Defining Juvenile Delinquency: After Completing This Chapter, Students Should Be Able To
Defining Juvenile Delinquency: After Completing This Chapter, Students Should Be Able To
Defining Juvenile Delinquency: After Completing This Chapter, Students Should Be Able To
Delinquency
15
16 | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
placing-out
reform schools
child-saving movement
rehabilitative ideal
“best interests of the child”
due process of law
status offender
balanced and restorative justice
status offense
Juvenile delinquency, as we know it today, is a relatively recent concept. This
does not mean, however, that young people in the past were more compliant
than they are today. In fact, Socrates (470–399 BCE) offered a critique that
CASE IN
The “Stubborn Child Law”
Deuteronomy 21:18–21
18
If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son who does not obey his
father and mother and will not listen to them when they discipline
him, 19 his father and mother shall take hold of him and bring him
to the elders at the gate of his town. 20 They shall say to the elders,
“This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious. He will not obey us. He
is a profligate and a drunkard.” 21 Then all the men of his town shall
stone him to death. You must purge the evil from among you. All Is-
rael will hear of it and be afraid.
In November 1646, the governing body of Massachusetts Bay Colony took
these verses almost verbatim and made them into law. The colonial codes of
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire followed suit. Though sub-
stantially amended, the Massachusetts law remained in effect until 1973.
In his book, Stubborn Children: Controlling Delinquency in the United
States, 1640–1981, John Sutton points out that “the ‘stubborn child law’ was
legally distinctive in three ways: (1) It defined a special legal obligation that
pertained to children, but not to adults; (2) it defined the child’s parents as
the focus of that obligation; and (3) it established rules to govern when pub-
lic officials could intervene in the family and what actions they could take.”
While the “bare words” of these stubborn child laws made it a capital offense
for a child to disobey parents, they also “established rules to govern when
public officials could intervene in the family and what actions they could
take.” We will explore this new approach to child misconduct in this chapter.
Source: Sutton, Stubborn Children, 11–12, numbers added.
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 17
sounds amazingly contemporary: “The children now love luxury. They have bad
manners, contempt for authority, they show disrespect for adults and love to talk
rather than work or exercise. They no longer rise when adults enter the room.
They contradict their parents, chatter in front of company, gobble down food at
the table, and intimidate teachers.”1 So it seems that a concern over the “next
generation” is perennial.2
Scholars say that juvenile delinquency was “invented” or socially con-
structed in order to indicate that the concept is a product of a great many social,
political, economic, and religious changes. With regard to juvenile delinquency,
these changes began in the Renaissance (roughly 1300–1600), but were most
pronounced during the Enlightenment (mid-1600s–late 1700s) and the Indus-
trial Revolution (1760–mid 1900s).3 This transformation of thought and prac-
tice eventually led to a series of legal changes at the end of the nineteenth
century that created the legal status of “juvenile delinquent” and a separate le-
gal system that included juvenile courts and reformatories.4 The use of a sepa-
rate legal status and legal system for juveniles spread rapidly throughout the
United States in the early twentieth century. It was not long, however, before the
legal philosophy of the juvenile court began to be seriously questioned. Begin-
ning in the 1960s, a “second revolution” significantly altered contemporary def-
initions of juvenile delinquency and practices of juvenile justice.5
Using a social constructionist perspective, this chapter traces the historical social constructionist
origins and recent transformations of juvenile delinquency as a legal concept. perspective An attempt
to understand the many
We also consider the associated changes in juvenile justice practices. As our per- social, political, and
spectives toward juvenile delinquency have changed, so too has our legal re- economic factors that lead
to the development of an
sponse to it. Focusing on this correspondence, this chapter covers four areas: (1) idea, concept, or view.
the social construction of “juvenile delinquency,” (2) the invention of the juve-
nile court, (3) the transformation of juvenile justice systems, and (4) the legal
definitions of “juvenile delinquency.”
Figure 2-1 The Discovery of Childhood and Adolescence. While the ancient Greeks were aware that the age
of youth was distinctive, characterized by distinctive behaviors, attitudes, and emotions, the conception of de-
velopmental stages and social differentiation based upon age was “discovered” very slowly beginning in the
Renaissance. Childhood and adolescence, as we know the companion concepts today, were not given full ex-
pression as developmental stages in the life course until the late nineteenth century.
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 21
of England, parens patriae provided the fundamental legal authority for the idea
of juvenile delinquency and the early juvenile court.
The Latin phrase parens patriae means literally “parent of the country.”33 As parens patriae Literally
a Renaissance legal doctrine, parens patriae vested far-reaching power in the king means “parent of the
country.” The legal
as sovereign and supreme guardian over his land and people—the “king’s prerog- authority of courts to
ative.”34 Chancery courts were established to provide just settlements to disputes assume parental
responsibilities when the
but to do so in a way that maintained the king’s prerogative. These disputes arose natural parents fail to
mainly with regard to property rights and inheritance. Chancery court decisions fulfill their duties.
sought the orderly transfer of property interests and feudal duties, especially when
the “crown’s interests” were at stake economically and politically.35
Parens patriae provided the king with considerable legal authority to support
and protect the social and political order of English feudal society.36 Attached to
this authority, however, was a duty that the king had to his subjects in return for
the allegiance paid to him. In practice, this duty was concerned primarily with
the social welfare of certain dependent groups. Chancery court cases centered
on three dependent groups: children, those who were mentally incompetent,
and those in need of charity.37 Under parens patriae, the king was established as
protector and guardian of these dependent classes.
With regard to children, parens patriae was applied most extensively to cases
in which the wardship or guardianship of young children was at issue.38 In me-
dieval England, though all infants were considered wards of the king because of
the king’s prerogative, cases involving the wardship of children of the landed
gentry were of primary legal concern.39 These children were heirs to an estate or
had already inherited an estate from a deceased father. Gaining custody and con-
trol of these children and their estates through wardship could prove profitable
for relatives.
Gradually, the chancery courts extended the doctrine of parens patriae to in-
clude the general welfare of children; the proper care, custody, and control of
children was to the “crown’s interests.”40 This included the ability of the courts
to assume and exercise parental duties—to act in loco parentis—when parents
failed to provide for the child’s welfare.41 Implicit in this doctrine are the devel-
opmental concepts of childhood and adolescence in which it is the parents’
responsibility to protect, nurture, supervise, discipline, train, and educate chil-
dren. Insuring the general welfare of children was a means to maintain the
power of the monarchy and the feudal structure of English society.42 It is im-
portant to note that the chancery courts did not have jurisdiction over children
charged with criminal offenses. Juvenile offenders were handled within the
framework of the regular court system. As a result, the parens patriae doctrine of
equity law “embraced the dependent and not the delinquent child.”43
Positivist Criminology
To say that juvenile delinquency is socially constructed means that it is a prod-
uct of prevailing thoughts and perspectives. The two historical developments we
have considered so far correspond closely in time and perspective. A third his-
torical development took root somewhat later but had an equally strong influ-
ence on the idea of juvenile delinquency.
22 | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
crime. While the pathological emphasis of positivist criminology gives the im-
pression that criminality is determined and therefore unchangeable, the use of
the scientific method to uncover the causes of crime gave hope that these
pathologies could be understood and treated. The rehabilitative ideal emerged
and prospered, especially with regard to children and adolescents.47 Charles
Cooley, a well-known sociologist, writing in 1896, declared: “when an individ-
ual actually enters upon a criminal career, let us try to catch him at a tender age,
and subject him to rational social discipline, such as is already successful in
enough cases to show that it might be greatly extended.”48
and “relieve” the poor. However, these local statutes merely stated the obligation,
without specifying who should be considered “poor” or what provisions were to
be provided to the poor.52
poor laws Laws enacted in Colonial poor laws mirrored, but did not merely duplicate, those that had
colonial America that developed earlier in sixteenth-century England.53 Sharing similar philosophy
established a civic duty of
private citizens to and purpose with the parens patriae doctrine, colonial communities (and later
“relieve” the poor. These cities and states) developed a system for protecting poor children and, if nec-
laws usually provided a
definition of residence so essary, separating them from their “undeserving parents.”54 This system grew
that outsiders could not to include laws, passed by local legislative bodies, regulating the poor; the cre-
benefit from private relief.
Legal authority was also ation of charitable organizations and relief societies; and, especially in urban
granted for governmental places, government-sponsored institutions. Poor laws provided legal authority
agencies or private relief
societies to separate poor
for governmental entities and authorized private philanthropic agencies to sep-
children from their arate poor children from their parents and to apprentice these children to lo-
“undeserving” parents. cal residents. The apprenticeship system kept relief costs down because the
child’s labor paid for care, education, and training. However, the overall qual-
ity of the care and training was questionable, and in many cases, apprentice-
ship was merely a “business proposition” in which the child provided slave
labor for a term.55
Gradually, the view developed that poverty, if left unchecked, will lead chil-
dren to “a future of crime and degradation,” a process known throughout much
pauperism The view, of the nineteenth century as pauperism.56 This point of view contrasted sharply
popularly held throughout from the doctrine of original sin, widely accepted in earlier times. Instead of fo-
the nineteenth century,
that children growing up cusing on the sinful nature of individuals, pauperism emphasizes a breakdown
in poverty, surrounded by in social order.57
depravity in their
neighborhood and family, The working assumption of pauperism led to the creation of various insti-
are destined to lives of tutions to help the poor. Institutional charity was thought to be superior to
crime and degradation.
physical and nutritional care offered in the home, or financial support paid to
the poor, because these noninstitutional forms of relief were thought to have
“ ‘pauperized’ the poor by creating habits of idleness and dependency.”58 Insti-
tutional relief efforts included the almshouse, workhouse, and poor house,
which sought to motivate the poor out of poverty by hard work and strict disci-
pline.59 However, reformers soon realized that these institutional settings could
similarly pauperize children by exposing them to adults “addicted to idleness
and intemperance.”60
As an expression of this perspective, the New York House of Refuge was es-
tablished in 1824 by the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, the
successor to the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism. The House of Refuge
dealt both with children who were convicted of crimes and those who were va-
grant, but in practice almost all of its children were vagrants from pauper fami-
lies.63 State legislation gave the Society authority to manage the institution and the
children under its custody.64 Houses of refuge followed soon in Boston (1825) and houses of refuge The first
Philadelphia (1828), and “for a quarter of a century the activities of these three in- institutional facilities in
the United States for poor,
stitutions defined institutional treatment of juvenile delinquents.”65 vagrant children. Both
David Rothman characterizes house of refuge reformers as conservative private and public refuges
sought to protect and
Protestants who desired to prevent pauperism and to protect and reform chil- reform the
dren, thereby sustaining order and stability in society.66 Through legislation, “predelinquent.”
“they widened the scope of permissible state intercession,” and their emphasis
on prevention, reform, and protection proved to be the “seeds of what came to
be called the juvenile court.”67
Not every vagrant or delinquent child was committed to a house of refuge,
however; only those that could still be “rescued” and were not too far down the
road of crime were admitted.68 The focus of houses of refuge was to protect the
“predelinquent.” Little distinction was made between “pauper, vagrant, or crim-
inal children”—all required protection and reform.69 Reformers were convinced
that these children were victims rather than offenders and that they needed to
be removed from evil influences of urban poverty: “Pauperism then was the en-
emy; juvenile delinquency, like intemperance, ignorance, and gambling, was the
symptom.”70 Reformers intended the house of refuge to be a sanctuary or haven,
where children could be isolated from the wickedness of the world and where
moral reform could take place.71
Assuming parental responsibility in an institutional setting proved to be a
difficult task for houses of refuge. Though reformers firmly believed that
parental neglect was the single greatest cause of delinquency, houses of refuge
were not intended literally to replace parents by providing a surrogate home en-
vironment. Instead, houses of refuge were intended to provide moral reform.72
John Sutton refers to houses of refuge as “moral institutions.”73 Moral reform in-
volved four basic elements: a daily regimen, strict discipline, education, and
work. David Rothman’s provocative book, The Discovery of the Asylum, speaks of
the house of refuge as a “well-ordered asylum.”74 Discipline was strictly en-
forced, based largely on solitary confinement and corporal punishment. Despite
humanitarian and religious intentions, houses of refuge frequently became sites
of physical abuse.75
As Case in Point, “A Typical Day at the New York House of Refuge” reveals,
education and work consumed the daily life of children in houses of refuge.
School in the early mornings and late at night, both before and after work, was
intended not only to provide academic skills and achievement, but also to pro-
mote self-discipline and to instill morality and religion. Children in houses of
refuge were also expected to work long and hard, doing physical labor and repet-
itive tasks such as making brass nails, finishing shoes, and wicker work.76 The
labor of children was sometimes contracted to manufacturers to provide revenue
for houses of refuge. The apprenticeship system was also used, justified as a
26 | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
CASE IN
A Typical Day at the New
York House of Refuge
At sunrise, the children are warned, by the ringing of a bell, to rise from their
beds. Each child makes his own bed, and steps forth, on a signal, into the
Hall. They then proceed, in perfect order, to the Wash Room. Thence they are
marched to parade in the yard, and undergo an examination as to their dress
and cleanliness; after which, they attend morning prayer. The morning school
then commences, where they are occupied in summer, until 7 o’clock. A short
intermission is allowed, when the bell rings for breakfast; after which, they
proceed to their respective workshops, where they labor until 12 o’clock,
when they are called from work, and one hour allowed them for washing and
eating dinner. At one, they again commence work and continue at it until five
in the afternoon, when the labor of the day terminated. Half an hour is al-
lowed for washing and eating their supper, and at half-past five, they are con-
ducted to the school room where they continue at their studies until 8
o’clock. Evening Prayer is performed by the Superintendent; after which, the
children are conducted to their dormitories, which they enter, and are locked
up for the night, when perfect silence reigns throughout the establishment.
The foregoing is the history of a single day, and will answer for every day in
the year, except Sundays, with slight variation during stormy weather, and
the short days in winter.
Source: Quoted in Mennel, Thorns & Thistles, 18–19.
stitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that
parental custody and control of children is a natural, but not inalienable right,
and if the parents fail to properly supervise, train, and educate their children,
their rights as parents can be taken over by the state.81 As one legal scholar
noted: the judicial reasoning in Ex Parte Crouse authorized state government to
“invade the home, replace the parents, and take custody of the child.”82
cottage, matron and/or patron (mother or father), and schedule. Cottages were
used to make the facility more like a family and less like a prison. Affectional
discipline, rather than physical discipline, was used in an effort to generate con-
formity and instill good citizenship.91 Some reform schools embraced Brace’s
conviction of reform through rural family and farm life and were therefore lo-
cated in rural areas.92
Cottage reform schools spread widely across the United States in the latter
half of the 1800s, but the degree of emphasis on the family ideal and the roles
of schooling and work varied greatly. Some reform schools provided only large
congregate housing of children, with little resemblance to family units.93 Con-
tract labor of children to manufacturers was a part of most reform schools, but
after the Civil War, child labor became more exploitative in some schools.94 In
addition, as farming opportunities diminished, training in agriculture pro-
vided in some rural reform schools became less marketable as a learned trade.
Similarly, changes in the nature of work brought on by the Industrial Revolu-
tion meant a significant reduction in apprenticeship opportunities—the
means by which most children were released from reform schools. In response
to this, some reform schools, especially those in the west, began to emphasize
vocational education and deemphasize a family environment. These programs
were oriented toward vocational education and often included military drill
and organization.95
Placement or commitment to reform schools was based on the legal author-
ity of the state, under parens patriae, to take over parental custody and control.
The reform school, however, provided the context for the first significant legal
challenges to the parens patriae doctrine, in the Illinois Supreme Court case
O’Connell v. Turner (1870).96
Michael O’Connell was sent to the Illinois State Reform School under a state
statute that authorized youths between the ages of six and seventeen to be com-
mitted based upon the charge of being “a vagrant, or destitute of proper parental
care, wandering about the streets, or committing mischief or growing up in men-
dicancy, ignorance, idleness and vice.”97 A writ of habeas corpus challenged this
commitment power when the decision was based solely on the dependency and
neglect of the child, without criminal conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed, ruling that a general consideration of the child’s “moral welfare and the
good of society” are not sufficient reasons for commitment to a reform school.
The state law allowing this was ruled unconstitutional, and officials were or-
dered to discharge Michael O’Connell.98
The state Supreme Court’s opinion questioned the state’s parens patriae au-
thority when protective custody was ordered based on the subjective consider-
ation of parental care and supervision. The court’s opinion stressed that parents
have a right and responsibility to rear and educate their children that cannot be
preempted by the government except under “gross misconduct [by the child] or
almost total unfitness on the part of the parents.”99
While the O’Connell decision focused on Illinois law and procedure and had
considerable impact in that state, reformers continued their efforts to allow and
encourage governmental intervention in the lives of dependent, neglected, and
delinquent children. The Chicago Reform School closed in 1872, two years af-
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 29
ter the court’s decision, and legislation repealed jurisdiction over “misfortune”
(dependency and neglect) cases.100
to “alleviate the miseries of urban life and to solve social problems by rational
enlightenment and scientific methods.”108 Still others argue that the child-
saving movement was an effort by the ruling class to repress newly arriving im-
migrants and the urban poor and to preserve its own way of life.109 Regardless
of which explanation is correct, leading child savers were prominent, influen-
tial, philanthropic women, who were “generally well educated, widely traveled,
and had access to political and financial resources.”110 Additionally, child savers
viewed their work as a humanitarian “moral enterprise,” seeking to “strengthen
and rebuild the moral fabric of society.”111
Child-saving was largely women’s work. Middle-class women “extended
their housewifely roles into public service and used their extensive political con-
tacts and economic resources to advance the cause of child welfare.”112 The child
savers argued that women were uniquely suited to work with dependent and
delinquent children.113 Women involved in the child-saving movement pro-
claimed that the domestic role of women made them better equipped to take on
the task of child-saving: “the child savers... vigorously defended the virtue of tra-
ditional family life and emphasized the dependence of the social order on the
proper socialization of children. They promoted the view that women were more
ethical and genteel than men, better equipped to protect the innocence of chil-
dren, and more capable of regulating their education and recreations.”114
CASE IN
Excerpt from Frederick Wine’s Closing Speech
to the Illinois Conference of Charities, 1898
We make criminals out of children who are not criminals by treating them as
if they were criminals. That ought to be stopped. What we should have, in our
system of criminal jurisprudence, is an entirely separate system of courts for
children, in large cities, who commit offenses which would be criminal in
adults. We ought to have a “children’s court” in Chicago, and we ought to have
a “children’s judge,” who should attend to no other business. We want some
place of detention for those children other than prison. . . . No child ought
to be tried unless he has a friend in court to look after his real interest. There
should be someone there who has the confidence of the judge, and who can
say to the court, “Will you allow me to make an investigation of this case?
Will you allow me to make a suggestion to the court?”
Source: Platt, Child Savers, 132.
provisions for the protection and custody of ‘delinquent’ children apart from
adult offenders existed in the United States long before the enactment of the ju-
venile court in 1899.”121
Nonetheless, the creation of the juvenile court culminated a century-long
evolution of thought and practice by which juveniles were differentiated from
adults both in terms of development and control.122 The new juvenile court es-
tablished a separate system that is noteworthy in terms of (1) structure and ju-
risdiction, (2) legal authority under the expansion of parens patriae, and (3)
legal philosophy and process.
CASE IN
Personnel of the Original Chicago
Juvenile Court
Descriptions of the procedures of the early juvenile court indicate that it was
informal and family-like. The image conjured up is of a kindly judge, sitting
in a big chair at a table next to a frightened youth (in a much smaller chair).
The judge dispenses fatherly wisdom to a repentant and receptive lad. When
one looks at the positions that made up the original juvenile court, however,
a very different picture emerges. The early juvenile court was composed pri-
marily of law enforcement personnel, not judicial personnel. In his study of
the first juvenile court in Chicago, Anthony Platt provides a roster of the orig-
inal court’s personnel.
The personnel of Cook County juvenile court consisted of
1. six probation officers paid from private sources, particularly
the Chicago Woman’s Club,
2. “one colored woman who devoted her entire time to the work,
free of charge, and whose services are invaluable to the court as
she takes charge of all the colored children,”
3. twenty-one truant officers paid by and responsible to the
Board of Education,
4. sixteen police officers, paid by the Chicago police department,
assigned to “assist the general probation officers in their visita-
tion work,” and
5. thirty-six private citizens who were occasionally responsible
for supervising children on probation.
In effect, the court staff was primarily composed of police and truant officers,
thus facilitating the arrest and disposition of delinquent youth. The juvenile
court provided its own policing machinery and removed many distinctions be-
tween the enforcement and adjudication of laws.
Source: Platt, Child Savers, 139–140.
The full title of the legislation that created the juvenile court indicates that
the new court was granted jurisdiction over both juvenile delinquents and de-
pendent and neglected children. As such, the juvenile court was deliberately cre-
ated to have broad jurisdiction over almost all juvenile matters. The act defined
a delinquent child as “any child under the age of sixteen (16) who violates any
law of the State or any city or village ordinance” (see Case in Point, “Ex-
cerpts”).126 The definition of a dependent and neglected child was much longer
and far more sweeping, covering a wide range of conditions from which children
must be protected, including homelessness, lack of parental care or guardian-
ship, and parental neglect and abuse. Notice too that dependency and neglect
includes a child who “habitually begs or receives alms” or “any child under eight
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 35
(8) years who is found peddling or selling any article or singing or playing any
musical instrument upon the streets or giving any public entertainment.” Taken
together, the newly established juvenile court was given broad jurisdiction in all
matters of dependency, neglect, and delinquency.
Such broad jurisdiction, however, blurred the distinctions among depen-
dent, neglected, and delinquent children. Regardless of the reason for referral,
the early juvenile court was ready and willing to step in if natural parents failed
to fulfill their proper function.127
as a civil court, not as a criminal court.136 The civil law tradition of parens pa-
triae, together with the rehabilitative ideal, resulted in at least three important
implications for the legal procedures of the early juvenile court: (1) diminished
criminal responsibility of juveniles, (2) a child welfare approach operating on
the concept of the “best interests of the child” and (3) informal and family-like
procedures.
1. Diminished criminal responsibility of juveniles: Drawn from the devel-
opmental concepts of childhood and adolescence, the early juvenile
court held that children and adolescents less than sixteen years of age
lacked the capacity to commit crime. This presumption of incapacity ac-
knowledged that young people could not be held legally responsible for
their offenses because they lacked physical and mental maturity.137
Viewed in this way, juveniles were not charged with or convicted of crim-
inal offenses, and rehabilitation, not punishment, was the appropriate
outcome of the juvenile court process. Judge Mack states, “children were
no longer to be dealt with as criminals, but rather through the parens pa-
triae power of the state were to be treated as wards of the state, not fully
responsible for their conduct and capable of being rehabilitated.”138
2. A child welfare approach—the “best interests of the child”: The child
savers envisioned the juvenile court as a welfare system, rather than a ju-
dicial system.139 As a result, the prevailing goal of the juvenile court was
to protect, nurture, reform, and regulate the dependent, neglected, and
delinquent child. The role of the juvenile court was not to determine
guilt or innocence, but to ascertain the character and needs of an offender
by analyzing his or her social background so that the court could make a
full determination of what was in the “best interests of the child.”140 ”best interests of the
child” The overarching
The early juvenile court’s intense focus on the individual juvenile of- interest of the traditional
fender, rather than the offense, coincides with the rise of positivist crimi- juvenile court to assess the
nology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Using detailed needs of the youth and
then to seek physical,
social histories, the juvenile court sought to uncover the causes of a emotional, mental, and
youth’s delinquent behavior and thereby provide a “proper diagnosis.”141 social well-being for that
youth through court
The identification of pathological traits and conditions was then used to intervention.
develop a treatment program that was individualized to the child.142
Because the juvenile court was primarily interested in determining
the “best interests of the child,” based upon a scientific assessment of the
“total child,” it gave little consideration to the reason for referral—
dependency, neglect, or delinquency.143 The referral offense was merely a
symptom that the juvenile court had to assess more thoroughly in order
to uncover the “real needs” of the child.144 According to Harvey Baker,
judge of the early Boston juvenile court, “The court does not confine its
attention to just the particular offense which brought the child to its no-
tice. For example, a boy who comes to court for some trifle as failing to
wear a badge when selling papers may be held on probation for months
because of difficulties at school; and a boy who comes in for playing ball
on the street may . . . be committed to a reform school because he is
found to have habits of loafing, stealing or gambling which can not be
corrected outside.”145
38 | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
saving reformers, arguing that they were self-serving, middle- and upper-class
women whose sole goal was to maintain the status quo by implementing new
and powerful control strategies through the creation of the juvenile court.154
Other scholars claimed that, while reformers may have been well-intended, the
rhetoric of reform was never really achieved in the newly created juvenile jus-
tice systems. From their point of view the resulting systems were even more
punitive and authoritarian than the earlier child welfare systems that were used
in combination with adult criminal courts. In addition, the new juvenile justice
systems were given extensive, almost unbridled, authority under the rehabilita-
tive ideal and expanded parens patriae.155
Despite occasional criticism, juvenile courts across the United States
achieved high regard in the decades following their creation. The few reports of
problems were viewed as “minor imperfections soon to be corrected by a con-
tinually improving system.”156 The confidential records and closed hearings of
juvenile courts made them inaccessible and effectively above reproof.
In re Gault (1967)167
Gerald Gault, age 15, was on probation in Arizona for a minor property offense
when he and a friend made a crank telephone call to an adult neighbor, asking
her, “Are your cherries ripe today?” and “Do you have big bombers?” Identified
by the neighbor, the youths were arrested and detained. The victim did not ap-
pear at the adjudication hearing, and the court never resolved the issue of
whether Gault made the “obscene” remarks. Nonetheless, Gault was committed
to a training school. The maximum sentence for an adult would have been a $50
fine or 2 months in jail. An attorney obtained for Gault after the trial filed a writ
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 41
of habeas corpus that was eventually heard by the US Supreme Court. The issue
presented in the case was the denial of Gault’s constitutional rights for due
process of law, including notice of charges, counsel, questioning of witnesses,
protection against self-incrimination, transcript of the proceedings, and appel-
late review. The Court ruled that, in hearings that could result in commitment
to an institution, juveniles have the right to notice and counsel, the right to
question witnesses, and the right to protection against self-incrimination. The
Court did not rule on a juvenile’s right to appellate review or transcripts, but it
encouraged the States to provide those rights. The Court based its ruling on the
fact that Gault was being punished rather than helped by the juvenile court. The
Court explicitly rejected the doctrine of parens patriae as the founding principle
of juvenile justice, describing the concept as “murky” and of “dubious histori-
cal relevance.” The Court concluded that the handling of Gault’s case violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “Juvenile court history
has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently moti-
vated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”
In re Winship (1970)168
Samuel Winship, age 12, was charged with stealing $112 from a woman’s purse
in a store. A store employee claimed to have seen Winship running from the
scene just before the woman noticed the money was missing; others in the store
stated that the employee was not in a position to see the money being taken.
Winship was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a training school. New
York juvenile courts operated under the civil court standard of “preponderance
of evidence.” The court agreed with Winship’s attorney that there was “reason-
able doubt” of Winship’s guilt, but based its ruling on the “preponderance of ev-
idence.” Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the central issue in the case was
whether “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” should be considered among the
“essentials of due process and fair treatment” required during the adjudicatory
stage of the juvenile court process. The Court rejected lower court arguments
that juvenile courts were not required to operate on the same standards as adult
courts because juvenile courts were designed to “save” rather than to “punish”
children. The Court ruled that the “reasonable doubt” standard should be re-
quired in all delinquency adjudications.
trials in juvenile court. The impact of the Court’s Gault and Winship decisions
was to enhance the accuracy of the juvenile court process in the fact-finding
stage. In McKeiver, the Court argued that juries are not known to be more accu-
rate than judges in the adjudication stage and could be disruptive to the infor-
mal atmosphere of the juvenile court by tending to make it more adversarial.
Transfer Provisions
All states have enacted laws that allow juveniles to be tried in adult criminal
courts. While these laws vary from state to state, transfer provisions fall into
three main categories: judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, and statutory
exclusion.191
1. Judicial waiver: Juvenile court judges are granted statutory authority to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer cases to criminal court.
Waiver decisions are discretionary and therefore subject to due process
review. While judicial waiver statutes vary from state to state, the basic
idea is that certain types of offenses and offenders, especially violent
ones, are beyond the scope of the juvenile court. States may use terms
other than judicial waiver, including certification, remand, or bind over
for criminal prosecution. States may also transfer or decline, rather than
waive, jurisdiction.
46 | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
Sentencing Authority
A second area of transformation in the 1980s was the enactment of state laws that
give both criminal and juvenile courts expanded sentencing options in juvenile
cases. This change resulted in a more punitive approach to juvenile delinquency.
Traditionally, juvenile court dispositions were individualized and based on the
background characteristics of the offender. Indeterminate sentencing laws allowed
the juvenile court judge to customize the disposition to fit the offender’s needs and
situation, with rehabilitation as the clear primary goal. As states shifted the pur-
pose of their juvenile justice systems away from rehabilitation and toward pun-
ishment, accountability, and public safety, juvenile case dispositions began to be
based more on the offense than the offender. “Offense-based dispositions tend to
be determinate and proportional to the offense; retribution and deterrence replace
rehabilitation as the primary goal.”194
Beginning in the mid-1970s, a number of states changed their statutes to al-
low for punishment in juvenile court disposition. New York’s Juvenile Justice
Reform Act of 1976 provided for secure confinement and mandatory treatment
of serious juvenile offenders, followed by strict parole standards and intensive
supervision upon release. By 1997, at least 16 states had followed New York’s
lead by adding or modifying laws to require minimum periods of incarceration
for certain violent or serious offenders.195
A number of states have also raised the maximum age of the juvenile court’s
continuing jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. In these states, the dispositional
order may extend the juvenile court’s jurisdiction beyond the upper age of orig-
inal jurisdiction (usually 18 years old).196 Illinois’s habitual juvenile offender
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 47
law, for example, allows the juvenile court to commit juvenile offenders who
meet the law’s criteria of habitual offender to the Department of Corrections un-
til these offenders are 21 years old.197
Confidentiality
A third area of juvenile justice transformation concerns the traditional confi-
dentiality of juvenile justice proceedings and records. In almost every state, “leg-
islatures have recently made significant changes in how information about
juvenile offenders is treated by the justice system.”198 Laws allowing for the re-
lease of court records to other justice agencies, schools, victims, and the public
have been enacted in most states. These laws also establish the circumstances
under which media access is allowed. A number of states also permit or even re-
quire the juvenile court to notify school districts about juveniles charged with
or convicted of serious or violent crimes.199
CASE IN
Purpose Clause of the Montana
Youth Court Act
41-5-102. Declaration of purpose. The Montana Youth Court Act must be
interpreted and construed to effectuate the following express legislative
purposes:
(1) to preserve the unity and welfare of the family whenever possible and
to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and phys-
ical development of a youth coming within the provisions of the
Montana Youth Court Act;
(2) to prevent and reduce youth delinquency through a system that does
not seek retribution but that provides:
(a) immediate, consistent, enforceable, and avoidable consequences
of youth’s actions;
(b) a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, detention, com-
petency development, and community protection for youth be-
fore they become adult offenders;
(c) in appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the youth court;
and
(d) that whenever removal from the home is necessary, the youth is
entitled to maintain ethnic, cultural, or religious heritage when-
ever appropriate.
(3) to achieve the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) in a family envi-
ronment whenever possible, separating the youth from the parents
only when necessary for the welfare of the youth or for the safety
and protection of the community;
(4) to provide judicial procedures in which the parties are ensured a fair,
accurate hearing and recognition and enforcement of their constitu-
tional and statutory rights.
Source: Montana Code Annotated 2005.
since been expanded to sixteen.202 Among the program areas are the con-
struction and staffing of juvenile detention or correctional facilities; the
hiring of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers;
accountability-based sanctions programs; graduated sanctions; restorative
justice programs; gun courts; and drug courts.203
The wording of “purpose clauses” in many state juvenile court acts was
changed to adopt balanced and restorative language, in order to demonstrate an
operating philosophy consistent with the requirements of JAIBG, thus making
these states eligible for block grants.204 The wording of the “Declaration of Pur-
pose” of the Montana Youth Court Act reflects this balanced and restorative jus-
tice orientation (see Case in Point, “Purpose Clause of the Montana Youth Court
Act”).
Defining Juvenile Delinquency | 49
CASE IN
Adjudication Classifications
in the Montana Youth Court Act
Delinquent youth means a youth who is adjudicated under formal proceed-
ings under the Montana Youth Court Act as a youth:
(a) who has committed an offense that, if committed by an adult, would
constitute a criminal offense; or
(b) who has been placed on probation as a delinquent youth or a youth in
need of intervention and who has violated any condition of probation.
Serious juvenile offender means a youth who has committed an offense that
would be considered a felony offense if committed by an adult and that is an
offense against a person, an offense against property, or an offense involving
dangerous drugs.
Youth in need of intervention means a youth who is adjudicated as a youth
and who:
(a) commits an offense prohibited by law that if committed by an adult
would not constitute a criminal offense, including but not limited to
a youth who: (1) violates any Montana municipal or state law re-
garding alcoholic beverages; (2) continues to exhibit behavior, in-
cluding running away from home or habitual truancy, beyond the
control of the youth’s parents, foster parents, physical custodian, or
guardian despite the attempt of the youth’s parents, foster parents,
physical custodian, or guardian to exert all reasonable efforts to me-
diate, resolve, or control the youth’s behavior; or
(b) has committed any of the acts of a delinquent youth but whom the
youth court, in its discretion, chooses to regard as a youth in need
of intervention.
Youth in need of care means a youth who has been adjudicated or deter-
mined, after a hearing, to be or to have been abused, neglected, or aban-
doned.
Source: Montana Code Annotated 2005. 41-5-103. Definitions. (11), (38), and
(51). 41-3-102. Definitions (34).
52 | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
SUGGESTED READINGS
Fox, Sanford J. “Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective.” Stanford Law Review 22
(1970):1187–1239.
Joseph, Hawes. Children in Urban Society: Juvenile Delinquency in Nineteenth-Century America. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Mennel, Robert M. Thorns & Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United States 1825–1940. Hanover, NH:
University Press of New England, 1973.
Platt, Anthony. The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977.
Rothman, David J. The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic. Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1971.
Schlossman, Steven. Love and the American Delinquency: The Theory and Practice of “Progressive” Juve-
nile Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
GLOSSARY
balanced and restorative justice: A contemporary orientation in juvenile justice that emphasizes
offender accountability, community safety, and offender competency development.
“best interests of the child”: The overarching interest of the traditional juvenile court to assess the
needs of the youth and then to seek physical, emotional, mental, and social well-being for that youth
through court intervention.
child-saving movement: A loose collection of women from middle- and upper-class backgrounds who
exercised considerable influence in mobilizing change in how governments dealt with dependent,
neglected, and delinquent children. One particular child-saving group, the Chicago Women’s Club, is largely
responsible for the creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago.
due process of law: Procedural rights established in the Constitution (including the Bill of Rights) and
extended through appellate court decisions that are based upon individual freedoms and limitation of
governmental powers.
houses of refuge: The first institutional facilities in the United States for poor, vagrant children. Both
private and public refuges sought to protect and reform the “predelinquent.”
54
parens patriae: Literally means “parent of the country.” The legal authority of courts to assume parental
responsibilities when the natural parents fail to fulfill their duties.
pauperism: The view, popularly held throughout the nineteenth century, that children growing up in
poverty, surrounded by depravity in their neighborhood and family, are destined to lives of crime and
degradation.
placing-out: The practice, begun in the mid-1800s, in which philanthropic groups took vagrant and
wayward urban children west by railroad to be placed in farm families.
poor laws: Laws enacted in colonial America that established a civic duty of private citizens to “relieve”
the poor. These laws usually provided a definition of residence so that outsiders could not benefit from
private relief. Legal authority was also granted for governmental agencies or private relief societies to
separate poor children from their “undeserving” parents.
reform schools: In the mid-1800s a new form of institution began to replace houses of refuge. These
institutions emphasized education and operated with traditional school schedules. Many reform schools
also used a cottage or family system in which children were grouped into “families” of forty or fewer.
rehabilitative ideal: The traditional legal philosophy of the juvenile court, which emphasizes assessment
of the youth and individualized treatment, rather than determination of guilt and punishment.
social constructionist perspective: An attempt to understand the many social, political, and economic
factors that lead to the development of an idea, concept, or view.
status offender: A juvenile who has committed an act that would not be a crime if committed by an
adult. See status offense.
status offense: An act that is illegal for a juvenile but would not be a crime if committed by an adult.
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ENDNOTES
1. Quoted in Jensen and Rojek, Delinquency and Youth Crime, 5.
2. Sommerville, Rise and Fall.
3. Berger and Luckman, Social Construction of Reality; Empey, Stafford, and Hay, American Delin-
quency; Feld, Bad Kids; Platt, Child Savers.
57
104. Quoted in Mennel, Thorns & Thistles, 129. See also Platt, Child Savers, 132.
105. Fox, “Juvenile Justice Reform;” Mennel, Thorns & Thistles; and Platt, Child Savers.
106. Sutton, Stubborn Children, 125–132. See also Feld, Bad Kids, 34–36; Krisberg and Austin, “Amer-
ica,” 24; and Krisberg and Austin, “United States,” 27.
107. Platt, Child Savers, 10. See Hawes, Children in Urban Society, for this point of view.
108. Platt, Child Savers, 10.
109. For this critical–revisionist point of view, see Platt, Child Savers; Rothman, Discovery; Schloss-
man, Love; and Sutton, Stubborn Children.
110. Platt, Child Savers, 77.
111. Ibid., 75, also 3.
112. Ibid., 83.
113. Ibid., 79.
114. Ibid., 7; see also the quotation of Christopher Lasch on page 76.
115. Platt, Child Savers, 130–131.
116. Ibid., 131.
117. Platt, Child Savers, 131–132; and Mennel, Thorns & Thistles, 130.
118. Platt, Child Savers, 133–134; and Krisberg and Austin, “United States,” 29.
119. Feld, Bad Kids, 55–56, 75; Hellum, “Juvenile Justice,” 299; Platt, Child Savers, 135; and Sutton,
Stubborn Children, 132.
120. Mennel, Thorns & Thistles, 43–44, 131; and Platt, Child Savers, 9.
121. Platt, Child Savers, 101.
122. Feld, Bad Kids, 56, 75.
123. Taylor, Fritsch, and Caeti, Juvenile Justice, 89.
124. Feld, Bad Kids, 56; Platt, Child Savers, 10; and Sutton, Stubborn Children, 121.
125. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
126. Illinois Statute 1899, Section 131.
127. Platt, Child Savers, 135; and Feld, Bad Kids, 62.
128. Mennel, Thorns & Thistles, 132. See also Platt, Child Savers, 137.
129. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pennsylvania 48 (1905).
130. Ferdinand, “History,” 207; and Fox, “Juvenile Justice Reform,” 1229.
131. Feld, Bad Kids, 62; and Platt, Child Savers, 135.
132. Revised Statutes of Illinois, 1899, Sec. 21. Quoted in Hawes, Children in Urban Society, 170.
133. Mack, “Juvenile Court,” in Feld, Bad Kids, 4.
134. Allen, Borderland; Feld, Bad Kids; and Platt, Child Savers, 43, 45.
135. Mack, “Juvenile Court,” in Feld, Bad Kids, 7.
136. Feld, Bad Kids, 68.
137. Brummer, “Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction,” 777.
138. Mack, “Juvenile Court,” 109.
139. Feld, Bad Kids, 66.
140. Feld, Bad Kids, 65–69; and Platt, Child Savers, 141.
141. Feld, Bad Kids, 66.
142. Feld, Bad Kids, 60; and Rothman, Discovery, 43.
143. Feld, Bad Kids, 66.
144. Ibid.
145. Quoted in Platt, Child Savers, 142.
146. Platt, Child Savers, 137–138.
147. Feld, Bad Kids, 66.
148. Quoted in Platt, Child Savers, 144.
149. Quoted in Platt, Child Savers, 143.
150. Feld, Bad Kids, 68; and Schlossman, Love.
151. Platt, Child Savers, 139.
152. Mennel, Thorns & Thistles, 132.
153. Ferdinand, “History,” 207.
154. Platt, Child Savers; Krisberg and Austin, “America;” and Krisberg and Austin, “United States.”
155. Feld, Bad Kids; Fox, “Juvenile Justice Reform;” and Schlossman, Love.
156. Hellum, “Juvenile Justice,” 301.
157. Tappan, “Treatment Without Trial?”; and Ferdinand, “History,” 210.
60
158. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966).
159. Hellum, “Juvenile Justice,” 301–302.
160. Ibid., 302–303.
161. Feld, Bad Kids, 92–94; Ferdinand, “History,” 212–213; Hellum, “Juvenile Justice,” 302–303; Ler-
man, Community Treatment and Control; Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks, Effectiveness; and Martin-
son, “What Works?”
162. Schur, Radical Non-Intervention.
163. Ferdinand, “History;” Hellum, “Juvenile Justice;” and Howell, Juvenile Justice.
164. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967); Feld, Bad Kids; Ferdinand, “History;” Snyder and
Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 87.
165. These case summaries are taken verbatim or paraphrased from the work of Snyder and Sick-
mund, Juvenile Offenders, 90–92.
166. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966).
167. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
168. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970).
169. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971).
170. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975).
171. End of excerpted case summaries from Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 90–92.
172. Crank, “JJDP Mandates;” and Howell, Juvenile Justice, 15–19.
173. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Challenge, 80.
174. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Juvenile Delinquency,
27; and Crank, “JJDP Mandates,” 1.
175. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Challenge, 83.
176. Ibid., 80.
177. Ibid., 81.
178. Ibid.
179. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, “Corrections,” 211, as cited in Howell Juvenile Jus-
tice, 17.
180. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force, 23, as cited
in Howell, Juvenile Justice, 18.
181. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force, 259, as
cited in Howell, Juvenile Justice, 18.
182. Raley, “JJDP Act.”
183. Shepherd, “Look Back,” 20.
184. Excerpted from Crank, “JJDP Mandates,” 2–4. See also Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offend-
ers, 88.
185. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 88. See also Krisberg et al., “Watershed.”
186. Feld, Bad Kids, 97–106.
187. National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1984:9), cited
in Krisberg et al., “Watershed,” 7.
188. Wilson and Howell, Comprehensive Strategy.
189. Krisberg et al., “Watershed,” 7–9.
190. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 88–89.
191. The following is drawn extensively from Sickmund, “Juveniles in Court,” 6. See also DeFrances
and Strom, “Juveniles Prosecuted;” Griffin, Torbet, and Szymanski, Trying Juveniles; Puzzanchera,
“Cases Waived;” Rainville and Smith, “Juvenile Felony Defendants;” Strom, Smith, and Snyder,
“Juvenile Felony Defendants;” and Snyder, Sickmund, and Poe-Yamagata, Juvenile Transfers.
192. Sickmund, “Juveniles in Court,” 7.
193. Ibid., 10.
194. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 108.
195. Rubin, Juvenile Justice, 35.
196. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 108.
197. 705 ILCS 405/5-815.
198. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 101.
199. Ibid.
200. Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders, 87, 89; Bazemore, Balanced; Freivalds, “BARJ;” and
Bazemore and Umbreit, Balanced.
201. Albert, “Juvenile Accountability,” 1.
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