U.S. vs.

Cuna, 12 Phil 241, December 15, 1908

G.R. No. 4504. December 15, 1908 | CARSON

FACTS

On August 12,1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Isabela,
charging the defendant Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco) for the violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461
“Opium Law” of the Philippine Commission.

On June 30, 1907 defendant sold for tents a small quantity of opium to Apolinario Gumpal, a Filipino
woman who was neither a doctor, pharmacist, vender of opium with license nor an inveterate user of
opium.

The defendant demurred to the information on the ground that the said act was repealed by Act. No
1761 which took effect on October 17,1907, and since it was repealed there is no law in force which
penalizes the offense.

The trial court dismissed the case since no law in force, in accordance with the accused, if he be tried
and convicted, can be punished for the offense committed in June 1907. “The time when the defendant
alleged committed the offense, the Opium Law was in force and continue to be in force until October
17, 1907 , when it was superseded by a new Act, No. 1761, which, in section 33 thereof, repeals Act
No. 1461, without excepting from the provisions of the repealing clause cases pending at the time of
its enactment, for the infraction of Act No. 1461, and without prescribing what disposition should be
made of such cases.”

The Government appealed from the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information.

ISSUE

Whether or not the defendant should be convicted even when the law was repealed?

RULING

The court held that , the doctrine of English and American common law relied upon by counsel for
defendant is not and has not been the accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction, and that, in accordance
with the accepted doctrine, the courts in these Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence offenders who have violated the provisions of Act No. 1461 prior to the date when Act No.
1761 went into effect, notwithstanding the provision of the latter Act repealing Act No. 1461; and that
the penalty prescribed by the repealing Act for the violation charged in the information not being more
favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the old law, the penalty to be imposed is that
prescribed by the old law.
NOTES

SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., suing in his behalf and for the benefit of all other persons having
common or general interest with him in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court, petitioners-
appellants, 
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and ADMINISTRATOR OF ECONOMIC COORDINATION, respondents-
appellees.

FACTS

Respondent National Power Corporation "has for some years now been, and still is, by virtue of similar,
valid and existing contracts entered into by it with one hundred and thirty seven (137) natural persons
and corporations distributed all over the country, supplying, distributing, servicing and selling electric
power and energy at fixed rites schedules to the latter who have for some years now been and still are,
legally engaged in resupplying, redistributing, reservicing and reselling the said electric power and
energy to individual customers within the coverage of their respective franchises." 4 

Republic Act No. 3043.15 PETITIONER CHALLENGES THE - Section of an amendatory act,1 empowering
respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise
holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that
such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its
investments plus two-month operating expenses.".

Mention was then made of the National Power Corporation approving a rate increase of at least 17.5%,
the effectivity of which, was at first deferred to November 1, 1962, then subsequently to January 15,
1963, with the threat that in case petitioners would fail to sign the revised contract providing for the
increased rate, respondent National Power Corporation would then cease "to supply, distribute and
service electric power and energy to them." 9

June 18, 1960, an act authorizing the increase of the capital stock of the National Power Corporation
to P100 million took effect.

petitioners, transgressed the constitutional provision on the subject matter and title of bills as well as
the due process clause.
10
 A declaration of unconstitutionality was therefore sought by them.

It was prayed: "(1) To give due course to this petition;

(2) To issue a writ of preliminary injunction,

(3) After due hearing, to declare the rider or Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 null and void for

After the submission thereof, the lower court, in a decision of January 30, 1965, sustained the validity
and constitutionality of the challenged provision. Hence, this appeal

ISSUE
Whether or not Republic Act No. 3043 is violative of the constitutional provision

RULING

"which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject” This provision is similar to those
found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills
and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.17 Where the subject of a
bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the
subject of proposed legislative measures.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be
deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the
title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating
to its subject finding expression in its title. 18 More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a
statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state
the precise nature of the amendment.19

We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which requires that any bill
enacted into law shall embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof. WHEREFORE, there
being no showing that Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 is unconstitutional, the decision of the lower
court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed. With costs against petitioner Alalayan.

"which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject” This provision is similar to those
found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills
and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.17 Where the subject of a
bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the
subject of proposed legislative measures.

Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should
be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes
the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
bill.

It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study
and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators."

We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which requires that any bill
enacted into law shall embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

FACTS :

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

1. RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution, design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue

2. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings

3. Report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these
provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

1. it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating
in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute
— and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law —
must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to
"concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in
the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise
of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the
executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House
and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate
The Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing
an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective.
Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

2. It was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S.
No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before
a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are
really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing
with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to
meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential
certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment.
It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the
bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the
Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in
emergency session. 11

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the
requirement of three readings on separate days, also.

It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual
condition in this country.

3. only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the
conferees present.

Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three
readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was
passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then
referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House
bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House
bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise
version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate,
presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the
Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact
and in law

4. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of
its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment
was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained 21 or that certain
provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to
look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart
from this rule.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government

5. Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it
was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in the
near future," in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax
of 2%.

As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree
Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590)
by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No.
1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides
that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress when the common good so requires
Dissent

davide

The Constitution provides for a bicameral Congress. Therefore, no bill can be enacted into law unless it is
approved by both chambers -- the Senate and the House of Representatives (hereinafter House).
Otherwise stated, each chamber may propose and approve a bill, but until it is submitted to the other
chamber and passed by the latter, it cannot be submitted to the President for its approval into law.

First violation. -- Since R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it must originate exclusively in the House --
not in the Senate. As correctly asserted by petitioner Tolentino, on the face of the enrolled copy of R.A.
No. 7716, it is a "CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND SENATE BILL NO. 1630." In short, it is
an illicit marriage of a bill which originated in the House and a bill which originated in the Senate.
Therefore, R.A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House.

1. As to a bill originating in the House:

(a) Upon its approval by the House, the bill shall be transmitted to the Senate;

(b) The Senate may approve it with or without amendments;

(c) The Senate returns the bill to the House;

(d) The House may accept the Senate amendments; if it does not, the Secretary General shall notify the
Senate of that action. As hereinafter be shown, a request for conference shall then be in order.

2. As to bills originating in the Senate;

(a) Upon its approval by the Senate, the bill shall be transmitted to the House;

(b) The House may approve it with or without amendments;

(c) The House then returns it to the Senate, informing it of the action taken;
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

July 1, 2005 - JULY 1 2005 EFFECTIVITY THE COURT HAS ISSUED A TRO - arbitrarily by 10%. And that’s
one reason among many others this Court had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the
implementation. should be 3% only, in some cases it should be 6% depending on these mitigating
measures and the location and situation of each products.

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "No-Amendment
Rule"

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the
Journal.

Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. 32 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed
by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said
bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said
provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would
lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its
constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of
amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both
houses of Congress is prohibited.
Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate
the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article VI, Section 28(2)

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those
that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved"
by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing
"on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to
such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed
out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106685 December 2, 1994

SIMPLICIO A. PALANCA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER ELEVENTH DIVISION), and EDGARDO S. SANICAS, represented
by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE S. SANICAS, respondents.

While foreign exchange controls are tools in the maintenance of the value of the Philippine currency,
such controls are not the only means of maintaining that value. The requirements in R.A. No. 529 that
the money of obligation or payment in all domestic transactions must be in Philippine currency are also
measures to maintain such value.

Besides, a Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law. Article 7 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.