COLLEGE OF LAW

Philippine-Japan Friendship Highway, Sasa, Davao City

Name : Salman M. Johayr

Year and Program : 2nd Year; 4-year program

Instructor : Atty. Kristine Mae Quibod

Subject : Law on Property

Date submitted : November 5, 2020

TITLE III. DONATION

Nature of Donations (Artciles 725-734)

1.Abella v. CIR

[GR No. 120721; February 23, 2005]

FACTS:

In 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the
campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then running for the Senate. On April 21, 1988,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the petitioners P263,032.66 for their
contributions. Petitioners questioned the assessment through a letter to the BIR. They
claimed that political or electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they are not liable for donor's tax. The
claim for exemption was denied by the Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not campaign fund from private respondents to Sen. Angara is

considered a donation

RULING:

Yes. Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of
liberality or animus donandi.

The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners, the
late Manuel G. Abello8, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz, each
gave P882,661.31 to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material
consideration. All three elements of a donation are present. The patrimony of the four
petitioners were reduced by P882,661.31 each. Senator Edgardo Angara's patrimony
correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.249 . There was intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi was present since each of the petitioners gave their contributions without
any consideration.
 2. Lentfer v. Jurgen Wolff

[GR No. 152317; November 10, 2004]

FACTS:

The petitioners are Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina wife, Victoria
Moreño-Lentfer; and John Craigie Young Cross, an Australian citizen, all residing Oriental
Mindoro. Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German citizen, residing in Makati City. They
alleged that with respondent, on engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C.
Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the land
where the house stood. The sale of the beach house and the assignment of the lease right
would be in the name of petitioner Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, but the total consideration of
220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory
note was executed by said respondent in favor of petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held
in trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,0004 at Solid Bank
Corporation. The Lentfer couple urged him to buy petitioner Cross' beach house and lease
rights in Puerto Galera and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount of
DM 221,7005 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.
However, Cross, Moreño-Lentfer and Atty. Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of
sale whereby the beach house was made to appear as sold to Moreño-Lentfer for only
P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made in favor of Moreño-Lentfer.
Upon learning of this, respondent filed a Complaint with the lower court for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not payment by respondent is considered a donation

RULING:

No. Petitioner Moreño-Lentfer's claim of either cash or property donation rings

hollow. A donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right
in favor of another, who accepts it. But when a large amount of money is involved,
equivalent to P3,297,800, based on the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are constrained
to take the petitioners' claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt.

Petitioners could not brush aside the fact that a donation must comply with the
mandatory formal requirements set forth by law for its validity. Since the subject of donation
is the purchase money, Art. 748 of the New Civil Code is applicable. Accordingly, the
donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its acceptance should have been in
writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal
requisites prescribed by law.
 3. Ocampo v. Ocampo
[GR No. 150707; April 14, 2004]
FACTS:

Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the 2
respondents to this case. In the celebration of their marriage, they acquired several
properties, all of which are owned in common by their children. However, the
residential/commercial lot in Nabua, Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned by respondent
Fidela Ocampo who acknowledged that the same is co-owned by her and her siblings.

Petitioners also filed a supplemental complaint where they allege that Fidela Ocampo
cancelled the first TCT of the lot in Nabua and issued a new one in the form of Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both
the donor of the donee are notoriously aware that the lot is still under dispute in the
petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation. They also allege
that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen, daughter of another defendant Felicidad,
is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share
therein, knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs
and defendants herein. Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the
absolute owner of the property since 1949, and that its title is free from all encumbrances
and adverse claims. In 1984, Fidela conveyed the property to Belen via a Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos and since September 13, 1987, Belen has been the absolute owner of the same
property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs
of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid

RULING:

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to

the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings.
What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement --
assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property had already
been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly
inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s
ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written
acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this
case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest since the
alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was
no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had
already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she
had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against."As correctly
found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact
against the interest of the declarant, since her right over the property had already been
extinguished by the prior act of donation.
 4. Tan Queto v. CA

[GR No. L-36548; February 27, 1987]

FACTS:

Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot either as a

purported donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged
consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already
married to her husband Juan Pombuena. In 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title
over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta.

In 1938, a decision was promulgated pronouncing Juan as the owner of the land. On
22 September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between Pershing Tan
Queto and Restituta for a period of 10 years. Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta
sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease contract having expired) before the
Municipal Court of Ozamis City. As a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was
issued in Juans name. In 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement
whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became
the owners of a parcel of land with the house constructed thereon previously owned (that is,
before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a
concrete building, without any objection on the part of Restituta. The Municipal court ruled in
favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in the CFI, the entire case
was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto.
Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but
disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lot in question is paraphernal

RULING:

The land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid
donation interviews because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code),
nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The
allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the
estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of
future inheritance is generally prohibited.

The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition
(delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00
(then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is
therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used
being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of
her own). The contention that the sale was fictitious or simulated (and therefore void) is
bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid consideration therefor. Secondly, assuming that there
had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a
stranger to said stratagem (like petitioner herein).
 5. Lagazo v. CA

[GR No. 112796; March 5, 1998]

FACTS:

Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee Tito

Lagazo, was awarded a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate, a
public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its
land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.

Before she left for Canada where she executed a special power of attorney in favor
of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him to execute all documents necessary
for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot. However, the latter failed to
accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina Reyes revoked
said authority in an instrument executed in Canada. Catalina Reyes executed in Canada a
Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-appellee Lagazo. Lagazo then
checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the delinquent
list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and
declared the said property in the name of Catalina. Lagazo thereafter sent a demand letter to
defendant Alfredo Cabanlit asking him to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate
the premises claiming ownership thereo by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him
by Espanol. Hence, Lagazo instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against defendant-appellant Cabanlit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation in favor of petitioner was valid

RULING:

No. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple
donation are not applicable. Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the purchase
price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed
by the donor as a condition for the donation. We rule that the donation was simple, not
onerous.

It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as
the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with
Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
This much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that
a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother. The payments even seem to
have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of
petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her
obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the
donation. Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence
makes the donation null and void.
 6. Liguez v. CA

[GR No. 120 phil 577]

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant against the widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to
recover a parcel of 51.84 hectares of land, situated in barrio Bogac-Linot, of the municipality
of Mati, Province of Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of
donation of said land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May
1943. The defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an illicit
causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering into marital relations with Salvador
P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been adjudicated to the appellees as
heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since 1949.

At the time, the appellant Liguez was a minor, only 16 years of age.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation was inoperative, and null and void (1) because
the husband, Lopez, had no right to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant; and
(2) because the donation was tainted with illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and
donee were participants

RULING:

No. The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation
regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the same is
illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez, himself, if
living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his heirs, as his privies and successors
in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez himself.

Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the
defense of immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of
the same must be decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the
prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character and the
right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law. The appellant
Conchita Liguez declared entitled to so much of the donated property as may be found, upon
proper liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal
partnership with Salvador P. Lopez or the legitimes of the forced heirs of the latter.
 7. City of Angeles v. CA

[GR No. 97882; August 28, 1996]

FACTS:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of 6 parcels of unregistered
lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, in favor of private respondent
Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 while the second deed
pertained to parcel 3. The third deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained the
reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the
donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.

The Danlags sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners spouses Gestopa. Later, the
Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the 6 parcels of land subject of the deed
of donation inter vivos. Spouses Gestopa and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation
was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue
influence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:

The donation was inter vivos. Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter
vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In ascertaining the intention
of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together.

The deed of donation dated 1973 showed that Diego donated the properties out of
love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the
reservation of lifetime usufruct indicated that the donor intended to transfer the naked
ownership over the properties. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation. An acceptance
clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations
inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be
accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The right to dispose of the properties
then, belonged to the donee, Mercedes. The donor's right to give consent was merely
intended to protect his usufructuary interests.

The attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also

demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject
properties upon its execution. Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag
spouses already executed 3 donations mortis causa. If they did not intend to donate inter
vivos, they would not again donate the 4 lots already donated mortis causa.
 8. Del Rosario v. Ferrer

[GR No. 187056; September 20, 2010]

FACTS:

The spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled

"Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses
property. Both the donor husband and wife died.

In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of
donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-
90589. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion,

Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a
donation inter vivos.

RULING:

That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this
Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Notably, the three
donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. This
Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations.Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the

conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Given that the
donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void
for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer
had. Nemo dat quod non habet.
 9. Villanueva v. Branoco

[GR No. 172804; January 4, 2011]

FACTS:

Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, sued

respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial
Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in
Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership
over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn,
bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the
Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.

In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the
Property in May 1965.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract between the parties ’predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo

and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise.

RULING:

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a

perfected donation inter vivos.

This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a
gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have
easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or
encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that
effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her.

In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case,

petitioner tries to profit from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.
Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the Deed’s juridical
nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By treating
the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary
disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance, petitioner assumes that the
Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor the import of the contested clause supports
petitioner’s theory.
 10. Pajarillo v. IAC
[GR No. 72908; August 11, 1989]
FACTS:

The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother named Felipe Balane
and a sister named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Perfecta died in 1945 leaving inter alia a
registered tract of land consisting of about 28 hectares in the barrio of Luctol, Municipality of
Macalelon in Quezon Province. In 1946, Juana and Felipe, as the only brother and sister
respectively and forced heirs of Perfecta, executed a public instrument entitled "Extra-judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero."

In the agreement, Juana and Felipe, in consideration of love and affection agreed in
carrying out the antemortem wish of Pefecta by donating to private respondent SALUD
SUTEXIO DE MATIAS (only niece) the 28-hectare land Perfecta owned. It also conditioned
that SALUD must assume the P1,000 obligation or debt of Perfecta’s estate with the
Philippine National Bank. It was also stated therein that SALUD accepted the said donation
and expressed her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of Juana and Felipe. Later, Salud
executed a public instrument accepting the donation made by Felipe and Juana. Therein,
she expressed her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of Juana and Felipe. One of the
witnesses, who signed in this document was petitioner Eufemia Pajarillo. These instruments
were never registered nor was title transferred in SALUD's name although she said she
immediately took possession of the land. Meantime, intestate proceedings were instituted on
the estate of Perfecta and the said land was among those included in the inventory of the
properties belonging to the decedent. SALUD interposed no objection to its inclusion nor did
she oppose its subsequent adjudication to her mother Juana in the project of partition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement was really a donation since the donor of
the property who was Perfecta, as she was already deceased, could no longer bestow the
intended gift and that Felipe and Juana could not have made the donation either because
they were not moved by the same sentiments Perfecta had for her niece Salud

RULING:

Yes, it was a donation. The argument appeared to be too much nit picking, if not
sophistry. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners
of the property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they
pleased and for whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they chose to respect Perfecta's
wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to SALUD, there was no legal
impediment to their doing so. In fact, that was not only the legal but also the moral thing to
do.

There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their
sister's sentiments and decided not to donate the property to SALUD, keeping the same for
themselves. The fact that they did not do this speaks well indeed of their integrity and their
loyalty as well to their deceased sister. The extrajudicial settlement also reflected their own
affection for SALUD which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of liberality.
Notably, in her acceptance of the donation, SALUD referred to the donors Felipe and Juana,
and not Perfecta.
 11. Maglasang v. Cabatingan

[GR No. 131953; June 5, 2002]

FACTS:

Respondent Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in
favor of his brother. Also, she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners.
The deeds provided that it shall take effect upon the donor’s death. Conchita died.
Respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground that it is void for failure to
comply with the formalities of a will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed is a donation mortis causa.

RULING:

Yes, it is. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that
the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to
petitioners prior to Conchita’s death.

Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on

solemnities of wills and testaments. Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary
public, they were not executed in the manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil
Code, thus it is void.
 12. Ganuelas v. Cawed
[GR No. 123968; April 24, 2003]
FACTS:

On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a Revocation of Donationpurporting to set

aside the Deed of Donation.More than a month later, Celestina died without issue and any
surviving ascendants and siblings.After Celestinas death, Ursulina had been sharing the
produce of the donated properties with the private respondents Leocadia Flores, et al.
(Flores et.al.), nieces of Celestina.In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the
deed of donation, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over
the donated properties and since then, she refused to give Flores et.al. any share in the
produce of the properties despite repeated demands.Flores et.al. were thus prompted to file
on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San Fernando, La Union a complaint against Ursulina
et.al.

The deed of donation executed by Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of
acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte;The
donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the
Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. Thus prayed that
Ursulina be ordered to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of the
properties and for the cancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of Ursulina,
the partition of the properties among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by
Ursulina of an accounting of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and for her to return or
pay the value of their shares. Ursulina et.al.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject properties are donations inter vivos from Celestina to
Ursulina

RULING:

No. The properties are to be considered donations mortis causa. The donation shall
be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect is an explicit indication that the deed
is a donation mortis causa.

The absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that Celestina retained
complete dominion over her properties (donation mortis causa). The lack of witnesses
acknowledgement of the will before the notary public rendered the entire document Void.The
attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating
Article 806 of the civil code which provides: Article 806.Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testatorand the witnesses.The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the clerk of court. RTC,
SC AFFIRMED: The subsequent execution by Celestina of the revocation of donation
showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its
finding that the conveyance was mortis causa.
 13. Spouses Gestopa v. CA

[GR No. 111904; October 5, 2000]

FACTS:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of 6 parcels of unregistered
lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, in favor of private respondent
MERCEDES DANLAG-PILAPIL. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2 while the second
deed pertained to parcel 3. The third deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained the
reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the
donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary.

In 1973, the Danlags, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the
aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, respectively, again in favor of
MERCEDES. This contained two conditions, that (1) the Danlags shall continue to enjoy the
fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the MERCEDES cannot sell or dispose of
the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval.
MERCEDES caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the
taxes on them. On appeal by MERCEDES to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. It held that the deed of donation dated 1973 be not
revoked and that the deed of revocation be null and void. It declared MERCEDES as the
absolute and exclusive owner of the 6 parcels of land specified in the deed of donation inter
vivos. It then declared the sale by Diego to the GESTOPAs as null and void. It further
ordered reconveyance of the parcels of land to MERCEDES.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:

Yes. The donation was intervivos. Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter
vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. In ascertaining the intention
of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. The deed of donation dated
1973 showed that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This
is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicated that
the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor
reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society,
indicating that the donor intended to part with the 6 parcels of land. Lastly, the donee
accepted the donation. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the
form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The
attending circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real
intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution.
Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed 3
donations mortis causa. If they did not intend to donate inter vivos, they would not again
donate the 4 lots already donated mortis causa.
 14. De Luna v. Abrigo

[GR No. 57455; January 18, 1990]

FACTS:

On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square meters
of Lot No. 3707 of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now
Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the foundation). The donation,
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and conditions and
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation
or non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. On
April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna “revived” the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a
document entitled “Revival of Donation Intervivos”. As in the original deed of donation, the
“Revival of Donation Intervivos” also provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the
donated area in case of violation of the conditions thereof, couched in the following terms:

“That violation of any of the conditions herein provided shall cause the automatic reversion of the
donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns and representatives, without the need of executing any
other document for that purpose and without obligation whatever on the part of the DONOR.”

The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same document,
subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation. The donation was registered
and annotated on April 15, 1971. On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the foundation
executed a “Deed of Segregation” whereby the area donated which is now known as Lot No.
3707-B of Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 was adjudicated to the foundation. As a result,
transfer certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued in the name of the foundation. The
remaining portion known as Lot. No. 3707-A was retained by the donor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the noncompliance on the terms and conditions of the donation will
leads to the reversion of the donation to the heirs

RULING:

Yes. It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation
of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply to
onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts. In the light of the above, the rules on
contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable
in the case at bar.

Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right “to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.”
Paragraph 11 of the “Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that” violation of any of the
conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his
heirs, without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without
obligation on the part of the DONOR.” Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who
voluntarily consented thereto.
 15. CJ Yulo v. Roman Catholic

[GR No. 133705; March 31, 2005]

FACTS:

On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at

Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 m2. Thereafter, or sometime in 1980,
the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter fence on the donated
property. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the donee
without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease
to Gomez ended in 1985.The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was
again leased by the donee, this time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a
ranch. After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time,
leased a portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for
fattening cattles. Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior written consent of the
donor.

Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its
president Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was
revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee’s non-
compliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donated parcel land will be reverted to the donor due to non-
compliance and breach of the conditions

RULING:

No. An onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but by
the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides: “Donations
with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed”. In order for a contract which imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous
donation in this case wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter
property in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to
establish a home for the aged and the infirm , may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New
Civil Code, the breach of the conditions thereof must be substantial as to defeat the purpose
for which the contract was perfected.

Casual breaches of the terms and conditions of the donation, may, in that event,
even be considered as no breach at all when the Court strikes down such absolute condition
of prior written consent by the donor in all instances without any exception whatsoever. The
Court, however, understands that such a condition was written with a specific purpose in
mind, which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was intended is
achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than totally striking it would,
therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the donation. Thus, for as long as the contracts
of lease do not detract from the purpose for which the donation was made, the complained
acts of the donee will not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and conditions of
the deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor. Any act by the donor to
prevent the donee from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was
intended would constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate.
 16. Baretto v. City of Manila

[7 phil 416]

FACTS:

On June 16, 1885, in reply to an inquiry from the corregidor of the city of Manila as to
whether he would sell his plat of ground facing the Malacañang Palace, in order to assist in
the improvement of the locality, the plaintiff Mr. Baretto wrote the following letter:

I have the honor to state that I am willing to convey the land belonging to me in front
of the Malacañang Palace, corner of San Rafael and Aviles streets, district of San
Miguel, not as a sale but as a gift, thus contributing with great pleasure to the
beautifying of that neighborhood, but I make this donation on condition that no
structures shall be erected upon the land and that it will not be devoted to any
purpose other than the beautifying of the vicinity, and for this purpose the city should
acquire such of the adjoining land as may be necessary to form with mine a public
square with gardens and walks.

The plaintiff thereafter sent to the Ayuntamiento his title deeds, and until the month of
February, 1903, appears to have had the idea that a formal transfer of the plot had been
executed by him; in fact, it had not been. The city, however, entered into possession of the
land, building a railing separating it from the adjoining property, and ever since that time the
ground has been used as part of the public street, increasing the width thereof opposite the
exit from the Palace and substantially improving the appearance of the locality. Baretto now
brings an action to recover possession of the land on account of the failure of the city to
comply with the conditions of the donation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property donated will be retained to the donor

RULING:

No. Although a formal conveyance of the property appears to have never been
made, yet the taking possession of the land by the city upon the terms contained in the offer
and acceptance give effect to the latter. The conditions expressed in the offer of the plaintiff
were two: First. That no building should be erected upon the ground; and Second. That it
should be devoted to purposes of adornment; to which end, however, the Ayuntamiento was
required to acquire enough of the contiguous lots to form in all a great public plaza with
gardens and paths.

This last requirement is so specific and concrete that it must have formed an
essential part of the conditions in the mind of the donor and must have also attracted the
attention of the donee. It has never been complied with. It is contended by the city that its
resolution and letter of acceptance, omitting any express mention of this part of the
condition, worked an evasion of it, and that the subsequent delivery of the plaintiff s title
deeds must be taken as an acceptance of the terms specified by the city in its letter, without
reference to the plaintiff's first offer. The judgment of the Court of First Instance awarding the
plaintiff possession of the property is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of
First Instance for determination of the time within which the contiguous property must be
acquired by the city in order to comply with the condition of the donation.
 17. Shoppers Paradise v. Roque

[GR No. 148775; January 13, 2004]

FACTS:

On December 23, 1993 Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation

represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with
Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land, with an area of two thousand and
thirty six (2,036) square meters, situated at Plaza Novaliches, Quezon City. Petitioner issued
to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000 00 by way of “reservation payment.” Simultaneously,
petitioner and Dr Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property.
Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00 “down
payment” to Dr. Roque.

The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be
annotated on TCT No. 30591 within sixty (60) days from 23 December 1993 or until 23
February 1994. The annotations, however, were never made because of the untimely
demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque. The death of Dr. Roque on 10 February 1994 constrained
petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late
Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. Efren P. Roque
alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed
of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa
Roque, on 26 December 1978, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter
into the assailed agreements with petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not here was valid donation to respondent

RULING:

Yes. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is

undisputed. The trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-
registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of
acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee. In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity
that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code provides, however,
that “titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds)
shall not prejudice third persons.” It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an
immovable property, that the donation be made in a public document but, in order to bind
third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (Registry of Land
Titles and Deeds).
 18. Imuan v. Careno

[GR No. 167995; September 11, 2009]

FACTS:

Pablo contracted two marriages and all his children on both are already dead. The
petitioners in the case are his grandchildren while the respondent is the husband of his
daughter from his second marriage. Juana, Pablo’s second wife, together with her children
continued to be in possession of the parcel of land owned by Pablo after his death.
Petitioners now brought an action for reconveyance, damages, and annulment of deed of
sale by Juana to the respondents. They contend that it was through their tolerance that
Juana and her children constructed their house on the lot in dispute, that Pablo have not
partitioned among his heirs his property and the sale made by Juana to respondents are null
and void. Respondents invoke the ground that when Pablo married Juana the property was
his exclusive property and donated such through propter nuptias when they married

ISSUE:

Whether or not property donated to Juana by Pablo by way of donation propter

nuptias is valid

RULING:

Yes. The joint affidavit that the defendants-appellants presented, attesting to the
donation propter nuptias of the disputed property by Pablo to Juana, can be the basis of the
belief in good faith that Juana was the owner of the disputed property. Related to this, it is
undisputed that Pablo and Juana had lived in the disputed property from the time of their
marriage in 1919, and Juana continued to live and to possess this property in the concept of
an owner from the time of Pablo's death in 1936 up to the time she sold it to spouses Cereno
in 1970. These circumstances, in our view, are sufficient bases for the belief that Juana was
the owner of the property she conveyed by sale, and leave us convinced that the spouses
Cereno had the "good faith" that acquisition by prescription requires when they became the
purchasers in the contract of sale with Juana.

Notably, one of the affiants in the joint affidavit which was executed in 1970 was
Alfredo, Pablo's son by his first marriage, where he attested that the property was given by
his father Pablo to Juana by donation propter nuptias. Not one among Alfredo's children had
ever come out to assail the validity of the affidavit executed by their father.
 19. Republic v. Spouses Llamas

[GR No. 194190; Juanuary 25, 2017]

FACTS:

On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action
for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat Road.
This action was brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case.

Llamas spouses filed "Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed
Intervention as Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They also filed
their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. After which, on August 2, 1994, they filed a
"Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40%
of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and Improvements."

Spouses Llamas alleged that the Department of Public Works and Highways for
what was supposedly its deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous
Orders and even with its own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just compensation to
the Llamas Spouses. The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road
lots are not compensable since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of
man."

ISSUE:

Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and

Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road

RULING:

Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act must first be made by
the "owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the
subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as an automatic cession to government of
subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner:
"subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until
expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local government
should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as
a public road.

In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent to do an act of liberality) is an

indispensable element of a valid donation, along with the reduction of the donor's patrimony
and the corresponding increase in the donee’s patrimony. Section 31 's compulsion to
donate (and concomitant compulsion to accept) cannot be sustained as valid. Not only does
it run afoul of basic legal concepts; it also fails to withstand the more elementary test of logic
and common sense. This is the position of the 1998 White Plains Decision. Moreover, as this
1998 Decision has emphasized, to force this donation and to preclude any compensation-is
to suffer an illegal takin
 20. NPC v. Delta P

[GR No. 221709; October 16, 2019]

FACTS:

Respondent Delta P, Inc. (Delta P), an independent power producer, previously took
over the operations of a generating plant in Puerto Princesa City owned by Paragua Power
Corporation (PPC). At the time of the takeover of operations, PPC had a Power Purchase
Agreement (PPA) with petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), wherein the
latter agreed to purchase the electricity generated by the former for the purpose of meeting
NAPOCOR's obligation to supply the consumers of Palawan Electric Cooperative, Inc. in
Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Narra, Aborlan, and Quezon, Palawan.

As a result of Delta P's takeover, NAPOCOR was requested to direct payment for the
services to Delta P. However, NAPOCOR refused to do so, with the reasoning that PPC, not
Delta P, is the contracting party involved in the PPA. The standstill resulted in Delta P
subsequently advising NAPOCOR that it could no longer operate the power station for lack
of funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NAPOCOR's supply of fuel to Delta P is gratuitous, and in the form of
a donation.

RULING:

Yes. The Court adheres to the findings of fact consistent with both the RTC and the
CA that the debit made by NAPOCOR was unilaterally done, and that NAPOCOR's supply of
fuel to Delta P was an act of gratuity.

In the present case, absent any proper substantiation on the part of NAPOCOR that
there was arbitrariness or oversight on the part of the RTC or CA in appreciating the
evidence presented as to the status of the grant during the lower proceedings, the Court
adheres to the lower courts' findings of fact. Even if the Court would rely on its own perusal
of the records, it is clear that NAPOCOR's motivation for supplying the fuel was the power
crisis in Palawan and the request of the local government to intervene. While this may not be
as absolute an act of liberality as NAPOCOR had a personal agenda for doing so, such
reason does not take away from the fact that the supplying of fuel was done without the
annexing of any condition to be complied with by Delta P. There was not even an annotation
in any document that Delta P would have to pay any amount back, nor any indication
whatsoever that the supply was a mere loan. Absent any these, for whatever reason, the
Court agrees to the finding that the supplying of fuel was a donation.
Person who may give or receive a donation (Articles 735-749)

21. Calicdan v. Cendena

[GR No. 155080; February 5, 2004]

FACTS:

Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to
respondent Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a
fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon, where he
resided until his death.

Petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for
“Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages” against the respondent, alleging that
the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the
land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the
construction of his house thereon.

Respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to
him by Fermina; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in
possession of the land for a period of 45 years. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. On Appeal,
the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that the donation was valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation in favor of respondent was valid

RULING:

No. As correctly held by the the trial court, the donation of the land was void because
Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his
parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and
Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto
died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the
deceased spouse. However, notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, the Court found
that respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
 22. Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla

[GR No. 150179; April 30, 2003]

FACTS:

Filomena Almirol de Sevilla died intestate leaving 8 children, namely: William, Peter,
Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla, and Jimmy, all surnamed Sevilla. William, Jimmy
and Maria are now deceased and are survived by their respective spouses and children.4
Filomena Almirol de Sevilla left several properties. Felipe Sevilla, Rosa Sevilla, and the heirs
of William, Jimmy and Maria, all surnamed Sevilla, filed the instant case against Leopoldo
Sevilla, Peter Sevilla and Luzvilla Sevilla, for annulment of the Deed of Donation and the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Accounting, Damages, with prayer for Receivership and for
Partition of the properties of the late Filomena Almirol de Sevilla. They alleged that the Deed
of Donation is tainted with fraud because Felisa Almirol, who was then 81 years of age, was
seriously ill and of unsound mind at the time of the execution thereof; and that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition is void because it was executed without their knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation inter vivos executed by Felisa Almirol in favor of
Leopoldo Sevilla is valid

RULING:

There is said to be no consent and consequently no contract when the agreement is

entered into by one in behalf of another who has never given him authorization therefor
unless he has by law a right to represent the latter. Hence, the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition is void ab initio and not merely unenforceable. Moreover, donation inter vivos is
immediately operative and final.—In the case at bar, at the time Felisa executed the deed of
extra-judicial partition dividing the share of her deceased sister Honarata between her and
the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, she was no longer the owner of the 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot No. 653, having previously donated the same to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla
who accepted the donation in the same deed. A donation inter vivos, as in the instant case,
is immediately operative and final. As a mode of acquiring ownership, it results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
 23. Ortiz v. Basada

[GR No. l-7303; May 19, 1955]

FACTS:

Pacita Ortiz and Cresencia Ortiz pray for a review of the decision of the CA
dismissing their complaint against Andres Basada for recovery of a parcel of land. In the
Deed of Donation, Bonifacio Yupo and Vicenta De Guerra donated to their grandchildren
Crecencia, Alejandro and Pacita, all surnamed Ortiz, three (3) parcels of land in North
Samar. And, that the grandchildren accepted the donation intervivos. Alejandro Ortiz died
and the donor sposes executed another notarial deed of donation of the same property in
favor of Basada, nephew of Vicenta, subject to the condition that the done would serve and
take care of the donors until their death. This donation was also duly accepted by Basada in
the same instrument.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Basada acquired ownership and possession of the donated property

RULING:

Yes. From the time the public instrument of donation is simultaneously executed and
acknowledged by donors and donees, the latter acquired not only the ownership but also the
possession of the donated property, since the execution of a public instrument of
conveyance is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be
made, unless the contrary is expressed or inferable from the terms of the deeds.
 24. Catalan v. Basa
[GR No. 159567; July 31, 2007]
FACTS:

In 1948, Feliciano Catalan (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service.
The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to
render military service due to his “schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates
him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce and pointless speech.” Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo and in 1951 an Absolute
Deed of Donation was executed by Feliciano in favor of his sister MERCEDES CATALAN
(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, In 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property to their son Eulogio Catalan. And, in 1979, Mercedes
sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. Also, in 1983,
Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered to
their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. Lot 4 was also donated to
Eulogio and Florida Catalan.

In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against the herein
respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio,
as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if
Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as
he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to give valid consent

RULING:

Yes. In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s
capacity to give consent at the time of the donation; The burden of proving incapacity rests
upon the person who alleges it.—In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial
is the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of
proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this
effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.

A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to
intelligently dispose his property.—From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a
person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to
show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had
lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano
was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the
contrary was adduced. Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only
established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on
December 22, 1953.
 25. Lentfer v. Jurgen Wolff
[GR No. 152317; November 10, 2004]
FACTS:

Petioners Gunter Lentfer, a German citizen; his Filipina wife, Victoria Moreño-Lentfer;
and John Craigie Young Cross, an Australian citizen, all residing in Sabang, Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro. Respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff is a German citizen, residing in San
Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioners alleged that with respondent, in 1992, they engaged
the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo C. Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house
owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the
assignment of Cross’ contract of lease on the land where the house stood. The sale of the
beach house and the assignment of the lease right would be in the name of petitioner
Victoria Moreño-Lentfer, but the total consideration of 220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be
paid by respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory note was executed by said respondent
in favor of petitioner Cross. According to respondent, however, the Lentfer spouses were his
confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit account in the amount of DM 200,0004 at
Solid Bank Corporation.

Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, the Lentfer couple urged him
to buy Cross’ beach house and lease rights in Puerto Galera. Wolff agreed and through a
bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the amount of DM 221,7005 as total consideration
for the sale and assignment of the lease rights. However, Cross, Moreño-Lentfer and Atty.
Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach house was made to
appear as sold to Moreño-Lentfer for only P100,000.6 The assignment of the lease right was
likewise made in favor of Moreño-Lentfer. Upon learning of this, respondent filed a
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4219 with the lower court for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of property with damages and prayer for a writ of attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the principle of solutio indebiti under article 2154 of the new civil
code, the principle of justice and equity, apply in the case at bar

RULING:

Yes. Records show that a bank-to-bank payment was made by respondent Wolff to
petitioner Cross in favor of co-petitioner Moreño-Lentfer. Respondent was under no duty to
make such payment for the benefit of Moreño-Lentfer. There was no binding relation
between respondent and the beneficiary, Moreño-Lentfer. The payment was clearly a
mistake. Since Moreño-Lentfer received something when there was no right to demand it,
she had an obligation to return it. Following Article 22 of the New Civil Code, two conditions
must concur to declare that a person has unjustly enriched himself or herself, namely: (a) a
person is unjustly benefited, and (b) such benefit is derived at the expense of or to the
damage of another. Moreover, a donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives
freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it, but when a large amount of
money is involved, the Court is constrained to take the donee’s purported claim of liberality
of the donor with more than a grain of salt; A donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as
well as its acceptance should be in writing.
 26. Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman

[GR No. 181132, June 5, 2009]

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged that they could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be
satisfied first. Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their
claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva
was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds
among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries;
and that it released Odessa’s share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the
shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters
of guardianship.

Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of

action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because
Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her
in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the shares
of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate
had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined.

ISSUE:

Whether or not illegitimate children can be beneficiaries in an insurance contract.

RULING:

Yes. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states that the insurance proceeds shall be
applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it
is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only
persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or
the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The
exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third
persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In
such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and,
thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife
have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of
Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no
moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming
as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in
the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations
under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on
the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the
designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners.
 27. Parajillo vs IAC

GR No. 72908, aug 11, 1989

FACTS:

That on May 20, 1946, FELIPE BALANE and JUANA BALANE DE SUTERIO, the
only heirs to the properties of the late PERFECTA BALANE DE CORDERO, executed a
DEED OF DONATION in favor of Salud was made, in accordance to the antemortem wish
of Perfecta Balane de Cordero, to the effect that the property described in the Deed of
Donation, be given to Salud because of her love and affection for me, being her only niece.

These instruments were never registered nor was title transferred in Salud's name
although she says she immediately took possession of the land. Meantime, intestate
proceedings were instituted on the estate of Perfecta and the said land was among those
included in the inventory of the properties belonging to the decedent

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is not properly accepted hence, void.

RULING:

Yes, it is pointed out that the donation is defective in form because of non-compliance with
the requirements of the law regarding its acceptance. As it was executed in 1946, the
applicable rule is Article 633 of the old Civil Code reading as follows:

Art. 633. In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made by
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and the amount of the charges to be assumed by the donee
expressed.

The acceptance may be made, in the deed of gift or in a separate public

writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.

If the acceptance is made, by separate public instrument, authentic notice

thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.

There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate public instrument and that
it was duly communicated to the donors. Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But what
they do contend is that such acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," meaning the
extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that
"authentic notice" of the acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the
first instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this donation and
does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor," the only
signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the
reason for the separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month later.
 28. Lagazo vs CA

[GR. No. 112796, March 5, 1998]

FACTS:

Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to
become a permanent resident therein and she appointed Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact
to fix the requirements needed. Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina
appointed Lagazo as her new attorney-in-fact. The grant was subsequently given and later,
the land was donated to Lagazo. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the property.
The latter claims ownership over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him
by Espanol. Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in
favor of plaintiff-appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the
Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid
the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said
property in the name of Catalina Jacob.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but
not formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered
complete, valid and subsisting.

RULING:

No. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The
donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon
the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.”

Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence
makes the donation null and void.
 29. RP vs Leon Silim

[GR. No. 140487, April 02, 2001]

FACTS:

Silim and Mangubat donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public
Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur, on the condition that said land shall
be used exclusively and forever for educational purposes. However, as the said parcel of
land was too small for the construction of the planned Bagong Lipunan School Building, the
Province of Zamboanga, through its division superintendent, executed a deed of exchange
in favor of a new and suitable location. Consequently, whatever was built on the donated lot
was dismantled and transferred to the new fitting location.

The issue arose when the donators found out that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma took
the land for himself and constructed his house thereon. Silim and Mangubat sought to have
the donation declared null and void on the ground that the condition of the donation was
violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school, which it
was conditioned on, was never built thereon.

RULING:

Yes. The Court upheld the validity of the donation. Firstly, it ruled that there was a
valid acceptance in accordance with Arts. 745 and 749 of the Civil Code: it was made
personally or through an agent, and it was made in a public document. Anent the second
contention concerning the non-fulfillment of the consideration, the Court ruled that contrary
to Silim and Mangubat’s argument, the parcel of land was used precisely for school
purposes. The exchange of the donated lot for a bigger lot was done in pursuance with the
condition that they (Silim and Mangubat) imposed. Remember: the lot was exchanged with a
bigger lot to give way for the construction of Bagong Lipunan Elementary School and for no
other reason.

The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of
the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the
donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the
limited area of the donated lot.
 30. Quilala v. Alcantara

[GR No. 132681; December 3, 2001]

FACTS:

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
containing an area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila. The deed of donation was
registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and
TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala. On November 7, 1983, Catalina
Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges
that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.

The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and
Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signing on the wrong side of the page of the document invalidates
it

RULING:

No. The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not
also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It
cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public
in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second
page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth
on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
 31. Valencia v. Locquiao

[GR No. 122134; October 3, 2003]

FACTS:

On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of

donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario
Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito)
and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the
terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in
question, as well as a male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the
donor parents, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.

The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage
was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. Herminigildo and Raymunda died on
December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively, leaving as heirs their six (6) children,
namely: respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and petitioner Romana,
all surnamed Locquiao. With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner
Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took possession and cultivated the subject land.
When respondent Romanas husband got sick sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner
Constancia Valencia (hereafter, petitioner Constancia) took over, and since then, has been
in possession of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not acceptance of the donation by the donees is required in donations

propter nuptias

RULING:

No. Acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gifts. As provided in Article
129, implied acceptance is sufficient. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or
donations by reason of marriage arethose made before its celebration in consideration of the
same and in favor of one or both of thefuture spouses. Distinction is crucial since they have
different formal essential requisites.
 32. Shopper’s Paradise v. Roque

[GR No. 148775; January 13, 2004]

FACTS:

On December 23, 1993 Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation

represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with
Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land, with an area of two thousand and
thirty six (2,036) square meters, situated at Plaza Novaliches, Quezon City. Petitioner issued
to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000 00 by way of “reservation payment.” Simultaneously,
petitioner and Dr Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property.
Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00 “down
payment” to Dr. Roque.

The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be
annotated on TCT No. 30591 within sixty (60) days from 23 December 1993 or until 23
February 1994. The annotations, however, were never made because of the untimely
demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque. The death of Dr. Roque on 10 February 1994 constrained
petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late
Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. Efren P. Roque
alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed
of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa
Roque, on 26 December 1978, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter
into the assailed agreements with petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deceased was an authorized agent.

RULING:

A person dealing with registered land may thus safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefore, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property but, where such party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right thereto, his knowledge
of that prior unregistered interest would have the effect of registration as regards to him.

The appellate court was not without substantial basis when it found petitioner to have
had knowledge of the donation at the time it entered into the two agreements with Dr.
Roque. During their negotiation, petitioner, through its representatives, was apprised of the
fact that the subject property actually belonged to respondent.

It was not shown that Dr. Felipe C. Roque had been an authorized agent of
respondent. In a contract of agency, the agent acts in representation or in behalf of another
with the consent of the latter. Article 1878 of the Civil Code expresses that a special power
of attorney is necessary to lease any real property to another person for more than one year.
The lease of real property for more than one year is considered not merely an act of
administration but an act of strict dominion or of ownership. A special power of attorney is
thus necessary for its execution through an agent.
 33. Florencio v. De Leon

[GR No. 149570; March 12, 2004]

FACTS:

Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828 square meters
located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and
Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein without any
rentals therefor. De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to her wishes,
her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995,
Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April
26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio,
demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. The
latter refused and failed to vacate the property.

De Leon's heirs contends the following: a). Defendants’ possession of the premises
was merely on the tolerance of the late Teresa de Leon. b). The alleged Deed of Donation
does not exist, is patently a falsified document and can never be the source of any right
whatsoever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Rosendo Florencio, who appears to be the donee under the
unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material possession of
the property over the respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the
property.

RULING:

No. The petition has no merit. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in
an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected
from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that
the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to
comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid,
must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the
same deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the
knowledge of the donor. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it
must be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of
Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of
land. The necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are
affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their
predecessors-in-interest.
 34. Arangote v. Maglunob

[GR No. 178906; February 18, 2009]

FACTS:

Elvira Arangote acquired the subject parcel of land from Esperanza Maglunob, who
was grand aunt of respondents Martin Maglunob and Romeo Salido. On June 1986,
Esperenza executed an affidavit in which she renounced her rights, share and participation
in the land in favor of Elvira and her husband. It appears that the lot was not exclusive
property of Esperanza but also of the other heirs of Martin I whom she represented in the
partition agreement. Elvira and her husband, Ray constructed a house on the land in 1989
and in 1993, OCT was issued in her name by the DAR. However, respondents with the help
of hired persons entered the property and built a wall behind and in front of Elvira’s house.
Elvira and Ray sued respondents for quieting of title and declaration of ownership.
Respondents averred that they were co-owners of the land with Esperanza who allegedly
inherited the land from Martin 1 together with Tomas and. They argued that Esperanza could
not have validly waived her rights in favor of Elvira and Ray. MCTC ruled for Elvira. RTC
reversed MCTC and declared respondents lawful owners of the land together with the other
heirs of Martin I. Elvira went to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Before SC,
Elvira argued that both RTC and CA erred in declaring the affidavit of Esperanza void
because it is a valid and binding proof of transfer of ownership of the subject property as it
was coupled with actual delivery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation to Elvira and her husband is valid

RULING:

No. The donation to Elvira and her husband is not valid. The SC ruled that the
affidavit executed by Esperanza wherein she renounced, relinquished and waived all her
rights, share, interest and participation in the subject property in favor of Elvira and Ray is in
fact a donation. Thus, it should have complied with the requirements of Article 749 of the
Civil Code.

In the case at bar, the affidavit executed by Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share
and participation over the property in favor of Elvira suffered from legal infirmities. In Sumipat
vs. Banga, the Court ruled that title to immovable does not pass from the donor to the done
by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument
and the donor duly notified thereof. In this case, the acceptance of the donation was not
made by Elvira either in the same affidavit or in a separate public instrument. Neither was
there notice of acceptance given to the donor, therefore the donation is void.
 36. Paghubasan v. Apostol

[GR No. 250372; February 3, 2020]

FACTS:

Here, Rafael and Norie’s property was under co-ownership. Norie failed to
substantiate her claimthat she was financially capable to buy the subject property, said
purchase was considered as solely financed by Rafael.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation done is valid.

RULING:

No. The donation is not valid and therefore, void.

Rafael’s registration of the subject property under Norie’s name was tantamount to a
void donation under Article 739 (1) of the Civil Code. Hence, the CA properly ordered the
reconveyance of the subject property to Amparo and to Rafael’s estate.
Effect and limitations (Articles 750-759)

37. Heirs of Velasquez v. CA

[GR No. L-58671; February 15, 2000]
FACTS:

Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate and were childless.
Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the
plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence
of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties. The heirs of Anatalia
de Guzman filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of
Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters refusal to partition the
conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman,
before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de
Guzman and Cesario Velaquez; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman et
al, that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed
were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to
Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several
children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide
the properties equally. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants
forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for
partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the
properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses,
to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and
to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from
the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of
the spouses Aquino

RULING:

No. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the done and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated.

Here, the donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted
through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same
deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally
speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and
irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760,
764 and 765 of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became
the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be
revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the
Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, like that the Aquino spouses did not
intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the
grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might
be inofficious.
 38. Spouses Gestopa v. CA

[GR No. 111904; October 5, 2000]

FACTS:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered
lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of private respondent
Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil (Diego’s illegitimate child). All deeds contained the reservation of
the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and
(2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if
deemed necessary. Years later, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag,
executed a another deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land
and two others in favor of Mercedes containing the two conditions, that (1) the Danlag
spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the
donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their
prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to
her name and paid the taxes on them. Subsequently, the Spouses Danlag sold 2 parcels to
herein petitioners Spouses Gestopa, and revoked the donation inter vivos covering the six
parcels of land. Mercedes filed with the RTC a petition against the Danlags and Gestopas for
quieting of title, stating that she had already obtained ownership over the six parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the (second) donation was inter vivs.

RULING:

Yes. It is a donation inter vivos. The Supreme Court held that it was a donation inter
vivos for the following reasons: (1) the granting clause of the deed showed that Diego
donated the properties out of love and affection for Mercedes; (2) the reservation clause in
respect of the lifetime usufruct indicated that Diego intended to transfer the naked
ownership over the properties; (3) Diego reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society; and (4) Mercedes accepted the donation. A valid
donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure
by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude, which were
not invoked. As the donee, it is with Mercedes who has the right to dispose of the properties.
 39. Calicdan v. Cendana

[GR No. 155080; February 5, 2004]

FACTS:

On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of donation whereby she
conveyed a parcel of land to respondent Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into
possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey
residential house thereon. He occupied the land from 1949 until his death in 1998. On June
1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that
respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely
tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the construction of his house
thereon.

In his Answer, respondent alleged that the land was donated to him by Fermina in
1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession
of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by
prior judgment in the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent
Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of
properties of the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is valid.

RULING:

The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the
owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto Calicdan from his parents. Thus, the
land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan,
because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the
surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse.
Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of
usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey.

After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals’ ruling
that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent admitted
during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan
in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista.
 40. Lansang v. Almario

[GR No. 243844; February 11, 2019]

FACTS:

The marriage celebrated8 in 1959 between Rey and Virginia Almario subsisted because a
divorce decree obtained by Filipino citizens is not recognized in the Philippines.9 Thus, the
subject properties, which were bought during their marriage, remained to be conjugal in
nature, especially since petitioner failed to prove that Rey obtained those properties using
his exclusive funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is valid

RULING:

No. The Court declared it to be void, and could no longer be reduced 'for being
inofficious.

In the present case, he marriage celebrated8 in 1959 between Rey and Virginia
Almario subsisted because a divorce decree obtained by Filipino citizens is not recognized
in the Philippines. Thus, the subject properties, which were bought during their marriage,
remained to be conjugal in nature, especially since petitioner failed to prove that Rey
obtained those properties using his exclusive funds. Being conjugal properties, the
disposition thereof requires the consent of both spouses, which does not obtain in this case.
As such, the Deed of Donation should be annulled and the certificates of title issued in
petitioner's name must be cancelled. Moreover, it was no longer necessary to inquire into
whether or not the donation was inofficious for impairing respondents' legitime; since the
donation has already been declared void, it could no longer be reduced 'for being
inofficious.
Revocation and Reduction of Donations (Articles 760-773)

41. Eduvigis Cruz v. CA

[GR No. l-58671; November 22, 1985]

FACTS:

Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq. m. residential lot in San
Isidro, Taytay Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces
private respondents herein, in a deed of donation entitled "Kasulatan Sa Kaloobpala". The
property was accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents. Cruz judicially
adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke the
donation, but the donees resisted, alleging that: (a) the property in question was co-owned
by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence
the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and (b) Eduvigis Cruz owns another
property, an agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adopted child.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation in the CFI. Trial
court rendered a decision revoking the donation. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court
and dismissed the complaint. Thus, prompted herein petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject
donation.

RULING:

YES. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously
donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or
reduction of the donation within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs
the legitime of the adopted,taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of
the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). Of course, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by
law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the
subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at
all of the total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the
contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land (27,342 sq.
m.) situated in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although then subject to
litigation.

The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual

finding of the CA that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of
the donated land,the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then
more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.
 42. De Luna v. Abrigo

[GR No. 57455; January 18, 1990]

FACTS:

De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation.

The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain
terms and conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would
automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions,
de Luna “revived” the said donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the
following terms and conditions: 1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense
a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica; 2) Construction
shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from the date of the
Deed unless the Donor grants extensions; 3) Automatic reversion in case of violation.

The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT.
By a Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while
the remaining area was retained by the De Luna. The children and only heirs of the late De
Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with the RTC for the cancellation of the
donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The Foundation defended itself by
saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor
granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for revocation already prescribed

RULING:

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of
the donation. However, it is our opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations
in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed
by the rules on contracts.

In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription
and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
 43. Eduarte v. CA

[GR No. 105944; February 9, 1996]

FACTS:

Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of
donation inter vivos of ½ of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed
another deed of donation inter vivos ceding the other ½ of the property to Helen Doria. Helen
Doria donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church.
Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some 700 meters for his
residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on
the ground that the deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his
liberality claiming ingratitude

ISSUE:

Whether or not the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of

ingratitude against Calapine

RULING:

As noted in Tolentino’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code on

paragraph (1) of Article 765 "all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are
causes for revocation." Petitioners’ attempt to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal
detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the donor
despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under
the Revised Penal Code.
 44. Heirs of Velasquez v. CA

[GR No. 126996; February 15, 2000]

FACTS:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945
and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters
Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina deGuzman (grandmother of
the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to
acquire real properties.

The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with
the plaintiffs’ mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and
Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the
conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario
Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband
earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all
the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her
sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother
allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half
(1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to ½ of each of all the properties in question being
the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs alsio
claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took
possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs’ repeated demands for partition,
defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the
properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino
spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in
equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the
land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall
have been effected.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donated property may be revoked

RULING:

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title

over the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted,
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. The donation of the first
parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were
then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted through their father
Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of
donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally
speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly
and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in
Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the
second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the
other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the
repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their
properties since Anatalia (Leoncia’s sister) had several children to support is not one of the
grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation
might be inofficious.
 45. Ricky Quilala v. Gliceria Alcantara

[GR No. 132681; December 3, 2001]

FACTS:

On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
containing an area of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for Manila.

The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course,
TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta
Quilala. Respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes,
claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity.

The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and
Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument,
thus rendering the donation null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is valid and irrevocable

RULING:

The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in favor
of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made
in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee,
and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,
provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once
the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the
lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document, and the donor must know the acceptance by the donee.
 46. Ganuelas v. Cawed
[GR No. 123968; April 24, 2003]
FACTS:

On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property
covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas, one of the
petitioners, for and in consideration of the love and affection which Celestina has for Usulina,
and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former. The donation
was to become effective upon Celestina Ganuelas' death, but in the event that Usulina dies
before the former, the present donation shall be rescinded and of no further force and effect.
On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a Revocation of Donation, and died a month
thereafter without issue, and any surviving ascendants and siblings. After Celestina’s death,
Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properties with private respondents,
the nieces of Celestina. In 1982, or 24 years after the execution of the Deed of Donation,
Ursulina secured the tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, and since
then, she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of the properties
despite repeated demands. Private respondents were thus prompted to file a complaint
against Ursulina, along with Metodio and Antonio.The trial court, holding that the provision in
the Deed of Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the
"donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect" is an explicit
indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa, thus declaring null and void the Deed of
Donation of Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the partition of the
estate of Celestina among the intestate heirs. The trial court also held that the absence of a
reservation clause in the deed implied that Celestina retained complete dominion over her
properties, thus supporting the conclusion that the donation is mortis causa. Lastly, the trial
court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the Revocation of Donation showed
that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its finding
that the conveyance was mortis causa.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the contested revocation of donation, of a Donation Mortis Causa,

was valid

RULING:

Yes. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it
must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 25 and 749 of
the Civil Code, except when it is onerous, in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it
is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the
validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that
any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to
the death of Celestina. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the
properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in
the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a post-mortem.
 47. Spouses Gestopa v.CA
[GR No.111904; October 5, 2000]
FACTS:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered
lands, who executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which are dated March 4,
1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes. All
deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to amend, cancel or revoke the
donation during their lifetime, and to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated
during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. On January 16, 1973, Diego with the
consent of his wife, Catalina, executed a deed of donation inter vivos covering the
aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels, again in favor of private respondent
Mercedes. This contained two conditions: that (1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to
enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose
of the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval.
Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes
on them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and
4 to herein petitioners, Spouses Gestopa, and executed a deed of revocation recovering the
six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos. Mercedes Pilapil
(herein private respondent) filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and the
Danlags, for quieting of title, alleging that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag;
that she lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego and his mother, Maura
Danlag, when the latter was still alive, and recognition of the services she rendered, Diego
executed a Deed of Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying to her the six (6) parcels of
land. She accepted the donation in the same instrument, and through machination,
intimidation and undue influence, Diego persuaded the husband of Mercedes, Eulalio Pilapil,
to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was
coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied
with all of them; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis in revoking the subject
donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos has been revoked

RULING:

No. A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of

officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude.19 The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of
revocation. The deed merely stated: Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting
the donor to gather coconut trees and her filing of instant petition for quieting of title. There is
nothing on record, however, showing that private respondent prohibited the donors from
gathering coconuts. Even assuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from gathering
coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act covered by Article 765 of the Civil Code.
Nor does this Article cover respondent's filing of the petition for quieting of title, where she
merely asserted what she believed was her right under the law.Finally, the records do not
show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation.
 48. RP v. Leon Silim
[GR No. 140487; April 2, 2001]
FACTS:

On 17 December 1971, Respondents-Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat,

donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and
forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the
District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of
Donation.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay
Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one
hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division
Superintendent Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the
exchange of the one-half hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new
and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this,
District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby
the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the
Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school
building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new
location. When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma
was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a
house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is
already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the
construction of the house on the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised
him to just file a case in court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Donation was null and void on the grounds of invalid acceptance;
and violation of the imposed condition

RULING:

No. There was no breach or violation of the condition imposed in the subject Deed of
Donation by the donee. The exchange is proper since it is still for the exclusive use for
school purposes and for the expansion and improvement of the school facilities within the
community. The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of the donation
made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
Here, there was a valid acceptance of the donation. The purpose of the formal
requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the
donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the
acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not
registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in
conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extra-judicial
settlement of the donee’s acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form
over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation.
 49. Camarines Sur Teachers v. Province
[GR No. 199666; October 7, 2019]
FACTS:

The Province of Camarines Sur is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land
situated in Barangay Peñafrancia, Naga City. The Local Government of the Province of
Camarines Sur, via then Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza donated a portion of said property
to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) by virtue of the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos. On October 14, 2007, the Province of Camarines Sur executed a Deed
of Revocation of Donation, and served a copy thereof to the Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association on October 17, 2007. On October 23, 2007, the Province of Camarines Sur thru
the Provincial Legal Officer sent a demand letter to CASTEA for the latter to vacate the
premises of the property in question.
On the other hand, CASTEA contends that Camarines Sur has ceased to be the owner
of the square meters portion of the property possessed and occupied by CASTEA
contending that the ownership thereof has already been transferred to CASTEA by virtue of
the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos it executed in favor of CASTEA on September 28, 1966.
CASTEA argues that its act of leasing out to Bodega Glassware portion of the building it
constructed on the donated property does not constitute selling, mortgaging or encumbering
the donated property or any improvements thereof. CASTEA also maintains that the
incumbent governor has no authority to file the instant case because the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has not given its authority to do so. Thus, when Gov. Luis Raymund F.
Villafuerte, Jr. signed the verification and certification on non-forum shopping of the
complaint without authority from the Provincial Board, it is as if the plaintiff which is a
corporate body did not sign the verification and certification. Hence, the case should be
dismissed outright.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a need for a judicial determination of the valid exercise of the
automatic revocation or rescission right granted to the donor

RULING:

Yes. In this case, since CASTEA contests the propriety of the Province's revocation of
the Deed of Donation, then mere invocation by the Province of the automatic revocation
clause is insufficient. A judicial declaration of its propriety is, therefore, required before the
continued possession by CASTEA, as donee, can be declared unlawful. It is not disputed
that CASTEA fully complied with its prestation to do — the building which it agreed to put up
was constructed by CASTEA within the one-year period provided in the Deed of Donation.
When the law states "when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions" it
implies that all the conditions or charges imposed must be complied with. Thus, if there are
several conditions or charges imposed upon the donee the failure to perform one will be
sufficient cause for revocation since what is necessary is not mere delay, but delay in law or
mora and the reason for this ground of revocation is based not only on the principles of
contracts but on the fact that the donee must suffer for failing to respect the will of the donor
whose liberality has benefited him.As to the effect of partial non-fulfillment, there is opinion to
the effect that generally, partial non-fulfillment of a condition or charge imposed on the
donee is as much a ground for revocation as total non-performance.