).
 Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records of CC No. 03-0713 and found out that
respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money
against Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise
impleaded were several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security
agreements totaling P13,500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.
It appears from the records of CC No. 03-0713 that on July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC issued an Order
directing the service of summons to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho Corporation
provided by BDO: Fumakilla Compound, Amang Rodriguez Avenue, Brgy. Dela Paz, Pasig City
(Fumakilla Compound).
Parenthetically, the records of CC No. 03-0713 show that respondent BDO already foreclosed the
Fumakilla Compound as early as August 21, 2000, following Tancho Corporation’s failure to pay its
obligation, and BDO already consolidated its ownership of the property on November 16, 2001.
Understandably, on July 31, 2003, the process server filed an Officer’s Return stating that summons
remained unserved as the “defendants are no longer holding office at [Fumakilla Compound].”

On October 27, 2003, after the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita and her codefendants,
BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by publication. On October 28, 2003, the RTC granted the
motion.
On August 10, 2004, BDO filed an ex parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against
the defendants, including Carmelita. During the hearing on the motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title
of the subject property. The Makati RTC thereafter granted BDO’s motion and a Writ of Attachment was
issued against the defendants in CC No. 03-0713, effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of
BDO.
On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex parte motion praying, among others, that the summons and
the complaint be served against Carmelita at the subject property. The Makati RTC granted the motion.
On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return stating that no actual personal service was made as
Carmelita “is no longer residing at the given address and the said address is for ‘rent,’ as per information
gathered from the security guard on duty.”
On May 30, 2006, however, BDO filed a manifestation stating that it had complied with the October
28, 2003 Order of the Makati RTC having caused the publication of the alias summons and the complaint
in People’s Taliba on May 15, 2006.
Thereafter, upon BDO’s motion, the Makati RTC declared the defendants in CC No. 03-0713,
including Carmelita, in default. BDO soon after proceeded to present its evidence ex parte.
On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision holding the defendants in CC No.
03-0713 liable to pay BDO P32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid and attorney’s fees. The Makati RTC decision was published on June 9, 2008.
 On August 20, 2008, the Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon BDO’s motion. The Order
states that in the event
 
 

that the judgment obligors cannot pay all or part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the
properties of the defendants to satisfy the award.
On October 28, 2008, the Makati RTC’s sheriff filed a Report stating that he tried to serve the Writ of
Execution upon the defendants at Fumakilla Compound but he was not able to do so since the defendants
were no longer holding office thereat. The Sheriff also reported that, on the same day, he went to the
subject property to serve the execution but likewise failed in his attempt since Carmelita was no longer
residing at the said address.
On November 11, 2008, BDO filed a Motion to Conduct Auction of the subject property. The motion
was granted by the Makati RTC on May 5, 2009 so that the subject property was sold to BDO, as the
highest bidder, on October 6, 2009.
Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim
and, on January 21, 2013, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on
Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents, docketed as CC No. 73761, with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (Pasig RTC).1
He alleged in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal
partnership of gains he established with his wife. He further averred that the alleged surety agreements
upon which the attachment of the property was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and
did not redound to benefit their family. Thus, he prayed that the surety agreements and all other
documents and processes, including the ensuing attachment, levy and execution sale, based thereon be
nullified.
BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to
hear Eliseo’s Complaint, the case was barred by res judicata given the Decision
_______________

1  The Complaint was raffled to Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC.

and orders of the Makati RTC, and, finally, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
In an Order dated May 31, 2013, the Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC held that it could not pass upon matters already brought before the RTC Makati and, citing Spouses
Ching v. Court of Appeals,2  the husband of a judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a
separate and independent action to determine the validity of the levy and sale of a property.
 On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification.
Relying on Buado v. Court of Appeals,3  the Pasig RTC held that since majority of Eliseo’s causes of
action were premised on a claim that the obligation contracted by his wife has not redounded to their
family, and, thus, the levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate action is not an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment and execution in the
first place.
The Pasig RTC clarified, however, that it cannot annul the surety agreements supposedly signed by
Carmelita since Eliseo was not a party to those agreements and the validity and efficacy of these contracts
had already been decided by the Makati RTC.
Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC’s Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In its petition, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 133994, BDO contended that it was an error for the
Pasig RTC to apply Buado as it does not apply squarely to the circumstances of the case and has not
superseded Ching. BDO maintained that by reinstating the complaint, Pasig RTC has violated the rule
prohibiting noninterference by one court with the orders of a coequal court.
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2  G.R. No. 118830, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 88.

3  G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 397.
 

In its January 20, 2015 Decision,4  the appellate court granted BDO’s petition and ordered the Pasig
RTC to cease from hearing CC No. 73761 commenced by Eliseo. In so ruling, the CA held that Eliseo is
not a stranger who can initiate an action independent from the case where the attachment and execution
sale were ordered. Thus, the CA concluded that in opting to review the validity of the levy and execution
sale of the subject property pursuant to the judgment of the Makati RTC, the Pasig RTC acted without
jurisdiction.
Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence, he came to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
218540.
On August 19, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution denying Eliseo’s petition. Eliseo begs to differ
and takes exception from the said holding in his motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2015, which
is presently for Resolution by this Court.
Meanwhile, on an ex parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a
Writ of Possession and the issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the
respondent bank.
Arguing that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the service of the
summons and the other processes of the court was defective, Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) with the CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 134664.
Before the CA can act on the Petition for Annulment, the Borlongans found posted on the subject
property a Writ of Possession dated August 1, 2014 and a Notice to Vacate dated August 29, 2014.
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4     Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices

Rebecca Guia-Salvador and Ramon A. Cruz.

In its Resolution dated November 12, 2014,5  the appellate court denied Carmelita’s prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI).
Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA’s November 12, 2014
Resolution. On March 23, 2015, however, the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration,
holding that “upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of
the foreclosed property becomes absolute.”
Thus, on April 27, 2015, Carmelita filed a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 217617, before
this Court, ascribing to the appellate court the commission of serious reversible errors. The Court denied
the petition on June 22, 2015. Hence, on September 1, 2015, Carmelita interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration urging the Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case and reconsider its
stance.
Considering that both cases originated from the same facts and involved interrelated issues, on
January 25, 2016, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 218540 with G.R. No. 217617.
 
Issues
 
The question posed in G.R. No. 217617 is whether or not the CA erred in refusing to issue a TRO
and/or WPI stopping the consolidation of BDO’s ownership over the subject property. On the other hand,
the issue in G.R. No. 218540 revolves around whether the Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a
case filed by the non-debtor husband to annul the levy and execution sale of the subject property ordered
by the Makati RTC against his wife.
_______________

5  Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal
M. De Leon and Stephen C. Cruz.

Our Ruling
 
 A reexamination of the antecedents and arguments in G.R. Nos. 217617 and 218540 compels the
reversal of the appellate court’s resolutions in both cases.
 
G.R. No. 217617
The Issuance of a TRO/WPI

is not a prejudgment of the

main case
 
On the propriety of CA’s refusal to issue a TRO/WPI, it is worthy to note that Section 3, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, viz.:
Section   3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
 
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where
there is a showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a
TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
In Levi Strauss (Phils.) Inc. v. Vogue Traders Clothing Company,6  the Court already explained that
the issuance of a TRO is not conclusive of the outcome of the case as it requires but a sampling of the
evidence, viz.:
Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence
adduced by the applicant (herein petitioner).   The evidence submitted during the hearing of the
incident is not conclusive, for only a “sampling” is needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of
fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature.
Moreover, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case can be heard. Since Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial courts
sufficient discretion to evaluate the conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ which often
involves a factual determination, the appellate courts generally will not interfere in the absence of
manifest abuse of such discretion. A writ of preliminary injunction would become a prejudgment of a
case only when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive pleading, so much so that
there is nothing left for the trial court to try except merely incidental matters. (emphasis supplied)
  
Notably, the primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the appellate court is the declaration
of the nullity of
_______________

6  G.R. No. 132993, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 52.

the proceedings in the RTC and its Decision dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely confined to the
prevention of the issuance of the writ of possession and the consolidation of the ownership of the subject
property in BDO’s name — the concerns of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI.
Indeed, the petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was intended to preserve
the status quo ante,7  and not to preempt the appellate court’s decision on the merits of her petition for
annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of the CA to deny her of this provisional remedy.
The appellate court’s error is readily apparent given the stark existence of the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On the first ground, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected. This right is
not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but her constitutionally protected right to due
process before she can be deprived of her property. No less than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the
1987 Constitution mandates that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (emphasis supplied)
 
In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the thing in
litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that interest.8 Thus, as the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have
in support of her defense, she must be properly served the summons of the court. In other words, the
_______________

7  Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, G.R. No. 143994, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 535.
8  De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014, 743 SCRA
52.

service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process9 and compliance with the rules
regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
10  Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it would seem that the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be
properly served the summons and be notified has been disregarded by the officers of the trial court.
At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI is
self-evident.   Without   a TRO and/or WPI   enjoining the respondent bank from continuing in the
possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject property, petitioner’s right to be afforded due
process will unceasingly be violated.
It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights is by itself a grave and
irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.
Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly and issued the TRO and/or WPI
posthaste to protect the constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is duty-bound to do.
 
The performance of official

duty was not regular
 
Regrettably, the appellate court fell short in the fulfillment of its mandate and instead relied on the
disputable presumption that “official duty has been regularly performed.” The Court cannot subscribe to
the position taken by the appellate court.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be
_______________

9   Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013, 694 SCRA 302.
10  Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 672.
 

resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant’s “whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” The relevant sections of Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court provide, thus:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant.—Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering
it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
x x x x
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.—In any action where
the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may
order.
 
It is, therefore, proper to state that the hierarchy and rules in the service of summons are as follows:
(1) Personal service;
 (2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time; and
(3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant’s whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry.

Simply put, personal service of summons is the preferred mode. And, the rules on the service of
summons other than by personal service   may be used   only   as prescribed and   only   in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be
shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have
failed before substituted service may be availed.11  Furthermore, their rules must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully as they are extraordinary in character and considered in derogation of the usual
method of service.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,12  the Court enumerated and explained the requirements to effect a
valid service of summons other than by personal service, viz.:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
x x x x
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence,
and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus,
they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand,
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be
resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted
service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve
the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to
prove impossibility of prompt service. “Several
_______________

11   Supra note 9, citing Casimina v. Legaspi, 500 Phil. 560, 569; 462 SCRA 171, 177-178 (2005)
and   B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc. v. R.S. Ampeloquio Realty Development, Inc., G.R. No. 169919,
September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 468, 474. See also Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974,
August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21.
12  Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, id.

attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can
be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy
requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that “impossibility of prompt
service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure
of such efforts,” which should be made in the proof of service.
 
In the case now before Us, the summons was served on the petitioner by publication. Yet, the
circumstances surrounding the case do not justify the resort.
Consider: in July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve the summons on the defendants, including
petitioner Carmelita, at Fumakilla Compound,   i.e., at the property already foreclosed, acquired, and
possessed by the respondent bank as early as August 2001. Immediately after this   single attempt   at
personal service in July 2003, the respondent bank moved in October 2003 for leave to serve the
summons by publication

(and not even substituted service), which motion the RTC granted.
Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her the summons
before the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of
petitioner and her whereabouts.
It should be noted that the principal obligor in CC No. 03-0713 was Tancho Corporation and
petitioner Carmelita was impleaded only because she supposedly signed a surety agreement as a director.
As a juridical person, Tancho Corporation is required to file mandatory corporate papers with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), such as its General Information Sheet (GIS). In 1997 and
2000, the GIS filed by Tancho Corporation with the SEC provided the names of its directors and their
addresses. One of these directors included petitioner Carmelita with her address listed at 41 Chicago St.,
Quezon City. The GIS of Tancho Corporation was readily available to the public including the RTC’s
process server and respondent bank.
Patently, it cannot be plausibly argued that it was impossible to find the petitioner and personally
serve her with summons. In like manner, it can hardly be stated that the process server regularly
performed his duty.
 
The subject property was not

foreclosed by the respondent

bank; right of BDO to the

possession of the subject

property is questionable
 
Still unwilling to issue the TRO and/or WPI fervently prayed for by petitioner, the appellate court
held that “upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the
foreclosed property becomes absolute.” This Court cannot affirm the appellate court’s ruling.
 At the outset, it must be pointed out that the subject property was never mortgaged to, much less
foreclosed by, the respondent bank. Thus, it was error for the CA to refer to the subject property as
“foreclosed property.”
Rather, as disclosed by the records, the possession of the subject property was acquired by BDO
through attachment and later by execution sale. However, it is presumptive to state that the right of BDO
over the possession of the subject property is now absolute considering that there is an action that
questions the validity of the bank’s acquisition over the same property.
In Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13  we explained that the expiration of the redemption
period does not automatically vest in the auction purchaser an absolutely possessory right over the
property, viz.:
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the writ of possession may issue in favor of a
purchaser in an execution sale when the deed of conveyance has been executed and delivered to him after
the period of redemption has expired and no redemption has been made by the judgment debtor.
A writ of possession is complementary to a writ of execution (see Vda. de Bogacki v. Inserto, 111
SCRA 356, 363), and in an execution sale, it is a consequence of a writ of execution, a public auction
sale, and the fulfillment of several other conditions for conveyance set by law. The issuance of a writ of
possession is dependent on the valid execution of the procedural stages preceding it. Any flaw afflicting
any of its stages, therefore, could affect the validity of its issuance.
In the case at bar, the validity of the levy and sale of the properties is directly put in issue in
another case by the petitioners. This Court finds it an issue which requires preemptive resolution. For if
the
_______________

13  No. L-69294, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 563.

 

respondent acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, then, he is not
entitled to its possession.
The respondent appellate court’s emphasis on the failure of the petitioner to redeem the properties
within the period required by law is misplaced because redemption, in this case, is inconsistent with the
petitioner’s claim of invalidity of levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the
regularity of the sale and would estop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on that
ground. (emphasis supplied)
 
Thus, even given the expiration of the redemption period, a TRO and/or WPI is still obtainable and
warranted where the validity of the acquisition of the possession is afflicted by Constitutional and
procedural infirmities.
 
G.R. No. 218540
Eliseo can file an inde-

pendent action for the an-

nulment of the attachment

of their conjugal property
 
As to the question of the Pasig RTC’s jurisdiction to hear Eliseo’s complaint, we cannot subscribe to
BDO’s contention that Eliseo cannot file a separate and independent action for the annulment of the levy
on their conjugal property.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third party claimants of properties under execution
to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action with another court. It states, thus:
SECTION 16. Proceedings Where Property Claimed by Third Person.—If the property levied on is
claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of
his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the
same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not
be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond
approved by the court to indemnify the third party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court
issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be
enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from
the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third party
claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment
obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third party claimant who filed a
frivolous or plainly spurious claim. (emphasis supplied)
 
Clearly, the availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision requires only that that
the claim is a third party or a “stranger” to the case. The poser then is this: is the husband, who was not a
party to the suit but whose conjugal property was executed on account of the other spouse’s debt, a
“stranger” to the suit? In Buado v. Court of Appeals,14  this Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to
resolve the issue, it must first be determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can file an independent separate
action, distinct from the action in which the writ was issued. We held, thus:
_______________

14  Buado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 3.

A third party claim must be filed [by] a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other
words, only a stranger to the case may file a third party claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
“stranger?”
 x x x x
Pursuant to   Mariano   however,   it must further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
x x x x
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from
the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by
one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
x x x x
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch
21. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal property was attached on the basis of a surety
agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in behalf of Tancho Corporation. In our 2004 Decision
in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,15  we elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal
partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a contract of surety, holding thusly:
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened
to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and
was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his
family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the
petitioner-husband’s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh
capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The
benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself.
This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used
for his own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we
_______________

15  G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 356.

ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the term “obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” Thus:
x x x x
The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-Perez and G-Tractors, Inc. are
not controlling because the husband, in those cases, contracted the obligation for his own business. In this
case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the
private respondent. (emphasis supplied)
 
Furthermore, it is not apparent from the records of this case that BDO had established the benefit to
the conjugal partnership flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita. Thus, Eliseo’s
claim over the subject property lodged with the RTC Pasig is proper, with the latter correctly exercising
jurisdiction thereon.
Besides, BDO’s reliance on Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals16  (2003) is improper. In the present
case, Eliseo and his wife discovered the attachment of their conjugal property only after the finality of the
decision by the RTC Makati. There was, therefore, no opportunity for Eliseo to intervene in the case
before the RTC Makati which attached the conjugal property, as a motion to intervene can only be filed
“at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.”17 This spells the whale of difference between
the case at bar and the earlier Spouses Ching. Unlike in the present case, the debtor in the case cited by
BDO was properly informed of the collection suit and his spouse had the opportunity to question the
attachment of their conjugal property before the court that issued the levy on attachment, but simply
refused to do so. Thus, to now deny Eliseo the opportunity to question the attachment made by the RTC
Makati in a separate and inde-
_______________

16  Ching v. Court of Appeals, supra note 2.

17  Rules of Court, Rule 19, Section 2.
 
 
443

pendent action will be to, again, refuse him the due process of law before their property is taken. As this
Court is duty-bound to protect and enforce Constitutional rights, this we cannot allow.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
(1) The January 20, 2015 Decision and May 26, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 133994 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 155 is ordered to continue with the proceedings and decide Civil Case No. 73761 with reasonable
dispatch.
 (2) The November 12, 2014 and March 23, 2015 Resolutions of the appellate court in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 134664 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining, prohibiting, and
preventing respondent Banco De Oro, its assigns, transferees, successors, or any and all other persons
acting on its behalf from possessing, selling, transferring, encumbering or otherwise exercising acts of
ownership over the property subject of the controversy. Said TRO shall remain valid and effective until
such time as the rights and interests of the parties in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 134664 shall have been
determined and finally resolved.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Reyes, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Petitions granted, judgment and resolutions reversed and set aside.
Notes.—As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.
(Chu vs. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, 694 SCRA 302 [2013])
 

In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. (Id.)
 
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