G.R. No.

242101, September 16, 2019

XXX,1 PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, THE RESPONDENT.

Facts: An Information was filed against XXX for committing lascivious acts
against AAA. During the arraignment, XXX pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Trial on the merits then ensued.

During the trial of the case, both parties gave their version of what happened
during that time. In the decision of the RTC, it ruled in favor of the complainant.
The RTC found AAA to be consistent and convincing in her testimony that on the
date in question, XXX inserted his hand under her shirt and bra and touched her
breast.12 The RTC held that AAA's positive and categorical testimony could not be
overturned by the mere denial of XXX. Further, XXX's allegation that AAA only
fabricated the story to be able to live with her boyfriend at the time did not
persuade the RTC. The RTC found it unbelievable for a woman of a young age to
concoct a story that would bring shame or embarrassment to her, moreso if it
would be found later on that the matters, she was testifying about were not true.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. XXX
alleged that there’s inconsistencies to the statement of AAA, thus, it should not be
given merit.

Issue: Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting XXX.

Held: No. The appeal is denied. The Court, however, modifies XXX's
conviction from "Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of
the [RPC]" to "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610."

In the Court's view, however, the inconsistencies referred to, if indeed they
exist, pertain to trivial matters which do not affect the central fact of the crime. As
regards the alleged inconsistencies in private complainant's Salaysay  and testimony
on whether she called first or texted his mother, We find these to be totally
inconsequential. The debate as to whether she called her mother first to narrate the
subject incident or texted her "Yung asawa mo, hayup yan, yung ginawa niya
sakin" is not relevant to the unlawful act committed by the accused-appellant. The
alleged inconsistencies cannot negate the testimony of the private complainant
which has been consistent with respect to the fact that accused-appellant, without
her consent, forcefully touched her breasts.

Discrepancies between the affidavit of a witness and her testimony in court

do not necessarily discredit her because it is a matter of judicial experience that
[affidavits], being taken ex-parte are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate. Minor variances in the details of a witness' account, more frequently
than not, are badges of truth rather than indicia  of falsehood and they often bolster
the probative value of the testimony.
 G.R. No. 243936, September 16, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. VERNIE ANTONIO

Y MABUTI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Facts: The two Information filed against Vernie pertaining to his activity
related to drugs. When arraigned, Vernie entered the plea of not guilty to both
charges. Thereafter, joint trial was conducted.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Officer (PO) 1
Byron Atilon (PO1 Atilon), the poseur buyer; and (2) PO2 Michelle Gimena (PO2
Gimena), the immediate back-up. The defense of Vernie was based solely on his
testimony. The evidence of the prosecution established that on August 20, 2016, a
buy-bust team was formed after a confidential informant reported to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG) that illegal drug
activities were being conducted by a certain Vernie in Brgy. Tejeros, Makati City.

After the obtaining the information with regard to the illegal activity, the
Police officers formed a team and went to the place and conduct the buy-bust
operation as planned. They confiscated three plastic sachet containing shabu
marked as “BSA”, two pieces small heat-sealed plastic sachet shabu marked as
“BSA-1” and “BSA-2”, and one piece five hundred peso bill marked as “BSA.” The
Chain of Custody Form12 shows that from PO3 Paredes, the seized plastic sachets
were received again by PO1 Atilon for delivery to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory. PO1 Atilon delivered the seized plastic sachets to the Southern
Police District Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemist Police Chief Inspector May
Andrea Bonifacio (PCI Bonifacio) received the seized plastic sachets from PO1
Atilon. Per Chemistry Report No. D-1219-16 13 signed by PCI Bonifacio, the
qualitative examination gave· positive result that the three heat-sealed plastic
sachets marked as "BSA," “BSA-1," and "BSA-2" contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

In the decision of RTC, it give credence to the testimonies of the police

officers, who were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.
Thus, convicting Vernie. Upon appeal, CA Affirmed the decision of RTC convicting
Vernie of the crime charged, on the ground that the chain of custody were
established. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Vernie is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: No. The corpus delicti in this case are: (1) one sachet of shabu sold to
the poseur buyer; and (2) the two additional sachets confiscated from Vernie. It is,
therefore, necessary that the identity and integrity of the dangerous drugs are
established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the shabu presented in court
must be the same shabu seized from him during the buy bust operation and the
body search after his arrest.

R.A. 9165 provides reasonable safeguards to preserve the identity and

integrity of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from
drug offenders. Strict compliance with the chain of custody rule is essential in cases
involving illegal drugs because these items are highly susceptible to planting,
alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. Thus, if
chain of custody rule will be strictly followed, there is moral certainty that
prosecution would be able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Although the Court acknowledges that strict compliance with the chain of
custody procedure may not always be possible, it must be stressed that for the
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses. Further, the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist.

All in all, the prosecution did not prove with moral certainty the guilt of the
accused-appellant on both charges.
 A.C. No. 6560, September 16, 2019

MIKE A. FERMIN, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. LINTANG H. BEDOL,

RESPONDENT.

Facts: Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed

by complainant Mike A. Fermin against respondent Atty. Lintang H. Bedol for
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complaint averred that one of his opponents and defeated candidate for the
mayoralty post of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, bai Susan Samad, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a petition to declare a failure of election in certain precincts of
barangay Guiawa. However, before the issuance of the COMELEC Resolution, the
respondent, in his capacity as the Provincial Election Supervisor III of Maguindanao,
had already issued a Notice1 dated July 23, 2004 to all candidates, which included
him, political parties and registered voters of Barangay Guiawa, Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao, informing them of the scheduled special election for Barangay
Guiawa on July 28, 2004; that he issued another notice 2 informing the candidates
and political parties of a conference on July 25, 2004 to be held in his office; and
that on July 26, 2004, he again issued a notice 3 that the canvassing of votes shall
be held in Shariff Aguak Maguindanao.

Complainant alleged that respondent, without basis in law and in fact, issued
the above-mentioned premature notices of special election which highlighted his
shameless disregard of the truth and brazen disrespect for the rule of law which is
his foremost duty as a member of the Bar.

In the decision of Commissioner Reyes of IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

issued Report and Recommendation finding the respondent guilty of violation of
Canon 1 of Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommend that he be
penalized with reprimand and stern warning.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively

liable.

Held: Yes. Respondent's act of issuing those notices ahead of the issuance
of the COMELEC en banc Resolution calling for a special election was not in
compliance with the procedures under the law and the COMELEC rules. In so doing,
he breached his duty to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities, thus, violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by
the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's
personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires
respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public. As servants of the law
and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing
and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars
worthy of emulation. This, in fact, is what a lawyer's obligation to promote respect
for law and legal processes entails. More so, a lawyer who is occupying a public
office. Lawyers in public office, such as respondent who was then a Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, are expected not only to refrain from any act
or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a
keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility,
higher than his brethren in private practice.
 G.R.No. 206598, September 04, 2019

SPOUSES SALVADOR BATOLINIO AND AMOR P. BATOLINIO, REPRESENTED

BY ROY B. PANTALEON AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONERS, v. SHERIFF
JANET YAP-ROSAS AND PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: The present case stemmed from an Ex Parte Petition3 for the issuance
of a writ of possession filed by Philippine Savings Bank (private respondent). On
October 26, 2007, Nicefora. Miñoza (Miñoza) obtained a loan from it in the amount
of P-5.7 Million;4 as security thereof, Miñoza executed a real estate mortgage (REM)
over a parcel of land registered under her name. Miñoza failed to pay the loan when
it fell due; thus, private respondent instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure of the
REM; and later, it emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction such that a
certificate of sale was eventually issued in its favor and registered with the Registry
of Deeds on June 23, 2008. Private respondent added that it demanded from
Miñoza and all those persons claiming rights under her to vacate the subject
property, but to no avail.

Meanwhile, spouses Salvador Batolinio and Amor P. Batolinio (petitioners)

filed an Omnibus Motion with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.8 They claimed that they were the owners of the subject property, which
was previously covered by TCT No. T-80337 under their name. They stated that in
2003, they mortgaged it to Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank), but in
September 2007, through a certain Leonila Briones, Yolanda Vargas, and Fedeline
Balbis, they decided to sell it to Miñoza for P2.435 Million. Allegedly, the aforesaid
sale was subject to conditions.

Passerted that Miñoza, in cahoots with other people, forged their signatures
in the deed of sale and certificate of full payment pertaining to the subject property,
they confirmed having executed a letter of guaranty for private respondent to
facilitate the loan of Miñoza. At the same time, they stated that they filed an
adverse claim on the subject property as well as a civil case 9 for cancellation of
title, specific performance, and damages against Miñoza, among other persons.
They also added that, they were third persons claiming rights adverse to Miñoza;
thus, they could not be deprived of the possession of the subject property without
being heard of their claim first

In the decision of RTC, it denied the petition of the petitioners. It stressed

that since its decision already became final and executory, then the issuance of a
writ of possession could no longer be enjoined. Upon appeal, the CA elucidated that
because petitioners sold the subject property to Miñoza through an absolute sale
and made no reservation of ownership until its full payment, they parted with their
ownership, leaving them without anymore right over the land in dispute. It also
explained that petitioners could not be considered third parties whose rights were
adverse to Miñoza because of the same reason that they already sold their rights
and participation over the property through an absolute sale.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct to rule that the petitioners do not

fall under the category of third party on the ground that they already
parted with the ownership of the subject property.
 Held: No. Section 7 of Act No. 3135, 12 as amended by Act No.
13
4118,  provides for the manner for the issuance of a writ of possession in
extrajudicial foreclosure of REM. Simply put, a successful buyer of a foreclosed
property bought at a public auction sale is authorized to apply for a writ of
possession (1) during the redemption period upon filing of the corresponding bond;
and, (2) after the expiration of the redemption period without any need of a bond.

Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which extends to extrajudicial

foreclosure sales, explicitly provides that when no redemption is made within one
year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is already
entitled to the possession of the subject property unless a third party is holding it
adversely to the judgment debtor.

It bears stressing that a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure becomes

the absolute owner of the subject property in case no redemption is made within
one year from the registration of the certificate of sale. As the absolute owner, the
purchaser is entitled to all the rights of ownership, including the right to possess
the property. It, thus, follows that upon proper application and evidence of
ownership, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the
court except where a third party is holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor.
 G.R. No. 238892, September 04, 2019

SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU AND AMADOR SU, PETITIONERS, v. EDA

BONTILAO, PABLITA BONTILAO, AND MARICEL DAYANDAYAN,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts: The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of

land located at Barrio Looc, Lapu-Lapu City, registered in the name of petitioner
Aurora Tojong Su, married to petitioner Amador P. Su.

Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, and

attorney's fees against respondents Eda Bontilao (Eda), Pablita Bontilao (Pablita),
and Maricel Dayandayan (Maricel; collectively, respondents) as well as several
others before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Lapu-Lapu City (MTCC), alleging
that respondents had constructed their houses on the subject property and had
been occupying the same by petitioners' mere tolerance, with the understanding
that they will peacefully vacate the premises upon proper demand.

In defense,15 respondents claimed that petitioners had no cause of

action against them, not being the real owners of the subject property. They
averred that petitioners obtained their title through fraud, having bought the
subject property from one Gerardo Dungog (Gerardo) despite full knowledge that it
was their predecessor, Mariano Ybañez (Mariano), who owned the same as
evidenced by a tax declaration issued under his name.

In so ruling, the MTCC found that being the registered owners of the
subject property covered by TCT No. 29490, petitioners have the right of
possession over the same, being one of the attributes of ownership. Moreover, the
actual possession and occupation of respondents was by mere tolerance of
petitioners, hence, respondents were bound to peacefully vacate upon demand.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed before RTC which affirms the decision of MTCC.
However, CA reversed the decision of RTC and dismissed the complaint altogether.
The CA held that it was grossly erroneous for the RTC to affirm the MTCC's recall of
its June 14, 2013 Order dismissing the case for failure of petitioners and their
former counsel to appear during the first scheduled preliminary conference.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the
courts a quo's issuances recalling the June 14, 2013 Order and in dismissing the
complaint for unlawful detainer based on purely procedural considerations.

Held: Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure states:

Section 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than
thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall
be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the
preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary
conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The
defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
 judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-
claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to

judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action
who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference. 

Relative thereto, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court,

which apply suppletorily insofar as not inconsistent with the Rules on Summary
Procedure.

In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of

tolerance must be proved; bare allegations are insufficient. For tolerance to exist,
the complainants in an unlawful detainer must prove that they had consented to the
possession over the property through positive acts. After all, tolerance signifies
permission and not merely silence or inaction as silence or inaction is negligence
and not tolerance. It was error for the courts a quo to rule in favor of petitioners
merely on the basis of the Torrens title registered in their names. There is no
question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property
thereby covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the fact alone that
petitioners have a title over the subject property does not give them unbridled
authority to immediately wrest possession from its current possessor in the absence
of evidence proving the allegations in their unlawful detainer claim. Indeed, even
the legal owner of the property cannot conveniently usurp possession against a
possessor, through a summary action for ejectment, without proving the essential
requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner choose to file an action for
unlawful detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the
occupation was based on his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner
would be in a better position by pursuing other more appropriate legal remedies.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 227336, February 26, 2018

ROMMEL RAMOS Y LODRONIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: In separate informations, petitioner was charged with violating

Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)  No. 9165 while his co-accused Rodrigo
Bautista y  Sison (Bautista)  was charged with violating Secs. 5 and 11 thereof. On
September 8, 2009, petitioner and Bautista were arraigned and they pleaded "not
guilty."On September 30, 2009, petitioner posted the required bail bond and was
released from custody. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The RTC Ruling

In its April 8, 2013 decision, the RTC found Bautista and petitioner guilty for the
respective offenses charged against them. The trial court disregarded the allegation
that the drugs were planted because it was unsubstantiated and no ill-motive on
the part of the police officers was shown. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
establish all the elements of illegal sale of drugs because it was proven that
Bautista sold the confiscated drugs to PO1 Madronero in a buy-bust operation. The
RTC also held that there was illegal possession of drugs because the dangerous
drugs were confiscated from petitioner and Bautista after the valid arrest. Upon
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC. It considered the recovery of the plastic
sachets of marijuana from petitioner as incident of lawful arrest.

Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE
THAT THE TWO (2) PLASTIC SACHETS OF MARIJUANA PRESENTED WERE THE VERY
SAME ITEMS CONFISCATED.

Held: Yes.

As a rule, questions of
  fact cannot be entertained
  by the Court; exceptions

The Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule: (1) the conclusion
is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.

Here, two of the exceptions exist – that the judgment is based -on
misapprehension of facts and the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. As
will be discussed infra,  the CA and the RTC gravely erred in ignoring the utter
failure of the prosecution to comply with the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. To finally resolve the factual dispute, the Court deems it proper to
tackle the factual questions presented.

The chain of custody rule

Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court until
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

Based on the foregoing, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending
team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately conduct a physical inventory;
and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the persons
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the
DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
G.R. No. 215281

ROLANDO DE ROCA, Petitioner
vs.
EDUARDO C. DABUY AN, JENNIFER A. BRANZUELA, JENNYL YN A. RI CARTE,
and HERMINIGILDO F. SABANATE, Respondents

Facts: In 2012, private respondents filed a complaint 6 for illegal dismissal

against "RAF Mansion Hotel Old Management and New Management and Victoriano
Ewayan." Later, private respondents amended the complaint and included petitioner
Rolando De Roca as [co]-respondent. Summons was sent through registered mail
to petitioner but it was returned.

Thereafter, a conference was set but only complainants attended. Thus,

another summons was issued and personally served to petitioner by the bailiff of
the NLRC as evidenced by the latter’s return dated 14 March 2012. Despite service
of summons, petitioner did not attend the subsequent hearings prompting the labor
arbiter to direct private respondents to submit their position paper.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Anent the Motion to Dismiss, Rule V, Sections 6 and 7 of the Revised 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure explicitly provide:

‘SECTION 6. MOTION TO DISMISS. - Before the date set for the mandatory
conciliation and mediation conference, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss
on grounds provided under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof Such motion shall be
immediately resolve[ d] by the Labor Arbiter through a written order. An order
denying the motion to dismiss, or suspending its resolution until the final
determination of the case, is not appealable.

SECTION 7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE. - No motion to dismiss shall be allowed

or entertained after the lapse of the period provided in Section 6 hereof.’

Clearly, respondent De Roca’s Motion to Dismiss, having been filed long after the
date set for the mandatory conference, should be dismissed on such ground being a
prohibited pleading.

Coming now on [sic] the meat of the controversy, since respondents obviously
failed to controvert the allegations by the complainants in their Position Papers
accompanied with supporting evidence, we have no recourse but to accord them
credence for being uncontradicted. Premises considered, judgement is hereby
rendered finding all the respondents liable for illegal dismissal.

Accordingly, all of them are hereby ordered to pay complainants their full
backwages and other monetary claims computed from date of their dismissal up to
the promulgation of this decision plus 10% of the total monetary award as
attorney’s fees.

Issue: Whether or not the courts decision is correct in finding that petitioner
is solidarily liable with EWAYAN/OCEANIC TRAVEL AND TOUR AGENCY.
 Held: Yes. "Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, except in case where the lights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." 23 The
contract of employment between respondents, on the one hand, and Oceanic and
Ewayan on the other, is effective only between them; it does not extend to
petitioner, who is not a party thereto. His only role is as lessor of the premises
which Oceanic leased to operate as a hotel; he cannot be deemed as respondent's
employer - not even under the pretext that he took over as the "new management"
of the hotel operated by Oceanic. There simply is no truth to such claim.

Thus, to allow respondents to recover their monetary claims from petitioner would
necessarily result in their unjust enrichment.

There is unjust enrichment ‘when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.’ The principle of
unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a
valid ba5is or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of
another.

The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one
from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or
consideration.

Taking this to mind, the labor tribunals and the CA should have considered
petitioner’s repeated pleas to scrutinize the facts and particularly the lease
agreement executed by him and Oceanic, which would naturally exculpate him from
liability as this would prove the absence of an employment relation between him
and respondents. Instead, the case was determined on pure technicality which in
labor disputes, is not necessarily sanctioned –given that proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are non-litigious in nature where they are encouraged
to avail of all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the case without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure.27 Petitioner's motion to dismiss, though belated,
should have been given due attention.

In arriving at the foregoing conclusions, the Court is guided by the allegations and
arguments of the parties on the existence of an employment relation between
them, which may be found in their pleadings - even at this stage. In particular,
respondents squarely addressed the issue in their Comment to the herein Petition.
On the other hand, petitioner has consistently raised the issue and argued against it
all throughout. Since the issue was raised in the Petition and adequately met by the
respondents in their Comment thereto, the Court is not precluded from ruling
thereon. There is thus no need to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. Finally, this resolves respondents' claim that the issue here involves
only the propriety of the NLRC's dismissal of petitioner’s petition for annulment of
judgment; having argued against petitioner's claim of absence of an employment
relation between them - and having presented documentary evidence below to
prove their case against petitioner - the issue relative to existence or non-existence
of an employment relation is ripe for adjudication before this Court.

With the view taken of the case, it necessarily follows that the decision of the Labor
Arbiter must be set aside for being grossly erroneous and unjust.1âwphi1 At worst,
it is null and void, and, as petitioner correctly put it, it is a "lawless thing, which can
be treated act an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its
head." Being of such nature, it could not have acquired finality, contrary to what
respondents believe - as it "creates no rights and imposes no duties. Any act
performed pursuant to it and any claim emanating from it have no legal effect." 29
A.C. No. 9257
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3490]

EDGAR M. RICO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO G. SALUTAN, Respondent

Facts: Complainant Edgar M. Rico explained that his · relatives were

plaintiffs in a civil case for Forcible Entry before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Davao City. The court had ordered the defendants to
restore plaintiffs' possession of the subject properties, remove all structures that
had been introduced on the same, and to pay reasonable sum for their occupation
of the properties.

Milagros Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the aforementioned case, filed
a separate case for Unlawful Detainer against Rico covering the same property. On
November 6, 2001, the MTCC ordered Rico to vacate the premises. Subsequently,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of
Execution.

The court's sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the writ could not
be served on Rico since the property subject of the case was different from the lot
which Rico was occupying. Thereafter, Villa Abrille, through her counsel, respondent
Atty. Salutan, filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution.
However, a return of service was once again executed by the sheriff and the same
motion was then again filed, this happened four times. For the fourth (4th) time,
Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. This time,
the MTCC granted it. Consequently, the court sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate
to Rico on June 10, 2010. On June 15, 2010, the same sheriff led the demolition of
the house and other improvements on the property. Thus, Rico filed the
administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Salutan should be held administratively

liable.

Held: No. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendation of the IBP that the instant administrative complaint against Atty.
Salutan must be dismissed.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.

Here, despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any
badge of deception on the lawyer's part. There was no court decision declaring that
Villa Abrille’s title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico's property. All that
Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not
shown to have misled or unduly influenced the court through misinformation. He
merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of the law
and the existing rules. He succeeded at finally having the writ of execution, albeit at
the fourth time, implemented.

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his
duties in accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in
Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding

of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
cannot be given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial
evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the
primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. 
A.C. No. 11871

POTENCIANO R. MALVAR, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. FREDDIE B. FEIR, Respondent

Facts: On February 13, 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a

complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie B. Feir alleging that on
December 17, 2014 and January 22, 2015, he received threatening letters from Feir
stating that should he fail to pay the sum of Pl8,000,000.00 to his client, Rogelio M.
Amurao, a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Estafa, a
civil complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and an administrative
complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be filed against him.
According to Mal var, Feir's demands were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due
to the fact that Feir tried to obtain something of value by means of threats of filing
complaints, and thus violation of the lawyer’s oath.

After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against Feir for lack of merit on February 23, 2016. On November
5, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving
the recommended dismissal of the complaint

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Feir violates the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

Held: No. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of

his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer

shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law." Moreover, Rule
19.01 thereof states that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the
adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to
yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.

In the absence, therefore, of any evidence preponderant to prove that Feir

committed acts constituting grounds for disbarment, such as the violation of Canon
19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath,
Malvar’s claims must necessarily fail.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 213669, March 05, 2018

JEROME K. SOLCO, Petitioner, v. MEGAWORLD CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts: Megaworld Corporation (Megaworld) was the registered owner of

parking slots covered by Condominium Certificates of Title (CCT) Nos. 593823 (Two
Lafayette property) and 64023 (Manhattan property) located in Two Lafayette
Square Condominium and Manhattan Square Condominium, respectively, in Makati
City.

For failure to pay real property taxes thereon from the year 2000 to 2008,
the City Government of Makati issued a Warrant of Levy over the subject
properties. On December 20, 2005, the properties were sold at a public auction,
wherein Jerome Solco (Solco) emerged as the highest bidder in the amount of
P33,080.03 for the Two Lafayette property and P32,356.83 for the Manhattan
property.

As the CCTs are still under Megaworld's name and the owner's duplicate
copies of the same are still in Megaworld's possession, Solco filed a Petition for
Issuance of Four New Condominium Certificates of Title and to Declare Null and
Void Condominium Certificates.

Megaworld filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Petition with Compulsory

Counterclaims. It entered into a Contract to Buy and Sell with Abdullah D.
Dimaporo (Dimaporo) covering a unit in the condominium and the Two Lafayette
property, which was delivered to Dimaporo on March 18, 1999; while on February
24, 1996 another Contract to Buy and Sell was entered into by it with Jose V. Delos
Santos (Delos Santos), covering another unit in the condominium and the
Manhattan property, which was delivered to Delos Santos on May 5, 1999. By
virtue of such transfers, the buyers assumed all the respective obligations,
assessments, and taxes on the property from the time of delivery pursuant to their
agreements. Hence, starting year 2000, Megaworld admittedly did not pay the real
property taxes thereon.

The RTC’s decision is in favor of Jerome Solco and against Megaworld

Corporation. Upon appeal, the CA found merit on Megaworld’s arguments as to the
irregularities which attended the entire delinquency proceedings.

Issue: May the validlity of a tax sale be the subject of a land

registration case?

Held: Yes. It must be remembered that LRC Case No. M-5031 is a petition
for declaration of nullity of a condomiminium certificate of title and the issuance of
a new one in lieu thereof. Solco basically seeks for consolidation of ownership and
issuance of a new title under his name over the subject property. Needless to say,
in such a case, the resolution of the propriety of the claimant's right necessitates
the determination of the issue of ownership over the subject property. Simply put,
the court cannot just order the cancellation of a title registered under a certain
person and the issuance of a new one in lieu thereof under the claimant's name
without first ascertaining whether the claimant is the true and rightful owner of the
subject property.

Thus, this Court has declared that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, with
the intention to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote expeditious termination of
cases, had eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the latter's limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court. The courts a quo had jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary
for the determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity of the tax
sale.
G.R. No. 198209

ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, Petitioner
vs
SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., (SODACO), ROLANDO
SANCHEZ, LEONARDO DALWAMPO and CARIDAD C. ALMENDRAS,
Respondents

Facts: On September 13, 2004, petitioner filed an Amended

Complaint4 seeking to annul the Deed of Sale (DOS) executed by and among
respondents Caridad C. Almendras (Caridad), Rolando C. Sanchez (Rolando) and
Leonardo Dalwampo over a parcel of unregistered la.rid located at Inawayan, Sta.
Cruz, Davao del Sur containing approximately 6.3087 hectares. Petitioner alleged
that he owned and had occupied said parcel of land since September 21, 1978 until
he was forcibly dispossessed by respondent South Davao Development Company,
Inc. (SODACO) on April 23, 1994. Petitioner claimed that Caridad sold the property
to Rolando, a purported dummy of SODACO. During the proceedings on March 16,
2010, Rolando filed a Request for Admission addressed to petitioner.

Petitioner, however, failed to file a sworn statement specifically denying the

matters therein or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot either deny or
admit said matters. Thus, Rolando filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. He
alleged that there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the issue of
ownership raised by petitioner being sham or fictitious, except as to the issue of
damages, he is entitled to a summary judgment. Rolando prayed that the complaint
be dismissed, that the validity of the DOS as well as his ownership and possession
of the subject property be upheld, and that a hearing be conducted solely for the
purpose of determining the propriety of his counterclaim for damages.

The RTC then concluded that by petitioner's failure to respond to the Request
for Admission, he was deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the matters
specified therein. In particular, petitioner is deemed to have admitted the fact that
the property in question had been validly sold to Rolando thereby rendering the
complaint without any cause of action.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT AFTER THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE
TRIAL COURT COULD DISMISS THE PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT MOTU PROPRIO FOR
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO FILE HIS OBJECTIONS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION
WHICH WAS ONLY FURNISHED TO HIS COUNSEL.

Held: The Issues raised by the petitioner in this case would require the Court
to examine the veracity of petitioner’s claim that the request for Admission was
unserved, given the supposed ambiguity of the Order. Such would go beyond the
Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari. In any case, we have
already explained that the RTC already ruled that the petitioner was already served
a copy of the Request for Admission.

Finally, as if the abovementioned procedural flaws were not enough,

petitioner went straight to this Court when he had the more appropriate remedy of
appealing before the CA.  Hence, it would be proper to conclude that petitioner had
forgone his right to open the entire case for review on any matter concerning a
question of fact.

As the instant Petition was filed without resorting to a more appropriate

remedy before the CA, the same should be dismissed following our ruling above .
G.R. No. 200396

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y

GIANAN, Petitioners
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondents

Facts: Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA  9287 for
collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known
as "lotteng'  and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and
cash. Another Information5 was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with
violation of the same law.

Petitioners filed t1eir respective Motions for Reinvestigation, which were both
granted by the RTC. Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued
separate Resolutions both dated September 13, 2005, amending the Informations
in both cases. In the Amended Information, the phrase "acting as a collector" was
included to charge Villamor as a collector in an illegal numbers game.

According to the Prosecution, Peñaflor received a call from an infonnant

regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at Barangay Francia, Virac,
Catanduanes, specifically at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD
Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO 1 Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to
Bonaobra's residence to confirm the report.

Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the
compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to
see the goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the
act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating
and examining numbers placed in "papelitos,"  which are slips of paper containing
bet numbers, and counting money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police
officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting
to ₱l,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos,"  a calculator, a cellular
phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho
where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed
against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 25, 2006, the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its
Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal
numbers game locally known as ''lotteng,"  a variant of the game Last
Two, respectively as a collector or agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator,
controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. The RTC gave credence to
the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in
flagrante delicto  committing an illegal numbers game locally known  as "lotteng," a
variant of Last Two.

Issue: Whether the petitioner’s conviction for violation of RA 9287 as

should be upheld.
 Held: No. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when
they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search
warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid
search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence
obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same
having been obtained in violation of the said right.

Section 2, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant

based on the existence of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be
effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a search or seizure
becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any evidence
obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. "Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree."

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two

elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer."
 G.R. No. 227398, March 22, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANASTACIO HEMENTIZA

Y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

Facts: On May 27, 2003, accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate
Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. 03-25726, accused-appellant
was charged with possession of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. In Criminal Case No. 03-25727, accused-appellant was charged with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of shabu.

On July 22, 2003, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded not

guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Forensic Chemist
P/Insp. Sharon Lontoc Fabros (Fabros), PO2 Rache E. Palconit (Palconit) and
Barangay Captain, Dr. Rina Gabuna Junio (Dr. Junio), as its witnesses.

RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of

violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC held that the
failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated did not automatically
render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the items seized from him as
inadmissible for it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved by the apprehending officers. It opined that the witnesses
presented by the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody of the
seized illegal drugs.

Issue: Whether the guilt of the accused for the crimes charged has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No. The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Similarly, it
is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of

dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.

The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of

the dangerous drug itself.

In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial

compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by R.A. No.
9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the records are bereft
of any showing that an inventory of the seized items was made. Neither does it
appear on record that the apprehending team photographed the contraband in
accordance with law.
G.R. No. 214864

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA), represented by Oscar M. Sevilla,

General Manager, Benjamin B. Cecilio, Assistant Manager for Operations,
and Sisali B. Arap, Port Manager, Petitioner
vs
NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC.
(NIASSI), represented by Ramon Calo, Respondent

Facts: Sometime in November 2000, PP A, through its Pre-qualification, Bids

and Awards Committee (PBAC) accepted bids for a 10-year contract to operate as
the sole cargo handler at the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte (Nasipit
Port). Subsequently, PBAC issued Resolution No. 005-2000 recommending that the
10-year cargo-handling contract be awarded to NIASSI as the winning bidder.

On November 20, 2000, the second highest bidder, Concord Arrastre and
Stevedoring Corporation (CASCOR) filed a protest with PPA's General Manager,
Oscar M. Sevilla (Sevilla), alleging that two of NIASSI's stockholders on record are
legislators who are constitutionally prohibited from having any direct or indirect
financial interest in any contract with the government or any of its agencies during
the term of their office.

Notwithstanding the protest, PPA issued a Notice of Award in favor of NIASSI

on December 21, 2000. The Notice of Award directed NIASSI to signify its
concurrence thereto by signing the conforme portion and returning the same to PP
A within 10 days from receipt. PP A received notice of NIASSI's conformity to the
Notice of Award on January 3, 2001.

However, instead of formally executing a written contract, NIASSI requested

PP A to issue a Hold-Over Authority (HOA) in its favor, in view of CASCOR's pending
protest. PPA granted NIASSI's request and issued a HOA dated August 1, 2001,
effective until October 31, 2001, "or until [such time] a cargo[-]handling contract
shall have been awarded, whichever comes first."

Barely two months after the last extension of the HOA, PPA issued a letter
revoking the extension. Hence, NIASSI filed with the RTC a Petition for Injunction
with Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order. The petition was later amended to a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
on December 22, 2004. RTC grants the petition of NIASSI.

Issue: Whether the CA erred when it issued the Amended Decision affirming
the September 2011 RTC Resolution and December 2011 RTC Order, and directing
PPA to execute a cargo-handling contract in favor of NIASSI for a full 10-year term
without deducting the period covered by the HOA.

Held: In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214, the CA held that (i) the 10-
year cargo-handling contract had already been perfected, and (ii) the HOA and its
subsequent extensions constituted partial fulfillment thereof. For emphasis, the
relevant portions are reproduced:
 Verily, the Holdover Authority (HOA) granted by the private respondent and
the series of extensions allowing the petitioner to operate provisionally the arrastre
service confirm the perfection of their contract despite the delay in its
consummation due to acts attributable to the private respondents. But it cannot be
gainsaid that the series of extensions constitute partial fulfillment and execution of
the contract of cargo handling services.

In tum, the Court's decision became final and executory after the lapse of 15 days
from notice thereof to the parties. From such time, the Court's decision became
immutable and unalterable.60

The Court notes that CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 and the instant Petition both stem from
the Amended Petition, and seek the same relief - the execution of a written contract
in accordance with the Notice of Award. Moreover, both cases involve the same
facts, parties and arguments. For these reasons, the Court believes that the
doctrine of the law of the case is applicable.

The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure from a rule previously made
by an appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same
case.61 Pursuant to this doctrine, the Court, in De La Salle University v. De La Salle
University Employees Association.

In this case, however, no further proceedings were conducted after the Decision of
the Supreme Court relative to the injunction proceedings had become final. To be
sure, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the
issue of whether or not the main case had become moot and academic because of
the finality of said Decision and, on the basis of the memoranda, the R TC resolved
to dismiss the Amended Petition, as it had nothing left to determine. 68 As such, no
evidence to controvert the findings of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00214 were
presented in the main case. This being the case, the factual findings of the CA in
respect of the perfected cargo-handling contract in the injunction proceedings
became conclusive upon finality of this Court's decision affirming the same. These
circumstances thus render the application of the law of the case doctrine proper .
 G.R. No. 186088, March 22, 2017

WILTON DY AND/OR PHILITES ELECTRONIC & LIGHTING

PRODUCTS, Petitioner, v. KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS,
N.V., Respondent.

Facts: On 12 April 2000, petitioner PHILITES filed a trademark application

(Application Serial Number 4-2000-002937) covering its fluorescent bulb,
incandescent light, starter and ballast. After publication, respondent Koninklijke
Philips Electronics, N.V. ("PHILIPS") filed a Verified Notice of Opposition on 17
March 2006.

On 8 August 2006, petitioner filed a Verified Answer, stating that its

PHILITES & LETTER P DEVICE trademark and respondent's PHILIPS have vast
dissimilarities in terms of spelling, sound and meaning.

IPP-BLA Director Estrellita Beltran-Abelardo rendered a Decision 8 denying the

Opposition filed by respondent PHILIPS. In upholding petitioner's trademark
application, the IPP-BLA stated that assuming respondent's mark was well-known in
the Philippines, there should have been prior determination of whether or not the
mark under application for registration was "identical with, or confusingly similar to,
or constitutes a translation of such well-known mark in order that the owner of the
well-known mark can prevent its registration." 9 From the evidence presented, the
IPP-BLA concluded that the PHILIPS and PHILITES marks were so unlike, both
visually and aurally. It held that no confusion was likely to occur, despite their
contemporaneous use.

Issue: Whether or not respondent's mark is a registered and well-known

mark in the Philippines.

Held: The Petition is bereft of merit. A trademark is "any distinctive word,

name, symbol, emblem, sign, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted and
used by a manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify and distinguish them
from those manufactured, sold, or dealt by others." It is "intellectual property
deserving protection by law," and "susceptible to registration if it is crafted
fancifully or arbitrarily and is capable of identifying and distinguishing the goods of
one manufacturer or seller from those of another."

Section 122 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC) provides
that rights to a mark shall be acquired through registration validly done in
accordance with the provisions of this law. Corollary to that rule, Section 123
provides which marks cannot be registered.

Section 123. Registrability. - 123.1. A mark cannot be

registered if it:

(d) Is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different

proprietor or a mark with an earlier filing or priority date, in
respect of:
    (i) The same goods or services, or
    (ii) Closely related goods or services, or
    (iii) If it nearly resembles such a mark as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion;

(e) Is identical with, or confusingly similar to, or constitutes a

translation of a mark which is considered by the competent
authority of the Philippines to be well-known internationally and
in the Philippines, whether or not it is registered here, as being
already the mark of a person other than the applicant for
registration, and used for identical or similar goods or services:
Provided, That in determining whether a mark is well-known,
account shall be taken of the knowledge of the relevant sector
of the public, rather than of the public at large, including
knowledge in the Philippines which has been obtained as a result
of the promotion of the mark.
List of Cases

1. XXX vs. People

2. People vs Vernie Antonio

3. Mike Fermin vs. Atty. Bedol

4. Spouses Salvador vs. Sheriff Yap-Rosas

5. Spouses Su vs. Bontilaco

6. Romel Ramos vs. People

7. Rolando Roca vs. Eduardo Dabuy

8. Edgar Rico vs. Atty. Salutan

9. Potencia Malvar vs. Feir

10. Jerome Solco vs. Megaworld

11. Alexis Almendras vs. South Davao Development Corporation

12. Martin Villamor vs. People

13. People vs. Anastacio Hementiza

14. PPA vs NIASSI

15. Wilton Dy vs. Koninklijke Philips Electronics

 BAR OPS METHOD 1
SUBMISSION NUMBER 3

Submitted by: Mariel Grace C. Delin

LLB IV, SY 2020-2021

Submitted to: Atty. Allan Carlos

Professorial Lecturer