Petitioner vs. vs. Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner vs. vs. Respondent: Third Division
DECISION
GESMUNDO , J : p
This is an appeal by certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the March 17,
2016 Decision 1 and August 30, 2016 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06638. The CA a rmed the September 16, 2013 Judgment 3 and the
January 10, 2014 Resolution 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
Branch 36 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 2011-11-29-108. The RTC found Domingo Agyao
Macad a.k.a. Agpad (petitioner) guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 .
The Antecedents
In the afternoon of November 27, 2011, PO1 Davies Falolo (PO1 Falolo), who was
not on duty, boarded a Bing Bush bus bound for Bontoc, Mountain Province. He sat on
the top of the bus as it was full. At Botbot, petitioner boarded the bus. He threw his
carton baggage over to PO1 Falolo. Petitioner, also carrying a Sagada woven bag, then
sat on top of the bus, two (2) meters away from PO1 Falolo. 5
When petitioner threw his carton box, PO1 Falolo already suspected that it
contained marijuana because of its distinct smell and irregular shape. He was also
dubious of the Sagada woven bag that petitioner had because it was supposed to be
oval but it was rectangular in shape. PO1 Falolo planned to inform other police o cers
at the barracks but he was unable to do so because he ran out of load to send a text
message. 6
Upon reaching Bontoc, petitioner alighted at Caluttit, while PO1 Falolo went down
at the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Compound to buy load for
his cellular phone. Unable to nd any store selling load, PO1 Falolo hailed a tricycle and
asked to be brought to Caluttit. PO1 Falolo seated at the back of the driver. When the
tricycle arrived at Caluttit, petitioner was still there and hailed and rode inside the same
tricycle, with PO1 Falolo still seated behind the driver. 7
When the tricycle reached the Community Police Assistance Center (COMPAC)
circle, PO1 Falolo stopped the tricycle and called SPO2 Gaspar Suagen (SPO2 Suagen),
who was then on duty. While SPO2 Suagen approached them, PO1 Falolo asked
petitioner if he could open his baggage, to which the latter replied in the a rmative.
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However, petitioner suddenly ran away from the tricycle towards the Pines Kitchenette.
Both police o cers ran after him and apprehended him in front of Sta. Rita Parish
Church. Petitioner was then handcuffed and he, together with his baggage, were
brought to the Municipal Police Station. 8
At the police station, the baggage of petitioner were opened and these revealed
eleven (11) bricks of marijuana from the carton baggage and six (6) bricks of marijuana
from the Sagada woven bag. The seized items were marked, photographed and
inventoried in the presence of petitioner, the barangay chairman, a prosecutor and a
media representative. The bricks from the carton baggage weighed 10.1 kilograms;
while the bricks from the Sagada woven bag weighed 5.9 kilograms. The items were
brought to the Regional Crime Laboratory O ce for a forensic examination, which
yielded a positive result for marijuana. 9
Version of the Defense
On November 27, 2011, petitioner boarded a Bing Bush bus and sat on top. With
him was an unidenti ed man, who had a carton box. When he alighted from the bus,
petitioner called for a tricycle where PO1 Falolo and the unidenti ed man had already
boarded. The unidenti ed man then asked petitioner to have his baggage dropped at
the "circle" and the former alighted at the motorpool. 1 0
Upon reaching the COMPAC, PO1 Falolo stopped the tricycle and asked
petitioner why his companion left. Petitioner denied that he had a companion. When he
saw PO1 Falolo call for another police o cer, he ran away. Realizing that the baggage
was not his, petitioner stopped near the church. At this point, PO1 Falolo and another
police o cer caught him and arrested him. Petitioner was then brought to the
COMPAC, where they waited for thirty (30) minutes before going to the municipal hall.
There, he was coerced to confess that the baggage was his.
The RTC Ruling
In its January 10, 2014 judgment, the RTC found petitioner guilty of transporting
illegal drugs and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
ne of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The trial court ruled that
petitioner's warrantless arrest was legal because he was caught in agrante delicto of
transporting marijuana, and, as such, the subsequent search and seizure of the
marijuana was legal as an incident of a lawful arrest. In addition, it posited that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized were preserved. The RTC observed
that no considerable time had elapsed from the time petitioner ran away until he was
arrested. Also, the trial court noted that the immediate marking of the seized items at
the nearest police station was valid. Further, it stated that the witnesses were able to
explain the minor inconsistencies in the documentary evidence presented. The fallo of
the RTC judgment reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered nding the accused
DOMINGO AGYAO MACAD GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime [of
violation] of Section 5 of R.A. [No.] 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a ne of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PhP500,000.00).
The subject prohibited drugs are forfeited in favor of the government and
are hereby directed to be turned over with dispatch to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement n (PDEA) for disposition in accordance with the law.
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Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator,
the District Jail Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Bontoc District Jail, Bontoc, Mountain Province is directed to immediately
transfer the accused, DOMINGO AGYAO MACAD, to the custody of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fteen (15)
days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
SO ORDERED. 1 1
Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its
resolution dated January 10, 2014.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its March 17, 2016 decision, the CA a rmed the RTC's decision. The appellate
court agreed that the search conducted was an incident of a lawful arrest because
petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid as it fell under Section 5 (a) and (b), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. The CA also noted that the pungent smell of marijuana emanating
from the baggage of petitioner constituted probable cause for PO1 Falolo to conduct a
warrantless arrest. It likewise reiterated that the prosecution was able to establish the
chain of custody.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its
September 23, 2016 resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/con scation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the nal disposition. 3 5 To ensure the establishment of the chain
of custody, Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 specifies that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were con scated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public o cial who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
supplements Section 21 (1) of the said law, viz.:
(a) The apprehending o cer/team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and con scation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were con scated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public o cial who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
o ce of the apprehending o cer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures ; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justi able grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
o cer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
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over said items[.] (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending
team, after seizure and con scation, to immediately conduct a physically inventory; and
photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the persons from
whom such items were con scated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any
elected public o cial who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof . 3 6
In the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team is now required to
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the
presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
con scated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an
elected public o cial and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. 3 7 In the present case, as the alleged crimes were committed on
November 27, 2011, then the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR shall
apply.
Notably, Section 21 of the IRR provides a saving clause which states that non-
compliance with these requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over the con scated items provided that such non-compliance were
under justi able grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team . 3 8
The exception found in the IRR of R.A. 9165 comes into play when strict
compliance with the prescribed procedures is not observed. This saving clause,
however, applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter explained the cited justi able grounds, and (2) when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the bene t of invoking the presumption of
regularity and bears the burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same drug that was con scated from the accused during his
arrest. 3 9
The prosecution substantially
complied with the chain of
custody rule
The Court nds that the prosecution was able to su ciently comply with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. When petitioner
was apprehended, he and his baggage were brought to the Municipal Police Station.
There, the seized items, consisting of eleven (11) bricks of marijuana from the carton
baggage and six (6) bricks of marijuana from the Sagada woven bag, were marked,
photographed and inventoried. At that moment, the presence of petitioner, Barangay
Chairman Erlinda Bucaycay, DOJ representative Prosecutor Golda Bagawa, a media
representative Gregory Taguiba, and a certain Atty. Alsannyster Patingan were secured
by the police o cers. 4 0 Accordingly, all the required witnesses under Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 were obtained. Petitioner does not even question the su ciency of the
required witnesses.
The seized items were also immediately weighed. The eleven (11) bricks from
the carton baggage weighed 10.1 kilograms; while six (6) bricks from the Sagada
woven bag weighed 5.9 kilograms. 4 1
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After the marking, inventory and taking of photographs, SPO1 Jessie Lopez
(SPO1 Lopez) prepared the inventory report and allowed the witnesses to sign it. SPO1
Lopez also signed the spot report. The seized items were then turned over to PO2
Jonathan Canilang (PO2 Canilang), who thereafter brought the said items along with the
request for laboratory examination to SPO3 Oscar Cayabas (SPO3 Cayabas) of the
Provincial Crime Laboratory, Bontoc, Mountain Province. SPO3 Cayabas then made a
request for examination to the Regional Crime Laboratory O ce. There, PSI Alex
Biadang (PSI Biadang) received the request for examination, along with the seized
items. After the examination, all the bricks tested positive for marijuana. The subject
bag and carton, together with the seized marijuana bricks, were all identi ed in open
court by PO1 Falolo and PSI Biadang. 4 2
Clearly, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized
drugs. They were able to prove that all the persons who handled the drugs were duly
accounted for and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
maintained by these persons until their presentation in court. In addition, there was no
lapse or gap in the handling of the seized items because the witnesses of the
prosecution correctly identi ed the persons involved in the custody of the seized
marijuana bricks.
The seized items may be marked in
the nearest police station; minor
discrepancy in the document is
immaterial
Petitioner argues that the police o cers should have immediately marked the
seized items upon his arrest and should not have left the baggage in the tricycle.
The Court is not convinced.
As a rule, under the IRR, the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served. Likewise, the
marking should be done upon immediate con scation. However, Section 21 of the IRR
also provides an exception that the physical inventory and photography of the seized
items may be conducted at the nearest police station or the nearest o ce of the
apprehending o cer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In
such instance, provided that it is practicable, the marking of the seized items may also
be conducted at nearest police station.
In Imson v. People , 4 3 the Court stated that to be able to create a rst link in the
chain of custody, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the
accused and upon immediate con scation. "Immediate Con scation" has no exact
de nition. Thus, testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police
station and in the presence of the accused was su cient in showing compliance with
the chain of custody rules. Marking upon immediate con scation contemplates even
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
Similarly, in People v. Bautista , 4 4 the Court reiterated that the failure to mark the
seized items at the place of arrest does not itself impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the con scated items inadmissible in evidence. Marking upon
"immediate" con scation can reasonably cover marking done at the nearest police
station or o ce of the apprehending team, especially when the place of seizure is
volatile and could draw unpredictable reactions from its surroundings.
In this case, it was reasonable for the police o cers not to conduct the marking
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immediately at the place of the arrest and seizure. Evidently, petitioner is a ight risk
because he immediately ran away at the sight of SPO2 Suagen. To conduct the marking
in an unsecured location may result in the escape of petitioner. Also, the seized
baggage contained large quantities of marijuana. It would be impractical, if not
dangerous, for merely two police o cers to conduct the marking of such drugs in
broad daylight and in open public, without the assistance and security of other police
o cers. Accordingly, it was prudent and rational for the police o cers to conduct the
marking in the police station. As stated earlier, PO1 Falolo and PSI Biadang were able
to identify all the marked items in open court.
Further, there was no opportunity of tampering when PO1 Falolo and SPO2
Suagen ran after petitioner. As properly discussed by the RTC, there was no
considerable time that elapsed from the moment that petitioner ran away from his
baggage up to the time the police o cers arrested him. The distance between the Sta.
Rita Church, where petitioner was caught, and the COMPAC, where the baggage was
left, was only about 500 meters. Thus, the police o cers were able to immediately
return to the baggage once they arrested petitioner. It would be the height of absurdity
to require the police o cers to simply wait at the tricycle while they freely allow
petitioner to escape even though there was probable cause to believe that he was
transporting illegal drugs.
Likewise, petitioner argues that the mistake in the document, entitled "Turn Over
of Evidence," which states that six (6) bricks of marijuana were contained in a carton,
instead of the Sagada woven bag, taints the chain of custody.
Again, the argument has no merit.
The RTC correctly observed that the statement in the turn over of evidence that
the six (6) bricks of marijuana were contained in a carton, instead of the Sagada woven
bag, was a minor oversight and does not in any way destroy the prosecution's case.
PO1 Falolo testi ed that the six (6) bricks of marijuana were contained in the Sagada
woven bag. When PO2 Canilang was presented as witness, he also testi ed that the six
(6) bricks of marijuana were acquired in the Sagada woven bag. Both witnesses were
able to properly identify the marking contained in the said bricks of marijuana from the
Sagada woven bag. These portions of the testimonies of the police o cer were never
assailed by petitioner during cross-examination, hence, these were readily admitted by
the RTC.
Verily, it was only in the turn over of evidence that the minor mistake was found
and it was a mere product of inadvertence. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses su ciently established that the six (6) bricks of marijuana were indeed
found in the Sagada woven bag. Accordingly, it was proven by the prosecution that the
six (6) marijuana bricks were seized from the Sagada woven bag belonging to
petitioner, and not from the carton.
In ne, the guilt of petitioner for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 for transporting illegal drugs has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The March 17, 2016 Decision and
September 23, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06638
are AFFIRMED in toto .
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
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Leonen, J., see concurring opinion.
Martires, * J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN , J., concurring :
This case involves a man who was both searched and arrested without a warrant.
Thus, while this case requires analysis of the rules governing when arrests may be
made without a warrant, due attention must also be given to the constitutional rights,
which underpin these rules, in particular the right of persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or a rmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The foregoing wording of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution implies that
there may be instances when there can be "reasonable" searches and seizures which
may be valid, even if done without a warrant.
It should be noted that what may be "reasonable" in relation to a lawful
warrantless search may be different from what may be "reasonable" in relation to a
lawful warrantless arrest. The reasonableness must be considered in relation to the
values being protected by the Constitution.
The right against unreasonable searches protects the implicit right of the person
to be left alone or the person's right to privacy. In other words, the right recognizes and
protects inviolable spaces, which cannot be intruded into by the State, except when
compelling State interests are present, and even then, only when such intrusion is the
least restrictive way to meet that State interest.
Thus, this Court has traditionally recognized that the State may conduct
warrantless searches of moving vehicles but only when there is probable cause and
when they are limited to a visual one aided only by a non-intrusive tool, such as a
ashlight. An argument can be made in favor of the validity of olfactory searches done
with the aid of a dog because the intrusion on the privacy of the individual being
searched is not too burdensome.
However, the question of whether any particular warrantless search is reasonable
is entirely distinct from the question of whether a warrantless arrest is reasonable. The
right of a person to not be unreasonably seized is related to his very right to life and
liberty. Thus, the grounds for causing warrantless arrests have been traditionally limited
to instances where police o cers have personal knowledge that a crime has been
committed. A warrantless arrest may not be valid on the basis of mere hearsay
information.
The Rules of Court provides for exceptions where a person may be lawfully
arrested, even without any arrest warrant having been issued:
RULE 113
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Arrest
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace o cer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
nal judgment or temporarily con ned while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one con nement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. 1
Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court only allows warrantless arrests for
crimes in agrante when the police o cer or private citizen conducting the arrest has,
within his or her purview, all the elements of the offense being committed by the
accused. This provision cannot validly be invoked where a police officer only possesses
information that the accused has committed a crime.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b) of the same rule requires that the arresting
police o cer has perceived, through his or her own senses, that a crime has just been
committed and, in addition to this perception, also has perceived facts which could
reasonably lead to the belief that the person about to be arrested was the offender. In
this case, the police o cer did not witness the occurrence of the crime itself but
witnessed some facts that led him to believe that the person about to be arrested
committed the offense.
When explaining why a warrantless search or seizure was valid, this Court must
take great care to specify how the circumstances allow for a warrantless search or
seizure. This Court must be clear on the exceptions that it is invoking to avoid
inadvertent carving out of additional situations where warrantless arrests appear to be
allowable, despite having little to no doctrinal basis.
In this case, the police o cer already had basis to conduct a warrantless search
from the time he smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the carton and the bag
with a Sagada weave. This is similar to the case of Posadas v. Court of Appeals , 2
wherein the police o cer had reason to conduct a warrantless search in a way akin to a
stop and frisk:
The assailed search and seizure may still be justi ed as akin to a "stop
and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo, momentarily while the
police o cer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of
Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a
store window and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a
third man. This aroused the suspicion of a police o cer. To the experienced
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o cer, the behavior of the men indicated that they were sizing up the store for
an armed robbery. When the police o cer approached the men and asked them
for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the o cer grabbed one of
them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he
did the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for
the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and
seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police o cer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is
reasonable for an o cer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a
crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual brie y in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 3 (Citation
omitted)
It is not necessary to invoke the presence of the carton and the bag in a moving
vehicle to justify their warrantless search. That an odor of marijuana was emanating
from the bag already su ciently justi ed its inspection. Further, it should be noted that
if the presence of the bag in a moving vehicle had formed the basis for the warrantless
search, under jurisprudence, the police o cer would have been limited to its visual
inspection only.
The search could have been justi ed in relation to the consent of the accused. Of
course, had this been the basis for the warrantless search, there would have been a
burden to establish that the accused made a knowing and intelligent waiver in
consenting to the search. The mere testimony of the police o cer would have been
insufficient for this purpose.
For a search to be validly made as an incident to a lawful arrest, the lawful arrest
should have preceded the search. In Malacat v. Court of Appeals , 4 this Court stressed
this rule:
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
"stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that
there rst be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot
be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting o cer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in agrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of Yu, the arresting o cer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
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going to be committed. 5 (Citations omitted)
In this case, the warrantless search was attempted before the accused started
to flee. Consequently, the search could not be considered an incident to a lawful arrest.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.
Footnotes
*On leave.
1.Rollo, pp. 64-77; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices
Francisco P. Acosta and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., concurring.
2.Id. at 78-79.
5.Id. at 65.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 66.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 66-67.
10.Id. at 67.
11.Id. at 59.
12.Id. at 15-16.
13.Id. at 90-116; prepared by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, Senior State Solicitor M.L.
Carmela P. Aquino-Cagampang, and Associate Solicitor Ronn Michael M. Villanueva.
14.Id. at 125-132.
17.Id.
18.If the petition requires a calibration of the evidence presented, then it poses a question of
fact, which cannot be raised before the Court; see Republic of the Phils. v. Rayos Del Sol,
et al., 785 Phil. 877, 887 (2016).
19.Sindac v. People, 794 Phil. 421, 429 (2016).
20.Id. at 429-430.
33.Id.
34.Id. at 61-62.
35.Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002.
39.People v. Carlit, G.R. No. 227309, August 16, 2017, citing People v. Cayas, 789 Phil. 70
(2016).
40.Supra note 7.
41.Rollo, p. 42.
42.Supra note 9.
3.Id. at 312-313.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.