1. [ G.R. No.

125055, October 30, 1998 ]

A. FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF

APPEALS AND SPOUSES ROMULO S.A. JAVILLONAR AND ERLINDA P. JAVILLONAR,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered on February 29, 1996 by
the Court of Appeals[1] reversing, in toto, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City in Civil Case No. 62290, as well as the appellate court's resolution of May 7, 1996
denying reconsideration.

Petitioner A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation granted a loan of P7.5 Million
to private respondents, the spouses Romulo and Erlinda Javillonar, in consideration of
which the latter executed the following documents: (a) a promissory note, dated November
27, 1991, stating an interest charge of 4% per month for six months; (b) a deed of mortgage
over realty covered by TCT No. 58748, together with the improvements thereon; and (c) an
undated deed of sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the mortgagee, petitioner A.
Francisco Realty.[2]

The interest on the said loan was to be paid in four installments: half of the total amount
agreed upon (P900,000.00) to be paid in advance through a deduction from the proceeds of
the loan, while the balance to be paid monthly by means of checks post-dated March 27,
April 27, and May 27, 1992. The promissory note expressly provided that upon "failure of
the MORTGAGOR [private respondents] to pay the interest without prior arrangement with
the MORTGAGEE [petitioner], full possession of the property will be transferred and the
deed of sale will be registered."[3] For this purpose, the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 58748
was delivered to petitioner A. Francisco Realty.

Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to pay the interest and, as a consequence,
it registered the sale of the land in its favor on February 21, 1992. As a result, TCT No.
58748 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. PT-85569 was issued in the name of
petitioner A. Francisco Realty.[4]

Private respondents subsequently obtained an additional loan of P2.5 Million from

petitioner on March 13, 1992 for which they signed a promissory note which reads:

PROMISSORY NOTE

For value received, I promise to pay A. FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, the additional sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00) on or before April 27, 1992, with interest at the rate of four percent (4%) a
month until fully paid and if after the said date this note and/or the other promissory note
of P7.5 Million remains unpaid and/or unsettled, without any need for prior demand or
notification, I promise to vacate voluntarily and willfully and/or allow A. FRANCISCO
REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to appropriate and occupy for their exclusive
use the real property located at 56 Dragonfly, Valle Verde VI, Pasig, Metro Manila.[5]
Petitioner demanded possession of the mortgaged realty and the payment of 4% monthly
interest from May 1992, plus surcharges. As respondent spouses refused to vacate,
petitioner filed the present action for possession before the Regional Trial Court in Pasig
City.[6]

In their answer, respondents admitted liability on the loan but alleged that it was not their
intent to sell the realty as the undated deed of sale was executed by them merely as an
additional security for the payment of their loan. Furthermore, they claimed that they were
not notified of the registration of the sale in favor of petitioner A. Francisco Realty and that
there was no interest then unpaid as they had in fact been paying interest even subsequent
to the registration of the sale. As an alternative defense, respondents contended that the
complaint was actually for ejectment and, therefore, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to try the case. As counterclaim, respondents sought the cancellation of TCT No.
PT-85569 as secured by petitioner and the issuance of a new title evidencing their
ownership of the property.[7]

On December 19, 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring as legal and valid, the right of ownership of A. Francisco Realty And Development
Corporation, over the property subject of this case and now registered in its name as owner
thereof, under TCT No. 85569 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, situated at No. 56 Dragonfly
Street, Valle Verde VI, Pasig, Metro Manila.

Consequently, defendants are hereby ordered to cease and desist from further committing
acts of dispossession or from withholding possession from plaintiff, of the said property as
herein described and specified.

Claim for damages in all its forms, however, including attorney's fees, are hereby denied, no
competent proofs having been adduced on record, in support thereof.[8]
Respondent spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
trial court and dismissed the complaint against them. The appellate court ruled that the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the case because it was actually an action for
unlawful detainer which is exclusively cognizable by municipal trial courts. Furthermore, it
ruled that, even presuming jurisdiction of the trial court, the deed of sale was void for being
in fact a pactum commissorium which is prohibited by Art. 2088 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner A. Francisco Realty filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals
denied the motion in its resolution, dated May 7, 1996. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PETITIONER.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

CONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF
PACTUM COMMISSORIUM AS DEFINED UNDER ARTICLE 2088 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

On the first issue, the appellate court stated:

Ostensibly, the cause of action in the complaint indicates a case for unlawful detainer, as
contra-distinguished from accion publiciana. As contemplated by Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, an action for unlawful detainer which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, is defined as withholding from by a person from
another for not more than one year, the possession of the land or building to which the
latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the supposed rights to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. (Tenorio vs. Gamboa, 81 Phil. 54;
Dikit vs. Dicaciano, 89 Phil. 44). If no action is initiated for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer within the expiration of the 1 year period, the case may still be filed under the
plenary action to recover possession by accion publiciana before the Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court) (Medina vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278). In plain language, the
case at bar is a legitimate ejectment case filed within the 1 year period from the
jurisdictional demand to vacate. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the
case. Accordingly, under Section 33 of B.P. Blg. 129 Municipal Trial Courts are vested with
the exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer case. (Sen Po
Ek Marketing Corp. vs. CA, 212 SCRA 154 [1990])[9]
We think the appellate court is in error. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful
detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action
(accion reivindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.

An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms
of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of
possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes
recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

Illegal detainer consists in withholding by a person from another of the possession of a land
or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former's
right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An ejectment suit is
brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or
possession de facto and not possession de jure, where dispossession has lasted for not more
than one year. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes and the one-
year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. The use of
summary procedure in ejectment cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property. They are not processes
to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on
the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of
possession. Its determination on the ownership issue is, however, not conclusive. [10]
The allegations in both the original and the amended complaints of petitioner before the
trial court clearly raise issues involving more than the question of possession, to wit: (a)
the validity of the transfer of ownership to petitioner; (b) the alleged new liability of
private respondents for P400,000.00 a month from the time petitioner made its demand on
them to vacate; and (c) the alleged continuing liability of private respondents under both
loans to pay interest and surcharges on such. As petitioner A. Francisco Realty alleged in its
amended complaint:

5. To secure the payment of the sum of P7.5 Million together with the monthly interest, the
defendant spouses agreed to execute a Deed of Mortgage over the property with the
express condition that if and when they fail to pay monthly interest or any infringement
thereof they agreed to convert the mortgage into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
plaintiff by executing Deed of Sale thereto, copy of which is hereto attached and
incorporated herein as Annex "A";

6. That in order to authorize the Register of Deeds into registering the Absolute Sale and
transfer to the plaintiff, defendant delivered unto the plaintiff the said Deed of Sale together
with the original owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 58748 of the Registry of
Rizal, copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part herein as Annex "B";

7. That defendant spouses later secured from the plaintiff an additional loan of P2.5 Million
with the same condition as aforementioned with 4% monthly interest;

8. That defendants spouses failed to pay the stipulated monthly interest and as per
agreement of the parties, plaintiff recorded and registered the Absolute Deed of Sale in its
favor on and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-85569, copy of which is hereto
attached and incorporated herein as Annex "C";

9. That upon registration and transfer of the Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the
plaintiff, copy of which is hereto attached and incorporated herein as Annex "C", plaintiff
demanded the surrender of the possession of the above-described parcel of land together
with the improvements thereon, but defendants failed and refused to surrender the same
to the plaintiff without justifiable reasons thereto; Neither did the defendants pay the
interest of 4% a month from May, 1992 plus surcharges up to the present;

10. That it was the understanding of the parties that if and when the defendants shall fail to
pay the interest due and that the Deed of Sale be registered in favor of plaintiff, the
defendants shall pay a monthly rental of P400,000.00 a month until they vacate the
premises, and that if they still fail to pay as they are still failing to pay the amount of
P400,000.00 a month as rentals and/or interest, the plaintiff shall take physical possession
of the said property;[11]
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that petitioner A. Francisco Realty raised issues
which involved more than a simple claim for the immediate possession of the subject
property. Such issues range across the full scope of rights of the respective parties under
their contractual arrangements. As held in an analogous case:

The disagreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 96 of the Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy,
Bulacan extended far beyond the issues generally involved in unlawful detainer suits. The
litigants therein did not raise merely the question of who among them was entitled to the
possession of the fishpond of Federico Suntay. For all judicial purposes, they likewise
prayed of the court to rule on their respective rights under the various contractual
documents ¾ their respective deeds of lease, the deed of assignment and the promissory
note ¾ upon which they predicate their claims to the possession of the said fishpond. In
other words, they gave the court no alternative but to rule on the validity or nullity of the
above documents. Clearly, the case was converted into the determination of the nature of
the proceedings from a mere detainer suit to one that is "incapable of pecuniary
estimation" and thus beyond the legitimate authority of the Justice of the Peace Court to
rule on.[12]
Nor can it be said that the compulsory counterclaim filed by respondent spouses
challenging the title of petitioner A. Francisco Realty was merely a collateral attack which
would bar a ruling here on the validity of the said title.

A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff (Valisno v. Plan, 143 SCRA 502 (1986). It stands on the same footing
and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. Hence, the same
rules on jurisdiction in an independent action apply to a counterclaim (Vivar v. Vivar, 8
SCRA 847 (1963); Calo v. Ajax International, Inc. v. 22 SCRA 996 (1968); Javier v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 605 (1989); Quiason, Philippine Courts and Their
Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 203).[13]
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals held that, even "on the assumption that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the instant case," petitioner's action could not succeed because
the deed of sale on which it was based was void, being in the nature of a pactum
commissorium prohibited by Art. 2088 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way to pledge or mortgage,
or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
With respect to this question, the ruling of the appellate court should be affirmed.
Petitioner denies, however, that the promissory notes contain a pactum commissorium. It
contends that ¾

What is envisioned by Article 2088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is a provision in the
deed of mortgage providing for the automatic conveyance of the mortgaged property in
case of the failure of the debtor to pay the loan (Tan v. West Coast Life Assurance Co., 54
Phil. 361). A pactum commissorium is a forfeiture clause in a deed of
mortgage (Hechanova v. Adil, 144 SCRA 450; Montevergen v. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA
641; Report of the Code Commission, 156).

Thus, before Article 2088 can find application herein, the subject deed of mortgage must be
scrutinized to determine if it contains such a provision giving the creditor the right "to
appropriate the things given by way of mortgage without following the procedure
prescribed by law for the foreclosure of the mortgage" (Ranjo v. Salmon, 15 Phil. 436). IN
SHORT, THE PROSCRIBED STIPULATION SHOULD BE FOUND IN THE MORTGAGE
DEED ITSELF.[14]
The contention is patently without merit. To sustain the theory of petitioner would be to
allow a subversion of the prohibition in Art. 2088.

In Nakpil v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[15] which involved the violation of a constructive

trust, no deed of mortgage was expressly executed between the parties in that case.
Nevertheless, this Court ruled that an agreement whereby property held in trust was ceded
to the trustee upon failure of the beneficiary to pay his debt to the former as secured by the
said property was void for being a pactum commissorium. It was there held:

The arrangement entered into between the parties, whereby Pulong Maulap was to be
"considered sold to him (respondent) x x x" in case petitioner fails to reimburse Valdes,
must then be construed as tantamount to a pactum commissorium which is expressly
prohibited by Art. 2088 of the Civil Code. For, there was to be automatic appropriation of
the property by Valdez in the event of failure of petitioner to pay the value of the advances.
Thus, contrary to respondent's manifestations, all the elements of a pactum commissorium
were present: there was a creditor-debtor relationship between the parties; the property
was used as security for the loan; and, there was automatic appropriation by respondent of
Pulong Maulap in case of default of petitioner.[16]
Similarly, the Court has struck down such stipulations as contained in deeds of sale
purporting to be pacto de retro sales but found actually to be equitable mortgages.

It has been consistently held that the presence of even one of the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code is sufficient to declare a contract of sale with
right to repurchase an equitable mortgage. This is so because pacto de retro sales with the
stringent and onerous effects that accompany them are not favored. In case of doubt, a
contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable
mortgage.

Petitioner, to prove her claim, cannot rely on the stipulation in the contract providing that
complete and absolute title shall be vested on the vendee should the vendors fail to redeem
the property on the specified date. Such stipulation that the ownership of the property
would automatically pass to the vendee in case no redemption was effected within the
stipulated period is void for being a pactum commissorium which enables the mortgagee to
acquire ownership of the mortgaged property without need of foreclosure. Its insertion in
the contract is an avowal of the intention to mortgage rather that to sell the property.[17]
Indeed, in Reyes v. Sierra[18] this Court categorically ruled that a mortgagee's mere act of
registering the mortgaged property in his own name upon the mortgagor's failure to
redeem the property amounted to the exercise of the privilege of a mortgagee in a pactum
commissorium.

Obviously, from the nature of the transaction, applicant's predecessor-in-interest is a mere

mortgagee, and ownership of the thing mortgaged is retained by Basilia Beltran, the
mortgagor. The mortgagee, however, may recover the loan, although the mortgage
document evidencing the loan was nonregistrable being a purely private instrument.
Failure of mortgagor to redeem the property does not automatically vest ownership of the
property to the mortgagee, which would grant the latter the right to appropriate the thing
mortgaged or dispose of it. This violates the provision of Article 2088 of the New Civil Code,
which reads:

The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose
by them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The act of applicant in registering the property in his own name upon mortgagor's failure
to redeem the property would amount to a pactum commissorium which is against good
morals and public policy.[19]
Thus, in the case at bar, the stipulations in the promissory notes providing that, upon
failure of respondent spouses to pay interest, ownership of the property would be
automatically transferred to petitioner A. Francisco Realty and the deed of sale in its favor
would be registered, are in substance a pactum commissorium. They embody the two
elements of pactum commissorium as laid down in Uy Tong v. Court of Appeals,[20] to wit:

The prohibition on pactum commissorium stipulations is provided for by Article 2088 of

the Civil Code:

Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgagee,
or dispose of the same. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The aforequoted provision furnishes the two elements for pactum commissorium to exist:
(1) that there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged
by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation; and (2) that there should be
a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or
mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated
period.[21]
The subject transaction being void, the registration of the deed of sale, by virtue of which
petitioner A. Francisco Realty was able to obtain TCT No. PT-85569 covering the subject
lot, must also be declared void, as prayed for by respondents in their counterclaim.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, insofar as it dismissed
petitioner's complaint against respondent spouses on the ground that the stipulations in
the promissory notes are void for being a pactum commissorium, but REVERSED insofar as
it ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over this case. The Register of Deeds of Pasig
City is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL TCT No. PT-85569 issued to petitioner and ISSUE a
new one in the name of respondent spouses.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Acting Chairman), Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.

2. SHEN V. ANTI-TERRORISM (G.R. NO. 178552; OCTOBER 5, 2010)

CASE DIGEST: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. and ATTY.

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.

CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 178554; G.R. No. 178581; G.R. No. 178890; G.R. No.
179157; G.R. No. 179461

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as
respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the
time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National
Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Should the petition prosper?

HELD: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1)
it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist

fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners
invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build."
They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding
such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out
that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and
the implementation of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army
(NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be oneof common and general knowledge; (2) it must bewell and authoritatively
settledand not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of
the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed
to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice.
Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge
or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-
called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely
harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP
and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372.
From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities
fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription
under RA 9372.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress
for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any
direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that
generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish
locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as

"communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official aremerely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners
contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful
demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly

focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.

4. G.R. No. 187231 June 22, 2010

MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO Petitioner,

vs.
COMISSION ON ELECTIONS and STRIKE B. REVILLA, Respondents.
 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner Minerva Gomez-Castillo (Castillo) hereby seeks to nullify the orders dated
January 30, 2009 and March 11, 20091 issued in EAC No. A-01-2009 by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).

Antecedents

Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during
the May 14, 2007 local elections. After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Revilla as the elected Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election
Protest Ad Cautelam2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which was
eventually raffled to Branch 19.

Through his Answer, Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging that it was
filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out that Supreme Court Administrative
Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007 designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88
of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests involving municipal
officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007, Castillo filed his protest in the
RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the proper court.

On November 21, 2008, Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest for being violative
of SCAO No. 54-2007.

On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of appeal.3 Thereupon, the RTC ordered
that the complete records of the protest be forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC.41avvphi1

The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being brought beyond the five-
day reglementary period, noting that although Castillo had received the November 21,
2008 order of the RTC on December 15 , 2008, she filed her notice of appeal on December
23, 2008, a day too late to appeal, to wit:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which requires the
appellant to file her notice of appeal "within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision
of the court xxx" and considering further that jurisprudence holds that perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
JURISDICTIONAL, this Commission, First Division, RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant appeal
for appellant's failure to file her Notice of Appeal within the five (5) day reglementary
period.

SO ORDERED.5
Castillo moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of her appeal, but the COMELEC
denied the motion because she did not pay the motion fees required under Sec. 7(f), Rule
40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-
0130, viz:

The "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by protestant-appellant Minerva G. Castillo, thru

registered mail on 13 February 2009 and received by this Commission on 4 March 2009,
seeking reconsideration of the Commission's (First Division) Order dated 30 January 2009,
is hereby DENIED for failure of the movant to pay the necessary motion fees under Sec.
7(f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure6 as amended by Comelec Resolution no. 02-
0130.71avvphi1

Castillo has brought the present recourse, contending that the COMELEC’s orders
dismissing her appeal and denying her motion for reconsideration were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Parties’ Arguments

Castillo insists that her notice of appeal was seasonably filed; otherwise, the RTC would not
have given due course to his appeal; that Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, cited in the assailed order dated January 30, 2009, did not apply to her case,
because Section 2 of Rule I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that:

Sec. 2. Applicability.- These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and Quo
Warranto cases cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction.

that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applied only to actions and proceedings brought
before the COMELEC, not to actions or proceedings originating in courts of general
jurisdiction; that even assuming that the appeal was belatedly filed, the rules on election
contests should be liberally construed to the end that mere technical objections would not
defeat the will of the people in the choice of public officers; that the Court relaxed on
numerous occasions the application of the rules in order to give due course to belated
appeals upon strong and compelling reasons; that an electoral contest like hers was
imbued with public interest, because it involved the paramount need to clarify the real
choice of the electorate; that Section 4 of Rule I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure even
allows the COMELEC to suspend its own rules of procedure in order to obtain a speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC; and that the COMELEC should not
have dismissed her motion for reconsideration for her mere failure to pay the
corresponding filing fee, but should have considered the soundness of her argument to the
effect that SCAO No. 54-2007 continued to vest jurisdiction to try and decide election
contest involving elective municipal officials in the RTC as a whole, rendering the
designation of the RTC branches to handle election protests akin to a designation of venue.

Castillo further insists that Section 12 of Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that assignment of cases to the specially designated courts should be done
exclusively by raffle conducted by the executive judge or by the judges designated by the
Supreme Court; and that her protest was thus duly raffled to the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite,
considering that SCAO 54-2007 should be construed as a permissive rule that cannot
supersede the general rule that jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the RTC.

In his comment,8 Revilla submits that the COMELEC correctly dismissed Castillo’s appeal
for being filed beyond the five-day reglementary period prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 22
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:

Section 3. Notice of Appeal. - Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the
court, the aggrieved party may filed with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy
thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.

that A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, otherwise known as The Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, clearly and categorically directed:

Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the commission on
Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court
that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not
represented by counsel.

that the period for filing an appeal is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and the
right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the law; that the notice of appeal, even on the assumption that it was filed on
time, still remained futile due to the petitioner’s failure to pay the corresponding fee for the
motion for reconsideration; that the failure to pay the filing fee rendered the motion for
reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, because it prevented the COMELEC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the protest; and that the COMELEC could not be faulted for applying its
procedural rules to achieve a just and expeditious determination of every proceeding
brought before it.

Issues

Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC Branch that has
jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely designate the proper venue for
filing?

In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the reversal of its order of
dismissal despite its having attained finality?

Ruling

The petition has no merit.

A
Error of Petitioner in filing the protest in RTC in Bacoor, not jurisdictional
It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed
by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of
the parties; nor conferred by any acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is
vested in Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.

The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating
the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated
as the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts;9 consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in
which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised.
The Rules of Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction. 10

The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been
vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). 11 On
the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may
be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises
such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a
just and orderly administration of justice,12 and is permissive, because it was enacted to
ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo
warranto involving elective municipal officials.13

Castillo’s filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of
venue. Hence, the dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain error, considering
that her wrong choice did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19 should
have done under the circumstances was to transfer the protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in
Imus, Cavite, which was the proper venue. Such transfer was proper, whether she as the
protestant sought it or not, given that the determination of the will of the electorate of
Bacoor, Cavite according to the process set forth by law was of the highest concern of our
institutions, particularly of the courts.

B
Castillo’s tardy appeal should be dismissed

Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:

Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on
Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented
by counsel.

Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC on December 15,
2008, she filed her notice of appeal only on December 23, 2008, or eight days after her
receipt of the decision. Her appeal was properly dismissed for being too late under the
aforequoted rule of the COMELEC.
Castillo now insists that her appeal should not be dismissed, because she claims that the
five-day reglementary period was a mere technicality, implying that such period was but a
trivial guideline to be ignored or brushed aside at will.

Castillo’s insistence is unacceptable. The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are
not mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they are essential to the finality of
judgments, a notion underlying the

stability of our judicial system.14 A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for
the short period of five days as the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in
election protests, in order that the will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible
so that the winning candidate is not deprived of the right to assume office, and so that any
doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly deserving winning candidate is quickly
removed.

Contrary to Castillo’s posture, we cannot also presume the timeliness of her appeal from
the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by its elevating the protest to the
COMELEC. The presumption of timeliness would not arise if her appeal was actually tardy.

It is not trite to observe, finally, that Castillo’s tardy appeal resulted in the finality of the
RTC’s dismissal even before January 30, 2002. This result provides an additional reason to
warrant the assailed actions of the COMELEC in dismissing her appeal. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the COMELEC’s assailed actions were appropriate and lawful, not tainted
by either arbitrariness or whimsicality,

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

5. Neypes vs CA G.R. No. 141524

FACTS:
– Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro

-Both petitioners and respondents filed various motions with the trial court.
Petitioners – Motion to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau
of Forest Development in default
Respondents: Motion to dismiss

RTC’s order dated May 16, 1997:

1. Granted the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of
Forest Development in default for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper;
2. Denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
3. Denied the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo based on
prescription, and because there were factual matters that could be determined only after
trial.

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the trial court
could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint
itself without waiting for the trial proper.

RTC’s order dated February 12, 1998: Dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that
the action had already prescribed.

March 3, 1998 – Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal

March 18, 1998 – Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (15 days after receipt of the
order)
July 1, 1998 – the RTC issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
July 27, 1998 – petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.
August 4, 1998 – the RTC denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
was filed before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal of the notice of appeal.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner seasonably filed their notice of appeal.

Petitioner’s argument: The 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on
July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998,
only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition ruling that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint.

RULING: The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of
15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). There is a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
Notes:

Remedial Law – Appeals —- The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of
the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

6. Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines [G.R. No. 164195. April 5,
2011]
FACTS:
Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic Act
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government
took petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued the properties
atP165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount. Consequently, on
instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank deposited for AFC and
HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, respectively, or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon
revaluation of the expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made additional deposits,
placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an
increase of nearly five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed
separate complaints for just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
where it was dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a case
with the RTC for the proper determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12%
interest plus attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the Supreme
Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Third
Division deleted the award of interest and attorney’s fees and entry of judgment was
issued. The just compensation of which was only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a
second motion for reconsideration with respect to denial of award of legal interest and
attorney’s fees and a motion to refer the second motion to the Court En Banc and was
granted accordingly, restoring in toto the ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed their second
motion for reconsideration as well for holding of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Political Law (Constitutional Law)
(1) Whether or not the “transcendental importance” does not apply to the present case.

(2) Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance” cannot justify the
negation of the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a vested
right in favor of the Government that respondent LBP represents.

(3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission showing that just compensation for expropriated agricultural
property must be viewed in the context of social justice.
Civil Law:
Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration of respondent deleting interest and
attorney’s fees amount to unjust enrichment in its favor.
Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not the rules on second motion for reconsideration by the Supreme Court
should be strictly complied with by a vote of two-thirds of its actual membership.
(2) Whether or not the holding of oral arguments would still serve its purpose.
(3) Whether or not the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-
Intervention from the Office of the Solicitor General may still be granted.
RULINGS:
Political Law (Constitutional Law)
(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of
public interest – the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right,
namely, the right of a landowner to receive just compensation when the government
exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent
domain – “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
While confirming the State’s inherent power and right to take private property for public
use, this provision at the same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power.
When it takes property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has the
corresponding obligation to pay the owner just compensation for the property taken. For
compensation to be considered “just,” it must not only be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner without delay.
(2) No. The doctrine “transcendental importance,” contrary to the assertion it is applicable
only to legal standing questions, is justified in negating the doctrine of immutability of
judgment. It will be a very myopic reading of the ruling as the context clearly shows that
the phrase “transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize the overriding public
interest involved in this case. The Supreme Court said in their resolution:
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern
from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-
important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent
domain case be “just” when the payment for the compensation for property already taken
has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private
interest is involved in this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government
as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or
standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these standards
have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private interest matter is an extremely
shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.
xxxx
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental
importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a
societal objective of that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half
century.
From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests of justice are duly
served.
(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to give a lower market price per square meter for larger tracts
of land, the Commission never intended to give agricultural landowners less than just
compensation in the expropriation of property for agrarian reform purposes.
[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the right of
landowners to receive just compensation for the expropriation by the State of their
properties. That the petitioners are corporations that used to own large tracts of land
should not be taken against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable
doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution
fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice
must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
Civil Law
Yes. In the present case, it is undisputed that the government took the petitioners’ lands on
December 9, 1996; the petitioners only received full payment of the just compensation due
on May 9, 2008. This circumstance, by itself, already confirms the unconscionable delay in
the payment of just compensation.
An added dimension is the impact of the delay. One impact – as pointed out above – is the
loss of income the landowners suffered. Another impact that the LBP now glosses over is
the income that the LBP earned from the sizeable sum it withheld for twelve long years.
From this perspective, the unaccounted-for LBP income is unjust enrichment in its favor
and an inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was what the Court essentially
addressed when it awarded the petitioners 12% interest.
Remedial Law
(1) No. When the Court ruled on the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by a vote of 12
Members (8 for the grant of the motion and 4 against), the Court ruled on the merits of the
petitioners’ motion. This ruling complied in all respects with the Constitution requirement
for the votes that should support a ruling of the Court. Admittedly, the Court did not make
any express prior ruling accepting or disallowing the petitioners’ motion as required by
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. The Court, however, did not thereby contravene its
own rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration; since 12 Members of the Court opted to
entertain the motion by voting for and against it, the Court simply did not register an
express vote, but instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule through the
participation by no less than 12 of its 15 Members. Viewed in this light, the Court cannot
even be claimed to have suspended the effectiveness of its rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration; it simply complied with this rule in a form other than by express and
separate voting.
(2) No. The submissions of the parties, as well as the records of the case, have already
provided this Court with enough arguments and particulars to rule on the issues involved.
Oral arguments at this point would be superfluous and would serve no useful purpose.
(3) No. The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG speaks, has been amply protected
through the direct action of petitioner LBP – the government instrumentality created by
law to provide timely and adequate financial support in all phases involved in the execution
of needed agrarian reform. The OSG had every opportunity to intervene through the long
years that this case had been pending but it chose to show its hand only at this very late
stage when its presence can only serve to delay the final disposition of this case. The
arguments the OSG presents, furthermore, are issues that this Court has considered in the
course of resolving this case. Thus, every reason exists to deny the intervention prayed for.
7. Enrique G. De Leon vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 212623, Jan. 11,
2016
FACTS:
This is a case for Grave Oral Defamation filed against Enrique G. De Leon, who allegedly
uttered “WALANGHIYA KANG MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO
NOON. PATAY KA SA AKIN MAMAYA” and other words and expressions of similar import,
thereby bringing SPO3 Pedrito L. Leonardo into public contempt, discredit and ridicule.
Per version of the prosecution, De Leon and his son filed a complaint for grave misconduct
against SPO3 Leonardo before the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). At the first
scheduled hearing, De Leon uttered the said words to SPO3 Leonardo in the presence of
several persons. SPO3 Leonardo later entered the incident in the blotter of Special
Operations Group of the Philippine National Police and on the same day filed his complaint
at the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP).
Per version of the defense, there was a prior incident involving De Leon and his son and
SPO3 Leonardo, who approached the two while having breakfast with fellow joggers at the
Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban Station. SPO3 Leonardo allegedly said, “Putang ina
mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy,” and tried to shoot his gun but the gun did not fire. De Leon
escaped the encounter and consequently, he filed an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the PLEB. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay sa
Paghahabla, De Leon narrated that he and SPO3 Leonardo were former jogging buddies
and that the latter wanted to borrow money from the former in the amount of PHP
150,000.00 but he declined. SPO3 Leonardo became upset with him, culminating in the
gun-pointing incident.
On the day of the PLEB hearing, the defense alleged that it was SPO3 Leonardo who
badmouthed and threatened De Leon by uttering the words, “Putang-ina mong mayabang
ka, pag di mo inurong demanda mo sa akin, papatayin kita.” Moments later, they caused the
incident to be entered in the police blotter.
On the same day, after receiving subpoena from the OCP for SPO3 Leonardo’s case against
him, De Leon utilized the police blotter to file a case against SPO3 Leondardo in Camp
Crame. But De Leon did not immediately file a case against SPO3 Leonardo before the OCP.
The trial court found De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. It
considered SPO3 Leonardo’s police blotter as prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein and ruled that his actuations on the day of the incident were spontaneous. On the
other hand, De Leon’s defense were found to be only an afterthought and self-serving as he
merely filed counter-charges against Leonardo after he had received the subpoena from the
OCP.
On appeal, the RTC rendered its decision affirming in toto the ruling of the MeTC. De Leon’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Aggrieved, De Leon filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA, which affirmed
the RTC decision with modification as to the imposed penalty. De Leon’s move for partial
reconsideration was to no avail.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE MeTC FAILED TO INCLUDE THE FACTS AND THE LAW
UPON WHICH THE DECISION WAS BASED
WHETHER DE LEON’S GUILT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
HELD:
The MeTC Decision clearly stated the facts and the law on which it was based.
There was no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The CA correctly stated that the
MeTC clearly emphasized in its decision, the factual findings, as well as the credibility and
probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis-à-vis the evidence of the prosecution.
The MeTC presented both version of the prosecution and that of the defense. De Leon was
not left in the dark. He was fully aware of the alleged errors of the MeTC. The RTC, as an
appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the MeTC.
Likewise, when it comes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect,
even finality, to the evaluation by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented before it.
The crime committed is only Slight Oral Defamation.
The Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon were defamatory in nature. It is,
however, of the view that the same only constituted simple oral defamation.
First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each other
as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident, there
was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo.
Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on the
administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the
gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of time within which
the wounded feelings could not have healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but a
mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed during their
encounter.
Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep into
the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have been
considered. It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon hurled
those words. There was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De
Leon’s utterance could simply be construed as his expression of dismay towards his actions
as his friend and member of the community.
DISCUSSION:
Constitutional Requirement that Decisions must clearly state the Facts and Law on which
they are based.
Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him and filed with the clerk of the court.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a
judgment, the judge did so through the process of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard
against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
Minimum Standard for the Judiciary in Rendering Decision
The standard “expected of the judiciary” is that the decision rendered makes clear why
either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any
rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and
distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is
necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of
being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.
It is understandable that courts, with heavy dockets and time constraints, often find
themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most desirable.
Judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless,
concisely written such as they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express, at
least in minimum essence, its factual and legal bases.
Elements of Oral Defamation
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing. It is defined as “the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.” The
elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3)
publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is
dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral
defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and
insulting nature.
How to determine if allegation is defamatory
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime,
the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which
tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are
not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis
for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact
that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
When defamation is serious or slight
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon
the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended
party. The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend
to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended
party constitutes only a light felony.
Examples of cases for grave oral defamation
In U.S. v. Tolosa, where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets
including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to
injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was
grave slander. In Balite v. People, the accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation as
the scurrilous words he imputed to the offended party constituted the crime of estafa.
Examples of cases for slight oral defamation
In the case of People v. Arcand, a priest called the offended party a gangster in the middle of
the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander as there was
no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. In Pader v. People, the Court ruled that the
crime committed was only slight oral defamation as it considered the expression, “putang
ina mo,” as expression to convey anger or displeasure. Such utterance was found not
seriously insulting considering that he was drunk when he uttered those words and his
anger was instigated by what the private complainant did when the former’s father died.
Example of a case where no defamation was found
Also in Jamilano v. Court of Appeals, where calling someone “yabang” (boastful or arrogant)
was found not defamatory, the complainant’s subsequent recourse to the law on oral
defamation was not sustained by the Court.
Defamation against a Public Officer
Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by profession,
his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has been held that a
public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. The
doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was uttered in
connection with the public officer’s duty.
One of man’s most prized possession is his integrity. There lies a thin line between criticism
and outright defamation. When one makes commentaries about the other’s performance of
official duties, the criticism is considered constructive, then aimed for the betterment of his
or her service to the public. It is thus, a continuing duty on the part of the public officer to
make room for improvement on the basis of this constructive criticism in as much as it is
imperative on the part of the general public to make the necessary commentaries should
they see any lapses on the part of the public officer.
8. CAGAS VS. COMELEC
EN BANC G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012 DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the order dated August 13, 2010 (denying the affirmative defenses raised by the
petitioner),[1] and the order dated October 7, 2010 (denying his motion for
reconsideration),[2] both issued by the COMELEC First Division in EPC No. 2010-42, an
election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista, protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee.[3]
Antecedents
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and
local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010
of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was
proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.[4]
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules
and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42).[5]
The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,[6] the petitioner averred as his special
affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that
Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner,[7] viz:
After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission (First Division) makes
the following observation:
Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
on June 3, 2010 as evidenced by O.R. No. 1118105; and
Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the Protestant set forth the specific
details of the acts and omissions complained of against the Protestee.
It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June 3, 2010 is a substantial
compliance with the requirement of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, taking into
consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of said Resolution. Furthermore, the Protestant has
likewise essentially complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the above-mentioned Resolution.
In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DENY the
Protestee's special affirmative defenses.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether
the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of
Section 2, paragraph 2,[9] Rule 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,[10] requiring all
decisions to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which they were based;
and that it also contravened Section 7(g),11] Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
requiring a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that the
matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1,[12] Section 5,[13] and
Section 6,[14] all of Rule 20 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced the requirement
for the "detailed specification" to prevent "shotgun fishing expeditions by losing
candidates;"[15] that such requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure,[16] under which the protest needed only to contain a
"concise statement of the ultimate facts" constituting the cause or causes of action; that
Bautista's protest did not meet the new requirement under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804;
and that in Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[17] the Court upheld the
dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) for not
specifically alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.
In his opposition,[18] Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in
Panlilio v. COMELEC;[19] that the rules of the COMELEC required the initiatory petition to
specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral frauds, anomalies and election
irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was based;
and that Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not apply because, firstly,
Peña had totally different factual antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the omission of
material facts from Peña's protest prevented the protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from
being apprised of the issues that he must meet and made it eventually impossible for the
HRET to determine which ballot boxes had to be collected.
On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order,[20]
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order
was contrary to law, to wit:
The Protestee's August 28, 2010 "Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Certify the
Case to the Commission En Banc" relative to the Order issued by the Commission (First
Division) dated August 13, 2010 is hereby DENIED for failure to show that the assailed
order is contrary to law
Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the protestant's petition
have substantially complied with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that
will warrant the opening of the ballot boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised in
the protest but also those set forth in the Protestee's answer. When substantial compliance
with the rules is satisfied, allowing the protest to proceed is the best way of removing any
doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the electorate. All other issues laid down in the
parties' pleadings, including those in the Protestee's special and affirmative defenses and
those expressed in the preliminary conference brief, will best be threshed out in the final
resolution of the instant case.
The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the Commission En Banc is
DENIED considering that the 13 August 2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not
dispose of the instant case with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.
Issue
The petitioner submits that:
THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR
INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT.
The petitioner argues that Section 9,[21] Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 obliged
the COMELEC First Division to summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form
and content; and that the insufficiency in substance arose from the failure of the protest to:
(a) specifically state how the various irregularities and anomalies had affected the results
of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the protested precincts were "pre-shaded bogus-
ballots" used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to accurately
account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with particularity how many
additional votes Bautista stood to receive for each of the grounds he protested. He
concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in allowing the
protest of Bautista despite its insufficiency.
Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere fishing expedition
to be outrightly dismissed in light of the elections being held under an automated system.
In support of his urging, he cites Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[22] where the
Court took judicial notice of the accuracy and reliability of the PCOS machines and CCS
computers, such that allegations of massive errors in the automated counting and
canvassing had become insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to entertain or to give due
course to defective election protests.[23] He submits that a protest like Bautista's cast
doubt on the automated elections.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bautista both posit that the
COMELEC had the power and prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of
an election protest; and that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC First Division
acted within its discretion. Additionally, the OSG maintains that the assailed orders, being
interlocutory, are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition for
certiorari.
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The
following cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections[24] are
enlightening, viz:
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is
prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by
the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided bythis constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
[emphasis supplied]
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc,not of a division,
certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to
the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedyin the ordinary course of law. A motion
for reconsideration is a plainand adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory.xxx[25]
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for
the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en
banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits. It is true that
there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission
on Elections.[26] In that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First
Division admitting an answer with counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by
filing a petition for certiorari directly in this Court on the ground that the order constituted
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division. The Court granted the
petition and nullified the assailed order for being issued without jurisdiction, and explained
the exception thuswise:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc, this
Court finds the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated
February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will
necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commission en banc. No less
than the Constitution requires that election cases must be heard and decided first in
division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and
February 28, 1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders
because they merely rule upon an incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa's
answer with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they
leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the
rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a division,
like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the
Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly
provides for this,
Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx
xxx
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division
which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that
the subject case does not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc
can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:
Section 2. The Commission en banc. The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter
specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the
members of a Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or
where, upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or
issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the
Commission en banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission
may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case where a division is
not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First Division
unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the
Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum
which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not
permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the
ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not
appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter
is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to
act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of
necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en
banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory
order can be reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because
the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed
specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of
the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers involving
not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections but also the resolution and determination of election
controversies.[27] The breadth of such powers encompasses the authority to determine
the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election protest and to decide based on
such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly
dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The Court has upheld the COMELEC's determination of the sufficiency of allegations
contained in election protests, conformably with its imperative duty to ascertain in an
election protest, by all means within its command, who was the candidate elected by the
electorate.[28] Indeed, in Panlilio v. Commission on Elections,[29]we brushed aside the
contention that the election protest was insufficient in form and substance and was a sham
for having allegations couched in general terms, stating:
In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioner's argument that the protestant had
no cause of action, as the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in
general terms, were not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of
ballots. The Court states the rules in election protests cognizable by the COMELEC and
courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of
categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in
an election protest that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as
evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes
and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.
In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court considered the allegations in
an election protest, similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.
Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities
are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots.
The pronouncement is in accordance with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. Where allegations in a protest or counter-
protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so
require, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots
and other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be
examined and the votes recounted.
In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and
counter-protest warranted the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination
of their contents to settle at once the conflicting claims of petitioner and private
respondent.
The petitioner adds that with the Court havingnoted the reliability and accuracy of the
PCOS machines and consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) computers in Roque, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections,[30] Bautista's election protest assailing the system and
procedure of counting and canvassing of votes cast in an automated system of elections
should be immediately dismissed.
We are not persuaded.
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an election protest to
challenge the outcome of an election undertaken in an automated system of elections.
Instead, the Court only ruled there that the system and procedure implemented by the
COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines and CCS computers met the minimum system
requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436.[31] The Court did not
guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections, as can be
gleaned from the following pronouncement thereat:
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that
a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would
be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot
guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and
consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to
Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent
constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a
considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards
successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is
laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of
orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and
assist Comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system.
Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed,
credibly.[32]
In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the other submissions of the
petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
9. PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE v. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, GR No. 158239, 2012-01-25
Facts:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to
respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land
They... agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the
balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of
time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact,
Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would
receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the
vendor's undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margarita's sole surviving
heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of
the... properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties
by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land
into a residential or industrial subdivision.[4] Faced with Priscilla's refusal to... comply,
Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction,
and damages against her in the
RTC
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by
prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla's motion to dismiss on February 4, 1998.[8] However,
upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted
the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against... her
Javellana moved for reconsideration... the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.
Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order,[14] which the RTC gave due
course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to
assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint
On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for... certiorari,[17] finding that
the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders... the CA
promulgated its decision... reversing and setting aside the dismissal... and remanding the
records to the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law."... that the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and
obligations of Margarita with respect to the parcels of land; that Margarita's undertaking
under the contract was not a purely... personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla,
who was consequently bound to comply with the obligation; that the action had not yet
prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible
brought by Javellana who had actual... possession of the properties; and that based on the
Issues:
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not outrightly
dismissing Javellana's appeal because: (a) the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable;
(b) the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly by three days; and (c)
Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail
the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the CA. She
posited that, even if the CA's decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the
RTC's dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the complaint
stated no cause of action, and the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The petition for review has no merit.
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the... order of dismissal was a final order and
appealable
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or
judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an ...
order denying a motion for... reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.[
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already retroactively
extended the fresh period rule to "actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is... adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive... operation
of statues they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of... procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within
which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by
the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period...
rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Consequently, we rule that Javellana's notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the
fresh period rule.
III
No forum shopping was committed
10. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) vs. HON.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN and HOTEL ENTERPRISES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 164939, 6 June 2011 SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) vs. HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 172303

FACTS:
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However, due to humanitarian
considerations, it ordered financial assistance. Petitioner assailed the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for certiorari which was dismissed outright
for being the wrong remedy. The CA explained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure explicitly provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgments, final
orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition for Review which should
be filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution
of the voluntary arbitrator. Considering that petitioner intended the petition to be a
Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves to dismiss the petition outright for being
an improper mode of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator is a
petition for certiorari.
RULING:
No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for
review under Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA,
within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for
certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this
case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose,
and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such
purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be
ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement
of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital
system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the
correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious
observance by the parties of the procedural rules.
11. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F.
CABALLERO, GR No. 158090, 2010-10-04
Facts:
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential
lot... designated as Lot No. 3355, Ts-268, covered by TCT No. T-16035 of the Register of
Deeds of Cotabato,... On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a
loan from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of
P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a
real estate mortgage on the same... date, mortgaging the afore-stated property as security.
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, on January 20, 1973,
the mortgage covering the subject property was foreclosed, and on March 26, 1973, the
same was sold at a public auction where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount
of P36,283.00.
For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the designated period,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership on September 5, 1975.
Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was cancelled and TCT No. T-45874 was issued in the
name of... petitioner.
On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the
consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of
Fernando's continued occupancy of the subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that
he be... allowed to repurchase the same through partial payments. Negotiation as to the
repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for several years, but no
agreement was reached between the parties.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public bidding.
Since CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awarded the subject property.
the Board of Trustees of the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award of the
subject property to CMTC for a total consideration of P450,000.00. Thereafter, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed between petitioner and CMTC on July 27, 1989, transferring
the subject property to CMTC. Consequently, TCT No. T-45874 in the name of GSIS was
cancelled, and TCT No. T-76183 was issued in the name of CMTC.
Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn
Caballero, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato... the RTC... ruled
in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint.
Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC... respondent
filed a Notice of Appeal.
affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment
ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be
deleted.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING
THAT GSIS' COUNTERCLAIM, AMONG OTHERS, OF P249,800.00 REPRESENTING RENTALS
COLLECTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM CARMELITA MERCANTILE TRADING
CORPORATION IS IN THE NATURE OF A PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM WHICH
REQUIRED THE PAYMENT BY GSIS OF DOCKET FEES BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER SAID COUNTERCLAIM.
Ruling:
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.[13] This, petitioner did not do,
because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental... payments was a compulsory
counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar
as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected... from CMTC, is
considered null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC did not
arise after the filing of the complaint; hence, the rule laid down in Sun Insurance finds no
application in the present case.
Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over it and, thus, there is no need to discuss the second issue raised
by petitioner.
12. [ GR No. 154061, Jan 25, 2012 ]
PANAY RAILWAYS INC. v. HEVA MANAGEMENT +
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo
City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioner's failure to pay the corresponding docket fees.
The facts are as follows:

On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned and controlled

corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract covering several parcels of lands,
including Lot No. 6153, in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure P20 million worth
of loan and credit accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153:
that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-C, and a
squatter area known as 6153-D.[1]

Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No. 6153. On 20 January 1986, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the bank as the highest bidder and purchaser.
Consequently, the sale of Lot No. 6153 was registered with the Register of Deeds on 28
January 1986 and annotated at the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT) covering
the mortgaged properties.

Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the basis of a Deed of
Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner failed to exercise the right to redeem
the properties. The corresponding TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the bank.

On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against petitioner. During
the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized manager and officer-in-charge and
with the assistance of counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Suspension of the Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.[2] The pertinent
portions of the Manifestation and Motion state:

3. That after going over the records of this case and the case of Traders Royal Bank vs.
Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280, PRI is irrevocably withdrawing its Motion for
Suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above, and its Motion for Reconsideration referred
in paragraph 2 above and will accept and abide by the September 21, 1990 Order denying
the Motion For Suspension;

4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be the registered owner of
Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159, and Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-
84234; T-84235; T-84236; T-84237, T-84238 and T-45724 respectively, free of liens and
encumbrances, except that portion sold to Shell Co. found in Lot 5. That Petitioner (TRB) as
registered owner is entitled to peaceful ownership and immediate physical possession of
said real properties.

5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff validly foreclosed the Real
Estate Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure to pay the loan of ?20,000,000.00. That TRB
was the purchaser of these lots mentioned in paragraph 4 above at Sheriff's Auction Sale as
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated January 20, 1986 and the Certificates of Titles
issued to Petitioner;

6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present or future opposition to the grant of
the Writ of Possession to TRB over the parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 4 above and
subject of this Petition and even assuming "arguendo" that it has, PRI irrevocably waives
the same. That PRI will even assist TRB in securing possession of said properties as witness
against squatters, illegal occupants, and all other possible claimants;

7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders physical possession and control
of the premises of these lots to TRB, its successors or its assigns, together with all the
buildings, warehouses, offices, and all other permanent improvements constructed thereon
and will attest to the title and possession of petitioner over said real properties. (Emphasis
supplied)

TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No. 6153, which is under
dispute.

It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included some
excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint
for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum;
Cancellation of Title No. T-89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
Reconveyance plus Damages.[3]

It then filed an Amended Complaint[4] on 1 January 1995 and again filed a Second
Amended Complaint[5] on 8 December 1995.

Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on these grounds: (1)
petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was a waiver, an abandonment and an
extinguishment of petitioner's claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause of
action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order[6] granting the Motion to Dismiss of
respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner was a judicial
admission of TRB's ownership of the disputed properties. The trial court pointed out that
the Manifestation was executed by petitioner's duly authorized representative with the
assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring petitioner from
claiming otherwise.

On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary docket
fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground
of nonpayment of docket fees.

In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar with the
revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1 July 1997. Its representative
was likewise not informed by the court personnel that docket fees needed to be paid upon
the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the
payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal
interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.

On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order[8] dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of
Rule 41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order[10] alleging that the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing to relax procedural rules for the sake
of substantial justice.

On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.[11]

On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the
Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
strictly applied procedural rules.
On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision[12] on the Petition. It held that while
the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period was a ground for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court.
Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the appeal and set aside the latter's assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.

Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.

It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA's Decision, this Court issued
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on 1 May 2000, amending
Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular
expressly provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal
for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000[13] was issued on 29 August
2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.

By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned Orders of the trial
court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision[14] in the present Petition granting
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.

The CA's action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that SC
Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA
should consider the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Rexes V.
Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court,
which became effective a little over a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was
thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of the case.

On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution[15] denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the Notice of
Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of
Appeal at the time of filing. Alternatively, petitioner argues that while the appeal was
dismissible for failure to pay docket fees, substantial justice demands that procedural rules
be relaxed in this case.

The Petition has no merit.

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on
the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected.
Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that "a person
has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application
to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure."[16] More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay
the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC
dismissed the Notice of Appeal.

The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal has no merit.
When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the
RTC's dismissal of the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court.
Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the appeal,
taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation of its Decision.

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. The
Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees.[18]

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.[19]
We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice" is not a magic wand that
would automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are required to be
followed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[20]

We cannot consider counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of Court
as a persuasive reason to relax the application of the Rules. It is well-settled that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule that any act
performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.[21]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.