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Satyagraha
Satyagraha and employee and employee
relations relations
Lessons from a multinational automobile
transplant in India 501
Saji K. Mathew and Robert Jones
Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, Australia

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of non-violent protest (satyagraha) in a
multinational automobile plant in India that has suffered from considerable employee relations
problems.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs a case study of a Japanese-owned company
using data obtained from 30 personal interviews and from internet media sources.
Findings – It is found that workers initially pursued their protests through satyagraha-style methods
before taking on a more violent posture when company management refused to accept any notion of
jointly seeking a new harmony. The reasons for these developments are explored.
Practical implications – The paper has implications for the manner in which scholars and
practitioners view the respective roles, significance, and management of satyagraha and non-
satyagraha protest in Indian companies.
Originality/value – The importance of satyagraha in Indian employee relations is under-researched
in comparison with other factors, and is especially significant for culturally-unaware multinational
companies in successfully understanding and managing protest in the workplace context.
Keywords India, Employees relations, Multinational companies, Automobile industry, Protest,
Satyagraha, Toyota
Paper type Research paper

Lean production methods have become ubiquitous across the global automobile
manufacturing industry. Lean production focuses on eliminating waste from all
aspects of the enterprise. Anything that does not produce value is classified as waste
(Womack et al., 1990). Opposition to lean production is widespread in the critical
literature, often condemned as an inhuman device that sacrifices human considerations
for commercial gain (Stewart et al., 2009). A popular analogy is to equate “lean” with
“mean” and “management by stress” (Parker and Slaughter, 1988a). The anti-lean
literature concentrates its analysis on the de-humanising and exploitative dynamics of
the system that sacrifices dignity and safety in an endless search for more from less
(Parker and Slaughter, 1988b; Babson, 1995; Elger and Smith, 1994; Stewart et al.,
2009). A number of researchers have published ethnographic accounts of the realities
for workers within lean factories in the automobile industry, for example, Toyota
(Kamata, 1982; Mehri, 2005), Subaru-Isuzu (Graham, 1995), Mazda (Fucini and Fucini,
1990), Vauxhall-GM and Rover-BMW (Stewart et al., 2009), and GM-Suzuki CAMI
(Rinehart et al., 1997). These studies have all occurred within developed industrial
nations (USA, Canada, UK, and Japan). However, the literature is far less rich in Employee Relations
Vol. 34 No. 5, 2012
connection with opposition to lean systems in the automobile industry in developing pp. 501-517
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited
nations. In this paper we analyse the role of opposition to lean production in a 0142-5455
multinational vehicle producer in India. DOI 10.1108/01425451211248550
ER India is a heterogeneous country with diverse religions, cultural values, and
34,5 languages often varying between different states and regions (Tripathi, 1990; Sen,
2005; Das, 2000). This diversity can complicate employee relations for multinational
companies wishing to establish operations within the country (Sinha, 2004; Bagla,
2008). Numerous studies have pointed to the complexity of factors that influence
human resource management and employee relations in the country (Budhwar, 2003;
502 Bjorkman and Budhwar, 2007; Ramaswamy and Schiphorst, 2000). One aspect of
Indian society that outsiders often find difficult to grasp relates to the notion of protest.
Protest lies at the heart of Indian history and culture and can take on a bewildering
variety of forms (Bayley, 1962). But, arguably the form of protest that has most
captured the imagination of scholars relates to the Gandhian philosophy of satyagraha.
Satyagraha espouses that “non-violence is a power that can transform adversaries into
friends and resolve issues of injustice and oppression” (newworldencyclopedia.org,
n.d.). More fully, the word translates as “Truth-force” or “the force that is generated
through adherence to Truth” (mkgandhi.org, n.d.). Satyagraha was extensively
followed as a form of protest against British colonialism in the period after 1920. The
British left India in 1947 and Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated in 1948 but there is
evidence that his mantra of non-violent protest still enjoys popularity in modern-day
India. For example, as recently as April 2011 the influential Indian social activist and
Gandhi adherent, Anna Hazare, commenced a satyagraha-style fast-until-death in
protest against the government’s refusal to allow a greater public role in the Anti-
Corruption Bill. This quickly developed into a mass movement ( Jha, 2011). Within
days the government acceded to all his demands.
Although satyagraha has been well analysed in the literature in relation to such
topics as political studies, social change, and philosophy it is noticeable that its role in
regard to employee relations, especially in regard to multinational companies, remains
under-researched. This represents a significant gap in the literature. The purpose of
this paper is to analyse the role of satyagraha in a multinational automobile plant in
India that has suffered from considerable employee relations problems. We employ
a case study of Toyota Kirloskar Motors (TKM) because of the momentous impact of
industrial unrest during the early years of this company’s operation. Toyota Motors
entered India in 1997 as a joint venture with the Kirloskar group of manufacturing
companies with the name TKM and started producing motor vehicles in late 1999 at its
Bidadi plant near Bangalore. This gives us an opportunity to study the chronological
nature of protest at the plant and make a welcome addition to the literature on this
company. The academic literature is fragmented and analytically thin, comprising
only a few descriptive case studies (Majumdar, 2006b; Mikkilineni, 2006; Ray and Roy,
2006), book chapters (Das and George, 2006), and other scattered references (Sinha,
2004; Mooij, 2005).
It seems remarkable that the legacy of satyagraha is still strong in India despite
the momentous events that have occurred in the country since independence, most
notably the era of state-sponsored socialism (1948-1991) and the more recent impact
of capitalist-inspired globalisation (since 1991). Other competitive philosophies in India
have been in direct contrast with satyagraha, such as the propagation of violence as the
only way to attain freedom by Subhash Chandra Bose, the rise of extreme Hindu
nationalism, and the impact of communist-inspired political parties and trade unions.
We offer two potential explanations for this. The first lies in the all-encompassing
nature of Indian thought: “a unique feature of Hinduism has been its ability to
incorporate a wide variety of different beliefs” (Kumar and Sethi, 2005, p. 56). Scholars
have noted that over thousands of years Indian culture has exhibited the ability to Satyagraha
absorb fresh ideas without allowing itself to be dominated by any one of them. Kumar and employee
and Sethi (2005, p. 56) note that “the primary focus of Hindu thought has been on
incorporating new developments instead of trying to refute them”. These authors cite relations
the work of Doniger (2001) who writes “it is axiomatic that no religious idea in India
ever dies or is superseded – it is merely combined with the new ideas that arise in
response to it”. 503
The second potential explanation lies in the Indian mindset for improvised
solutions. Jugaad is a Hindi word that refers to an improvised solution to a pressing
need. It is predicated on the notion of going outside a system or process to solve
a problem. Within this context, jugaad literally means an arrangement or to “work
around” something. It implies alternatives, substitutes, make-dos, good-enoughs, and
plan Bs, etc., an alphabet soup of options that work ( Jana, 2009). It possesses the
characteristics of being an innovative solution to the problem at hand which
provides an answer to an immediate dilemma. Jugaad thrives within a context of scarce
resources, necessity, and personal survival, where more often than not things fail to
work, and where systems and processes are poorly designed and executed. To get
things done people must learn how to reconnoitre around these barriers (Chadha,
2009). The concept has a class component to it. Jugaad are things that poor people
do to survive in an environment where they have to make the most of the resources
they do have: a tribute to native inventiveness, ingenuity, cleverness, and lateral
thinking. Such an environment makes inventers and innovators out of ordinary
people.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next two sections we analyse the
respective roles of satyagraha and non-satyagraha as forms of protest. This is followed
by an explanation of our methodology and an analysis of our case study at TKM.
We conclude the paper with a discussion and conclusion of our findings.

Satyagraha as a form of protest

In this section we examine the Gandhian philosophy of satyagraha and analyse
the strict limits within which it is confined. In terms of etymology the word is a
portmanteau of the Sanskrit words satya (truth) and agraha (to grasp, hold firmly,
insist on) (wikipedia.org, n.d.).
According to Gandhi (1920) “I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth
did not admit of violence being inflicted on one’s opponent but that he must be weaned
from error by patience and compassion”. The object is to “convert, not to coerce, the
wrong-doer” (Gandhi, 1939/1999). Satyagraha does not foresee the destruction of an
enemy but rather the conversion of an enemy: “the goal is to win hearts [y] it seeks to
liquidate antagonisms but not the antagonists themselves” (satyagraha1.com, n.d.).
Since the aim is to conquer through conversion “in the end there is neither defeat nor
victory but rather a new harmony” (britannica.com, n.d.). Satyagraha does not seek to
“end or destroy the relationship with the antagonist, but instead seeks to transform or
purify it to a higher level” (newworldencyclopedia.org, n.d.). The achievement of such a
new harmony creates a lasting peace rather than a short-term peace because all parties
have come to recognise and respect the truth. The oppressor is able to live on but this
time in a situation of cooperation, mutual acceptance, and lasting relationship.
The truth does not always reside on the side of the non-wrong-doer. Gandhi believed
that truth could be found in the opponent’s camp as well and hence should be respected
(Wintle, 2002). Sometimes concessions have to be made. Cooperation and negotiation
ER are vital ingredients in the process of finding a new harmony. Everything possible
34,5 must be done to keep open the path to the oppressor “lest the opponent become
alienated and access to their portion of the truth become lost” (dfong.com, n.d.). For
Gandhi, satyagraha was not a mere act of protest aimed at securing short-term
victories but more an introspective act characterised by fasting and soul-searching in
pursuit of truth. Non-violence is an inviolate component of satyagraha. It is
504 contradictory to attempt to use violence to achieve peace. Justice cannot be obtained
through unjust means in the sense that violent and coercive means merely embed that
injustice. In this regard we can note the existence of three basic concepts that form the
essence of satyagraha: sat (openness, honesty, and fairness), ahimsa (refusal to inflict
injury on others), and tapasya (willingness for self-sacrifice).
When conducting satyagraha campaigns, Gandhi laid down a number of principles
and rules as part of a code of discipline for non-violent protest. These include harbour
no anger; suffer the anger of the opponent; refuse to retaliate to the assault of the
opponent; do not submit to any order given in anger; refrain from cursing or swearing;
do not insult the opponent; do not directly coerce or physically obstruct anyone; do not
destroy property; do not be secretive; do not resist arrest; if taken prisoner behave in an
exemplary manner; there must be no impatience, no barbarity, no insolence, no undue
pressure, and no intolerance (Gandhi, 1930/1999; Prabhu and Rao, 1967).
Gandhi practiced two types of satyagraha in his campaigns: civil disobedience
and non-cooperation (Shepard, 2000). Civil disobedience means breaking a law and
courting arrest. However, only unjust laws were to be broken. Flouting all laws was
forbidden. By “refusing to submit to the wrong or cooperate with it in any way” the
oppressed person reveals his portion of the truth (britannica.com, n.d.). When breaking
an unjust law Gandhi stressed the “civil” aspect of the disobedience in the sense that
the protest had to be civilised and polite. Breaking the law was not the essence of the
protest. Going to prison was the object (Shepard, 2002). He wanted to make a statement
about how deeply he cared about the issue at hand. Rarely did such actions have direct
impact on the oppressor himself. Instead they operated through their indirect effects on
multiple audiences who would eventually bring unbearable public pressure upon the
wrong-doer and institute a change of heart.
Non-cooperation meant refusing to cooperate with the oppressor and according
to Shepard (2002) encompassed such actions as strikes, economic boycotts, and tax
refusals. Again such actions were performed in a civil manner but possessed a
dynamic of their own. Oppressors obtain their power from the willingness of people
to obey. But if people refuse such obedience and show willingness to suffer in their
self-sacrifice then the oppressor loses his power.

The elements of satyagraha: pradarshana, dharna, and hartal

In this section we examine the three components of satyagraha as defined by
Gandhi – pradarshana, dharna, and hartal – and analyse the role played by each of
these in the pursuit of non-violent protest:
(1) Pradarshana is a public demonstration involving a collective expression of
emotions. These can be either negative (e.g. labour protests) or positive
(e.g. celebrations such as weddings or religious festivals). Pradarshanas can
take place in various ways such as meetings, rallies, marches, and processions.
Their function is twofold. First, they act as an awareness mechanism. They
communicate the displeasure of people to perceived oppressors, bringing their
 grievances to the attention of those concerned. Second, they act as a mass Satyagraha
mobilisation attempt or a collective show of strength by the group affected by a and employee
decision or action. This process acts to test the willingness (Kelly, 1998) and
“secure concerted and collective responses” from supporters (Salamon, 2000, p. relations
115). In both these aspects they attempt to seek attention from both oppressors
and potential supporters. Quite often a pradarshana occurs at the site of a
protest (such as an industrial organisation) or culminates at the locus of official 505
power (such as a government department) (Gadgil and Guha, 2007).
When Gandhi returned from South Africa to lead the Indian freedom
movement he initiated pradarshanas as a way to mobilise the people and protest
against colonial oppression. Gandhi insisted that these pradarshanas should be
peaceful and whenever peace was breached by the participants he called off such
demonstrations (Tiberg, 2009). Pradarshanas have ever since been a common
way of peaceful protest in India in respect to all aspects of society, whether
political, religious, or industrial. The Times of India (2010) recently reported that
opposition parties within the Karnataka Assembly protested against alleged
illegal mining and corruption by undertaking a 310 kilometre padayatra (a
journey or pilgrimage by foot) from Bangalore to the site of one of the alleged
illegal mines. Supporters wore white Gandhi hats and waved the tricolour.
(2) Dharna is a method of seeking justice by sitting at the door of a wrongdoer,
traditionally a debtor, and fasting until justice is obtained (thefreedictionary.com,
n.d.). It can be conducted either by an individual, a group, or a community.
Etymologically the word derives from the Sanskrit word dhri which means
“holding out” (Hardiman, 2003, p. 44). It is inherently a peaceful demonstration.
Fasting was regarded as an effective tool in line with the Hindu faith which
believes that if the fasting person dies then his spirit will continue to torment and
cause afflictions to the unbending opponent (Bondurant, 1998). Hence, whenever
someone resorts to fasting this is looked upon with anxiety and attempts are
immediately made to dissuade the person from fasting either by accepting all
demands or initiating dialogue towards resolution.
During the colonial and post-Independence era dharna has evolved as a sit-in
strike or demonstration to show solidarity for a cause as well as seek the attention
of higher authorities. Dharna is also a means of drawing sympathy to the cause
from external audiences (Sharma, 2008). Thus it acts as a bi-pronged tool where
public support for the cause is gained and the authorities are morally persuaded
to resolve the grievance. The dharna is still extremely popular in India and is
practiced by all sectors of society. Recently an all-night dharna was held by
opposition parties within the Karnataka Assembly to protest alleged illegal
mining and corruption. The opposition members wore yellow miners’ helmets as
a symbol of protest (Times of India, 2010)
(3) Hartal is an expression of protest by stopping work. This is also an ancient
form of protest in India. During the Mughal rule in India the artisans
(goldsmiths, silversmiths, etc.) resorted to hartal against the fiscal exploitation
of the rulers by closing their shops and quitting the place on masse (Habib,
1995). Gandhi also used hartal as a weapon during the independence
movement. He called a nationwide hartal on 6 April 1919 to protest the Rowlatt
Act of the British government to control revolutionary activities, by shutting
down shops and businesses, stopping work, and fasting for a day (Brown,
ER 1972). This form of general strike (also called bandh) is still popular in modern
34,5 India. A bandh can be ordered by a community, a political party, or a trade
union where people stay in their homes, shops, and workplaces are closed, and
public transport does not operate. Being a collective society, when unrest is felt
in one sector of society in India it can quickly spread and acquire a broader
dimension across domains not directly related to the focus of the original
506 unrest. In this sense, hartal has become a common feature of industrial
relations in India. Trade unions often call for stoppages of work of varying
lengths, anything from a lightning strike (lasting for only an hour or two) to an
indefinite strike (lasting for an unspecified period). The involvement of
external trade unions affiliated to political parties helps to give the factory
hartal a broader dimension. Outside officials possess political power which can
bring more pressure to bear on company managements and government
authorities. This external influence often has the effect of spreading specific
industrial disputes into the wider community (Ramaswamy, 1974).

Non-satyagraha as a form of protest

We have argued that the three concepts of pradarshana, dharna, and hartal are crucial
components of the overall philosophy of satyagraha, but Gandhi laid down strict rules
of discipline for how satyagraha should be performed. As soon as a pradarshana,
dharna, or hartal turned violent it would be rejected by Gandhi. An example of this
concerns the practice of dharna. In the pre-Gandhian period a dharna comprised
of sitting at the doorstep of a debtor and fasting. However, when fasting failed to
evoke any satisfactory response from the oppressor the person would then resort to
self-infliction of wounds in order to escalate the protest (Spodek, 1971). Later, when
Gandhi adopted the practice of dharna and absorbed it within satyagraha, he took
fasting and hunger strikes (bhook hartal ) to be the essence of self-sacrifice and
abolished any resort to self-infliction of wounds. Thus, in the strict sense, satyagraha
moves beyond its intended domain as soon as any of the disciplinary rules surrounding
its operation are breached, for example, resorting to violence, breaking all laws not
just unjust laws, showing anger, swearing at or insulting the oppressor, deliberately
obstructing pathways or premises, retaliation, destroying property, and so on. Hence,
during any pradarshana, dharna, or hartal, as soon as the event starts to involve
deliberate obstruction, burning effigies, shouting insulting slogans, imprisoning
officials in their place of work ( gherao), throwing stones, sabotage, looting, rioting,
burning, damaging or destroying property, self-wounding, or self-immolation, then it
moves beyond the domain of satyagraha.

Methodology
The authors have undertaken three separate field trips to Bangalore to gather data
conducting 30 separate interviews in the process: eight with business journalists,
four with external union officials, three with internal shop stewards, eight with senior
managers, two with middle managers, three with training personnel, and one each
with a maintenance worker, and an Indian academic. All interviews were tape recorded
and transcribed. At the end of each field trip the interviews were analysed for
important themes which formed the basis for our next round of interviews in
subsequent trips. We also performed an internet search for significant events
occurring at the plant during the period since 1999. These were downloaded, arranged
in chronological order, and analysed for important themes. This data were used to Satyagraha
inform our interview questions and add density to our data. and employee
The three shop stewards we interviewed had previously been rank-and-file
workers at TKM and had been at the forefront of on-going worker opposition in the relations
plant. All of them had served various periods of suspension from their employment
because of their agitation for union recognition. In particular they enjoyed almost cult
status amongst the workforce for their leading roles in occupying the factory in 2006 507
and threatening to commit suicide by igniting the LPG cylinders. After the recognition
of the Toyota Kirloskar Motor Employees Union (TKMEU) in 2007 these three
individuals were elected by the workforce to the three most senior union roles within
the plant – general secretary, president, and vice president. In addition, our four
interviews with external union officials took the form of two interviews in 2009 and
two interviews in 2010 with the general secretary and assistant general secretary of
Centre for Indian Trade Unions (CITU). This is the external union federation that the
workers in the plant turned to for assistance when their demands for union recognition
were first aired in 2001. CITU is a Marxist-oriented grouping of trade unions. These
two officials subsequently played major roles in the worker campaign against the
TKM management between 2001 and 2006. Consequently, although only eight of our
30 interviews were conducted with workers, shop stewards, or external union officials,
these individuals in total played the most significant leadership roles in the worker
movement and were well qualified to impart detailed information and to act as the
spokespeople for the mass of the workers themselves.

Opposition to lean production at Toyota India

At the time of its establishment TKM was one of the lowest automated Toyota plants
in the world. Construction started in 1997 on a greenfield site in the township of Bidadi,
40 kilometres outside Bangalore in southern India. The manufacturing workforce was
comprised almost entirely of young, inexperienced males who possessed a two-year
diploma from a technical institute but (importantly) with no prior industry “baggage”,
so that the workforce could be groomed into Toyota methods more easily (interview
with shop steward). Annual production targets were initially very modest, of the order
of 20,000 vehicles using a single-shift system, but Toyota harboured ambitious plans to
make India the hub of its global market share vision which aimed to capture 15 per cent
of world production by 2010. The first motor vehicle (called the Qualis) rolled off the
production line in January 2000. The vehicle sold strongly in the opening months,
exceeding expectations. In response TKM management introduced a two-shift system
in May 2000. A four-hour gap separated the two shifts and this was often filled with
mandatory overtime, invariably arranged with short notice. The Deputy Managing
Director of TKM stated “we want to do more work in lesser time” (Murali, 2000).
Simultaneously the TPS system was being rolled out in the factory. Just-in-time,
kaizen, teamwork, standardised work, and 5S (sort, straighten, shine, standardise,
and sustain) were the first techniques to be introduced into the plant. Initially these had
some success as the young workers were keen to learn and make a good impression
(interview with maintenance worker). By November 2000 the inventory build-up at the
plant was equivalent to only one-day’s production. Vehicle output in 2000 reached
almost 22,000 units, about 3 per cent of total Indian market share.
However, all these developments put pressure on the young and inexperienced
workforce, with significant adverse consequences. During the first year of production
several factors emerged that challenged industrial harmony in the plant. The pace,
ER discipline, and intensity of work was far greater than was considered normal within
34,5 the Indian context. But this situation was aggravated by a sense of job insecurity.
Workers had to wait three years before gaining permanent status in the plant.
Additionally, TKM would not recognise any external trade union despite India’s
long history of unionism. This was compounded by the feeling of disrespect that
workers felt from their Japanese trainers and managers. Local journalists informed us
508 of incidents of trainers shouting at workers, ridiculing their eating habits, and forcing
skilled (male) workers to perform menial tasks such as mopping the floors around
their workspace. The way in which workers were treated by management became a
serious issue:
[y] a worker can have satisfaction because of the treatment from the employer and how he is
looked after. That matters. That’s the big problem with Toyota [y] the burning issue is the
treatment of the workers, that is the problem here (interview with external union official).
In June 2001 TKM experienced its first industrial unrest. Tensions had been simmering
at the plant since April when the management unilaterally announced a pay rise of 300
rupees per month (about US$10). According to union sources the workers boycotted
lunch as a protest (interview with external union official). In response management
forced the workers out of the factory and declared that the action taken by workers
amounted to a strike. Approximately 25 leaders of the action were called in by
management for questioning and were subsequently “targeted” (Das and George, 2006,
p. 293). Workers then commenced a sit-in. The leader of the lunch boycott had his
employment terminated on the grounds of unsatisfactory work performance. Workers
went out on strike in consequence. Management attempted to form a company trade
union with limited powers. Instead workers formed their own trade union, TKMEU,
and registered this union with the government, although Toyota refused to recognise it.
Several activists within this union were dismissed or suspended on the grounds of poor
performance in terms of the performance appraisal system.
In 2002 another strike of 52 days duration was declared in protest against compulsory
overtime and further suspensions of union members and officials. The strike was labelled
illegal by TKM management who defended their actions that workers were only
suspended following indiscipline, misbehaviour, or poor performance in terms of the
appraisal system. Workers organising a gate meeting were arrested. The first half of 2004
experienced continuous industrial unrest. The issues were again compulsory overtime,
refusal to recognise the trade union, further suspension of union officials, and unilateral
wage increases without negotiation. Workers reacted by refusing to work compulsory
overtime, boycotted lunch, refused to perform warm-up exercises, not attending morning
meetings, and wearing black badges as a symbolic form of protest. The trade union
decided to affiliate with the CITU, widely regarded as a militant union federation with
Marxist leanings. From here onwards we observe a hybridised form of employee relations
combining the Gandhian philosophy of satyagraha and the Marxist philosophy of class
struggle. In early 2005 the TKMEU filed a demand for conciliation with the District
Labour Court. However, company management refused to sit in conciliation with
authorised union representatives. In consequence, the union mounted a large-scale
community campaign throughout Bangalore. With the satyagraha mode still not
abandoned the workers with the active support of CITU extended pradarshana to the
streets of Bangalore, now turning it into an anti-capitalist and anti-multinational
corporation protest. From this time onwards more proactive unrest with frequent violence
would be witnessed.
 In May 2005 the company announced another unilateral wage increase. In Satyagraha
consequence the union held a secret ballot and served a notice of strike action to occur and employee
in 14 day’s time. The company threatened to move the factory to north India unless the
industrial climate improved. Unrest spread to the local townships with accusations relations
that workers were threatened and assaulted by local “goons” (politically inspired
ruffians). The year 2006 witnessed a dramatic escalation in the intensity of industrial
unrest. The trigger was the release of a company inquiry which upheld the dismissal 509
and suspension of workers during the previous years. Strike action immediately
ensued and workers occupied the factory. Management declared the strike illegal in the
absence of the normal 14-day notice. A lockout was declared on safety grounds.
Workers inside the factory started to indulge in “violence and destruction” (ICMR,
2006). Management claimed “workers threatened to commit suicide by entering the
LPG zone” (business-standard.com, 2006). According to the company, striking workers
were threatening to blow up LPG gas cylinders on the premises. A senior manager sent
a provocative message to the workers offering to send over to them a box of matches
so that they could carry out their threat (interview with senior manager). Workers were
also accused of obstructing the outward movement of manufactured vehicles, illegally
stopping production, damaging a security car, and assaulting non-union members
(ICMR, 2006). A large police contingent gathered at the factory and food, water, and
toilet facilities were denied.
The Labour Commissioner arranged an immediate conciliation meeting between
the TKMEU and company management. However, management did not turn up for the
meeting claiming that workers were in a “violent and agitated mood” (ICMR, 2006).
Hundreds of workers had gathered outside the premises of the Labour Commissioner
in a ritual display of dharna. Management had claimed that they were “scared” to
attend the meeting because of this show of solidarity (business-standard.com, 2006).
When the conciliation meeting did get underway a few days later management refused
to sit down with external union officials in attendance. The commissioner was forced
to meet with each of the parties separately. The commissioner recommended that the
dismissal of workers should be set aside on condition that the strike and lockout were
both lifted. The union agreed but management refused, whereupon the commissioner
handed the matter over to the state government to resolve. In a sudden development,
TKM management lifted the lockout and the government banned the strike, forcing
workers back to work. Protesting workers assembled in a park opposite the State
Department of Labour. Police dispersed the crowd and arrested several workers
and external union organisers including the assistant general secretary of CITU. This
prompted spontaneous union agitation at several other factories belonging to other
companies. Gate meetings were held and demands made for the arrested workers to be
released, which they were later that day on bail. Subsequently, a further 27 workers
were suspended because of acts of vandalism during the unrest. Union members
commenced a rolling hunger strike. Union federations from around the world pledged
their support for the Toyota workers and community campaigns continued.
In a dramatic development during 2007 TKM management agreed to recognise
the TKMEU as the bargaining agent and allow elections for the union office bearers.
Workers who had been on suspension for many years were elected to senior positions.
The general secretary of CITU played a major role in smoothing the passage to
recognition by agreeing to move into the background if this would facilitate the
recognition of the union. As a result, TKMEU now negotiates with TKM management
on crucial aspects of workplace relations which previously caused unrest, especially
ER work intensification associated with line speed-ups and manning levels (interview with
34,5 shop steward). Importantly, union agreement now has to be reached about takt times.
Whenever line speed is increased the manning level has to be increased accordingly so
as to maintain a constant ratio of workers on the line. This major concession away from
a pure lean system has resulted in the TKM plant being dubbed the Toyota Indian
Production System (TIPS). Although external CITU officials play no official role
510 within the company, TKM management is prepared to tolerate the fact that TKMEU
office bearers take advice and instructions from CITU outside the plant.

Discussion and conclusion

The analysis above reveals our primary finding that workers at TKM initially pursued
their protests through satyagraha-style methods, which eventually took on a more
violent posture when TKM management refused to accept any notion of jointly seeking
a new harmony. Within a short period of time thereafter the company decided to
reverse its stance by recognising the trade union and reinstating suspended workers.
Below we analyse this finding under three headings: first, the initial thwarting of
satyagraha and the reasons for this; second, resorting to non-satyagraha methods;
and third, reconciling the juxtaposition of satyagraha and non-satyagraha methods in
the generation of a new harmony.

(1) The initial thwarting of satyagraha

Toyota workers commenced their initial industrial action independently in the sense
that they were not affiliated to any trade union. Their initial protests were well
matched to the principles of satyagraha. When TKM workers boycotted lunch in
June 2001 as a protest against a unilaterally imposed wage increase their action was
a typical example of satyagraha. Their intention was to raise the awareness of
management by bringing their grievance to public attention – an act of
communication. Since truth may also lie in the opponent’s camp the expectation is
that both parties would cooperate and negotiate to find a new harmony. This did not
happen. TKM management appeared unable to differentiate between satyagraha and
non-satyagraha protest. The protest lay outside the company’s discourse. The lunch
boycott was interpreted as disrespectful and disloyal to the notion of the family.
Company management declared the action to be a strike, forced the workers from the
factory, and then proceeded to discipline the alleged ringleaders. This over-reaction
stemmed from a serious cultural misunderstanding and its implications proved to be
far reaching. Workers responded by conducting a sit-in (another key element of
satyagraha), in this case involving a mixture of dharna and pradarshana. Again the
intention would have been to send a further message to TKM management expressing
their displeasure in the hope that a joint seeking of the truth would ensue to reach a
new harmony. But again this did not happen. Management terminated the employment
of the leader of the lunch boycott on the grounds of unsatisfactory work performance.
Workers went on strike, another example of satyagraha, this time in the form of a
hartal – an expression of protest by stopping work. Management responded by trying
to form a company trade union, but workers responded by establishing their own trade
union. Management refused to recognise this union and dismissed several activists on
the grounds of poor performance.
Satyagraha-style protests continued from 2001 until 2005 (before degenerating
thereafter) involving a variety of actions including strikes, gate meetings, refusing to
work compulsory overtime, boycotting lunch, refusing to perform warm-up exercises,
not attending morning meetings, and wearing black badges. Invariably the company Satyagraha
reaction was to suspend and dismiss troublemakers. and employee
When we analyse this sequence of events which occurred over a short period of time
in mid-2001 we can unearth a typical example of cross-cultural misunderstandings relations
playing out in the form of disastrous employee relations. The emphasis in Toyota
company culture lies in harmonious unitarist relations (Liker, 2004). The concepts
of the Toyota Way and the Toyota Production System represent a paradigm of 511
one-best-way which TKM management expected employees to accept and practice
without protest. Not to do so represented disloyalty. By the time Toyota established
its operations in India in 1999 it had already enjoyed considerable success in
spreading its philosophy to many nations across the globe, including the prestigious
US market. With success comes hubris and we would suggest that Toyota entered into
India with a certain degree of arrogance.
The notion of an alternative way to the paradigm of the one-best-way was
unthinkable – far removed from the TKM dominant logic. Satyagraha stresses a joint
seeking of the truth to reach a new harmony. But the problem for TKM was that it
believed it already represented the truth and the existence of any new harmony arrived
at through a joint mission of truth seeking was an unimaginable notion that was
not understood or appreciated. This sense of superiority was revealed in 2005 by a
visiting Japanese management guru, Kenichi Ohmae, whilst attending a seminar in
Mumbai. He was reported in the Indian media as making comments to the effect that
Indians are not good at manufacturing:
Indians are not good at manufacturing. Even if they do what we tell them to do, they always
need to understand why they are doing it that way [y] in manufacturing when you have a
successful formula what you look for is implementation right? Indians always ask these
fundamental questions (Sangameshwaran, 2005, italics added).

This reference to a “successful formula” indicates the belief by TKM and other
Japanese managements in the superiority of their manufacturing principles and
practices and their expectation that it should be followed without question.
Accordingly they made very little attempt to understand Indian culture and work
habits. We found several examples from our own research where this attitude showed
through. First, the media gave prominence to the views of a leading HR consultant
who blamed TKM management (as well as other Japanese company managements in
India, e.g. Honda) for causing industrial unrest by failing to handle issues in a more
sensitive manner and also by issuing periodic threats to transfer its operations out of
Karnataka if the industrial climate failed to improve: “the management goofed up on
both the PR as well as the HR front [y] Japanese managements have hardly made any
effort to learn how to deal with India’s highly politicised unions” (Majumdar, 2006a).
Second, during the early days of employee discontent TKM management refused to
cooperate with a worker-inspired trade union and attempted to impose its own
company dominated union using employees sympathetic to the dominant company
paradigm. Third, a senior trainer for the company commented that he realised much of
TKM training contradicted Indian culture and stated “but quite frankly we are doing it
anyway” (interview with TKM trainer), a statement which seems to indicate a certain
level of hubris and an absolute faith in their approach. Fourth, at the height of
industrial unrest during 2006, TKM management continued to defend its policy of not
re-instating workers who had been suspended or dismissed, arguing “we will not
compromise on discipline; we are efficient because we are disciplined”
ER (thehindubusinessline.com, 2006). This moral indignation expressed by management
34,5 reinforces the belief in the rightness of its cause. Fifth, during the latter stages of
employee discontent when disharmony was reaching violent levels, there were several
occasions when TKM management turned down the possibility of sitting together in
common forums in an exercise of jointly seeking a new truth. Management refused to
attend a conciliation meeting with the Labour Commissioner in 2006 and refused again
512 a few days later to attend the rearranged conciliation meeting because external union
officials were in attendance. The commissioner was forced to meet both sides
separately. When the commissioner recommended a potential solution this was turned
down by management but agreed to by the union.
During the early days of operations there is little doubt that Japanese trainers
and managers were frustrated by Indian work habits. Indians failed to share with their
Japanese visitors the emphasis on discipline, precision, timeliness, and quality. A Japanese
trainer was reported as abusing a worker by seizing his cap, throwing it to the floor, and
stomping on it, whilst shouting “you Indians” (interview with journalist). Local Indian
managers could only rise to a certain level in the management hierarchy, with senior
decision-making roles occupied only by Japanese (interview with senior manager). This
inability to incorporate local knowledge probably exacerbated the groupthink mentality
within the dominant TKM schema. An Indian manager reported an example of a Japanese
manager raging “what kind of a country is this?” His retort back to the Japanese manager
was “we know what kind of country it is, but you don’t [y] if it was like Japan then we
don’t need you to come here and set up a car plant” (interview with senior manager). This
retort again reveals the ethnocentric thinking behind much Japanese management
philosophy in India and their inability to understand or incorporate local culture.

(2) Resorting to non-satyagraha methods

When non-violent methods were met with perceived repressive actions and a refusal to
enter into joint truth seeking, workers turned to the support of a left-leaning union
federation. This marked an epiphany in employee relations at TKM with the creation
of a hybridised philosophy combining satyagraha and class struggle. Various violent
acts were pursued such as assault, destruction of property, and threats of self-
immolation. Within a short period of time TKM management changed its stance and
decided to recognise the trade union and reinstate suspended workers. What
satyagraha had failed to achieve, non-satyagraha had been successful. It appeared that
TKM no longer believed that it already represented the truth and was prepared to enter
into dialogue and negotiations with a trade union about the best way to run its Indian
operation. Had TKM been converted or conquered? Official statements issued by TKM
management in the period after 2008 are illuminating. A new Japanese Managing
Director commenced at TKM in 2008. His messages were reconciliatory: “we did not
have much experience in the past ten years” (deepdictionary.com, 2008) and “the next
ten years will be different from the last decade [y] it is now time for a new vision and
mission” (thehindubusinessline.in, 2009). The Japanese Ambassador to India also
joined the reconciliation bandwagon urging his countrymen-industrialists to “rework
their perception of India” (Surendran, 2010). The new Managing Director continued to
make a significant impact on relationships through his use of the media: “the cultures
may be different, but the key to success of this joint venture is based on mutual respect
[y] we’re human after all and what shores up this mutual admiration is very deep and
frequent communication” (Mitra, 2010). It appears from these statements that TKM
management was now embracing a new harmony.
(3) Reconciling the juxtaposition of satyagraha and non-satyagraha methods Satyagraha
Can we reconcile the initial pursuit of non-violent protest at TKM with the later resort and employee
to more violent methods? Gandhi’s notion of satyagraha involved converting not
coercing the opponent so that his version of the truth is heard and a cohesive relations
relationship is generated at a new level of harmony and lasting peace. However,
against this strong philosophy must be set the two arguments we analysed earlier in
this paper: first, the prevalent Indian mindset of improvised solutions ( jugaad ); and 513
second, the tendency never to discard ideas but rather to find fresh ways of combining
the new with the old. Developments at TKM display the process of going outside
a system to solve a problem or an immediate dilemma ( jugaad ). Available resources
are combined in any manner to get the job done in any way possible. This can be
juxtaposed with the all-encompassing nature of Hindu thought which can incorporate
a wide variety of different beliefs without allowing any one new idea to dominate. In
this manner, we can argue that satyagraha has not been refuted at TKM. It has merely
been combined with a new idea that has arisen in response. The recognition of the
trade union at TKM and the new era of negotiated solutions we would suggest
represent a new harmony of joint seeking of the truth at the company. Whereas Gandhi
would argue that coercion can destroy a relationship and prevent the joint seeking of
truth and the generation of a new harmony, the process of protest at TKM could
be argued to have involved a coercive method aimed at forcing the opponent to see the
new reality. When satyagraha is tried, but found to have no result, the resort to
more violent methods can be embraced to coerce the opponent to see a new reality.
Once coerced, the opponent may come to embrace a new harmony in their own time,
an outcome that arguably has been observed at TKM in the period since 2007.
The contrast between the Indian experience of opposition to lean production
compared with such opposition in other countries is instructive. Researchers have
analysed the adverse impact of lean production on worker health and well-being and
exposed the myth of worker empowerment under such a system (Stewart et al., 2009).
However, Indian culture stresses that no ideas should ever be discarded. Rather
methods should be pursued of combining the new with the old. The aim is to eliminate
antagonisms but not the antagonists. The approach at TKM has been for workers
to employ both satyagraha and non-satyagraha methods in order to seek an
accommodation with the lean production approach in the form of a new harmony of
joint seeking of the truth at the company. Thus, the enemy is not destroyed and there is
no defeat or victory. Since 2007 Japanese hegemony within the plant has been softened
as a consequence of these oppositional methods. The trade union has been recognised,
negotiation is extensively practiced, and work intensification techniques have been
substantially downgraded in intensity to better accommodate the cultural mores of
Indian workers. The label TIPS reveals the nature of this new accommodation,
whereby the oppressor lives on in a converted state of lasting peace. In 2010 TKM
opened a second plant in Bangalore alongside the original plant with an annual
capacity of 100,000 vehicles to produce the new compact car Etios.
Placing this case study within its context is important to make sense of the process.
India is vital to Toyota’s global ambitions. The company has to remain within the
country in order to take advantage of the massive available market whilst profiting
from the cheap labour and other costs in the country. Leaving the country is not an
option and hence could largely explain the reason behind the accommodation with the
union since 2007. Thus, the “new harmony” may be the result of an instrumental short-
term accommodation by TKM rather than a lasting conversion of recognising and
ER respecting the truth. For this reason the situation needs to be protected and enhanced
34,5 through “constant vigilance” (interview with union shop steward). In the Indian
context this implies a strong coalition of interacting forces. These interactions involve
relationships between the internal trade union and its external federation, and through
these between local and national political parties, community activists, local and
international union groupings, and the media. These links started to be cultivated
514 in the period 2004-2006 and represent a natural extension of the Indian practice of not
separating work matters from family, social, and community practices. In this sense,
the ability to build strong coalitions both to defend and attack established discourses
is probably more easily achieved in the Indian context than in most western developed
countries. To this end it would be instructive to extend the research findings in this
paper to other Indian automobile producers such as Honda (which has experienced
considerable employee unrest) and Maruti-Suzuki (which experienced stability in
employee relations for many years but has recently suffered prolonged strikes).

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Corresponding author
Robert Jones can be contacted at: [email protected]

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