People vs. Antonio Comadre
People vs. Antonio Comadre
People vs. Antonio Comadre
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
That on or about the 6th of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro, Lupao,
Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill
and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, availing of
nighttime to afford impunity, and with the use of an explosive, did
there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lob a hand
grenade that landed and eventually exploded at the roof of the
house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly shrapnels that hit and
killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death certificate, and
causing Jerry Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey
Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena Agbanlog to suffer shrapnel
wounds on their bodies, per the medical certificates; thus, to the
latter victims, the accused commenced all the acts of execution that
would have produced the crime of Multiple Murder as consequences
thereof but nevertheless did not produce them by reason of the
timely and able medical and surgical interventions of physicians, to
the damage and prejudice of the deceaseds heirs and the other
victims.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed
appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell
on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling
the fence of a nearby school.5 ςrνll
Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of Robert Agbanlog, certified that the
wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the injuries
inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of death
was hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion.8 The
surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog and
Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.9 ςrνll
Antonios father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his claim
that he was at home watching television with them during the night
in question.14 Josie Comadre, Georges wife, testified that her
husband could not have been among those who threw a hand
grenade at the house of the Agbanlogs because on the evening of
August 6, 1995, they were resting inside their house after working
all day in the farm.15 ςrνll
SO ORDERED.
On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police
station to give a more detailed account of the incident, this time
identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator together with
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.
It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on
the basis of the record for the trial judge might have died, resigned,
retired, transferred, and so forth.23 As far back as the case of Co
Tao v. Court of Appeals24 we have held: The fact that the judge who
heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and
that for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely
relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment
erroneous. This rule had been followed for quite a long time, and
there is no reason to go against the principle now.25 ςrνll
We disagree.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements
of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is
the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation
rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is
required.26
ςrνll
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did
not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must
therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime
as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to
establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act
in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio
was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The
ratiocination of the trial court that their presence provided
encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid of any
factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on
record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of
conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would
be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did
not commit.28 There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre
must answer for the crime.
x x x.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly
intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating circumstance,
instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and
explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes
under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend
the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use
of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in
committing any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.
The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a
separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of
unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances
specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the
aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident
premeditation in paragraph 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of
Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA No. 8294
does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
A reading of the title36 of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the qualifier
illegal/unlawful. ..possession is followed by of firearms,
ammunition, or explosives or instruments... Although the term
ammunition is separated from explosives by the disjunctive word
or, it does not mean that explosives are no longer included in the
items which can be illegally/unlawfully possessed.In this context,
the disjunctive word or is not used to separate but to signify a
succession or to conjoin the enumerated items
37 38
together. Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294, subtitled: Section 3.
Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Explosives, clearly refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, or
possession of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. Thus, when
the second paragraph of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
RA No. 8294 speaks of the use of the aforementioned explosives,
etc. as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of crimes, it
refers to those explosives, etc. unlawfully manufactured,
assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed or possessed mentioned in
the first paragraph of the same section. What is per se aggravating
is the use of unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The
mere use of explosives is not.
The information in this case does not allege that appellant Antonio
Comadre had unlawfully possessed or that he had no authority to
possess the grenade that he used in the killing and attempted
killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure requires the averment of aggravating
circumstances for their application.39
ςrνll
Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert
Agbanlog civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, P35,000.00
as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
Pursuant to existing jurisprudence43 the award of civil indemnity is
proper. However, the actual damages awarded to the heirs of
Robert Agbanlog should be modified, considering that the
prosecution was able to substantiate only the amount of P18,000.00
as funeral expenses.44 ςrνll
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, p. 17.
2
Record, pp. 27-29.
3
Also referred to as Jerry Bullanday in the records.
4
TSN, October 12, 1995, p. 4; March 6, 1996, p. 3; March 21,
1996, p. 2; July 10, 1996, pp. 2-3.
5
TSN, October 12, 1995, p. 5; March 6, 1996, pp. 2-3; July 10,
1996, pp. 2-4.
6
TSN, October 12, 1995, pp. 5-7; March 6, 1996, pp. 4-5; March
21, 1996, p. 3; July 10, 1996, p. 3.
7
TSN, March 21, 1996, pp. 4-6.
8
Record, pp. 10-11.
9
TSN, October 12, 1995, p. 10; March 6, 1996, p. 10; March 21,
1996, p. 5; July 10, 1996, pp. 6-7.
10
Record, p. 299.
11
TSN, August 28, 1998, pp. 7-9.
12
TSN, August 5, 1998, pp. 2-8.
13
TSN, December 3, 1998, pp. 3-10.
14
TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 7-8; April 9, 1999, pp. 6-8.
15
TSN, July 30, 1999, pp. 3-5.
16
Penned by Judge Bayani V. Vargas of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose City, Branch 39.
17
Rollo, pp. 67-68.
18
People v. Del Valle, G.R. No. 119616, 14 December 2001, 372
SCRA 297.
19
People v. Patalin, G.R. No. 125539, 27 July 1999, 311 SCRA 186;
citing People v. Agunias, G.R. No. 121993, 12 September 1997, 279
SCRA 52.
20
People v. Abundo, G.R. No.138233, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA
577.
21
People v. Francisco, G.R. NOS. 134566-67, 22 January 2001, 350
SCRA 55.
22
TSN, July 10, 1996, p. 4; March 21, 1996, p. 4.
23
People v. Escalante, G.R. No. L-37147, 22 August 1984, 131
SCRA 237.
24
101 Phil. 188, 194 (1957).
25
People v. Rabutin, G.R. NOS. 118131-32, 5 May 1997, 272 SCRA
197.
26
People v. Tabuso, G.R. No. 113708, 26 October 1999, 317 SCRA
454.
27
People v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 108174, 28 October 1999, 317 SCRA
577.
28
People v. Capili, G.R. No. 130588, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 354.
29
Defined as a sudden and rapid combustion, causing violent
expansion of the air, and accompanied by a report. United Life, Fire
and Marine Insurance, Inc. v. Foote, 22 Ohio St. 348, 10 Am Rep
735, cited in Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Revision, Vol. 1; also
defined in Wadsworth v. Marshall, 88 Me 263, 34 A 30, as a
bursting with violence and loud noise, caused by internal pressure.
30
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
xxx
xxx
31
People v. Tayo, G.R. No. L-52798, 19 February 1986, 141 SCRA
393, citing People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People v. Gallego and
Soriano, 82 Phil. 335; People v. Agcaoili, 86 Phil. 549; People v.
Francisco, 94 Phil. 975.
32
People, v. Tintero, G.R. No. L-30435, 15 February 1982, 111
SCRA 704; People v. Asibar, G.R. No. L-37255, 23 October 1982,
117 SCRA 856.
33
Entitled: An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, As Amended, Entitled Codifying the Laws on
Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives,
and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and
for Relevant Purposes.
34
Representative Roilo Golez, in his sponsorship speech, laid down
two basic amendments under House Bill No. 8820, now R.A.
8294: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The same rationale was the moving force behind Senate Bill 1148
as articulated by then Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago in her
sponsorship speech: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
xxx
It was only during the years of martial law 1972 and 1983 that the
penalty for illegal possession made a stratospheric leap. Under P.D.
No. 9 promulgated in 1972 the first year of martial law the penalty
suddenly became the mandatory penalty of death, if the unlicensed
firearm was used in the commission of crimes. Subsequently, under
P.D. No. 1866, promulgated in 1983 during the last few years of
martial law the penalty was set at its present onerous level.