THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A. CHAN

QUE AND HUI LAO CHUNG A.K.A. LEOFE SENGLAO, Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court’s consideration is the Decision1 dated January 9, 2009 and

Resolution2  dated April 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR
HC No. 00657 affirming the Decision3 dated June 21, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, in Criminal
Case No. Z-1058, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA No. 7659.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3

Isagani Yuzon, the officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the
Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious
looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said island. 4 
Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the specified
location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of
which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat.  They noticed one
(1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who
were transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to
the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away.  Due to the strong waves, the
police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead, went
towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On
board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a.
Chan Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent
plastic bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected
to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as “shabu.”  They requested the appellants to show their identification papers
but appellants failed to do so.5  Thus, the police officers directed appellants to
transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed appellants’ speed boat to
the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their
way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered
them “big, big amount of money” which they
6
ignored. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

<PNP Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro received a radio from a brgy. captain
that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said
island. Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the
specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side,
one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. On board
the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan
Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic
bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be
“shabu.”On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu
repeatedly offered them “big, big amount of money” which they ignored.>

Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with
the bags containing the crystalline substance, to the police station.  In the
presence of the appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they
conducted an inventory of the plastic bags which were forty-five (45) in
number, weighing about a kilo each.7  Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper
documentation from the appellants as to their identities as well as to the
purpose of their entry in the Philippine territory.8  However, the appellants did
not answer any of SPO3 Yuson’s questions.9  Immediately thereafter, SPO3
Yuson reported the incident to their superiors, PNP Provincial Command in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and PNP Regional Command IV in Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna.  The PNP Regional Director General
Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the following
day.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived together with Colonel Damian

on a helicopter.  They talked with Mayor Telebrico and the arresting officers
and then brought the appellants with the suspected illegal drugs to Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further investigation.11  There, the
appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs were turned over to Police
Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP,
Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the appellants using
“broken” English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan Liu only
kept saying the phrase “call China, big money,” giving him a certain cellular
phone number.12  He allowed appellants to call said number in which they
spoke with someone using their native language, which he could not
understand.13  Because of this difficulty, Inspector Culili sought the assistance
of Inspector Carlito Dimalanta in finding an interpreter who knew either
Fookien or Cantonese.

On December 5, 1998, the interpreter arrived. With the assistance of said

interpreter, Inspector Culili informed and explained to the appellants their
rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right to
counsel, as well as the right to be informed of the charges against them, and
the consequences thereof.14  Inspector Culili also requested the interpreter to
ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said constitutional rights.
However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase “big money, call China.” 
Apart from their names, aliases and personal circumstances, the appellants
did not divulge any other information.15 Inspector Culili, with the assistance of
the arresting officers, then prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of
the appellants, requested for their physical and medical examination, as well
as the laboratory examination of the white, crystalline substance in the bags
seized from them.16 He also assisted the arresting officers in the preparation
of their affidavits.17 According to Inspector Culili, moreover, he was able to
confirm that the appellants are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China,
based on an earlier intelligence report that foreign nationals on board
extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island
in Cavite, and Quezon Province.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic

Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory
Service Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an examination of the
white, crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags seized from the
appellants.19 After performing three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed
in her Chemistry Report that the same is, indeed, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.”20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental

Mindoro filed an Information21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, against appellants for violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to
Section 21 (a), Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No. 7659,
committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 3,

1998 at the coast of Brgy. Tambo, Ambil Island in the
Municipality of Looc Province of Occidental Mindoro, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused being then the persons not authorized by law
conspiring and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously import and bring through the use
of sea vessel into the above-mentioned place,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu contained in
forty-five (45) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags having a total
weight of 46,600 grams (46.60 kilograms) placed inside another
forty-five (45) separate self-seling (sic) transparent plastic bags
which is prohibited by law, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.  Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the
witnesses for the prosecution, specifically: SPO2 Paglicawan, SPO3 Yuson,
Police Inspector Culili, and Police Inspector Geronimo.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and
Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a
former Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la
Fuente Robles, a Member of the Looc Municipal Council, essentially maintain
that the subject crystalline substance was merely recovered by the
apprehending police officers from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo
Torreliza and not actually from the speed boat the appellants were
on.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt in its Decision
dated June 21, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding both accused CHI CHAN LIU @ “CHAN

QUE” AND HIU LAO CHUNG @ “LEOFE SENG LAO” GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING Section 14,
Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV as amended by
R. A. 7659 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer
the penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to each pay the FINE of One Million (Php1,000,000.00)
Pesos Philippine Currency, with cost de officio.

SO ORDERED.23
<Accused was convicted in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
which aws affirmed by the CA >

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision

dated January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants’
Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make
any revision, amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision.  Hence, the
present appeal raising the following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF

THE CRIME OF IMPORTATION OF REGULATED
DRUGS PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 14,
ARTCILE III, IN RELATION TO SECTION 21 (A),
ARTICLE IV OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7659, ARE
PRESENT IN THIS CASE.cralawred

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME

CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.cralawred

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES CAN
PREVAIL OVER THE GUARANTEES ENSHRINED AND KEPT
SACRED BY THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION IN THIS
CASE.cralawred

IV.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IS VALID.cralawred

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.24

Appellants maintain that there is no importation of regulated drugs in the

instant case since the elements of the crime of importation, namely: (1) the
importation or bringing into the Philippines of any regulated or prohibited drug;
and (2) the importation or bringing into the Philippines of said drugs was
without authority of law, were not established herein. Appellants assert that
unless there is proof that a ship on which illegal drugs came from a foreign
country, the offense does not fall within the ambit of illegal importation of said
drugs.  Thus, considering the prosecution’s failure to prove the place of origin
of the boat on which appellants were apprehended, appellants cannot be
convicted of the crime charged herein.

Appellants also claim that the prosecution failed to substantiate beyond

reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged for the chain of
custody of the illegal drugs subject of this case was not sufficiently
established. In addition, they emphasize the irregularities attendant in their
arrest and seizure of the illegal drugs in violation of their constitutionally
protected rights.  Appellants further call attention to the invalidity of their
arraignment for they were not represented by a counsel of their choice.

This Court finds merit on appellants’ first argument.

The information filed by the prosecutor against appellants charged appellants

with violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a), Article IV of
RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by RA No. 7659, which provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ARTICLE III
Regulated Drugs

Section 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. The

penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall import or bring any
regulated drug into the Philippines.

xxxx
 ARTICLE IV
Provisions of Common Application to Offenses Penalized
under Articles II and III

xxxx

Section 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty

prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense shall be
imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit the
same in the following cases:

a)  importation of dangerous drugs;

On the basis of the foregoing provisions, the crime of importation of regulated

drugs is committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the
Philippines without being authorized by law.  According to appellants, if it is
not proven that the regulated drugs are brought into the Philippines from a
foreign origin, there is no importation. In support of this, they cite our ruling
in United States v. Jose,25 wherein We said that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There can be no question that, unless a ship on which opium

is alleged to have been illegally imported comes from a
foreign country, there is no importation. If the ship came to
Olongapo from Zamboanga, for example, the charge that
opium was illegally imported on her into the port of
Olongapo, i.e., into the Philippine Islands, could not be
sustained no matter how much opium she had on board or
how much was discharged. In order to establish the crime
of importation as defined by the Opium Law, it must be
shown that the vessel from which the opium is landed or on
which it arrived in Philippine waters came from a foreign
port. Section 4 of Act No. 2381 provides
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring
any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, or
assist in so doing, shall be punished . . . .
It is clear that a breach of this provision involves the
bringing of opium into the Philippine Islands from a foreign
country. Indeed, it is a prime essential of the crime defined
by that section. Without it, no crime under that section can
be established.26

Moreover, the Black’s Law Dictionary defines importation as “the act of

bringing goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country.”27  As
used in our tariff and customs laws, imported articles, those which are brought
into the Philippines from any foreign country, are subject to duty upon each
importation.28  Similarly, in a statute controlling the entry of toxic substances
and hazardous and nuclear wastes, importation was construed as the entry of
products or substances into the Philippines through the seaports or airports of
entry.29  Importation then, necessarily connotes the introduction of something
into a certain territory coming from an external source.  Logically, if the article
merely came from the same territory, there cannot be any importation of the
same.

The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case,
stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt

that appellants were, indeed, guilty of importing regulated drugs
into the country in violation of aforesaid law. Appellants were
caught by police authorities in flagrante delicto on board a
speedboat carrying forty-five (45) plastic bags of shabu. The
drugs seized were properly presented and identified in
court. Appellants’ admission that they were Chinese
nationals and their penchant for making reference during
custodial investigation to China where they could obtain
money to bribe the police officers lead this Court to no
other reasonable conclusion but that China is the country
of origin of the confiscated drugs. All elements of the crime of
illegal importation of regulated drugs being present in this case,
conviction thereof is in order.30

We disagree.  The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese nationals as
well as their penchant for making reference to China where they could obtain
money to bribe the apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the
confiscated drugs necessarily came from China.  The records only bear the
fact that the speed boat on which the appellants were apprehended was
docked on the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental
Mindoro. But it could have easily come from some other locality within the
country, and not necessarily from China or any foreign port, as held by the
CA.  This Court notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat, it is
rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of
Occidental Mindoro from China.  Moreover, an earlier intelligence report that
foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels were seen along the
sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does not sufficiently
prove the allegation that appellants herein were, in fact, importing illegal drugs
in the country from an external source.  This, notwithstanding, had the
prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court that the
prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines, the
importation contention could have been sustained.

Appellants’ exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under

Section 14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from all
criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident.

At the outset, appellants may argue that as We have ruled in United States v.
Jose,31  possession  is  not  necessarily included in the charge of importation
and thus, they cannot be held liable thereof, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Counsel for neither of the parties to this action have discussed
the question whether, in case the charge of illegal importation
fails, the accused may still be convicted, under the information,
of the crime of illegal possession of opium. We, therefore, have
not had the aid of discussion of this proposition; but, believing
that it is a question which might fairly be raised in the event of
an acquittal on the charge of illegal importation, we have taken it
up and decided it. Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The court may find the defendant guilty of any
offense, or of any frustrated or attempted offense,
the commission of which is necessarily included in
the charge in the complaint or information.
As will be seen from this provision, to convict of an offense
included in the charge in the information it is not sufficient
that the crime may be included, but it must necessarily be
included. While, the case before us, the possession of the
opium by the appellants was proved beyond question and
they might have been convicted of that offense if they have
been charged therewith, nevertheless, such possession
was not an essential element of the crime of illegal
importation and was not necessarily included therein. The
importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship
carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the
opium be discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was
sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the
Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and
which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine Islands
with intent to discharge its cargo. That being the case it is
clear that possession, either actual or constructive, is not a
necessary element of the crime of illegal importation nor is
it necessarily included therein. Therefore, in acquitting the
appellants of the charge of illegal importation, we cannot
legally convict them of the crime of illegal possession.32

However, in our more recent ruling in People v. Elkanish,33 this Court held that
possession is inherent in importation. In that case, the accused, who was
suspected of being the owner of sixty-five (65) large boxes of blasting caps
found aboard a ship of American registry docked inside Philippine territory,
was charged with illegal importation of the articles under Section 2702 of the
Revised Administrative Code and illegal possession of the same articles
under Section 1 of Act No. 3023, in two (2) separate informations.  Ruling that
double jeopardy exists in view of the fact that possession is necessarily
included in importation, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the information on
illegal importation, in the following wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court

reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When a defendant shall have been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
 otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the defendant, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
With reference to the importation and possession of
blasting caps, it seems plain beyond argument that the
latter is inherent in the former so as to make them
juridically identical. There can hardly be importation
without possession. When one brings something or causes
something to be brought into the country, he necessarily
has the possession of it. The possession ensuing from the
importation may not be actual, but legal, or constructive,
but whatever its character, the importer, in our opinion, is a
possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal
prosecution. If he parts with the ownership of interest in the
article before it reaches Philippine territory, he is neither an
importer nor a possessor within the legal meaning of the term,
and he is not subject to prosecution for either offense under the
Philippine Laws. The owner of the merchandise at the time it
enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor. He who
puts merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title
thereto while it is in transit does not incur criminal liability.
Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign
vessel on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines
does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country.
(U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573).34

As We have explained in our more recent ruling above, there is double

jeopardy therein since the offense charged in the information on possession is
necessarily included in the information on importation in view of the fact that
the former is inherent in the latter.  Thus, this Court sustained the dismissal of
one of the two informations which charged the accused with importation to
avoid the implications of double jeopardy for possession is necessarily
included in the charge of importation.

Applying the aforequoted ruling, this Court finds that while appellants cannot
be held liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in the information,
their criminal liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond reasonable
doubt, may nevertheless be sustained.  As previously mentioned, the crime of
importation of regulated drugs is committed by importing or bringing any
regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law.  Indeed,
when one brings something or causes something to be brought into the
country, he necessarily has possession of the same.  Necessarily, therefore,
importation can never be proven without first establishing possession,
affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua non for it would
rather be unjust to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when
he is not proven to be in possession thereof.

At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession
when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation does
not violate their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation brought against them.  The rule is that when there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and
that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged.35 An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Indeed, We have had several occasions in the past wherein an accused,

charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal
possession thereof. In those cases, this Court upheld the prevailing doctrine
that the illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof
except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another
quantity of dangerous drugs not covered by or not included in the illegal sale,
and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for some
future dealings or use by the accused.37  Illegal possession of dangerous
drugs is therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale. 
Hence, convicting the accused with the former does not violate his right to be
informed of the accusation against him for it is an element of the latter.

In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element

of and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs,
convicting appellants of the former, if duly established beyond reasonable
doubt, does not amount to a violation of their right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against them.  Indeed, where an accused is charged
with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but
also of lesser crimes or offenses included
therein.38chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is

necessarily included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court
shall determine appellants’ culpability under Section 16,39 Article III of RA No.
6425.

The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
regulated drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the regulated
drug.40chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession
of the bags containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority.  As
mentioned previously, on the date of appellants’ arrest, the apprehending
officers were conducting a surveillance of the coast of Ambil Island in the
Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro, upon being informed by the
Municipality’s Barangay Captain that a suspicious-looking boat was within the
vicinity. Not long after, they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, the
persons on which were transferring cargo from one to the other. Interestingly,
as they moved closer to the area, one of the boats hurriedly sped away. Upon
reaching the other boat, the police officers found the appellants with several
transparent plastic bags containing what appeared to be shabu which were
plainly exposed to the view of the officers. Clearly, appellants were found to
be in possession of the subject regulated drugs.

Moreover, this Court is not legally prepared to accept the version of the
appellants that they had nothing to do with the incident and that they were
being framed up as the drugs seized from them were merely planted by the
apprehending officers.  At the outset, this Court observes that appellants did
not provide any explanation as to how the apprehending officers were actually
able to plant forty-five (45) bags of regulated drugs weighing about one (1)
kilo each in the speed boat of appellants in the middle of the ocean without
their knowledge.  Also, as the trial court noted, they did not even give any
explanation as to the purpose of their presence in the coast of Ambil, Looc,
Occidental Mindoro.  More importantly, aside from saying that the confiscated
bags of regulated drugs were merely implanted in their speed boat, they did
not provide the court with sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim. In the
words of the lower court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, the story of defense witnesses Jesus Astorga,

Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo Robles that the subject shabu
were taken only by the police authority from the house of
Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza taxes only one’s credulity.
Their testimonies appear to be merely a product of an
[afterthought]. They have not executed any prior affidavit on the
matters concerning their testimonies unlike the prosecution
witnesses SPO3 Yuson and SPO2 Paglicawan who executed
their joint affidavit almost immediately after their arrest. It is so
apparent from the testimonies of these three (3) above-named
defense witnesses that they [did not] know anything about the
case. What is even worse is that Atty. Evasco, the former
counsel of the accused, procured the testimonies of Jesus
Astorga, Fernando Oliva, and Godofredo Reyes. Clear enough
their intent or motivation is not for the truth to come out but for
the monetary consideration in exchange of their testimony.41

This Court has consistently noted that denial or frame up is a standard

defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. 
This defense has been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted.  In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence.42  Without proof of any intent on
the part of the police officers to falsely impute to appellants the commission of
a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-
serving claims of frame up by appellants.43chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Going now to appellants’ arguments that their criminal liability is negated by

certain irregularities in the proceedings of this case.  First and foremost,
appellants allege a violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures.  Due to the absence of probable cause, their
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure on their persons and
possession is unjustified and hence, the confiscated bags of regulated drugs
therefrom are inadmissible against them.

Section 2, Article III of the Philippine Constitution

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

A settled exception, however, to the above guaranteed right is an arrest made

during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued
warrant, under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of

a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
<Art. III, Sec. 2 of the constitution guaranty the freedom of person from
warrantless arrest and seizure however in cases provided in Sec.
5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)  When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
>
This Court has ruled that for an arrest to fall under the above exception, two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by
the apprehending officers in flagrante delicto.  As previously stated, the
records reveal that on the date of their arrest, the apprehending officers, while
acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted appellants
transferring cargo from one boat to another.  However, one of the boats
hastily sped away when they drew closer to the appellants, naturally arousing
the suspicion of the officers.  Soon after, the police officers found them with
the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. When they
requested appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well
as their purpose for being there, appellants refused to show them anything
much less respond to any of their questions.  In fact, when the officers were
transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to the shore, the appellant Chi
Chan Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers “big, big amount of
money.” Hence, the circumstances prior to and surrounding the arrest of
appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were actually
committing a crime within the view of the arresting officers, who had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.

In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and
seizure conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the
bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view of the arresting
officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of
obtaining a search warrant.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer,
who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.45  It applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. 

The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.  The object must be open to eye and hand, and its
discovery inadvertent.46chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of
ascertaining whether a criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and
place reported by the Barangay Captain.  In broad daylight, appellants were
seen in the act of transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another
and thereafter caught in possession of the same, which became inadvertently
and immediately apparent from the point of view of the arresting officers.  It is
undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of illegal drugs conducted by the
officers falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine. Consequently, the
confiscated drugs are admissible as evidence against appellants.
As to appellants’ assignment of failure on the part of the prosecution to
substantiate beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of the crime charged
for the chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not sufficiently established,
the same cannot be sustained as a review of the records of the case provides
otherwise. From the time of appellants’ arrest, the seized bags of regulated
drugs were properly marked and photographed.  Proper inventory was also
conducted in the presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico, who signed
a receipt evidencing that the confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP
Regional Headquarters.47  There, the evidence was sent to the Regional
Crime Laboratory Service Office for an examination which yielded positive
results.  The  laboratory  report, photographs, and receipts were all made part
of the records of this case.  In fact, the bags containing the crystalline
substance were presented before the trial court during the hearing held on
October 12, 1999 which was identified by SPO3 Yuson, the officer who
confiscated the same.  Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs was established by the prosecution.

Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally charged
in an Information on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after their arrest on
December 3, 1998, beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour period in Article 12548 of
the Revised Penal Code. But while the law subjects such public officers who
detain persons beyond the legal period to criminal liability, it must be
remembered that the proceeding taken against the detained persons for the
act they committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and
separate.49  This Court is nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances
faced by the police officers in this case, such as the language barrier, the
unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell on a
Sunday, as well as the disparity in the  distances  between  the different
offices.  But even assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the
filing of the Information, appellants should have taken steps to report or file
charges against the officers.  Unfortunately, they cannot now rely on
administrative shortcomings of police officers to get a judgment of acquittal for
these do not diminish the fact that illegal drugs were found in appellants’
possession.50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Anent appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights were further violated for
during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor
were they provided with one, this deserves scant consideration since the
same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of his
conviction.51 In this case, neither one of the appellants executed an admission
or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show, appellants barely even
spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase “call China, big money.” The trial
court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial
investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants’
constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.

In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the proceedings in

saying that during their arraignment, they were not represented by a counsel
of their choice but were merely represented by a court-appointed government
lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial court likewise appointed a special
interpreter, who merely understood a little Chinese language. As such,
considering the absence of any assurance that the interpreter was able to
explain to appellants the charges against them in the language they
understood, appellants therefore did not validly enter their plea.

The facts borne by the records of the case, however, militate against the
contention of the appellants. This Court does not find a violation of appellants’
right to counsel for even in their own narration of facts, appellants stated that
when they appeared without counsel when the case was called for
arraignment on January 19, 1999, the trial court gave appellants time to
secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when appellants
again appeared without counsel on February 23, 1999 that the court
appointed a counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office.52  It is clear, therefore,
that appellants had ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of
their own choice.  They cannot now assign error in the proceedings conducted
by the trial court for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in
full compliance with the law.

In much the same way, appellants had every opportunity to secure the
services of a Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their
standards.  As pointed out by the CA, the trial court gave appellants the
authorization to seek, through their counsel, the Chinese Embassy’s
assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter.53  Appellants were
even given time, through several postponements, to properly secure the
services of one. If appellants were unsatisfied with the competence of the
court-appointed interpreter, it should have taken the opportunities given by the
trial court.  In this relation, the trial court’s observations are worth mentioning,
to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Another factor that militates against the accused is their failure

to testify on their own behalf, the defense is trying to justify for
want of Chinese interpreter. The instant case has been filed in
Court since December 8, 1998 or six years more or less until
now. It is highly unbelievable that for such period of time
that this case has been pending in court, accused could not
still secure the services of a Chinese interpreter when as
borne out by the records, they were able to secure the
services of several lawyers one after the other. The accused
on two (2) occasions have even submitted written requests in
English (Exhibit “N” and Exhibit “O”) which were granted by the
Court allowing them to call their relatives but still they failed to
secure the services of an interpreter. To the mind of the Court,
accused can also understand English as proven by their letters. 
x x x 54

Indeed, this Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the
lower court as to appellants’ guilt of the offense charged against them,
especially when such findings are adequately supported by documentary as
well as testimonial evidence. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on
reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in
criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to
assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest
determination of the witnesses’ deportment during the
trial.55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, in view of the well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the
trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court,
absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would
warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome of the case, this Court finds
no cogent reason to deviate from the above findings.56 It is clear, therefore,
that based on the findings of the courts below, appellants were, in fact, in
possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority.

As to the penalty imposed on appellants, Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 7659,

amending RA No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
amended to read as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license
or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section
20 hereof.

xxxx
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Section
3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the
following quantities:

xxxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or

methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have
possessed forty-five (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride,
which is more than the two hundred (200) grams stipulated above, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with R.A. No. 9346,
otherwise known as “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines.”  As regards the fine, We find that the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in
view of the quantity seized from them.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 9, 2009 and Resolution dated April 24, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00657
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants herein are
found GUILTY of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
People v. Chi Chan Liu (Warrantless arrest seizure and searches)

Facts:

PNP Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro received a radio from a brgy. captain
that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said
island. Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the
specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side,
one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. On board
the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan
Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic
bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be
“shabu.”On their way, the police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu
repeatedly offered them “big, big amount of money” which they ignored.
Accused was convicted in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 which
aws affirmed by the CA

Issue:

WON warrantless arrest is valid?

Held: Art. III, Sec. 2 of the constitution guaranty the freedom of person from
warrantless arrest and seizure however in cases provided in Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer of a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)  When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view"
of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion
or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. In
addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and
seizure conducted on appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the
bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain view of the arresting
officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of
obtaining a search warrant. Accused are convicted.