EMIGDIO SORIANO v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI
EMIGDIO SORIANO v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals, but certified to this Court as
one involving purely legal issues. The complaint is for recovery of a piece of land. The
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Judge Jesus P. Morfe presiding, gave judgment
for the defendants, appellees, herein, on the following findings:
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2/24/2020 EMIGDIO SORIANO v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI
"The parties to the instant case submitted no testimonial evidence but merely
documentary proofs of some of their respective allegations.
"It appears from the evidence of the plaintiffs that the disputed Northeastern
portion, consisting of 25,000 square meters, forms part of a bigger parcel of land
consisting all in all of 317,600 square meters which, as early as July 18, 1933, was
owned by and registered in the names of the spouses Domingo Magali and
Modesta Calimlim (Original Certificate of Title No. 51878, Exhibit "I"). On July
28, 1939, said spouses sold the aforesaid Northeastern portion of said parcel of
land to the spouses Tomas Cerezo and Segunda Soriano for P500.00, but said
deed of sale (Exh. A) was never registered and annotated on said O.C.T. No.
51878. Said spouses Tomas Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in turn sold the same
Northeastern portion to Maximino Mamormo for P950.00 on January 7, 1941
(Exh. B). This deed of sale was also not registered and annotated on said 6.C.T,
No. 51878. On April 5, 1946 Francisca Reyes, as surviving spouse of said
Maximino Mamorno sold her one-half pro-indiviso share in said Northeastern
portion to the spouses Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera for P1,000.00, and
on the same day she, as guardian of her minor children, sold the remaining one-
half pro-indiviso of said Northeastern portion to the same spouses Emigdio
Soriano and Beatriz de Vera (Exhibit C and D). These two deeds of sale were on
April 9, 1946 registered under the provisions of Act No. 3344 and were,
consequently, also not registered and annotated on O.C.T. No. 51878. Under
these circumstances, plaintiffs Emigdio Soriano and Beatriz de Vera filed the
present action for reivindicacion of said Northeastern portion, the defendants
Modesta Calimlim and Lamberto Magali being now in possession of said
Northeastern portion and claim ownership thereof.
"Defendants' evidence (Exh. 3) on the other hand shows that in January, 1944
Maximino Mamorno in turn sold said Northeastern portion back to Modesta
Calimlim for P5,000.00, but, instead of executing a formal deed of sale, merely
delivered to said Modesta Calimlim the muniments of title over said land, among
which were the original of the deed of sale of July 28, 1939 by the spouses
Domingo Magali and Modesta Calimlim in favor of the spouses Tomas Cerezo
and Segunda Soriano (Exh. 1), and the original of the deed of sale of January 7,
1951 by the spouses Tomas Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in favor of said
Maximino Mamormo (Exh. 2). By virtue of said verbal sale Modesta Calimlim
has been, as found by this Court in its decision of June 26, 1956 in Civil Case No.
9618 between the same Emigdio Soriano and Modesta Calhnlim (Exh. 6), in
possession of said Northeastern portion continuously since January, 1944 to the
present time, paying the real estate tax thereon under Tax Declaration No. 47040
(Exhs. 4 and 4A to 4 O, inclusive). Consequently, defendant Modesta Calimlim,
one of the registered owners of said parcel of land covered by O.C.T. No. 51878,
and her co-defendants Manuel, Consorcia, Luis, and Tomas, all surnamed
Magali, surviving children of the other registered owner, Domingo Magali, are
now the lawful owners of said parcel of land, including the aforesaid
Northeastern part thereof.
"The defendants Luisa, Demetria and Lutgarda, all surnamed Magali, on their
part, presented no evidence in their behalf."
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2/24/2020 EMIGDIO SORIANO v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI
Three errors are assigned in this appeal, namely: (1) The lower court erred in not
holding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits A & B, plaintiffs) are valid and binding, even
though not registered and annotated at the back of original certificate of title No.
57878; (2) The lower court erred in not holding that there was in fact no verbal sale of
the property in question (northeastern portion) made by Maximino Mamorno in favor
of defendant Modesta Calimlim; (3) The lower court erred in not holding that the
deeds of sale (Exhibits C & D, plaintiffs) executed by Francisca Reyes in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellants were valid and binding and conveyed the ownership of the
property in question (northeastern portion) to said appellants.
The first assignment of error misses the point made by the court a quo in its decision.
It did not say that the deeds of sale marked Exhibits A and B were not valid and
binding, but rather that they became functus oficio and divested the vendees of their
rights thereunder upon surrender of the documents to Modesta Calimlim when the
land was "resold" to her verbally in 1944. Indeed those two sales are the basis of the
respective claims of the parties, both of whom derive their conflicting titles from the
second vendee appellees by virtue of the verbal sale aforesaid, made by Maximino
Mamorno in 1944, and appellants by virtue of the two deeds executed by Francisca
Reyes, Mamorno's surviving spouse, on April 5, 1946.
The decisive questions, as raised in the second and third assignments of error, are,
first, whether or not there was in fact a sale in favor of appellees, and second, if there
was, whether or not it is superior to the sales in favor of appellants.
The first question seems at first blush to be one of fact, which would place this appeal
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. But in reality the question refers to the
correctness of the ruling of the court a quo in admitting and giving probative value to
the documentary evidence presented by appellees. The pivotal document is their
Exhibit 3, which is a sworn written statement of Ildefonso Mamorno, dated June 10,
1946, affirming his personal knowledge that his son Maximino had sold the disputed
land to Modesta Calimlim for P5,000.00 in January 1944; that no written instrument
of sale was executed but that all the papers (muniments of title) concerning the land
were delivered by his son to the said vendee; that his son actually received the
purchase price; and that possession of the land was thereupon delivered to the
vendee. Exhibit 3 is one of the documents submitted before the Deputy Clerk of Court,
who had been commissioned to receive them upon motion of both parties, and no
objection to the admission of any one of them appears in the record.
True, Exhibit 3 could have been objected to because the affiant did not testify and
hence could not be cross-examined by the adverse party as to its contents. But no such
objection having been interposed, the right of cross-examination was waived; and
having thus been admitted in evidence, the document is entitled to some probative
value as to the fact of the verbal sale. Since this fact is categorically stated in Exhibit 3,
it is not a mere inference from, but rather antecedent to and herefore justified the
consideration of, the corroborative circumstantial evidence presented by appellee, to
wit: (1) actual possession of the land by appellee since 1944; (2) possession by them of
the originals, of the first two deeds of sale (Exhibits 1 and 2); (3) tax declaration in the
name of appellees; (4) receipts of tax payments made by them; and by contrast, (5)
possession by appellants of only a carbon copy and a true copy of Exhibits 1 and 2
(Exhs. A and B), respectively, as well as their failure either to declare the land in their
names or to pay the taxes thereon.
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2/24/2020 EMIGDIO SORIANO v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO MAGALI
As basis of the declaration by the court a quo that since 1944 appellees had been in
actual possession of the land, reliance is placed on its finding to that effect in the
decision in the previous case of forcible entry between the same parties (Case No.
9618, Exh. 6), which was decided in favor of appellees, who were the defendants in
that case, appellants invoke section 7 of Rule 72, which states as follows:
While it is true that the judgment in an action for forcible entry is not conclusive of
the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of
action, the rule does not say that such facts shall have no probative value whatsoever.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary as in the case at bar there is none the
previous judgment on the question of material possession carries a persuasive effect.
The logic of the situation is that if Modesta Calimlim purchased the land, albeit
verbally, in 1944, the corroborative circumstances pointed out above would not have
existed. The originals of the two deeds of sale (Exhibits I and 2), would not have been
in the hands of the appellees, nor would they have declared the land in their names
nor paid the taxes thereon.
This case, therefore, should be resolved in the light of the law governing double sale of
the same property Article 1473 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 1544, provides that if
immovable property is sold to different vendees the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property; and
should there be no inscription the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession. Appellees obtained possession of the land in good
faith in 1944; appellants never did so. The registration by appellants of the sale in
their favor was made under Act 3344, which refers to properties not registered under
the Land Registration Act, and hence was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of
the Civil Code. Registration of Instruments, in order to affect and bind the land, must
be done in the proper registry (Secs. 50 and 51, Act 496).
The Statute of Frauds, invoked by appellants with reference to the verbal sale to
Modesta Calimlim, has no application in this case, because the statute applies only in
an executory sale of real property, not in one which has been consummated by the
delivery of the property to the vendee.
There being no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon
and Regala, JJ., concur.
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