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Plaintiff-Appellee vs. vs. Defendant-Appellant The Solicitor General Herminio Sugay
Plaintiff-Appellee vs. vs. Defendant-Appellant The Solicitor General Herminio Sugay
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CUEVAS , J : p
In an amended Information 1 filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is,
having conceived and deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with
whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated
at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y Pablo was working as a security guard; and
the said accused, having in her possession a bottle containing gasoline suddenly
and without warning, poured the contents on the person of her husband, Elias Day
y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo suffered
burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.
Contrary to law." 2
Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and
thereafter sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00; and to pay costs.
From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which
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referred the appeal to us considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua)
assailing her aforesaid conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting
her solely on the basis of the alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that Pneumonia
was a complication of the burns sustained by the victim; 3) in not finding her not to have
caused the death of the deceased; and 4) in not acquitting her at least on ground of
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:
"On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the
NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a
security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo-worth of gasoline from
the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle
(t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo,
because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had
been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building,
she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day
shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14, id). The appellant tried of hearing the victim, then got the
bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n.,
p. 14, id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame.
(Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p. 197, Rec.).
The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she
gave a written statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she admitted having
burned the victim.
Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital
and then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on
March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p. 208, rec. due to `Pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2x
secondary.'" 3
Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not
appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; and (2) whether or not the burns
sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the
victim's death. llcd
Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay
City. She was thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police who
took her statement in Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into
writing 5 After Sgt. Garcia was through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal
Paredes who asked her questions regarding the said statement and its execution and
before whom said statement was subscribed and sworn to by her. In that investigation,
appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and thereafter set
him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement —
"T Ano ang nangyari at iyong binusan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na
si Elias Day?
S Dahil may sala siya, at sinonog niya ang aking mga damit, at may
babae pa, at saka lahat ng aming pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.
She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she
did not understand its contents because she is not a Tagala aside from having reached
only the primary grades; and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely
upon the promise of the policemen that she will later be released.
We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as
true. For the truth is that appellant knew and understood Tagalog despite her not being a
Tagala, having stayed in Manila since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning
incident in question for which she was investigated. During this period of almost fourteen
years, she was in daily association with Tagalogs communicating with them in Pilipino.
This is clear from her admission on cross-examination which runs thus —
"Q But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you
have been living here in Manila?
A Yes.
Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you speak
Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
A Yes, but I do not have interest to read." (TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).
All throughout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant was before Fiscal
Paredes, before whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of all what appeared in her
statement, 6 no denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police
investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely
affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be
released later. We therefor find her aforesaid claim highly incredible and a mere
concoction. For why will the police still resort to such trickery when the very sworn
statement given by her proved by its contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative.
In fact, almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were
practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity
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of her declarations contained therein. Moreover, We find said statement replete with
details which could not have been possibly supplied by the police investigators who have
no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with her and the victim, especially with
respect to the circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal incident that brought
about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's pronouncement
that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully understood its
contents; and that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto. LibLex
Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof
of guilt when taken without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the
declarant's conviction. 8 It is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The
burden of proof is upon the person who gave the confession. 9 That presumption has not
been overcome in the instant case.
Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn
statement in assessing her guilt since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By
then, she had yet no time to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the
aftermath consequences of her criminal design she must have been motivated by no other
purpose except to admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took the witness
stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January
13, 1969 . . . more than five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the benefit
of too many consultations.
That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she
went to the latter's place of work on that fatal night and intended all the consequences of
her nefarious act finds clearer manifestation and added support in her total indifference
and seemingly unperturbed concern over the fate that had befallen the victim . . . her
husband . . . especially at times when he needed her most. Being the wife, she must be the
closest to him and the hardest hit by the mishap if she has not authored the same nor
voluntarily participated therein. She was then reasonably expected to come to his succor
and alleviate him from his sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having seen her
husband even once while the latter lay seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and
death. Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she ever present during the wake while
the victim's remains lay in state. That she was under detention does not excuse nor justify
those glaring and significant omissions. For she could have asked the court's permission
for any of the enumerated undertakings which we believe would not have been denied. But
she did not even attempt.
Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more
convinced of the falsity and incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her claim that her
purpose in buying gasoline at so an unholy hour of the night, past ten o'clock in the evening,
solely for the purpose of cleaning her shoes which she would wear in going to church the
following Sunday, hardly recommend acceptance. That she dropped at her husband's
place of work also at the middle of the night for no other purpose except to deliver to him
gasoline for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too taxing upon one's credulity . . . more so if
we have to consider the previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning of that
fatal day.
In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband
died of pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as shown by the toxicology report
indicating presence of alcohol in the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband
on fire, she is not criminally liable for her husband's death.
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We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination.
The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to
exculpate the appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by
taking alcohol. In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to
produce an almost comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a
diminution of the oxygen content of the body. 1 0 In fine, as correctly pointed out by the
Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an efficient supervening cause
of his death which took place on March 10, 1965 , just four days after the burning. prcd
The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns
2º secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by the
post-mortem findings involved about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows
that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting
pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this
could not have resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It
concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to
the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art. 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed;
and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. 1 1
The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4;
and PP vs. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL, 748, 751 is as follows —
"One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury
contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that
other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility.
He would still be liable "even if the deceased might have recovered if he had taken
proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical operation, or that unskilled or
improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that
death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. `The principle on which this rule is founded is one of
universal application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that
every person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural
consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon
in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this
felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the
wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are themselves
consequences of the criminal act, must in law be deemed to have been among
those which are in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he must be
responsible." The rule has its foundation on a wise and practical policy. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
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human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of
medical men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt
as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment."
In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be increased to
P30,000.00. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against appellant.
It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court
recommends her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of
Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1. Appellant was accused merely of Frustrated Parricide in the original information filed on
March 8, 1965.
2. Pages 44-45, Record.