Corpuz Vs Agustin 183822
Corpuz Vs Agustin 183822
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated
1
08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City and its Resolution dated 15 July 2008
2
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the
unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa
Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa
Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City
Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions as follows:
1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with improvements
thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x
containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more
or less x x x.
2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with the improvements
thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x,
containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters,
more or less x x x.
Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name Original Certificate
of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D.
Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject
properties, the latter being relatives.
Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having acquired the
same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.
Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz,
Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a
consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,150.00).
The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint.
In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that they entered into and occupied
Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the
allegation of the plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to occupy the
subject properties, being his relatives, and considering further the length of time that the defendants
have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711,
and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon, this court is of the view and
holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession
of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the dispositive
portion of said decision states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the case by the MTC,
by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the appellate court through its Fourteenth
Division dismissed his appeal. It noted that his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed
4
the disputed properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in
favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents was later, on
15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their execution. The Quitclaim, which
5
was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29
October 1976, resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the
6
name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not annotated at the
back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered. 7
Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed
real property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this
conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of
ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents’ possession of the property was not by
mere tolerance of its former owner – petitioner's father – but was in the exercise of ownership. 8
The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his father’s sale of the properties to respondents as
early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul
it and oust respondents from the subject properties. The appellate court rejected his contention that,
9
as registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof,
compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the same
properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was
equivalent to registration of respondents’ unregistered deed. In dismissing his appeal, the
10
CA concluded that respondents’ possession was "not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of
the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer"; hence "the complaint for ejectment must
fail." The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
11
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of
Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT of appeals seriously erred in failing to consider the legal
ownership of petitioner on the disputed property to claim better right to possession.
Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who between the parties
has the right to possession of the disputed properties -- petitioner, who is the registered owner under
TCT No. T-12980; or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale
over the same properties?
We DENY the Petition.
Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to discuss the nature of
an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. A
resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination of who has the better right to
possession in this unlawful detainer case.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion
interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession
where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper
inferior court." In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to
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physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not
possession de jure. 15
Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that
issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However,
where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the
ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. 16
In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the disputed properties as
owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
1971. Respondents believe that they cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they
are the owners and are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this
claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and has
been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that, having registered the properties
in his name, he is the recognized owner and consequently has the better right to possession.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership,
which necessarily includes possession. Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the
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subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower
courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by
respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact,
they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years
up to this day.
Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al., which has facts and legal issues identical to those
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of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondents
over a disputed property. He had a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants
of the property claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The principal
issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the subject property.
This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the better right to
possession of the disputed property based on the following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to
circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted
competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of Possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive
of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action
involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a
Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in
support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title
in the name of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless
and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and
decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for
value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a collateral
attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. 19
the age-old rule "that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof."22
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful
detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the
latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept
of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner’s father. Under these circumstances, petitioner
cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment
proceeding.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the
owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.
To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what
action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases
—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious
means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It
does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment
case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the
subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by mere tolerance
of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person’s
withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the
expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed
or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right
to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents’ continued possession of the subject
properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner
has not established when respondents’ possession of the properties became unlawful – a requisite
for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.
In Canlas v. Tubil, we enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of a complaint for
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Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the
date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the requirements sufficient to
warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and
the CA have consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the
subject properties, since their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership.
Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
We concur in the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s father engaged in a double sale of the
disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took petitioner more or less five years from
1971 when he acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the
conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens
system. Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but without
bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.
We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court’s conclusion that petitioner's failure to initiate any
action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of
registration of respondents’ unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court
of Appeals :25
(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at that time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides that the registration of the deed is
the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the
party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right
to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud (Gustillo v.
Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of petitioner was executed ahead of
the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of the subject properties by petitioner’s father to
respondents cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the
transaction.
We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-
12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title issued to him was
an "act of fraud" on his part. We find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the
26
Torrens title of petitioner – an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case. 1âwphi1
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral
attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. It is a well-established
27 28
doctrine that the title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged,
or diminished in a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein
29
the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral
attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.
Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the better right to possession in
relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of
petitioner's Torrens title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an
issue that we cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Decisions
1âwphi1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of
Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner –
are AFFIRMED.
We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
per Special Order No. 1174 dated January 9, 2012.
Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.
Rollo, p. 43.
2
Rollo, pp. 36-38.
3
Rollo, p. 36.
4
CA rollo, p. 40.
5
Id.
6
Rollo, p. 88.
7
Rollo, p. 40.
8
Id.
9
10
Id.
11
Id. at 41.
12
Id.
13
Rollo, pp. 15-16.
14
Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium I (7th rev. ed. 2007).
15
David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003) as cited in Urieta vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R.
16
17
Vicente v. Avera, G.R. no. 169970, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 634.
18
G..R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
Supra, citing Estrellita S.J. vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and Lina F. vda. de
19
Santiago, G.R. No. 117971, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 12; citing Noblejas and Noblejas,
Land Titles and Deeds, 210 (1992); citing Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 (1990).
(Ching v. Court of Appeals was erroneously cited as G.R. Nos. 59568-76 in the original
Decision in Co v. Militar).
20
G.R. No. 159292, 12 July 2007, 527 SCRA 474.
21
G.R. No. 166941, 14 December 2009, 608 SCRA 169.
22
Id.
23
G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
24
G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147.
25
414 Phil. 311, 323 (2001).
26
Rollo, p. 291.
Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada, G.R. No. 152423,
27
15 December 2010.
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA
28
315.
Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Magay v. Estiandan, G.R. No. L-28975,
29
27 February 1976; 69 SCRA 456 as cited in Pena, Pena, Jr. & Pena, Registration of Land
Titles and Deeds (2008).