MONTES Cases 21-26 Notes Transpo
MONTES Cases 21-26 Notes Transpo
3. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not
being included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with
under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier
from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers
or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or
force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code
which provides: "Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar
stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to
public policy . . . (6) That the common carrier's liability for acts
committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or
irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or
diminished"; In the same case, the Supreme Court also held that:
"Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible
— and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility
— even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where
such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave of irresistible threat,
violence of force," We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty
of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."
6. While the affidavit of Juanito Morden, the truck helper in the hijacked
truck, was presented as evidence in court, he himself was a witness as
could be gleaned from the contents of the petition. Affidavits are not
considered the best evidence if the affiants are available as witnesses.
7. Granting that the said evidence were not self-serving, the same were
not sufficient to prove that the contract was one of lease. It must be
understood that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not
what it is called by the contracting parties.
JOSE PILAPIL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., GR. No.
52159 December 22, 1989
1. No, the company is not liable for the incident. While the law requires
the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence
against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers.
2. Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care,
vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common
carriers to only such as human careand foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all
the circumstances.
1. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them. Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them,
common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or
negligent if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or if the
same deteriorated.
1. Yes, Ganzon is liable. In the case at bar, the contract of carriage was
deemed perfected by the delivery of the scraps which was unconditionally
placed in the possession and control of the common carrier and
subsequently upon receipt by the carrier for transportation. Consequently,
the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced.
3. The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to
any of the following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil
Code, namely: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Hence, the
petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.
ART. 362. — Nevertheless, the carrier shall be liable for the losses
and damages resulting from the causes mentioned in the preceding
article if it is proved, as against him, that they arose through his
negligence or by reason of his having failed to take the precautions
which usage his established among careful persons, unless the
shipper has committed fraud in the bill of lading, representing the
goods to be of a kind or quality different from what they really
were.
If, notwithstanding the precautions referred to in this article, the
goods transported run the risk of being lost, on account of their nature
or by reason of unavoidable accident, there being no time for their
owners to dispose of them, the carrier may proceed to sell them,
placing them for this purpose at the disposal of the judicial authority
or of the officials designated by special provisions.
5. Under the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the
defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods by
virtue of their nature occurred on account of its negligence or because
the defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful persons.
4. Even granting arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event,
it accounted only for the delay in departure. When the vessel finally left
the port of Cebu on July 10, 1972, there was no longer any force majeure
that justified by-passing a port of call. The vessel was completely
repaired the following day after it was towed back to Cebu. In fact, after
docking at Tacloban City, it left the next day for Manila to complete its
voyage.
5. As to the defense of the petitioner that it relied on the conditions in
small bold print at the back of the ticket reading, the Court held that even
assuming that those conditions are squarely applicable to the case at bar,
petitioner did not comply with the same. It did not cancel the ticket nor
did it refund the value of the tickets to private respondents. Besides, it
was not the vessel's sailing schedule that was involved. Private
respondents complaint is directed not at the delayed departure the next
day but at the by- passing of Catbalogan, their destination. Had petitioner
notified them previously, and offered to bring them to their destination at
its expense, or refunded the value of the tickets purchased, perhaps, this
controversy would not have arisen. Furthermore, the conditions relied
upon by petitioner cannot prevail over Articles 614 and 698 of the Code
of Commerce heretofore quoted.