Sanchez v. Rigos
Sanchez v. Rigos
38
369
ing notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes, however, of the
nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of
sale.
Same; Statutory construction; Provisions of same law should be
reconciled.—This view has the advantage of avoiding a conflict between
Article 1324—on the general principles of contracts—and 1479—on sales
—of the Civil Code, in line with the cardinal rule of statutory construction
that, in construing different provisions of one and the same law or code,
such interpretation should be favored as will reconcile or harmonize said
provision and avoid a conflict between the same.
Same; Same, Exceptions not favored unless dearly intended.—The
decision in Southwestern Sugar So Molasses Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co., holding that Art. 1324 is modified by Art. 1479 of the Civil
Code, in effect, considers the latter as an exception to the former, and
exceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the contrary is clear, and
it is not so. insofar as said two articles are concerned.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
370
case to Us, upon the ground that it involves a question purely of law.
The record shows that, on April 3, 1961, plaintiff Nicolas
Sanchez and defendant Severina Rigos executed an instrument,
entitled “Option to Purchase,” whereby Mrs. Rigos “agreed,
promised and committed x x x to sell” to Sanchez, for the sum of
P1,510.00, a parcel of land situated in the barrios of Abar and Sibot,
municipality of San Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, and more
particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12528
of said province, within two (2) years from said date with the
understanding that said option shall be deemed “terminated and
elapsed.” if “Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the
property” within the stipulated period. Inasmuch as several tenders
of payment of the sum of P1,510.00. made by Sanchez within said
period, were rejected by Mrs. Rigos, on March 12, 1963, the former
deposited said amount with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija and commenced against the latter the present action, for
specific performance and damages.
After the filing of defendant’s answer—admitting some
allegations of the complaint, denying other allegations thereof, and
alleging, as special defense, that the contract between the parties “is
a unilateral promise to sell, and the same being unsupported by any
valuable consideration, by force of the New Civil Code, is null and
void”—on February 11, 1964, both parties, assisted by their
respective counsel, jointly moved for a judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, on February 28, 1964, the lower court rendered
judgment for Sanchez, ordering Mrs. Rigos to accept the sum
judicially consigned by him and to execute, in his favor, the requisite
deed of conveyance. Mrs. Rigos was, likewise, sentenced to pay
P200.00, as attorney’s fees, and the costs. Hence, this appeal by Mrs.
Rigos.
This case admittedly hinges on the proper application of Article
1479 of our Civil Code, which provides:
“ART. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is reciprocally demandable.
371
________________
1 “OPTION TO PURCHASE
WITNESSETH:
“That I am the owner of that property covered by Transfer Certificate of Titie No. NT-12528
of the Land Records of Nueva Ecija, my ownership thereof is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale in my favor known as Doc. No. 47; Page No. 12; Book No. 1; Series of 1961 of Notary
Public, A. Tomas;
“That I have agreed, promised and committed and do hereby agree, promise and commit to
sell the property covered by the above numbered certificate of title to NICOLAS SANCHEZ,
Filipino, of legal age, married to Engracia Barrantes, with residence at San Jose, Nueva Ecija,
within a period of two (2) years from the execution of this instrument for the amount of One
Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos (P1,510.00) Philippine Currency;
“That if within the period of two (2) years from the execution of this instrument said
Nicolas Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the property under this option, then his
right is deemed terminated and elapsed and that I shall no longer be compelled to sell to him
the property;
“That I, NICOLAS SANCHEZ, whose personal circumstances are mentioned above hereby
agree and conform with all the conditions set forth in this option to purchase executed in my
favor; that I bind myself with all the terms and conditions.
“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their signatures below this 3rd
day of April, 1961, at San Jose, Nueva Ecija.
_______________
373
“One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to
the truth of his own allegations, and without giving- the opposing party an
opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of
all the material and revelant allegations of the opposing party, and to rest
his motion for judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his
own as are admitted in the pleadings. (La Yebana Company vs. Sevilla, 9
Phil. 210).” (Italics supplied.)
4
4
This view was reiterated in Evangelista
5
v. De la Rosa and Mercy’s
Incorporated v. Herminia Verde.
Squarely in point is Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v.
Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.,« from which We quote:
‘ART. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable.
‘An accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is binding upon the pro-
_______________
374
“On the other hand, appellee contends that, even granting that the ‘offer
of option’ is not supported by any consideration, that option became binding
on appellant when the appellee gave notice to it of its acceptance, and that
having accepted it within the period of option, the offer can no longer be
withdrawn and in any event such withdrawal is ineffective. In support of
this contention, appellee invokes article 1324 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the
offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such
withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon consideration, as something
paid or promised.’
“There is no question that under article 1479 of the new Civil Code ‘an
option to sell,’ or ‘a promise to buy or to sell,’ as used in said article, to be
valid must be ‘supported by a con. sideration distinct from the price.’ This is
clearly inferred from the context of said article that a unilateral promise to
buy or to sell, even if accepted, is only binding if supported by a
consideration. In other words, ‘an accepted unilateral promise’ can only
have a binding effect if supported by a consideration, which means that the
option can still be withdrawn, even if accepted, if the same is not supported
by any consideration. Here it is not disputed that the option is without
consideration. It can therefore be withdrawn notwithstanding the acceptance
made of it by appellee.
“It is true that under article 1324 of the new Civil Code, the general rule
regarding offer and acceptance is that, when the offerer gives to the offeree
a certain period to accept, ‘the offer may be withdrawn at any time before
acceptance’ except when the option is founded upon consideration, but this
general rule must be interpreted as modified by the provision of article 1479
above referred to, which applies to ‘a promise to buy and sell’ specifically.
As already stated, this rule requires that a promise to sell to be valid must be
supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
“We are not oblivious of the existence of American authorities which
hold that an offer, once accepted, cannot be withdrawn, regardless of
whether it is supported or not by a consideration (12 Am. Jur. 528). These
authorities, we note, uphold the general rule applicable to offer and
acceptance as contained in our new Civil Code. But we are prevented from
applying them in view of the specific provision embodied in article 1479.
375
VOL. 45, JUNE 14. 1972 375
Sanchez vs. Rigos
While under the ‘offer of option’ in question appellant has assumed a cleai’
obligation to sell its barge to appellee and the option has been exercised in
accordance with its terms, and there appears to be no valid or justifiable
reason for appellant to withdraw its offer, this Court cannot adopt a
different at. tiude became the law on the master is clear. Our imperative
7
duty is to apply it unless modified by Congress.”‘
However, this Court8 itself, in the case of Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc.
v, Cua Hian Tek, decided later than Southwestern Sugar &
9
Molasses Co. v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., saw no distinction
between Articles 1324 and 1479 of the Civil Code and applied the
former where a unilateral promise to sell similar to the one sued
upon here was involved, treating such promise as an option which,
although not binding as a contract in itself for lack of a separate
consideration, nevertheless generated a bilateral contract of purchase
and sale upon acceptance. Speaking through Associate Justice, later
Chief Justice, Cesar Bengzon, this Court said:
‘If the option is given without a consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale,
which is not binding until accepted. If, however, acceptance is made before a
withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale, even though the option was not
supported by a sufficient consideration. * * *.’ (77 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 652.
See also 27 Ruling Case Law 339 and cases cited.’)
_______________
7 Italic ours.
8 102 Phil. 948, 951-952.
9 Supra.
376
‘It can be taken for granted, as contended by the defendant, that the option
contract was not valid for lack of consideration. But it was, at least, an offer
to sell, which wa« accepted by letter, and of the acceptance the offerer had
knowledge before said offer was withdrawn. The concurrence of both acts—
the offer and the acceptance—could at all events have generated a contract,
if none there was before (acts. 1254 and 1202 of the Civil Code).’ (Zayco
vs. Serra, 44 Phil. 331.)”
______________
10 Supra.
377
________________
1 97 Phil., 249.
2102 Phil., 948.
378
________________
379
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.