G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005 ALVIN JOSE, Petitioner, People of The Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005 ALVIN JOSE, Petitioner, People of The Philippines, Respondent
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation
of Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said
crime in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the
following:
… [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics
Unit received an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant
was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The
information was that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver
100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-
buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of
the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of a P1,000.00
bill on top of a bundle of make-believe "money bills" supposedly amounting
to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna
went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant
1
boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the
morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN,
July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-
389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant
approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams
of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked
SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of "money bills."
Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to
Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of "money
bills."
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction
was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William
Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as Narcom
Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of
"money bills" and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente
Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10
and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo
examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a
second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-
36).4
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM
Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person
with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were
later able to identify three of these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3
Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced
to board another car while another person drove Sonny Zarraga’s car with Alvin Jose
as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On
the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny
Zarraga’s car. One of the men saw a substance inside the said compartment. He
tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million
peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarraga’s mother-in-law
who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
2
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny
Zarraga’s cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarraga’s wife. Col. Castro
talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the
release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the
bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank, Pinky
Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for
Sonny Zarraga’s release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky
Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as
Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank
which prompted the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room
and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarraga’s jewelry, P85,000.00 in
cash and Sonny Zarraga’s car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even
able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarraga’s ATM card.5
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the
crime charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the
cost of suit.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and
surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs
Board.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as
follows:
3
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE
PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH
ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING
PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT
PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE APPELLANTS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST
THEM.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification.
The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its
finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime;
hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a
reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to allege that he acted
with discernment when the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to
prove the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging
that –
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
4
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with
discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article
192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided
for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was
burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner
insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment
under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no
such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the
Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to
sell the shabu subject of the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted
with discernment; hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor to allege
specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not
necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the
petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner
show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgment to know
that the acts he committed were wrong.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and
under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law
applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special
penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him
to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of
such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime – the capacity to know
what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of
human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong. 9 However,
such presumption is rebuttable.10 For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable,
the prosecution is burdened11 to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong.12 Such circumstantial evidence may include the
utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of
the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the
crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding
the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was
committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer.
The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car
with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-
5
buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra
replied in the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to
bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The
petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who
handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell
them?
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically…. I
withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell
us who asked you that question?
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
A Yes, Sir.
6
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us.
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by
these police officers?
A Yes, Sir.
7
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with
the shabu?
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-
buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received
the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing
over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the
car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the
accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the
petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and
at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer
did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers
used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the
testimony of the poseur-buyer:
ATTY. VERANO:
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?
A No, Sir.
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of
the boy?
8
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not
surprised that a young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?
FISCAL:
ATTY. VERANO:
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very
young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.
COURT:
WITNESS:
A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.15
FISCAL:
COURT:
Please proceed.
FISCAL:
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13,
1995 and did I hear it right that you went to Manuela at 5 o’clock in the
afternoon?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
9
Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City?
You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 o’clock?
A No, Sir.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of
the police, you said that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance
to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car
when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is
that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to
anybody since the day that you were arrested?
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside
that [L]ancer car?
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were
accosted by a male person at the workshop and then you went out of
Megamall and when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car
dangling at the waist. At whose waist?
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car
was?
A No, Sir.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking
area of SM Megamall, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?
10
A No, Sir.
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had
not made any call?
A No, Sir.
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you
claimed that there was already this group which met you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male
person who arrested you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?
A No, Sir.
A No, Sir.
FISCAL:
ATTY. VERANO:
COURT:
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you
seen any shabu. In support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to
an examination?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
11
COURT:
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner
conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved
the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is
defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such
conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed
to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded
that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano ,17 we held that:
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene’s mental capacity to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of
Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked
about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he
participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would
still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the
presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract
from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the
government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.18
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.19
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
2
Penned by Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez.
3
Rollo, p. 22.
4
Id. at 83-84.
5
Id. at 84-85.
6
Id. at 88.
7
Id. at 24-25.
12
8
Id. at 8.
9
Wharton Criminal Law, Vol. I, p. 74.
10
Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 321 SCRA 375
(1999); Guevarra v. Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476 (1989).
11
Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858).
12
Adams v. State, 262 A.2d 60 (1970).
13
TSN, 30 July 1996, pp. 7-9.
14
Id. at 10.
15
Id. at 29.
16
TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 27-29.
17
307 SCRA 701 (1999).
18
Id. at 712.
19
There is no showing in the Rollo whether the petitioner posted bail or is
detained.
13