Jacques Berlinerblau, Toward A Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa
Jacques Berlinerblau, Toward A Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa
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Zito, p. 124.
12 See citationsof Bourdieu'swork below for his referencesto
heresy,orthodoxy,anddoxa.
13GordonLeff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages: The Relation of Heterodoxyto Dissent:
c. 1250-1450 (New York:ManchesterUniversity Press, 1967), 1:1.
14 Malcolm
Lambert,Medieval Heresy: Popular Movementsfrom the Gregorian Reform
to the Reformation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 4-5. Also see Kurtz (n. 2 above),
pp. 1098, 1110; Zito (n. 3 above), p. 125; and Jacques Berlinerblau,The Vowand the 'Pop-
ular Religious Groups'of Ancient Israel: A Philological and Sociological Inquiry (Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), pp. 22-24.
15 Mustafa
Emirbayer,"Manifesto for a Relational Sociology," American Journal of So-
ciology 103 (1997): 289; also see Pierre Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant,An Invitation to
Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). The relational approach
applies in all areasof religious research.See, e.g., William Swatos, Jr.,and Kevin Christiano
on the definitionof secularization in "SecularizationTheory:The Course of a Concept,"So-
ciology of Religion 60 (1999): 209-28.
16 Kai Erikson, WaywardPuritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York:
Wiley, 1966), p. 6; also see lmile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans.
S. Solovay and J. Mueller (New York:Free Press, 1966), p. 70. For a discussion of some of
the practices and beliefs which do seem to be inherent to "popularreligion," or at least the
academic discourse on "popularreligion" see Jacques Berlinerblau,"Max Weber's Useful
Ambiguities and the Problem of Defining 'Popular Religion,"' Journal of the American
Academy of Religion (2001), in press.
and eccentric types, has become a much more general condition; indeed,
heresy has become universalized."28
All of this points to the importance of identifying some fundamental
sociological criteriato account for where the heresy/orthodoxynexus can
be said to exist. To this end, theorists have made a variety of suggestions,
some more useful than others. Berger maintainsthat heresy "presupposed
the authorityof a religious tradition."29Collins, paralleling Weber'sdef-
inition of a church, emphasizes that "a particulartype of religious and
political organization"evokes the heretical.30In anotherWeberiananaly-
sis, Hamid Dabashi suggests that "it is the political success of a given
interpretivereading that rendersa religious position 'orthodox.'"31Others
stress the importanceof a written tradition.32
Zito peels off the exclusively religious connotationof heresy seen in the
definitions of Collins and Berger. For him, heresy "is not, strictly speak-
ing, a religious phenomenon, but an institutional phenomenon. It arose
first within religion only because of the religious institution'scentral po-
sition in governing the discourses of a particularhistorical moment."33
What is attractivein Zito's proposal is that it sees the relation of heresy
and orthodoxy as not restricted to religion but germane to manifold
departmentsof human interaction. Provisionally, I will retain the more
pliant definitionof heresy advocatedby Zito and fuse it with Collins's and
Dabashi'semphasis on the political natureof orthodoxy.In order for her-
esy to "arise"there must exist an authoritativepolitical apparatus(i.e., an
orthodoxy), one capable of identifying heretics and effectively "manag-
28Peter L.
Berger, The Heretical Imperative: ContemporaryPossibilities of Religious
Affirmation(New York:Anchor, 1979), pp. 30-31; also see Stambolovic(n. 9 above), p. 601.
29
Berger, The Heretical, p. 27.
30 Collins (n. 6 above), 218. I concur
p. only with the second half of this equation. The
religious criteria mentioned by Collins are not convincing. In his view, the heretical arises
underconditions of "aggressive monotheism"evinced by a "universalisticchurch"(pp. 217,
218, 222). The remarkof Henderson is instructive here: "heresy is not such a fragile hot-
house plant that it requires the services of a monotheistic doctrine, a central ecclesiastical
authority,an inquisition,or even a creed. Neo-Confucianismin Chinalacked all of the above
and yet developed notions of heresy and orthodoxy"(n. 1 above), pp. 7, 5; contra Collins,
p. 221. Collins closely follows Weber'sdefinitionof churchwhen defining heresy. He points
out that in social bodies based on kinship structures heresy is not possible (p. 216; see
Weber, Economy and Society [n. 20 above], p. 1164, and see p. 56). He also calls attention
to the need for literacy,records,communications,and "a ritualfocus of loyalty aroundrules
and sacred books rather than individual persons" (p. 221). Eisenstadt (n. 6 above), p. 3,
following Karl Jaspers, identifies orthodoxies only in those societies where there exists "a
basic tension between the transcendentaland mundaneworlds."For a discussion of Weber's
conception of the church, see Pierre Bourdieu, "Legitimation and StructuredInterests in
Weber'sSociology of Religion," in Max Weber,Rationality and Modernity,ed. S. Lash and
S. Whimster (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 132.
31 HamidDabashi, Authorityin Islam: From the Rise of Muhammadto the Establishment
of the Umayyads (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction,1989), p. 71.
32 See Wach (n. 1 above), p. 143; Collins, p. 221; Henderson, p. 7.
33 Zito (n. 3 above), p. 126.
Having stated our three basic ground rules, we now turn to the writings
of various social theorists on the subject of heresy/orthodoxy. The ap-
proaches to be discussed in this section surface, in simplified form, in
much heresy research conducted by scholars of religion.
In A Letter Concerning TolerationJohn Locke made the ingenious ob-
servationthat "every one is Orthodoxto himself."40Be that as it may, the
objective fact remains that only one group (or coalition of groups) within
a social body can behave like an orthodoxy in word and deed. This means
that it must retain the capacity to label others as heretics-and make this
label stick. For the comparative-historicalsociologist, the specific con-
tents of any given orthodoxy (creed, metaphysics, dogma, political ideol-
ogy, scientific paradigm,etc.) are of less interestthanthe mannerin which
it maintains its superordinatepolitical position. In what follows I draw a
theoretical sketch of orthodoxy in its most extreme and dominant mani-
festation, that is, a hierocracy,an apparatuswith all of the resourcesof the
(secular) state at its disposal.41Marxist, Weberian,and Gramscianpolit-
ical sociology offer useful guidelines for this particular"hard"version of
orthodoxy.42
In Engels's discussion of heresy in The Peasant War in Germany the
church is construed as the institution that represents the interests of the
feudal class. Heresies are understood as manifestations of class conflict,
as economically grounded challenges to ecclesiastical rule. As Hugues
Portelli phrases it, "For Engels, heresy is the ideological expression of a
rupture between a subaltern class and a ruling class.43 The heresy of
40 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration(Indianapolis:Hackett, 1983), p. 23.
41 See
Weber, Economy and Society (n. 20 above), pp. 1158-1211 and p. 54; and see
Roland Robertson, "Church-StateRelations in ComparativePerspective,"in Church-State
Relations: Tensions and Transitions, ed. Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1987), pp. 153-61.
42 Eisenstadt offers a somewhat similar definition of an orthodoxy as an "organized
church attempting to mobilize the religious (and, at times, political) sphere, and which
emphasizes the structuringof clear cognitive and symbolic boundaries of doctrine" (n. 6
above), p. 6.
43 "Pour Engels l'he6rsie est l'expression ideologique de la ruptured'une classe subal-
terne avec la classe dirigeante."Hugues Portelli, Gramsci et la question religieuse (Paris:
Editions Anthropos, 1974), p. 93, and see p. 76.
62
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (n. 51 above), p. 340.
63 I would restress that for Gramsci and Weber a relation to
religion's political power
assumed different forms throughouthistory. Not all orthodoxies have the entire state appa-
ratusat their disposal, a state of affairsrecognized in Weber'sdiscussion of the pure type of
Caesorapapismand Gramsci'sreflections on the Italy of his times. Gramscioccasionally dis-
cussed instances in which a religious group was not the directive grouping but one group
within a hegemonic apparatus(see Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebooks, pp. 245, 90, 100),
and also see Selections from Cultural Writings,p. 299; Fulton (n. 49 above), pp. 211-12;
Nesti (n. 50 above), pp. 348-49; and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and
Political Theory (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1992), p. 144.
64 Gramsci,Quadernidel carcere: Volumeprimo, volumesecondo (Turin:Giulio Einaudi,
1977), p. 1384; also see Portelli (n. 43 above), p. 94.
65 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 397.
adhereto the same religious faith as the orthodoxy (i.e., Catholicism). The
border between mass and intellectual heresies is, as Weber would say,
"fluid,"and we should not discount the possibility of mass heresies led
by intellectuals. In fact, Bourdieu seems to allude to a somewhat similar
possibility when he suggests that heresy arises when "in a crisis situation,
contestationof the ecclesiastical monopoly by a fraction of the clergy en-
counters the anticlerical interests of a fraction of the laity and leads to
contestation of ecclesiastical monopoly as such."66
DURKHEIMIANAND SIMMELIANAPPROACHES
66
Elsewhere, Bourdieu speaks of the hereticalpotential of the "lower clergy" ("Genesis"
[n. 21 above], pp. 26, 27-28). See n. 104 below for more observations on Bourdieu'scon-
ception of heresy.
67 Lewis Coser, "Durkheim's Conservatism and Its Implications for His Sociological
Theory,"in Essays in Sociology and Philosophy, ed. K. H. Wolff (New York:Harper,1960),
pp. 225, 215.
68 Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim, His Life and Work:A Historical and Critical Study
(Stanford, Calif.: StanfordUniversity Press, 1985), p. 475; JonathanTurnerand Alexandra
Maryanski, Functionalism (Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings,1979), p. 22; Talcott
Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. ed. (New York:Free Press, 1954), p. 206.
69 Robert Merton, On Theoretical Sociology: Five Essays Old and New (New York:Free
Press, 1967), p. 83; S. N. Eisenstadt, "FunctionalAnalysis in Anthropology and Sociology:
An InterpretiveEssay,"Annual Review of Anthropology 19 (1990): 251.
70 Coser, "Durkheim'sConservatism," 225.
p.
71
StjepanMestrovic, "Durkheim'sConcept of the Unconscious,"CurrentPerspectives in
Social Theory5 (1984): 277, and EmileDurkheimand the Reformationof Sociology (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1988), p. 13; Ken Morrison,"Durkheimand Schopenhauer:New
Textual Evidence on the Conceptual History of Durkheim'sFormulationof the Egoistic-
Altruistic Types of Suicide," DurkheimianStudies 4 (1998): 121; Philip Mellor, "Sacred
Contagion and Social Vitality: Collective Effervescence in Les Formes elementaires de la
vie religieuse," DurkheimianStudies 4 (1998): 105.
72 Albert Pierce, "Durkheimand Functionalism,"in Essays on Sociology and Philosophy,
ed. K. H. Wolff (New York:Harper, 1960), p. 156.
73 lmile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. J. Spaulding and G. Simpson
(New York:Free Press, 1966), p. 43.
74 JenniferLehmann,DeconstructingDurkheim:A Post-Post-StructuralistCritique(Lon-
don: Routledge, 1993), p. 29; Emile Durkheim,Montesquieuand Rousseau: Forerunnersof
Sociology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 2.
75 Pierce, p. 160.
76 Durkheim, The Rules (n. 16 above), pp. 64-75.
77 Ibid., p. 70.
In fact, the belief that the heretic is a progressive element, one who
heroically (albeit, perhaps,unknowingly) expands the parametersof a re-
strictedconscience collective for futuregenerationsto benefit, constitutes
a veritable axiom in recent heresy research. This ranges from Georges
Duby's description of heresy in feudal times as "perhapsthe most con-
vincing sign, of that tumultuous vitality that impelled Western civiliza-
tion forward in its sudden advance" to the self-explanatory title of
Bourdieu'sarticle, "Vive la crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science."82It
should be recalled, however, that heretics may be beholden to the most
reactionary,incoherent,senselessly violent or insignificantof positions. It
would be better to see them as potential catalysts for social change, as
opposed to social progress; a value-neutralorientation is in order.
Both Durkheim and Simmel make assumptions about the conscious-
ness of agents, which differ from those seen in the thought of Weber and
Gramsci. Notice the theme of obfuscation in Simmel's passage cited
above: the group thinks it punishes the heretic for the violation of the
symbol, when in reality the crime is against group unity. Durkheim,as is
well known, posits similar acts of misrecognition in The Elementary
Forms of Religious Life. As Bryan Turnerwrites, "The beliefs of the
participantswere in fact mistaken, since the real object of worship was
the social group."83This line of reasoning is not limited, of course, to
these two theorists. Engels makes a similar surmise about the human
being's boundless capacity to misrecognize social reality when he asserts
"the class struggles of that time appear to bear religious earmarks...
the interests, requirementsand demands of the various classes hid them-
selves behind a religious screen."84
That there exist powerful social forces outside of the awareness of
agents-but accessible to the insightful theoretical sociologist-is not
necessarily an easy idea to digest. That a heretic is martyredfor the good
of the social body is not a surmise made by heretics or their sympathizers.
Nor can it be said that the inquisitor understands the burning of this
dissenter as an activity that loosens the vice grips of a constricted con-
science collective for future generations to benefit. In part, this may ac-
82
Georges Duby, The ThreeOrders:Feudal Society Imagined,trans.ArthurGoldhammer
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 31; Pierre Bourdieu, "Vive la crise! For
Heterodoxy in Social Science," Theory and Society 7 (1988): 773-87; Weber in The Reli-
gion of China (n. 46 above) also seems to count on heterodoxy for the stimulationof inno-
vation or a breakfrom the traditionalstructuresof Confucianism. Yang, in the introduction
to this work, writes, "Weber'sproblem was to find out whether such heterodoxy as Taoism
could have been 'the source of a methodicalway of life differentfrom the official orientation'
and could have initiated a trendtowardcapitalism"(p. xxxiv; also see Eisenstadt, "Dissent"
[n. 6 above], p. 1). For other positive evaluations of the heretic see Erikson (n. 16 above);
and Wolpe, "Holistic Heresy"; Stambolovic; and Gursoy (all in n. 9 above).
83Turner(n. 45 above), p. 243.
84
Engels (n. 44 above), p. 86.
Doxa
A glance at our epigraphreveals PierreBourdieu'sintroductionof a third
concept, doxa, to accompany the old duo of heresy and orthodoxy.From
the outset, it must be stressed thatthis initiative has been forged in the cru-
cible of rathersecularproblematics.While it is truethatin an earlierstudy
the prophet is equated with the heretic, Bourdieu's heretics are as likely
to be professors in the modern French university.86Be that as it may, the
doxic conception, I believe, poses new and interestingquestions to schol-
ars of religion.
For Bourdieu, orthodoxy and heterodoxy exist in "the universe of dis-
course (or argument)"while doxa resides in "the universe of the undis-
cussed."87Yet in spite of their paradiscursive nature, doxic beliefs are
"known"by agents. Or, as Loic Wacquantdescribes it, they comprise "a
85 Weber,
Economy and Society (n. 20 above), p. 9.
86 Bourdieu's
equation of the heretic with the prophetoccurs in his 1991 piece "Genesis
and Structureof the Religious Field" (n. 21 above), originally published in French in 1971.
Secular heretics appear in more recent studies. Thus, in Homo Academicus (n. 7 above),
Bourdieu speaks of the debate between traditionalist schools (represented by Raymond
Picard) and modernist schools (representedby Roland Barthes) of literary interpretationin
France. Defenders of the orthodoxy were forced by Barthes'schallenge to make "as explicit
profession of faith, the doxa of the doctors, their silent beliefs which have no need for
justification... (producing) in broad daylight the unconscious thoughts of an institution"
(p. 116). On the discipline of sociology as the "solvent of doxa," see Loic Wacquant,"The
Double-Edged Sword of Reason: The Scholar'sPredicamentand the Sociologist's Mission,"
EuropeanJournal of Social Theory 2 (1999): 275-81. David Swartz, in "Bridgingthe Study
of Cultureand Religion: PierreBourdieu'sPolitical Economy of Symbolic Power,"Sociology
of Religion 57 (1996): 71, calls attentionto Bourdieu'srelative lack of interest in religion.
87Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992), p. 168.
realm of implicit and unstated beliefs ... which govern their practices
and representations"without agents even realizing it.88In his many asides
on the topic, Bourdieuoffers the following descriptionsof doxa: "the pre-
verbal taking-for-grantedof the world that flows from practical sense";89
"fundamental acceptance of the established order situated outside the
reach of critique";90"the world of tradition experienced as a 'natural
world' and taken for granted";91presuppositions-doxa-of "the game";92
"unthoughtassumptions";93"the ensemble of fundamentalbeliefs which
do not even need to affirmthemselves in the guise of an explicit dogma,
conscious of itself";94"an adherenceto relations of orderwhich, because
they structureinseparablyboth the real world and the thought world, are
accepted as self-evident."95
To this point we see that doxa is what agents immediately know but do
not know that they know. Or, as Bourdieu cleverly expresses this idea, it
"goes without saying because it comes without saying."96In their unrec-
ognized state, doxic beliefs are sharedby all members of a field. Inquisi-
tors and hereticsmay disagree over many issues, but they all concur, albeit
unknowingly,as to certaindoxic "truths."Here there is unanimityor what
Bourdieu refers to as "an unquestionedand unified cultural'tradition."'97
Yet doxic assumptionsshadow, so to speak, the imperativesof orthodox
rule. Bourdieu addresses this problematic with clarity in Practical Rea-
88 Loic
Wacquant,"Towardsan Archaeology of Academe: A Critical Appreciation of
Fritz Ringer's 'Fields of Knowledge,"' Acta Sociologica 38 (1995): 185; also see Pierre
Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity
Press, 1998), p. 81.
89 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1990), p. 68.
90 Pierre Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant(n. 15 above), p. 247; also see pp. 73-74.
91 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, pp. 164, 166.
92 Bourdieu, The Logic, p. 66.
93 Bourdieu, "The Specificity" (n. 8 above), p. 279, also see "Genesis," p. 13.
94 "l'ensemble de croyances fondamentalesqui n'ont meme pas besoin de s'affirmersous
la forme d'un dogme explicite et conscient de lui-meme" (Bourdieu, Mgditations pasca-
liennes [Paris: Seuil, 1997], p. 26).
95 Bourdieu,Distinction: A Social Critiqueof the Judgementof Taste,trans.RichardNice
(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1984), p. 471, and also see "The Philosoph-
ical Institution,"in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge:Cam-
bridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-8; PierreBourdieuand J. C. Passeron,"Sociology and
Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrectionof a Philosophy without Subject,"
Social Research 34 (1967): 162-212; Craig Calhoun, Critical Social Theory: Culture,His-
tory, and the Challenge of Difference (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 56, 151.
96 Bourdieu, Outline, p. 167.
97 Bourdieu and Wacquant,Invitation,p. 248, n. 45; and see Bourdieu, Practical Reason,
p. 67, Ce que parler veut dire: L'economiedes echanges linguistiques (Paris:Fayard, 1982),
p. 156, Mgditations, pp. 22, 123; Beate Krais, "Gender and Symbolic Violence: Female
Oppressionin the Light of PierreBourdieu'sTheory of Social Practice,"in Bourdieu: Criti-
cal Perspectives, ed. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 169.
98
Bourdieu, Practical Reason (n. 88 above), p. 57. Swartz notes that for Bourdieu
"taken-for-grantedassumptions" play an active role in "the constitution and maintenance
of power relations" (n. 86 above), p. 76.
99 Coser, "Durkheim'sConservatism" (n. 67 above).
100
"Legitimation"(n. 30 above), pp. 119-36.
101Bourdieu and
Wacquant (n. 15 above), p. 251, n. 49; Bourdieu, Ce que parler,
pp. 150-51, and Outline (n. 87 above), pp. 168-70; Craig Calhoun, "Habitus, Field, and
Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity," in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone, eds.,
p. 80; Krais, p. 167; Bourdieu, "ConcludingRemarks:For a Sociogenetic Understandingof
Intellectual Works,"in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone, eds., p. 269, and Les regles de 'art:
GenBseet structure du champ litteraire (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 261; and see B. Berger, An
Essay on Culture: Symbolic Structureand Social Structure(Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1995), p. 34.
102
Bourdieu, Outline, p. 169.
CONCLUSION:THEORIZINGTHE NEXUS
In closing, I will articulatethree distinct, though imbricated,definitions of
the phenomena discussed in this article. These are stated in hopes that
they will be refined, recast, and even usefully rejected by other students
of the nexus. Each definition represents, admittedly, a rather superficial
theoretical compromise between the possibilities raised by the more
agency-orientedpositions of Weber and Gramsci and Durkheimiansoci-
ology, in which conscious intentions assume a place of little analytical
prominence. Of course, any serious endeavorto reconcile the subjectivist
and objectivist traditionswithin social theory would requireengagement
with a variety of ontological and epistemological issues well beyond the
scope of this article.107For now, I will simply suggest that when study-
ing the heresy/orthodoxynexus we posit the existence of two analytical
105See Nicholas Garnham,"Bourdieu, the Cultural
Arbitrary,and Television," in Cal-
houn, LiPuma, Postone, eds., p. 179; and see Bourdieu, La domination masculine (Paris:
Seuil, 1998), p. 133.
106We might adoptanotherof Bourdieu'sconcepts as a means of accountingfor the afore-
mentioned "insideness" of the heretic. We could argue that heretics share with orthodoxy
"field-specific"doxic beliefs incorporatedwithin what Bourdieu refers to as the habitus (see
Wacquant,"Towards"[n. 88 above], pp. 184-85; and Bourdieu, Meditations [n. 94 above],
pp. 22, 121). In The Logic of Practice (n. 89 above), Bourdieu explains, "Sociology treats
as identical all biological individuals who, being the productsof the same objective condi-
tions, have the same habitus. A social class (in-itself)-a class of identical or similar con-
ditions of existence and conditionings-is at the same time a class of biological individuals
having the same habitus" (p. 59). What is useful for our purposes is that habitus is consti-
tuted by a large quantity of sociological variables; "embodied history,"Bourdieu calls it
(p. 56). Thus, the heretic-one who shares a similar habitus with all other members of the
orthodoxy-effectively shares numerous "conditions of existence" with members of this
group. Such an approachmight be preferableto the monocausalexplanationsof the heretic's
"insideness"discussed above. A more precise statement of the relation between doxa and
habitus is also in order. Should we assume that doxa is the "structured"disposition of the
habitus (see Bourdieu, The Logic, p. 68)? On the incorporationof doxa within habitus see
Krais, p. 169; John Codd, "MakingDistinctions: The Eye of the Beholder,"in Harker,Ma-
har, and Wilkes, eds., p. 145.
107 Suffice it to say that futureattemptsto theorize heresy need to integrateobjectivist and
subjectivist modes of analysis. It is precisely this effort to collapse "the antinomy of social
physics and social phenomenology"that is centralto Bourdieu'sproject (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant,p. 7); also see Bourdieu, The Logic, pp. 30-51, and "Vive" (n. 82 above), p. 780. Also
of interest is Mestrovic'sclaim that Durkheim'scentral concept of the "collective represen-
tation" is an attemptto mediate between objectivism and subjectivism (see n. 71 above).
levels. The first level requiresthat we take seriously what inquisitors and
heretics think they are doing and how the endeavor to dominate and to
resist domination contributes to the overall configuration of the nexus.
The second level alerts us to the possibility that the nexus itself may have
causes and effects that are beyond the control, intentionality,and compre-
hension of the agents we are observing.
Heterodoxy/orthodoxy: A relation of political superordinationand
subordinationwitnessed across time and space. The relation presupposes
the existence of a social body sufficientlydifferentiatedto permitthe gen-
esis and expression of heterogeneous thought among its members. It also
presupposes the existence of an organizationthat can articulatea partic-
ular conception of "the natural,"promulgatethis view, and control those
of its members who deviate from it. This interactionis most visible in the
context of religious history (notably Christianity and Islam, where the
terms were first postulated). Yet althoughit is most conspicuous in the re-
ligious sphere, the heresy/orthodoxynexus is not exclusive to that sphere.
It is discernible in academic disciplines, political movements, professions,
schools of artistic thought, in short, anywhere where there exists an or-
ganizationof men and women capable of expoundinga "straight"opinion
and managing those of its members who "swerve."
The relation between heterodoxy and orthodoxy may have causes and
consequences that those who participate in the relation do not readily
recognize. Agents, on either side of the divide, are not likely to under-
stand that the interaction may stimulate social (or at least group) unity,
strengthensocial bonds, unleash salutaryideas into the world, not to men-
tion a variety of possible dysfunctional dividends. Nor is an orthodoxy
able to see that in stigmatizing, imprisoning, or compromising with the
heretic, it comes to be itself. Bourdieu's notion of doxa reminds us that
studentsof this nexus must also be receptive to the existence of an unrec-
ognized unanimitybetween the putative belligerents. Heretics and inquis-
itors share beliefs about the world in common, albeit unknowingly.These
provide a shared epistemological backdrop against which specific dis-
agreements are highlighted.
Orthodoxy: Any organization of human beings who can advance a
binding conception of "the natural"and enforce adherenceto this concep-
tion. The essential attributeof an orthodoxy,what distinguishes it from all
contemporaneousothers who also advance a conception of the "natural,"
is its ability to manage, as it sees fit, those within its ranks who deviate.
An orthodoxy is rendered vulnerable-or thinks it is rendered vulnera-
ble-by internaldissent, by those who for all intents and purposes it con-
ceives of as "one of us."The studentof heresy must identify the particular
sociological basis upon which this perception rests. Subjectively, the cri-
teria that make one a memberof "our"groupin the eyes of the orthodoxy
Hofstra University
108
Bourdieu, however, contests Engels's reading ("Genesis," p. 15).
109Zito (n. 3
above), p. 129; Bourdieuwho, as noted above, equates prophecywith heresy,
makes a similar argument when he suggests that "prophetic discourse contains almost
nothing that is not part of prior tradition"("Genesis,"p. 35).