SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-35574. September 28, 1984.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALENTINA

MANANQUIL Y LAREDO , defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio Sugay for defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; EXTRAJUDICIAL

CONFESSION; PROOF OF VOLUNTARINESS; CASE AT BAR. — All throughout the entire
investigation and even at the time appellant was before Fiscal Paredes, before whom she
subscribed and swore to the truth of all what appeared in her statement, no denunciation
of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was
there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures
thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be released later. We therefore
find her aforesaid claim highly incredible and a mere concoction. For why will the police
still resort to such trickery when the very sworn statement given by her proved by its
contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact, almost all the recitals and
narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her on the witness
stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein.
Moreover, We find said statement replete with details which could not have been possibly
supplied by the police investigators who have no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance
with her and the victim, especially with respect to the circumstances and incidents which
preceded the fatal incident that brought about the death of the latter. We therefore find no
error in the trial court's pronouncement that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily
given by her; that she fully understood its contents; and that she willingly affixed her
signature thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF VOLUNTARINESS; CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF GUILT
WHEN VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. — Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be
regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when taken without maltreatment or intimidation and
may serve as a basis of the declarant's conviction. It is presumed to be voluntary until the
contrary is proven. The burden of proof is upon the person who gave the confession. That
presumption has not been overcome in the instant case. Indeed the trial court could not be
faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn statement in assessing her guilt
since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By then, she had yet no time to
concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shocked by the aftermath consequences of her
criminal design she must have been motivated by no other purpose except to admit the
undeniable. On the other hand, when she took the witness stand, disclaiming any
responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January 13, 1969 . . . more than
five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the benefit of too many
consultations.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHEN WRONGFUL ACT DONE DIFFERENT
FROM THAT INTENDED; ARTICLE 4, PARAGRAPH I OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
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 REQUISITES. — Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. I of the Revised Penal
Code which provides: "Art. 4. Criminal Liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." The essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony
has been committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
4. ID.; ID.; PNEUMONIA, A COMPLICATION OF BURNS SUSTAINED AND CAUSED BY
APPELLANT, FOUND TO BE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF DEATH; CASE AT BAR. — The claim
that the victim drank the liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to
exculpate the appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by
taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to
produce an almost comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a
diminution of the oxygen content of the body. In fine, as correctly pointed out by the Hon.
Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an efficient supervening cause of his
death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four days after the burning. The cause of
death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2º secondary.
There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by the post-mortem
findings involved about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that
pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia
as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this could not have
resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly
so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death,
merely contributory.

DECISION

CUEVAS , J : p

In an amended Information 1 filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is,
having conceived and deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with
whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated
at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y Pablo was working as a security guard; and
the said accused, having in her possession a bottle containing gasoline suddenly
and without warning, poured the contents on the person of her husband, Elias Day
y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo suffered
burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.
Contrary to law." 2

Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and
thereafter sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00; and to pay costs.
From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which
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 referred the appeal to us considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua)
assailing her aforesaid conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting
her solely on the basis of the alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that Pneumonia
was a complication of the burns sustained by the victim; 3) in not finding her not to have
caused the death of the deceased; and 4) in not acquitting her at least on ground of
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:
"On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the
NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a
security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo-worth of gasoline from
the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle
(t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo,
because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had
been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building,
she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day
shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14, id). The appellant tried of hearing the victim, then got the
bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n.,
p. 14, id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame.
(Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p. 197, Rec.).
The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she
gave a written statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she admitted having
burned the victim.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital
and then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on
March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p. 208, rec. due to `Pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2x
secondary.'" 3

Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus:

"It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when appellant returned from Olongapo City.
She fed her grandson and put him to bed. After filling the tank with water, she
remembered that the next day was a Sunday and she had to go to church. Her
shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline with which to clean them. Taking with
her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station and bought
ten centavos worth of gasoline. Then she remembered that her husband needed
gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his place of work. (p.13, ibid.)
Appellant saw her husband inside a building of the NAWASA standing by the
window. As the iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door.
Elias opened the door, but when he saw his wife he shouted at her. Appellant said
that she had brought the gasoline which he needed for his lighter, but Elias, who
was under the influence of liquor, cursed her thus: 'PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON'. Elias continued shouting and cursing even as appellant told him that
she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted. Appellant trembled and
became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that she was sprinkling
the gasoline on her husband's face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down
for a while. Then she remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so
she went home leaving her husband who was walking to and fro and not paying
attention to her. (pp. 13-14, Ibid., p. 2, March 20, 1969).

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 She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to
apologize to her husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA, however, she found that
police officers were present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming
mad, and when he saw her he chased her. A policeman pulled appellant aside and
asked if she was the wife of Elias. When she replied in the affirmative, the police
officer accused her of burning her husband. She denied the accusation. But the
police took her to the headquarters, and prepared a written statement, Exhibits A,
A-1. Appellant was made to sign said statement upon a promise that she would
be released if she signed it. Although she did not know the contents, she signed it
because of the promise. (pp. 14-16, Id.; p. 5, March 20, 1969)" 4

Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not
appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; and (2) whether or not the burns
sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the
victim's death. llcd

Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay
City. She was thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police who
took her statement in Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into
writing 5 After Sgt. Garcia was through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal
Paredes who asked her questions regarding the said statement and its execution and
before whom said statement was subscribed and sworn to by her. In that investigation,
appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and thereafter set
him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement —
"T Ano ang nangyari at iyong binusan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na
si Elias Day?

S Dahil may sala siya, at sinonog niya ang aking mga damit, at may
babae pa, at saka lahat ng aming pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.

T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo sa

iyong asawa?

S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip kong

buhusan ng gasolina, kaya ang aking ginawa ay bumili ako ng
halagang 10 sentimos sa Esso Gasoline Station sa Talf Avenue at
inilagay ko sa isang boti.
T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay makabili ng gasolina sa station ng Esso sa
Taft Avenue dito sa Pasay City, ay ano ang ginawa mo?
S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya na pinaggoguardiahan sa Nawasa at
pagdating ko ruon ay kumatok ako sa pintuan ng Nawasa, at nang
marinig niya ang aking katok sa pinto ay binuksan niya ang pintuan,
at pagkabukas ng pintuan ay nakita niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako
ay minura ng puta putan Ina mo, lalakad ka ng gabi, at namumuta
raw ako, at pagkatapos na ako ay minura ay hinahabol pa ako ng
suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po kinuha ko ang aking dalang bote na
may gasolina at aking ibinuhos sa kanyang katawan, at aking kinuha
ang posporo at aking sinindihang at hangang magliyab ang suot
niyang polo shirt, na may guhit na itim at puti.
T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa
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 kanginang humigit kumulang na mag-iika alas 11:00 ng gabi Marzo
6, 1965?
S Opo, aking sinonog ang aking asawa." (Exhs. A & A-1 — Emphasis
supplied).

She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she
did not understand its contents because she is not a Tagala aside from having reached
only the primary grades; and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely
upon the promise of the policemen that she will later be released.
We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as
true. For the truth is that appellant knew and understood Tagalog despite her not being a
Tagala, having stayed in Manila since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning
incident in question for which she was investigated. During this period of almost fourteen
years, she was in daily association with Tagalogs communicating with them in Pilipino.
This is clear from her admission on cross-examination which runs thus —
"Q But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you
have been living here in Manila?
A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you speak
Tagalog?

A Yes.
Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.

Q And you were well understood by these Tagalog people?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, you can understand Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q And you can also read Tagalog?

A Yes.
Q You can read?

A Yes, but I do not have interest to read." (TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).

All throughout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant was before Fiscal
Paredes, before whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of all what appeared in her
statement, 6 no denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police
investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely
affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be
released later. We therefor find her aforesaid claim highly incredible and a mere
concoction. For why will the police still resort to such trickery when the very sworn
statement given by her proved by its contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative.
In fact, almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were
practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity
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 of her declarations contained therein. Moreover, We find said statement replete with
details which could not have been possibly supplied by the police investigators who have
no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with her and the victim, especially with
respect to the circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal incident that brought
about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's pronouncement
that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully understood its
contents; and that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto. LibLex

Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof
of guilt when taken without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the
declarant's conviction. 8 It is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The
burden of proof is upon the person who gave the confession. 9 That presumption has not
been overcome in the instant case.
Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn
statement in assessing her guilt since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By
then, she had yet no time to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the
aftermath consequences of her criminal design she must have been motivated by no other
purpose except to admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took the witness
stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January
13, 1969 . . . more than five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the benefit
of too many consultations.
That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she
went to the latter's place of work on that fatal night and intended all the consequences of
her nefarious act finds clearer manifestation and added support in her total indifference
and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that had befallen the victim . . . her
husband . . . especially at times when he needed her most. Being the wife, she must be the
closest to him and the hardest hit by the mishap if she has not authored the same nor
voluntarily participated therein. She was then reasonably expected to come to his succor
and alleviate him from his sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having seen her
husband even once while the latter lay seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and
death. Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she ever present during the wake while
the victim's remains lay in state. That she was under detention does not excuse nor justify
those glaring and significant omissions. For she could have asked the court's permission
for any of the enumerated undertakings which we believe would not have been denied. But
she did not even attempt.
Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more
convinced of the falsity and incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her claim that her
purpose in buying gasoline at so an unholy hour of the night, past ten o'clock in the evening,
solely for the purpose of cleaning her shoes which she would wear in going to church the
following Sunday, hardly recommend acceptance. That she dropped at her husband's
place of work also at the middle of the night for no other purpose except to deliver to him
gasoline for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too taxing upon one's credulity . . . more so if
we have to consider the previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning of that
fatal day.
In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband
died of pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as shown by the toxicology report
indicating presence of alcohol in the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband
on fire, she is not criminally liable for her husband's death.
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 We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination.
The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to
exculpate the appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by
taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to
produce an almost comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a
diminution of the oxygen content of the body. 1 0 In fine, as correctly pointed out by the
Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an efficient supervening cause
of his death which took place on March 10, 1965 , just four days after the burning. prcd

The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns
2º secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by the
post-mortem findings involved about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows
that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting
pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this
could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It
concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to
the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

"Art. 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred.

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended."

the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed;
and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. 1 1
The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4;
and PP vs. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL, 748, 751 is as follows —
"One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury
contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that
other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility.
He would still be liable "even if the deceased might have recovered if he had taken
proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical operation, or that unskilled or
improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that
death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. `The principle on which this rule is founded is one of
universal application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that
every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon
in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this
felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the
wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are themselves
consequences of the criminal act, must in law be deemed to have been among
those which are in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he must be
responsible." The rule has its foundation on a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
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 human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of
medical men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt
as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment."

In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be increased to
P30,000.00. Cdpr

WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against appellant.
It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court
recommends her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of
Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ ., are on leave.
Footnotes

1. Appellant was accused merely of Frustrated Parricide in the original information filed on
March 8, 1965.
2. Pages 44-45, Record.

3. Appellee's Brief, pp. 1 and 2.

4. Pages 4, 5 and 6, Appellant's Brief.
5. Exhibits "A" and "A-1".
6. Exhibits "A" and "A-1".
7. PP vs. Pincalin, 102 SCRA 137; PP vs. Carias, 122 SCRA 783.

8. PP vs. Perez, 102 SCRA 313.

9. PP. vs. dela Cruz, 115 SCRA 154.
10. TSN, February 6, 1974, page 30.
11. US vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310; US vs. Mallare, 29 Phil. 14.

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