MA. VIDIA B.

LARGO

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment
of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino
Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-
stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage
company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case
eventuated in Co's A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was
filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to
suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in
the sum of P361,528.00

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals which later affirmed the decision of the lower court.
This is a petition for certiorari from the appellee under the grounds that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Anti - Bouncing Check Law. In Circular (No. 4), dated December
15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows: 2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is
neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Where the check is issued as part of an
arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or
not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

However this was later reversed in administrative circular was subsequently issued on
August 8, 1984. Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of issuance of his
check

ISSUE:
Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of issuance of his check?

HELD:

No. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some
four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21,
1987, which the RTC's conviction was relied on, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. The new circular was delivered
after almost one (1) year when Albino Co hand the "bouncing" check to the complainant on
September 1, 1983. The Court merits this case under the maxims that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration
that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees
no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating
criminal liability
The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed
and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED,
with cost de officio

              .
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.

ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

Fact: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The
petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority
has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of
requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354, which of the
grounds is that it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue: Whether Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Held: Yes, The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. The Constitution
provides a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. The court are unable to
agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law
is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. This is not a question of wisdom or
power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court
has the duty and power to correct.

G.R. No. 198583, June 28, 2017

ARLYN ALMARIO-TEMPLONUEVO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND CHITO M. OYARDO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Templonuevo was elected as Sangguniang Bayan Member of the Municipality of

Caramoan, Province of Catanduanes, during the May 2007 elections. She served for 3
years. In the elections of May 2010, she was elected as Municipal Vice Mayor of the same
municipality.

In a complaint, Oyardo administratively charged Templonuevo before the Ombudsman for

violation of Sec. 2, par. 1 of Republic Act No. 9287.

In its January 6, 2010 Decision, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner guilty of
simple misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of one month suspension without pay.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that ARLYN
ALMARIO-TEMPLONUEVO be adjudged guilty of violation of simple misconduct and is
hereby imposed a penalty of one (1) month suspension from office without pay pursuant to
Section 7 Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 07 as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 in relation to Republic Act No. 6770.

The Honorable Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, Department of Interior and Local Government,
is hereby directed to implement this DECISION immediately upon receipt thereof pursuant
to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series
of 2006 dated 11 April 2006 and to promptly inform this office of the action taken hereon.
At the time Templonuevo received her copy of the January 6, 2010 Decision on September
27, 2010, her term as Sangguniang Bayan Member had expired. She, however, was elected
as Vice Mayor of the same municipality.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Templonuevo directly filed before the CA an
original petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. She
claimed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering her
suspension at a time when her term of office as Sangguniang Bayan Member had already
expired and she had been elected as Vice Mayor in the May 2010 elections.

Issues

A reading of the pleadings filed by the parties reveals that the issues are as follows:
1. Whether the CA committed an error in dismissing outright the petition filed by
Templonuevo on the ground of failure to file a motion for reconsideration from the
 decision of the Ombudsman finding her administratively liable and imposing upon her a
penalty of one month suspension.

2. Whether the CA committed an error in not treating the election of Templonuevo as

Vice Mayor of the same municipality as an event that precludes the imposition of the one
month suspension penalty following the doctrine of condonation.

HELD:

The Court grants the petition.

A motion for reconsideration is not required where the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman
is one month suspension before a petition under Rule 65 can be filed.

The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari.[16] Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.

involved.

Templonuevo contended that her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Ombudsman decision was justified because it would be useless. She claims that the
assailed decision was final, executory and unappealable, hence, beyond the ambit of a
motion for reconsideration following Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. She
also argued that the Ombudsman's decision was a patent nullity considering that her
election as Vice Mayor of the same municipality precluded the attachment to her of any
administrative liability arising from the acts done while she was a Sangguniang Bayan
Member.

The Court agrees with Templonuevo on her first position.

In Ombudsman v. Alano,the Court stressed that Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to, among others, "promulgate its
rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law." Pursuant to such constitutional authority, Administrative Order No.
07 (otherwise known as the "Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman"), dated
April 10, 1990, was issued. Section 7, Rule III thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Finality of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of
ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
The Court, in interpreting the above constitutional and statutory provisions, recognizes only
two instances where a decision of the Ombudsman is considered as final and unappealable
and, thus, immediately executory. The first is when the respondent is absolved of the
charge; and second is, in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary.

On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the
interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the condonation doctrine applies to a
public official elected to another office. The underlying theory is that each term is separate
from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first,
the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective official's re-election
serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known
the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given
fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the same. [Emphasis
supplied]
In this case, those who elected Templonuevo into office as Sangguniang Bayan member
and Vice Mayor were essentially the same. Stated otherwise, the electorate for the Vice
Mayor of a municipality embraces wholly those voting for a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Logically, the condonation doctrine is applicable in her case. The Court is, thus,
precluded from imposing the administrative penalties of one month suspension on account
of the same people's decision to elect her again to office.

The act committed by petitioner Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo is deemed CONDONED.