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FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, Petitioners,

-versus-
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, Respondent
G.R. No. 137944, THIRD DIVISION, April 06, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.

The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until
the contrary is proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one’s possession shall, under this
provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the
question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case
should be established in one of the ways provided by law. Respondent’s possession was not
disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners’ father claimed the land. But by then, her
possession, which was in the concept of owner – public, peaceful and uninterrupted – had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore, she herself, after her father’s demise, declared
and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a
claim for ownership through prescription.

FACTS

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad,


Binangonan, Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 26-0027. Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda
Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On
the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the
contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. Respondent is the present occupant of the land.
Earlier, on October 15, 1975, respondent and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of
petitioners, during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of the land. The
court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of petitioners.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due
execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been
sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution
of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent witness ever attested
to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Moreover, the appellate court held that the
probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with
respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and
continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article
538 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether CA erred in holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession,
coupled with xxx exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are
evidence of the best kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership and
enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor.

HELD
No. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the
contrary is proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this
provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the
question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case
should be established in one of the ways provided by law. To settle the issue of ownership,
we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt
that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her
father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married,
she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed
the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful,
and uninterrupted -- had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her
father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription. In contrast, the
petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership.
It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the
element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not
confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim
that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and
brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their
adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985),this supposed ownership cannot extend
to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed. We
cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was
established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued
in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they
announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most,
they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which
taxes have been paid.

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