RULE 72

Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. — Rules of special proceedings are provided for
in the following cases:

a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

b. Escheat;
c. Guardianship and custody of children;
d. Trustees;
e. Adoption;
f. Rescission and revocation of adoption;
g. Hospitalization of insane persons;
h. Habeas corpus;
i. Change of name;
j. Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
l. Constitution of family home;
m. Declaration of absence and death;
n. Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil registry.

Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
 CASE 1
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent
G.R. No. 133000           October 2, 2001

FACTS:
1. Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel
of land.
2. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate.
3. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received
1/14 share of the said property.
4. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the
land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered
under Graciano's name. The said remaining lot was further subdivided into two separate (1st
lot: 80.90 square meter, and 2nd lot: 396.70 square meter). Eventually, Graciano sold the
first lot to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.
5. On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
6. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 186059 was issued in the latter's name.
7. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as
heirs.
8. The Children of Graciano filed a complaint against Natcher stating that she employed fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the land by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of herein petitioner, and that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
9. Natcher contention: That she was legally married to Graciano, hence considered a
compulsory heir; that Graciano already distributed, in advance, the properties to his children
during his lifetime.

RTC: The Deed of Sale is prohibited by law, not a valid donation, and even if it is a donation, it
may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher.

CA: Reversed and set aside the decision ratiocinating that it is the probate court that has
exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate; that the court a quo erred
in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC may adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent
to any of the heirs.

RULING:
NO.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
 "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action
and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In
special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long
standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.16

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case,
reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario.
 CASE 2
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS,
AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174975               January 20, 2009

FACTS:
1. On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners
Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-
Dalupan are their children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.
2. On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court.
3. In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations:
o (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died;
o (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim;
o (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent;
o (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent;
o (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and
o (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the
decedent. 
4. Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the
following:
o (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and
o (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.
5. Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the grounds that the Shari’a
District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr.,
because he was a Roman Catholic.
6. The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court
held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the
settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. Private respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.
7. Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal and ordered the continuation of
trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Shari’ah District Court-Marawi did not acquire jurisdiction
over "the estates and properties of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr."

RULING:
NO.

Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the
Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous
understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to
the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as
plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that
the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding.

This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of
death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would
allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong"34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35 On
the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right,
or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the
estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the
purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate, pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
 CASE 3
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case:

This is an appeal assailing the Decision dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated
March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

Doctrine:
1. Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
2. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established
by law. There is no need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.

Facts:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of
the Philippine Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on
January 7, 1968.
2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in
order to serve his duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made
contact with any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from
the Philippine Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.
3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638
from the Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a
judicial declaration of presumptive death.
4. On April 10, 2012, petitioner filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo).
a. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of
the Tarlac City RTC.

RTC Ruling:
1. Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41 of
the Family Code.
2. The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiorari

CA Ruling:
1. Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41 only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage
which Petitioner did not seek.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive
death.

Ruling:
No, it cannot be validly granted moreover, the petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration
of presumptive death since it is not a viable suit.

Art. 41 of the Family Code states that “A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.”

In this case, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other
purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended.

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death
of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41
of the FC.

Additional Notes:
1. Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death
of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright.
This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no
court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.
2. Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the
considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code
was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:
a) Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain
facts.
b) Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an
action brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of
 the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could
decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to be
remedied nor any status to be established.
c) A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or
Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really
become "final" as the same only confirms that existence of a prima facie or disputable
presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
d) Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is
already established by law.
 CASE 4
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO
YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Nature of the Case:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch
59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a
pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 2011 and August 31, 2011 Orders
of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

Doctrine:
1. Determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special
proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession.
2. Civil Action vs. Special Proceeding
a. Civil Action- defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong (Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court)
b. Special Proceeding – a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking
the establishment of a status or right.

Facts:
1. On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed
as Civil Case No. T-2246.
a. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and
childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.
b. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title,
leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,
to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.
2. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno
a. as evidenced by:
i. his certificate of Live Birth;
ii. two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and
iii. a certified true copy of his passport.
b. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that:
i. petitioners have no cause of action against him;
ii. the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and
iii. the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.

RTC Ruling:
 1. On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.
a. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs.
b. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
evidence he submitted.
2. The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on
August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.
3. Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, sought
direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper.

Ruling:
Yes, the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. 

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in
the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the
heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails
to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of
the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that
the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding.
 CASE 5
Petitioners: Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO
GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS
JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN
vs.
Respondents: Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA
G.R. No. 150206               March 13, 2009

Facts:
Respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land located in Cagayan de Oro City
which she inherited from her mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife,
Laureana Clarito. Furthermore, that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, the lot was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also
claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail.
After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject property.

Petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan
Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and
that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from
Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including
respondent.

RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent on the Civil case filed for an action for
Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA declared that respondent’s claim of filiation
with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial.

Issue: (In relation to Special Procedure)

Whether or not the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made
in the proper special proceedings in court.

Ruling:
Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court.

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Further, in a case decided by the Supreme
Court, it explained that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights.

However, in a case decided by the Supreme Court, where the Court relaxed its rule and
allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the
party therein as heirs, when the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding.

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by
the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as
the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-
092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the
same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

OUTCOME OF THE CASE:

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the CA affirming the RTC because
those evidences presented by the respondent was dismally failed to substantiate proof that she is
the sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent’s cause of action is the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan to be entitled with
the inheritance of Juan Gabatan.

Law to establish filiation: (Important phrase)

 Article 265 – record of birth in the Civil Register
 Article 266 – proof of continuous possession of status of a legitimate child
 Article 267 – other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws

Respondent’s presented evidences and Supreme Court’s ruling on such:

1. Birth Certificate of the respondent in typewritten with her mother’s maiden name,
“Hermogena Clarito Gabatan” as Exhibit A.

The SC give credence to the submitted handwritten respondent’s Birth Certificate with
respondet’s mother’s full maiden name as “Hermogena Calarito” by the petitioner which
was supported with two competent witness as the custodian of public records as Exhibit 1.

Furthermore, even Exhibit A was accepted, the same cannot prove that “Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan” is the daughter of Juan Gabatan.

2. Testimony of respondent’s witnesses

The SC ruled that it cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses and such were, in
a word, hearsay.

3. Photocopied Dead of Sale presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by

the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the
sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased
Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement
therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in
interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. The CA considered the
same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.

The SC applies the best evidence rule. Although it admits exceptions, the respondent did
not present any reasonable ground to exempt from providing a secondary copy of it.
Furthermore, the copy presented does not provide evidence of the existence of an original
copy of it.
 CASE 6
Petitioner: ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER
Vs.
Respondent: ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix
G.R. No. 157912               December 13, 2007

Facts:
Victoria S. Medina is the duly appointed administratrix of the estateof Alice O. Sheker,
which is pending adjudication before the RTC of Iligan City. Alan Joseph Sheker filed a money
claim against the estate, a continent claim for agent’s commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and the amount of P275,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties. Victoria moved to
dismiss the money claim, on the following grounds: 1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in
Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,had not been paid; 2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and 3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally. Then, RTC dismiss the money claim.
Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim considering that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory
manner.

Ruling:
Yes, RTC erred in strictly applying the rules in ordinary actions but not entirely correct as
the petitioner’s contention of its supplementary application to rules in special proceedings.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Applicability of rules
of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put
into practice, done or accomplished (Webster's Third New International Dictionary). This means
that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions
are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.

Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for

complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

OUTCOME OF THE CASE:

The Court decided to reverse and set aside RTC’s decision because those issues raised by the
respondent was either not applicable or relaxed by the Court.
1. “the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid”

This is not a ground for dismissing the case because the filling fees shall constitute a lien
on the judgment pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 141 of the RoC or the trial court may order the
payment of such within a reasonable time.

2. “petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping”

The certification of non-forum shopping is not applicable to the contingent money claim of
the petitioner because the claim was not being an initiatory pleading and is only incidental
matter in the main action the whole probate proceeding upon filing of the petition for
allowance of the decedent’s will.

3. “petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed
and served personally”

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The
lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation
why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC
should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money
claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
 CASE 7
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORP.,
petitioners,
vs.
CA, HON. AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, RTC-Manila, Vr. 21, and ADMINISTATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

SUMMARY:
Petitioners were plaintiffs in two pending civil cases involving decedent Roberto Benedicto
(intestate). Private respondent Julita was appointed as administrator of the late Roberto’s estate.
Petitioners sought three specific reliefs that were denied by both RTC-Manila and the CA:
(1) They prayed that they be furnished “copies of all processes and orders issued” by the
intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administatrix Julita Benedicto with said
court,
(2) They prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administatrix
Julita to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission
thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the BIR to assist in the appraisal of the
fair market value of the same, and
(3) Petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administatrix Julita of her verified annual count, and, upon submission thereof, set the
date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.

FACTS:
1. In 2000, well-known sugar magnate Roberto Benedicto died intestate.
a. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita (administatrix), and his only
daughter Francisca.
2. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners:
a. Civil Case No. 95-9137 – pending with RTC-Bacolod, Br. 44, with petitioner Alfredo
Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein; and
b. Civil Case No. 11178 – then pending with RTC-Bacolod, Br. 44, with petitioners
Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.
c. The civil cases were based on TORT – they arose from Benedicto’s actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank.
3. In May 2000, private respondent Julita filed with the RTC-Manila a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the RoC.
a. This was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor.
b. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 million,
“net of liabilities.”
c. On Aug. 2, 2000, the RTC-Manila issued an order appointing Julita as administrator
of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.
4. In January 2001, Julita submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.
a. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated
before the Bacolod City courts.
b. Private respondent Julita stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two
cases as:
i. P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137, and
ii. P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.
 c. Thereafter, RTC-Manila required private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
5. On Sept. 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC-Manila a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
a. To this, private respondent opposed, disputing the personality of petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
b. Even before the RTC-Manila acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an
omnibus motion praying that the RTC-Manila set a deadline for the submission by
private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate.
c. Petitioners likewise filed other pleadings or motions with the RTC-Manila, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and
assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete
and inaccurate.

RTC-Manila Ruling:
1. On January 2, 2002, the RTC-Manila issued an order denying the (petitioners’)
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the RoC to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
2. The petitioners’ MR was also denied.

Court of Appeals
1. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
a. They argued that they had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with
RTC-Bacolod.
2. On February 27, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and declared that the RTC-Manila
did not abuse its discretion.
a. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate
court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
b. The CA also cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in
fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate
proceedings before other courts.
3. Thus, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the lower courts erred in denying the petitioners the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the
rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.

RULING:
NO, the lower courts did NOT err in denying the petitioners the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto.

The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings
under RoC, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Sec. 2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings.”

HOWEVER, notwithstanding Sec. 2, Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does
not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim.
 IN THIS CASE, the petitioners’ claim against the estate of the decedent is MERELY
CONTINGENT AND EXPECTANT.
The CA chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention (the Supreme Court AGREED on this wise). Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution of property in the custody of the
court x x x” While the language of Sec. 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently
held that the legal interest required of an intervenor “must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and NOT simply contingent and expectant.”

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the CA is correct. Nonetheless, as we have
explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as
persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and
rights provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT ISSUES:

1. Even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule
19, it would NOT necessarily mean the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
a. While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect
their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected.
2. Prayer 1: That petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate.
a. SC Ruling: To impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court
processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less
contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings,
and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of
cases.
b. FORTUNATELY, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by the Supreme Court:
i. Sec. 2, Rule 135 states that “the records of every court of justice shall be
public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested
person x x x.”
ii. Sa madaling sabi, hindi macompel ang court na magserve ng court processes
sa persons na CONTINGENT lang ang interest. Instead, said persons may
inspect the court records (kasi interested parties pa rin sila) in the intestate
proceedings.
iii. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them.
3. Prayers 2 and 3: Please refer sa summary above.
a. SC Ruling: There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either
duty (true inventory and appraisal, and annual count), BUT A PERSON WHOSE
 CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE IS STILL CONTINGENT IS NOT THE PARTY
ENTITLED TO DO SO.
b. Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the
proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Sec. 2,
Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal
of the administrator, a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to
seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the
preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence
or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
 Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons

RULE 73

Venue and Process

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.

Section 3. Process. — In the exercise of probate jurisdiction, Courts of First Instance may issue
warrants and process necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect
theirs orders and judgments, and all other powers granted them by law. If a person does not
perform an order or judgment rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it may
issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he performs such
order or judgment, or is released.

Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement of his estate, a person shall be
presumed dead if absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such
person proves to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after payment of all his
debts. The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding.
 CASE 1
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON,
petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

SUMMARY:
Respondent Elise, claiming to be the natural daughter (thus, compulsory heir) of Eliseo
Quiazon (who died intestate) filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las
Piñas City. Said petition was opposed by the petitioners (who claimed to be the legal wife of the
decedent, and children) due to, among others, improper venue.

The petitioners claimed that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac as shown in his Death
Certificate. As such, the Petition should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac, and not in Las Piñas.

FACTS:
1. Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on December 12, 1992.
2. On Sept. 12, 1994, herein respondents (Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter) filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo before RTC-Las Piñas City.
a. In her petition, respondent Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other.
i. To prove her filiation, Elise, among others, attached her Certificate of Live
Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
b. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and respondent Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to petitioner Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
c. In this petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000 and
personal properties worth P2,100,000.
d. In order to preserve the estate, Elise sought her appointment as administatrix of her
father’s estate.
3. The above petition was opposed by herein petitioners (by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss) Amelia (joined by her children) to whom Eliseo was married.
a. The petitioners claim that the venue of the petition was improperly laid.
b. That as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and
not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
i. That pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Revised RoC, the petition for
settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City.
c. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administatrix of Eliseo’s estate.

RTC Ruling:
1. Issued a Decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond amounting to P100,000.
a. That the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in
Capas as hearsay.

CA Ruling:
1. Affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
 a. That Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and
wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992.
2. Denied the petitioners’ MR.
3. Thus, the present petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45.

ISSUE:
WON the Petition for Letters of Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Piñas.

RULING:
YES, the Petition for Letters of Administration was properly filed with RTC-Las Piñas.

Under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the RoC, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death.

The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal
residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Sec, 1, Rule 73 of the RoC is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.

IN THIS CASE, it is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in said city.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode.

2. In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts.
a. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his
death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an
action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.

3. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.

4. Elise can be appointed as administatrix pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 78, and Sec. 2, Rule 79. –
as compulsory heir, Elise is an interested party.

5. Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights.
a. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally.
b. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
 marriage.
c. It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place
and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
d. Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father.

6. WON decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous. – YES, void.
a. Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating
priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac.
b. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved
at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
 CASE 2
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO
REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

Summary:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes,
one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI
Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in
Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the
second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she
was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but SC
held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate
proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack
of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA
ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

Facts:
1. 25 February 1964: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital,
Manila.
a. He was survived by his widow, (Petitioner), and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano
Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal
St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City; and
b. By his children of the first marriage,(Respondents) namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes
Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes
and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
2. 5 March 1964: Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with CFI
Cebu, alleging among other things, that:
a. The late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964;
b. He was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and
c. He left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
3. On the same date, CFI Cebu issued an order setting the petition for hearing, directing that
due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite
publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and
Province of Cebu.
a. The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and
modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to
be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court.
4. A third order was further issued stating that Lourdes’ petition for the appointment of a
special administrator was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as
reasons the following:
a. It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not
yet having been complied with.
b. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in
the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
5. 12 March 1964: Petitioner filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor,
as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament.
 a. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as
well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator.
6. 10 April 1964: CFI Cebu issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's
motion to dismiss until after CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of
that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased.
a. The order of CFI Cebu deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court
was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside
by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
proceedings in the appellate courts.
b. Instead, respondents filed CFI Quezon City an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City
court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in
view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court.
7. 11 April 1964: CFI Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason
the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."
a. Further found in said order that the residence of the late senator at the time of his
death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
b. Respondents’ MR and second MR were also denied.
8. 11 May 1964: the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times
at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared
and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
9. 15 May 1964: the Quezon City court noted that Respondents had opposed probate under
their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
a. That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
b. That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
c. That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by
mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the
time he affixed his signature thereto.
Probate Proceedings (CFI Quezon City):
1. The requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that
all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing.
2. Three instrumental witnesses testified to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio
Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty.
Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as
the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of
donation) all indicated that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City,
as also affirmed by him in his last will.
3. 15 May 1964: CFI Quezon City admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament
as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of
the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following
the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
4. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate
and naming Petitioner as executrix, Respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals to bar the Rizal
court from proceeding with the case.

Court of Appeals:
1. CA rendered a decision in favor of Respondents, holding that:
a. Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. The
case in Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first
invoked and which first attached.
b. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of
 i. whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and
ii. whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
c. Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI, it
follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI,
in which the petition for probate was filed by the Petitioner.
i. Petitioner should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in
the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
d. As to the order of CFI Cebu stating that the petition for appointment of special
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding”, it is sufficient to state in this connection that the
said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the
exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the
pronouncements of a trial judge.
2. Petitioner’s MR was denied.

Issue:
1. WON CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it to
refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. WON the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.

Ruling:
1. YES.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decedent or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.

HOWEVER, such court may, upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last
will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile
and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may
decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead
defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last
will.

In this case, upon Petitioner’s filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition,
CFI Cebu issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to
the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in
the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court,
then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would
thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon
City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.

2. NO.

Based on the above-mentioned ruling, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the
intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon
City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the
probate petition.
 Applying Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of
the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court
declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

In this case, Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the
Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Addt’l Notes:
◊ Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by
appeal:
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could
not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.

◊ When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had
improper venue:
The mischievous effect in the administration of justice of considering the question of
residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to
start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another
province is too obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the
one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on
jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon
City to the Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the
probate court.
 CASE 3
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018

Summary:
Estrellita’s husband is a PH Constabulary. He was missing for at least 3 decades. Estrellita
wanted to claim death benefits under PD1638 so she was instructed by PVAO/AFP to get a court
declaration of presumptive death. RTC granted under Art. 41 of the Family Code, which the CA
reversed. Supreme Court said a court declaration under Art. 41 is not warranted because this is a
case under NCC Arts. 390/391, which does not need a court declaration. PVAO/AFP can decide
on the presumptive death of their members for the purpose of claiming benefits.

Facts:
1. Wilfredo Matias is a Constabulary assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967
2. January 7, 1968: Estrellita Tadco-Matias and Wilfredo got married in Panagasinan
a. They acquired a conjugal home in 106 Molave St., Zpne B, San Miguel, Tarlac City.
3. September 15, 1979: went back to Pampanga to serve as constabulary
a. Wilfredo never came back since then
b. According to the service record of National Police Commission, he was declared
missing since 1979
c. Estrellita pestered the PH Constabulary about his whereabouts but to no avail: all
they know was that he was assigned to a place frequented by NPAs
4. After 3 decades of hoping: it is necessary for her to get a proof of death of at least a
declaration of presumptive death in order to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to
her in order to survive (since she has a meager source of income + old age)
5. April 10, 2012: Estrellita filed for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Wilfredo Matias
a. She filed for no other purpose than that to avail the benefit under PD 1638 (AFP
Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree)

RTC Ruling: GRANTED

1. Wilfredo is declared presumptively dead under Art. 41 of the Family Code for the purposes
of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer
2. Republic, through OSG, questioned this pronouncement via petition for certiorari

CA Ruling: REVERSED
1. RTC erred when it used Art. 41 of FC as the basis since it is not Estrellita’s purpose to
remarry, which is the purpose of Art. 41 of the FC.
a. IF ANYTHING, it must be under Arts. 390 and 391 of the New Civil Code
2. RTC has no jurisdiction to declare presumptive death under Arts. 390 or 391 of NCC.
a. Jurisprudence provides that Arts. 390 or 391 of NCC merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which
presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the
subject of an independent civil action or proceeding.
3. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
WON RTC has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

Ruling: NO.

In the case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, the rule
invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume that a
person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise
and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding.

Furthermore, the petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would be a prima facie presumption
only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement
or declaration, if it is that only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass.

In this case, the petition filed merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death under Civil
Code so RTC must have dismissed it outright since in our jurisdiction, it is not a valid suit, thus no
court has the authority to entertain such case. No actual right is enforced nor a wrong to be
remedied since NCC 390/391 merely express rules of evidence. Judicial pronouncement under
NCC 390/391 would never become final as the articles only confirms the existence of prima facie
or disputable presumption.

Addt’l Notes:
◊ WON the declaration of presumptive death under FC 41 is proper in this case

The petition for declaration of presumptive death is not an action that would have warranted
the application of FC 41 since Estrellita was not seeking to remarry. FC 41 is only applicable for
the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the law.

In this case, Estrellita was clearly relying on the presumption of death under the Civil Code,
NCC 390 or 391. In Estrellita’s petition, she files “not for any other purpose but solely to claim for
the benefit under PD 1638 as amended”. NCC 390 and 391 arises through operation of law
without the need of a court declaration, once factual conditions mentioned in the articles are
established. Philippine Veterans’ Affairs Office and AFP are the source of Estrellita’s
misconception since they require a declaration of presumptive death before beneficiaries can
claim death benefits. The PVAO and AFP can decide claims of death benefits of missing soldier
without requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such
soldier. The claimants of the death benefits need only to present “evidence” proving the
circumstances under NCC 390 or 391 except a court declaration.
 RULE 74

Summary Settlement of Estate

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and
no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means
of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,
whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and
as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of
deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under
oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be
filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor
files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.

Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the
estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the
estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than
one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice
which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interest persons as the court may direct,
the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and
without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the
persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after
the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons,
in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their

guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to
receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be
recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall
be recorded in the proper register's office.

Section 3. Bond to be filed by distributees. — The court, before allowing a partition in accordance
with the provisions of the preceding section, my require the distributees, if property other than real
is to be distributed, to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by court, conditioned for the payment of
any just claim which may be filed under the next succeeding section.

Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the
first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate
in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful
participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts
outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful
participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the
payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond
and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for
the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate
that may have been made.

Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person. — If on the date of the expiration of
the period of two (2) years prescribed in the preceding section the person authorized to file a claim
is a minor or mentally incapacitated, or is in prison or outside the Philippines, he may present his
claim within one (1) year after such disability is removed.
 CASE 1
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO
substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 187524               August 5, 2015

Nature of the Case:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009·, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, Which affirmed the
Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch
14, in Civil Case No. 217.

Facts:

1. Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs including herein respondents, as well
as several properties including a resort and a family home, both located in Nasugbu,
Batangas.
2. In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession, respondents alleged that their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio
and other children, sold the subject properties to herein petitioners without their knowledge
and consent.
3. Subsequently, respondents discovered an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a tabloid called Balita, thus, they caused the annotation of adverse
claim of the subject properties.
a. In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of
lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties.
4. However, the trial court decided in favor of herein respondents and annulled the transfer of
the subject properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
documents of conveyance offered by petitioners particularly:
a. the notary public was not commissioned to do so,
b. the date of execution was not indicated,
c. the amount of consideration was superimposed, and
d. it was not presented in the ROD of Nasugbu, Batangas.
5. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
a. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
6. It was elevated before the Supreme Court but it was automatically dismissed for failure to
comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's
identities.
a. Both motion for reconsideration and the subsequent 2nd motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
7. Petitioner’s son wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice seeking to decide the petition
on merits instead of technical defects but it was ignored. When the trial court’s judgment
attained finality, it issued an order of partial writ of execution.
8. Notwithstanding, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment and order before the
CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
a. However, CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration.
b. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
special proceeding for the settlement of estate of Pedro Rinoza and the Civil Action for annulment
of title of heirs and third persons in one proceeding. Considering that settlement of estate is a
special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was
sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides in part: “If the decedent left no will and
no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition…”

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides: “Complaint in action for partition of real
estate. - A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in
this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the property.”

Here, it must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if
testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate
shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in
the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein
the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate
either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The reason is
that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro
died without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioner's contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are,
in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

Additional Notes:

In Pereira v. Court of Appeals: Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court,

however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate
has no" debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action
for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to
do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the
heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where' partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
 CASE 2
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their
heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161220               July 30, 2008

Facts:

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children,
namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique.
On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante. On July 13, 1971, Gloria represented by counsel
filed before CFI of Cebu a petition for Letters of Administration but it was opposed by Francisco
assisted by counsel. In the hearing, both parties manifested that they agreed to settle their case.
Meantime, an order appointing Gloria as administratix was issued by the court. Subsequently, an
order was issued appointing Atty. Andres Taneo as the commissioner and to prepare the project of
partition for approval of the court. In his report, he stated that all heirs were subpoenaed to appear
on February 28 and 29, 1976 at Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu for a conference and meeting to
arrive at an agreement. However, Gloria, Salud and Enrique failed to appear in the said meeting
because they cannot be located at the given address but those who were present decided to go
ahead with the meeting. It further stated that one of the heirs informed all the present her desire to
buy the properties of the estate and pay Gloria P5,570.00 as her share of estate, as one of the
properties was mortgaged to her to defray their father’s hospitalization, in which, all heirs present
agreed. Consequently, the said report was approved by the court. It likewise appointed Lope
Cuyos as the new administrator on the basis of the motion to relieve Gloria.

Sometime in February 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique learned that all
the tax declaration of the properties in the name of their mother Agatona were cancelled and new
tax declaration were issued in the name of Columba. They filed a complaint against Gorgonio
Benatiro before the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP ) of the DOJ but it
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mediation before the barangay level was likewise
unsuccessful. Thus, a petition for annulment of the order was filed by respondents assailing that
the said Orde was null and void and has no effect. It being based on commissioner’s report which
was patently false and irregular and deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their
father’s estate. That no meeting ever took place for the purpose of settlement of estate and that
the report was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba who benefited from it.

Petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order
dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were
represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to
client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment
within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of
land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the
intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that
Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale
proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated
December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality. However, the CA granted the
annulment of the CFI’s order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all
the concerned parties to be present in the conference.

Issue:
 Whether or not the heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-
judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when
the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published.

Ruling:

No, they were not deemed notified.

In Cua v. Vargas, G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 374, it was held that,
“The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed
of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.”

Here, the publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of
execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was
never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the
settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the
present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and
the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed
notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards. We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a
hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of
the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the
statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively
depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law.
 CASE 3
JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA
VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 156536             October 31, 2006

FACTS:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester
Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres
Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan,
Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale4 was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings.
Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their
respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein,
she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16,
1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May
1995.5 She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had been published in the Catanduanes
Tribune.

After knowing of such sale to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property.
When the offer to redeem was refused, Gloria Vargas and her children filed a case for annulment
of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the MTC.

The MTC dismissed the complaint, declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding.

The RTC affirmed the MTC decision.

The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts, declaring that the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and
without any legal effect.

The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial
settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never
participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.

Petitioner argued among others, that the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property
subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The
publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the
partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no longer
have the right to redeem the property.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their
failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published.
2. Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who did
not participate therein, whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-
heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under
Article 1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual
knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exercise the
right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the date of actual
knowledge of the sale.

RULING:
The petition lacks merit.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement
will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who
had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of
execution.

The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

This is not to say, though, that respondents’ co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary
rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in
the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro
indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.

Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article
1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never
notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for
written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all
of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of
the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.

It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-
heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and
mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or
contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual
sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.
 It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the
vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under
the law, must be notified of the sale
Considering, therefore, that respondents’ co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is
no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner.
 CASE 4
SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners,
vs.
LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES MAGDALENA ROCES
TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES, JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA VIDA
PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.

G.R. No. 147468            April 9, 2003

Facts:
The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land
located on Arayat Street, Mandaluyong, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
caused the annotation of an affidavit of adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have
mortgaged the same to it.4

Subsequently, GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owner's
duplicates of titles. When Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, praying that the owner's duplicates in Roces' possession be declared null and
void and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be directed to issue new owner's duplicates to
GSIS.5 

The Court of First Instance issued an order granting the petition.6 The order became final
and executory, and TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) were issued in the name of
GSIS.7

Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980.8 He was survived by the respondents in
this case.

Reynaldo L. Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication

over properties. He alleged that the properties were owned by the spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces,
both of whom died intestate and that the properties were acquired during the existence of their
marriage; that the spouses left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that
neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the sole heir of the Roces
spouses.9

Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, praying for
the cancellation of TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664). 10 During the trial, GSIS failed to
produce any document evidencing the alleged real estate mortgage by Roces of the properties.
Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Montinola.
GSIS did not appeal the aforesaid judgment; thus, the same became final and executory.
Montinola executed a deed of absolute sale of the property covered by TCT No. 7299 in favor of
petitioner spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo.13 Thereafter, TCT No. 7673 was issued in the
names of petitioners.

Both TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673 contained the following annotation:
Subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the
inheritance left by the deceased SPS. CESAR ROCES & LILIA MONTINOLA.14

When respondents learned of the sale, they filed a complaint against Montinola and
petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They argued that the affidavit of self-adjudication
was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the Roces spouses and it was not true that
Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute
sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673, all covering the subject property, were null and void.15
 In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action
was barred by estoppel and laches.16

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of respondents.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, The Decision of the Court a quo appealed
from is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. Another Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the
Appellants.as follows:

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 which was denied in a Resolution dated

March 15, 2000.21 Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of appeals erred in holding that the annotation in the title
regarding section 4, Rule 74 is an encumbrance which disqualifies petitioners from being innocent
purchaser for value.

Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.

It is true that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens
and claims as are annotated on the title. However, this principle does not apply when the party has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.23

As stated above, the titles, namely, TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673, contained annotations which
made reference to the provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2)
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel
the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose
of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall
appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or
that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in
money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after
hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in
what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue
execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or
against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate
shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of
two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may
have been made.24

The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the
deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement and
distribution of estate. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not limited
to the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee of the
properties.
 In David v. Malay,25 it was held that the buyer of real property the title of which contain an
annotation pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value. In the same vein, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 7299 in this case
referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court was sufficient notice to petitioners of the
limitation on Montinola's right to dispose of the property. The presence of an irregularity which
excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face thereof.26 Purchasers of registered land
are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title.27

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the
consequences brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
 RULE 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. — No will shall pass either real or

personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal,
such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver. — The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty
(20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,
or to the executor named in the will.

Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. — A person named as executor in a
will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testate, or within twenty (20)
days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of
the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court
in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of
the trust or his refusal to accept it.

Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. — A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections without excused satisfactory to the court shall be
fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.

Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed. — A person having custody of a will after the
death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so
to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers
the will.
 CASE 1
In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. 38050           September 22, 1933

Summary:

Pursuant to the will left by Donata Manahan, petitioner was, thereby named as the
executrix of the testatrix. Prior thereto, she instituted a special proceeding to probate the will. Upon
hearing and after the presentation of evidence, no opposition challenged the will. As a result, it
was probated. One year and seven months later, respondent motioned for reconsideration praying
that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and be declared null and void ab initio.
Petitioner opposed and the RTC ruled on petitioner’s favor. Respondent appealed contending the
following: that she’s an interested party to the proceeding but was not notified; that the RTC did
not probate the will but only limited its authentication; and that the will is null and void ab initio on
the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been
complied with in the execution thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent can still challenge the order granting the probate of the will.

Ruling:

No. Respondent cannot anymore challenge the will after it was probated by the court. The
issue was resolved by the court as follows:

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from successfully
maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a
testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective
and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of
Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a

will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the
personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition
or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
....

XXX

Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to discuss herein the validity and
sufficiency of the execution of the will in question. As we have already said, this question
can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the
will in question was valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus
promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question
now constitutes res judicata.
 CASE 2
In the matter of the petition for probate of the will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia
Vs.
Natividad Garcia Santos
G.R. No. 204793. June 8, 2020

Characters:
1. Decedent: Consuelo, married to Anastacio Garcia (who also passed away)
2. Two daughters:
a. Remedios Garcia Tanchanco: died before her mother, leaving her children to be the
party in interest to the case.
b. Natividad Garcia Santos: the defending party to this case
3. Catalino Tanchanco and Ronaldo Tanchanco: children of Remedios, the ones challenging
the probate proceeding.

Summary:
Following the death of Consuelo, Catalino, one of her grandchildren, filed for settlement of
the intestate estate of Consuelo. Natividad, Consuelo’s daughter, filed a motion to dismiss stating
that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Consuelo. Both
cases were consolidated and each of the parties presented evidence. RTC appointed Catalino as
special administrator of the estate and disallowed the probate of the will. CA reversed RTC’s
decision and held that the trial court had prematurely ruled that Consuelo’s will is also intrinsically
invalid.

Facts:
1. Consuelo, at 91 years old, passed away leaving behind an estate consisting of several
personal and real properties.
2. Catalino filed a petition before the RTC of Pasay City to settle the intestate estate of
Consuelo.
3. Catalino alleged that the legal heirs of Consuelo are:
a. Catalino, Ricardo, Ronaldo and Carmela, all sumamed Tanchanco (children of
Remedios), and Melissa and Gerard Tanchanco (issues of Rodolfo Tanchanco,
Remedios’ son who predeceased her and Consuelo), and
b. Natividad, the remaining living daughter of Consuelo
4. Catalino additionally alleged that Consuelo’s properties are in the possession of Natividad
and her son, Alberto G. Santos (Alberto), who have been dissipating and misappropriating
the said properties.
5. Catalino prayed for:
a. his appointment as the special administrator of Consuelo’s intestate estate and the
issuance of letters of administration in his favor;
b. a conduct of an inventory of the estate;
c. Natividad and all other heirs who are in possession of the estate’s properties to
surrender the same and to account for the proceeds of all the sales of Consuelo’s
assets made during the last years of her life;
d. all heirs and persons having control of Consuelo’s properties be prohibited from
disposing the same without the court’s prior approval;
e. Natividad to produce Consuelo’s alleged will to determine its validity;
f. Natividad to desist from disposing the properties of Consuelo’s estate; and
g. other reliefs and remedies.
6. Natividad filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate
of the Last Will and Testament of Consuelo before Branch 115 of the RTC of Pasay City.
a. Natividad asked that Consuelo’s Last Will and Testament, entitled Huling Habilin at
Pagpapasiya ni Consuelo Santiago Garcia, be allowed and approved.
b. Moreover, as the named executrix in the will Natividad prayed that letters
testamentary be issued in her favor.
 7. The Tanchancos filed an Opposition to Natividad’s petition for probate alleging that:
a. the will’s attestation clause did not state the number of pages;
b. the will was written in Tagalog, and not the English language usually used by
Consuelo in most of her legal documents;
c. Consuelo could not have gone to Makati where the purported will was notarized
considering her failing health and the distance of her residence in Pasay City; and
d. Consuelo’s signature was forged.
e. Thus, they prayed for the disallowance of probate and for the proceedings to be
converted into an intestate one.
8. Natividad contended that there was substantial compliance with Article 805 of the Civil
Code:
a. Although the attestation clause did not state the number of pages comprising the will,
the same was clearly indicated in the acknowledgment portion.
b. Furthermore, the Tanchancos’ allegations were not supported by proof.
9. Conversely, the Tanchancos rebutted that the number of pages should be found in the body
of the will and not just in the acknowledgment portion.
RTC:
1. Eventually, the two were consolidated.
2. On the part of the will, the subject will was witnessed by:
a. Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico,
b. Atty. Ma. Isabel C. Lallana (who drafted the will), and
c. Atty. Aberico T. Paras; and
d. notarized by Atty. Nunilo O. Marapao, Jr.
3. All witnesses and the notary testified to the authenticity of the will, admitting the signing of
the will in the presence of each other and Consuelo in a conference room of Quasha Law
Office in Makati City.
a. Atty. Marapao averred that at the time of the execution of the will, Consuelo was very
alert and sane and was not suffering from any physical ailment.
b. Atty. Tantuico asserted that Consuelo was intelligent enough to read and understand
the will that she executed.
c. Atty. Lallana, through her deposition, identified the signatures on each and every
page of Consuelo’s will since she was familiar with the signatures of her former
associates and that of Consuelo’s given that she was present when the will was
signed.
d. Additionally, Atty. Lallana stated that during the execution of the will, Consuelo
possessed full mental faculties, consistently responded to the questions of the
witnesses regarding her personal circumstances, and was of sound mind and body.
4. On the part of Ronaldo, Ronaldo asserted that he had a close relationship with Consuelo
before she was hospitalized and insisted that Consuelo passed away without a will.
a. During the second year of Consuelo’s coma, Ronaldo met with Natividad, Alberto,
Catalino, Atty. Hizon, and Lumen Santiago to ascertain if Consuelo executed a will.
b. During the meeting, Natividad informed them that there was no will.
c. Moreover, he alleged that Consuelo cannot walk unaided as early as 10 years before
the alleged execution of the will due to a previous accident.
d. Ronaldo asserted that the will was one-sided as most of the properties would be
given to Natividad and contrary to Consuelo’s intention to equally distribute the
properties between her two daughters.
e. HOWEVER, Ronaldo conceded that Consuelo’s signatures in the will were similar
with those in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
f. Also, Ronaldo acknowledged that in a particular photo dated March 29, 1991,
Consuelo was standing alone and without assistance.
g. Also, he agreed that he could not have monitored every movement or transaction
entered into by Consuelo and that it was possible that Consuelo did not mention the
existence of the will to him.
 5. On the part of Catalino, Catalino alleged that he was Consuelo’s favorite and that they
had a close relationship.
a. He maintained that Consuelo told him that she did not execute a will since the
inheritance will be divided between her two children.
b. Catalino alleged that Natividad, after the burial of Consuelo, looted the things of
Consuelo and declared “war” against the Tanchancos.
c. HOWEVER, Catalino conceded that the signature in the will is similar to Consuelo’s
signature.
d. In any case, during his cross-examination, Catalino was confronted with the
inconsistency of the grounds they raised in their opposition to the probate of the will,
as they alleged forgery with respect to Consuelo’s signature in the will but at the
same time alleged that undue duress was employed upon Consuelo to execute the
will.
6. On the part of Natividad, she confirmed that she was in-charge of Consuelo’s businesses
during the latter’s confinement in the hospital.
a. She had an “and/or” account with Consuelo and she administered Consuelo’s
properties.
b. Consuelo was always accompanied by her alalay and she already needed
assistance because she could not stand on her own.
c. Consuelo was friends with Atty. Lallana who prepared Consuelo’s will sometime in
1987
d. Alberto, Natividad’s son, testified that Ronaldo knew about the status of the shares
of stocks which formed part of the estate as he was privy to the documents.
e. Moreover, he asserted that Consuelo, in 1987 or the same year the purported will
was executed, travelled to the United States.
f. The purported will was found in the belongings of Consuelo.
7. RTC appointed Catalino as the special administrator and set the bond at PhP 1 Million.
a. Natividad asked for a reconsideration but it was denied
8. RTC of Pasay City found the purported will replete with aberrations.
a. It noted that two attesting witnesses to the will and the notary public were all
associates of a Makati based law firm which is the counsel of Natividad in the instant
case.
b. Nobody among Consuelo’s relatives witnessed the execution of the alleged will.
c. Except for Natividad and her lawyers, no one knew that Consuelo ever executed a
will during her lifetime. Layug testified that they never went to a law office in Makati
City.
d. Moreover, the RTC noted that the will’s acknowledgment clause showed that
Consuelo’s residence was in Makati City and not in Pasay City where she actually
resided most of her life. It found it preposterous that Consuelo would change her
residence from Pasay City to Makati City just for the purpose of drafting a will, and
then return to Pasay City after its execution.
e. The RTC deemed it irregular when the purported will was suddenly produced only
after Consuelo’s death and not years earlier especially since it was allegedly
executed 10 years before her death.
f. Moreover, the will unconscionably favored Natividad as she was named as the
executrix of the will and most of the properties were disposed in her favor.
g. The trial court ruled that, taken as a whole, the will is dubious and should not be
allowed probate.
CA:
1. The CA held that Article 960 of the Civil Code preferred testacy over intestacy.
a. Also, according to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the due execution and
authenticity of a private document such as a will must be proved either by anyone
who saw the document executed or written or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
 b. Additionally, Section 11, Rule 76 provides that if the will is contested, all the
subscribing witnesses and the notary, if present in the Philippines and not insane,
must be produced and examined during the probate of the will
2. Natividad complied with the foregoing by presenting the testimonies of two attesting
witnesses, Atty. Tantuico and Atty. Paras, as well as that of Atty. Marapao who notarized
the will.
a. The appellate court held that the positive testimonies of the witnesses established
the due execution and authenticity of the will especially when the Tanchancos could
not present proof that the said witnesses are not credible or competent.
b. It added that the witnesses are all lawyers who are not disqualified from being
witnesses under the law except in cases relating to privileged communication arising
from attorney-client relationship.
3. The CA further found that while Consuelo figured in an accident which limited her mobility
years before the execution of the contested will, the Tanchancos failed to substantiate their
claim that it was impossible for Consuelo to move around outside her residence.
a. Moreover, it noted that Consuelo travelled to the United States on two occasions
more than a year before and then seven months after the contested will was
executed.
b. Thus, it was not impossible for Consuelo to travel from her residence in Pasay City
to the law office in Makati City.
4. Moreover, the appellate court held that a comparison of Consuelo’s signatures in her 1986,
1988 and 1989 residence certificates and the contested will did not compellingly show that
forgery was committed.
a. It ruled that the Tanchancos failed to establish that Consuelo’s signature was forged,
considering that they only advanced their self-serving allegation of fraud.
5. Also, that non-relatives witnessed the execution of the will did not affect its due execution.
a. It held that “the ruling of the court a quo that a perusal of the will even shows that it
unconscionably favors [Natividad] when the decedent [Consuelo] not only named
[Natividad] as executrix of the will but practically disposes of all the personal
properties in her favor including, if not all, the remaining real properties, already
involve [an] inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity which need not be inquired upon by
the probate court.
b. Ergo, the CA held that it is not a rule that an extrinsically valid will is always
intrinsically valid and that the trial court had prematurely ruled that Consuelo’s
will is also intrinsically invalid.
6. The CA found that the Tanchancos failed to prove that Consuelo was of unsound mind
when she executed the contested will.
a. Likewise, they only presented self-serving allegations without presenting an expert
witness that an 81-year-old woman does not have the legal testamentary capacity to
distribute her properties to her heirs upon her death. Additionally, it held that no law
requires the testator to execute the will in the presence of his or her heirs and
relatives.
b. It similarly ruled that the Tanchancos did not present proof that Consuelo could not
understand Tagalog.
7. The appellate court noted that while the attestation clause did not state the number of
pages comprising the will, still, it is verifiable by examining the will itself, as the pages were
duly numbered and signed by Consuelo and the instrumental witnesses.
a. Moreover, the acknowledgment portion of the contested will states that Ang HULING
HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan
ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito. SAKSI ang aking lagda at panatak
pangnotaryo.
b. In fine, the appellate court found that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code. It held that since Consuelo named
Natividad as the executrix of the will, such should be respected unless the appointed
 executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond in which case the
court may appoint another person to administer the estate.
8. The CA declared that the will should be allowed probate.

Issue:
Whether or not a probate proceeding can resolve inquiry as to intrinsic validity of the will.

Issue as to the attestation clause since it did not indicate the total page of the will.

SC Ruled in favor of the respondent. Since the will was executed complying all the requisites in
806 and 805.

Ruling: NO.
In the case of Baltazar v. Laxa, the Supreme Court held that the probate court cannot
inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator.
Thus, due execution is “whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law” as mandated by Articles 805 and 806 of the
Civil Code.
 CASE 3
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

G.R. No. L-23445             June 23, 1966

Testatrix: Rosario Nuguid, single without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate

Petitioner: Remedios Nuguid, sister of Testatrix
Respondents: Felix and Paz Nuguid, parents

Doctrine/s:
Wills; Succession; Probate of will; Court’s area of inquiry is limited to extrinsic validity of will;
When Court may rule on intrinsic validity.—In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the Court should meet that issue

Same; Preterition; Omission of forced heirs in the will.—Where the deceased left no descendants,

legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line—her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the
case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Summary:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her parents
and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sisters, filed in court a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She
prayed that the will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration be issued to her. Felix
and Paz, Rosario’s parents, opposed on the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution
of Remedios as the universal heir of the decedent, oppositors, who are compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line, were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Facts:
1. Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single
2. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Petitioners, and six (6) brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios(Respondent), Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid
3. Petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario Nuguid about 11 years before her demise.
a. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
4. Respodents entered their opposition to the probate of her will on the ground that by the
institution of Petitioner as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void.
CFI Ruling:
 CFI, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of
the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
 Petitioner’s motion to reconsider thwarted

Issue/s:
 1) WON probate proceedings are called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.
2) WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.

Ruling:
1. No, as a general rule, the probate court may not rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic
validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.

In this case, the parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But petitioner
and oppositors travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

However, if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, the litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event
of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again
before the Supreme Court on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result:
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce the Court to a belief that they might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.

2. Yes, the compulsory heirs were preterited.

Art. 854 of the New Civil Code provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

In this case, the holographic will allegedly executed by the decedent assigned Remedios as
the sole, universal heir despite the fact that Rosario’s parents and siblings are still living at the time
of her death. This thus resulted in the preterition of compulsory heirs.
 CASE 4
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

Doctrine/s:

Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity of a

will before passing upon its formal validity.—The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Same; Same; Invalidity of one testamentary disposition does not necessarily invalidate all
other dispositions made therein.—The rule is that “the invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be
presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made” (Art 792, Civil Code).

Summary:
Leodegaria Julian, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of 67. She was
survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and 6 legitimate children. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in
the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial will where testatrix declared (a) she was the
owner of the "southern half of 9 conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land
which she inherited from her father (c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of
the fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. Although initially
opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary
Rights manifesting that out of respect for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary
rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children.  In that same instrument he confirmed the
agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties
would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will. Atty. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the
lawyer of Petitioner, filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting
authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the
conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes. The lower court held that the will was void
and converted to intestate proceedings.

Facts:
1. Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. 
a. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate
Children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina
B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
2. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. 
a. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared that:
i. she was the owner of the "southern half" of nine conjugal lots (par. II);
ii. she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from
her father (par. III) and
 iii. it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her
heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be
satisfied out of the fruits of the properties.
3. Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-
two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she
described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
that part of her will. 
a. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by
her. 
b. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.
4. Felix Balanay, Sr. (husband) and Avelina B. Antonio (child) opposed the probate of the will
on the grounds of:
a. lack of testamentary capacity,
b. undue influence,
c. preterition of the husband and
d. alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. 
5. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which
he had received from the testatrix.
6. Petitioner, in his reply, attached an affidavit of Felix Balanay Sr., wherein he withdrew
his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its
probate.
a. The father also signed an instrument captioned “Conformation of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights” which contains manifestations that:
i. He has waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their six children and;
ii. He confirmed the agreement between him and his wife which they had
perfected before her death. (Conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will)

7. Avelina B. Antonio contended that the affidavit and conformation were void on the grounds:

a. That the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the “southern half” of
the conjugal lots.
b. That she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine
lots to her children.
8. Meanwhile, another lawyer (David Montaña Sr.) who claims to be the lawyer of the
petitioner filed a motion to withdraw probate of alleged will of the testator, requested
authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding, and that the corresponding notice
to creditors be issued.
RTC:
1. Dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an instestate
proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the instestate proceeding
for hearing.
a. The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point.
b. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. 
2. Petitioner, through a new counsel, asked for a reconsideration of the lower court’s order on
the ground that the said lawyer had no authority to withdraw the petition for the
allowance of the will because they have already terminated Montaña’s services and
informed him that his withdrawal of the petition was without their consent and was
contrary to the repeated reminder that their
mother’s will was “very sacred” to them.
a. Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration.
b. The lower court denied the motion.
 c. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent
assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

Issues:
WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

Ruling:
No, the probate court did not err.

The law provides where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

In this case, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity had been established.  The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.  Where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue.

HOWEVER:
The probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would
not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made").  "Where
some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if
they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"

In this case, the statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be
disregarded.

However, there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the
conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose
of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal
estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower
court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this
opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
 CASE 5
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG,
CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

Doctrine:
Succession; Wills; Jurisdiction; The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a
will null and void will be sustained where no useful purpose will be served by requiring the filing of
a separate civil action and restricting the court only to the issue of extrinsic validity of the will.—We
are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition f or probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA
449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho
v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
206, No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
Summary:
Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the
sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with
whom he had 3 children. Petitioner filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her
children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and
that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner. The lower court denied the
probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on
its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of
the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Facts:
1. Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal.
a. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page
three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina
Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in
the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public.
b. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the
testator and his three attesting witnesses.
2. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein Petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate.
a. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since
1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living
with petitioner as husband and wife.
 b. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein,
Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the
Peace.
c. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein
petitioner.
3. In 1974, Petitioner filed for a petition for probate (CFI Rizal, Br. 34 Caloocan City) and
asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
a. In 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and
improper influence by the petitioner to the testator alleging that the testator was
already very sick during and that she is wanting for integrity for living in concubinage.
CFI:
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974,
the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
CA:
1. The respondent court set aside the decision of CFI Rizal denying the probate of the will.
a. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of
the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
2.  Oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error"
praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the
decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead
passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs."
a. The motion was granted by the respondent court 
3. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
a. This was denied by the respondent court.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

Ruling:
No, the CA acted within its jurisdiction.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
 In this case, the Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
 CASE 6
NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE, petitioners,
vs.
GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

Doctrine:
Civil Law; Wills; As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to
passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution
thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law.—As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are
limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due
execution thereof, the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provision of the will. The
question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. Nufable vs. Nufable, 309 SCRA 692, G.R. No.
126950 July 2, 1999
Summary:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was
survived by his children. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication and
hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order admitting
to probate the last will and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable. However, one of
the heirs, Angel actually mortgaged the entire property to DBP two months prior to the settlement
which property was eventually foreclosed. Thereafter, Nelson, son of the mortgagors, purchased
said property from DBP. The other heirs now filed for the annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting one-fourth of the property to Nelson and
the other three-fourths to the other heirs. Petitioners filed the present petition contending that the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of Edras Nufable did not determine the ownership of the
land in question as against third parties.
Facts:
1. Edras Nufable owned at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square
meters, more or less.
a. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel
Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable.
2. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication and hearing, the then
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order admitting to probate
the last will and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable.
3. On June 6, 1966 the same court issued an Order approving the Settlement of Estate
submitted by the heirs of the late Edras Nufable.
4. HOWEVER, two months earlier, spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina Nufable mortgaged
the entire property located at Manjuyod to the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP].
a. Said mortgagors became delinquent for which reason the mortgaged property was
foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973
5. On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable (who died on
August 29, 1978), purchased said property from DBP.
6. Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable filed with the lower court a complaint
"To Annul Fraudulent Transactions, to Quiet Title and To Recover Damages' against
Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silmor Nufable and his mother Aquilina Nufable. Plaintiffs pray:
 a. That the said Deed of Sale (Annex "C") executed by the Development Bank of the
Philippines in favor of the defendants be declared null and void as far as the three
fourths (3/4) rights which belongs (sic) to the plaintiffs are concerned;
b. That the said three fourths (3/4) rights over the above parcel in question be declared
as belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth right to each of them;
c. To order the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs by way of actual
and moral damages the amount of P10,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as Attorney's
fees, and to pay the costs.
d. Plus any other amount which this Court may deem just and equitable.
7. In their Answer, Defendants contend that the late Angel Nufable was the exclusive owner
of said property, that as such owner he mortgaged the same to the Development Bank of
the Philippines on March 15, 1966, that said mortgage was foreclosed and the DBP
became the successful bidder at the auction sale, that ownership was consolidated in the
name of the DBP, and that defendant Nelson Nufable bought said property from the DBP
thereafter.
a. During this period, the plaintiffs never questioned the transactions which were public,
never filed any third party claim nor attempted to redeem said property as
redemptioners, and that said Deed of Sale, Annex "B" to the complaint, is fictitious,
not being supported by any consideration.
CA: (medyo nalito ako sa full text kasi wala akong makita na CFI ruling re: sale huhu)
The appealed decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new judgment is hereby entered declaring plaintiffs-appellants as the rightful co-owners
of the subject property and entitled to possession of 3/4 southern portion thereof; and defendant-
appellee Nelson Nufable to 1/4 portion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent probate
are pertinent and material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable
who purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property of the Development Bank of
the Philippines.

Ruling:
No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not affect the title
of Nelson.

At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of Edras had already
acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the
purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of the
late Esdras Nufable was admitted or that the Settlement of Estate was approved. It is to be noted
that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in
stating that “the land situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided
because this must remain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them
brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.” It was there for the will of the decedent that the
subject property should undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years
pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code.

Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject property to DBP on
March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angel’s right over the subject
property was limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso share. As co-owner of the subject property, Angel’s
right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only alienate his
pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. Hence, The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that
Angel Custodio Nufable “had no right to mortgage thesubject property in its entirety. His right to
encumber said property was limited only to 1/4pro indiviso share of the property in question.”

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition
for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
 RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court for the allowance of his will.

Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters are prayed;
(e) If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the allowance of the will, or the issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration with the will annexed.

Section 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such
court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed
by the testatorhimself.

Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The
court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident
in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be
known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he
be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of
residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at lest (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.

Section 5. Proof at hearing. What sufficient in absence of contest. — At the hearing compliance

with the provisions of the last two preceding sections must be shown before the introduction of
testimony in support of the will. All such testimony shall be taken under oath and reduced to
writing. It no person appears to contest the allowance of the will, the court may grant allowance
thereof on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only, if such witness testify that the
will was executed as is required by law.
In the case of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator. In the absence of any such competent witness, and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

Section 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will. Certificate thereupon. — No will shall be proved as a lost
or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is
proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been
fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two (2) credible witnesses. When
a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge,
under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed
and recorded.

Section 7. Proof when witnesses do not reside in province. — If it appears at the time fixed for the
hearing that none of the subscribing witnesses resides in the province, but that the deposition of
one or more of them can be taken elsewhere, the court may, on motion, direct it to be taken, and
may authorize a photographic copy of the will to be made and to be presented to the witness on
his examination, who may be asked the same questions with respect to it, and to the handwriting
of the testator and others, as would be pertinent and competent if the original will were present.

Section 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or do not reside in the Philippines. — If the
appears at the time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing witnesses are dead or insane, or that
none of them resides in the Philippines, the court may admit the testimony of other witnesses to
prove the sanity of the testator, and the due execution of the will; and as evidence of the execution
of the will, it may admit proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the subscribing witnesses, or
of any of them.

Section 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the
time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

Section 10. Contestant to file grounds of contest. — Anyone appearing to contest the will must
state in writing his grounds for opposing its allowance, and serve a copy thereof on the petitioner
and other parties interested in the estate.

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. — If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed under the
Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province
where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the
due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the
manner required by law.
If a holdgraphic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses
who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

Section 12. Proof where testator petitions for allowance of holographic will. — Where the testator
himself petitions for the probate of his holographic will and no contest is filed, the fact that the
affirms that the holographic will and the signature are in his own handwriting, shall be sufficient
evidence of the genuineness and due execution thereof. If the holographic will is contested, the
burden of disproving the genuineness and due execution thereof shall be on the contestant. The
testator to rebut the evidence for the contestant.

Section 13. Certificate of allowance attached to prove will. To be recorded in the Office of

Register of Deeds. — If the court is satisfied, upon proof taken and filed, that the will was duly
executed, and that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind, and
not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence, or fraud, a certificate of its allowance,
signed by the judge, and attested by the seal of the court shall be attached to the will and the will
and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk. Attested copies of the will devising real estate and
of certificate of allowance thereof, shall be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in
which the lands lie.
 CASE 1
TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,
vs. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA
FABELLA and ANDREA RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-23135, December 26, 1967
Facts:
1. Mariano Sumilang filed in the CFI-Quezon a petition for probate of a document alleged to
be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa.
a. Written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949.
b. The document institutes petitioner Mariano as sole heir of the testator.
2. Two sets of oppositors-appellants opposed the petition:
a. Questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under
duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament.
b. The first set of oppositors also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled
to inherit the estate of the deceased.
c. The second set only prayed for the disallowance of the will.
3. A few months after hearing, the oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that “the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and
testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by
implication of law six years before his death.”
a. That after making the will, deceased Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano and his
brother Mario the parcels of land described therein.
4. Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal:
a. That oppositors have no legal standing in court; and
b. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of the estate of the
aforesaid testator.
CFI-Quezon decision:
1. Ruled in favor of petitioner-appellee Mariano:
a. That the allegations in the oppositors’ motion to dismiss go to the intrinsic value of
the will and other grounds stated are without merit.
b. Upon discovery that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth
degree (and thus strangers to the deceased), the motion to strike out opposition and
other pleadings pertinent thereto was also ordered stricken out of record.
2. Thus, the instant appeal.

Issue:
WON the petition for probate should have been dismissed.
Ruling:
NO. The court a quo was correct in allowing the will for probate.
In Nuguid vs. Nuguid, to establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings x x x for the probate of a will.”
Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any
devise or legacy is premature.
In this case, the oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss the petition for probate on
the ground that the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands
disposed of therein.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides
the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution.
The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to the
extrinsic validity thereof.

Additional notes:
1. “It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat
Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as
one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor,” (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)
2. “The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the
court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the
intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle
them to be heard with relation thereto.” (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)
a. In this case, the oppositors do not take issue qith the court a quo’s finding that they
are strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate.
 CASE 2
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (3rd
Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
G.R. No. L-72706, October 27, 1987
Facts:
1. On May 29, 1984, Petitioner Acain filed in the RTC-Cebu a petition for the probate of the
Will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. 591-
A-CEB).
a. That Nemesio Acain died leaving a Will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio,
Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Conception, Quirina and Laura were instituted
as universal heirs.
b. Will was allegedly executed on Feb. 17, 1960, was written in Bisaya with a
translation in English.
c. The Will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment
of a certain Atty. Ignacio Villagonzalo as the executor.
2. On the disposition of the testator’s property, the will provided that in case his brother
Segundo Acain predeceases him, all the money properties, lands, houses in Bantayan and
in Cebu which constitutes his (Nemesio’s) share shall be given to his children, namely:
Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose.
a. Segundo predeceased Nemesio.
3. The oppositors (Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter’s widow
Rosa) filed a motion to dismiss on these grounds:
a. That the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedngs;
b. That the petitioner is merely a universal heir; and
c. The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
4. The motion to dismiss was denied, as well as the MR.
5. Subsequently, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
a. This was referred to the IAC.
b. Respondent IAC granted respondent’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the Will.
c. Petitioner’s MR was also denied.
6. Thus, the present petition for review of respondent IAC’s decision.

Issues:
1. WON the private respondents have been preterited.
2. WON the petitioner has legal standing to file the petition for probate.
Ruling:
1. The Widow was not preterited, but the legally-adopted child was.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
IN THIS CASE, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the DIRECT LINE.
AS TO THE CHILD (Virginia Fernandez, respondent): Under Art. 39 of PD 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. By the universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator, it cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in
the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime.

2. NO, the petitioner has no legal standing to file the petition for probate.
In Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967, in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor.
In this case, petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there
being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive (Art. 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an
interest in the will as an heir, defined under Art. 782 of the Civil Code.
HOWEVER, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect NOT an heir of the testator. Thus,
he has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Spec.
Proc. No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.
 CASE 3
APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 169700               July 30, 2009

Facts:
RTC
On June 3, 1991, Petitioner Apolonia Banayad Frianela filed before RTC Pasay City the
allowance of November 18, 1985 holographic will of her late uncle Moises Banayad, in which she
was named as DEVISEE. She alleged that Moises died without issue and left the following
properties: a parcel of land situated in Pasay City; Images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta
including the crown; and all personal belongings. Respondent, a cousin of petitioner filed his
opposition and counter-petitioned the allowance of two (2) other holographic wills of Moises dated
September 27, 1989 and September 28, 1989. After trial on merits, the trial court rendered its
decision declaring “November 18, 1985 WILL” having revoked by “September 27, 1989 WILL”,
allowed the latter will, and named respondent as administrator of Moises’ Estate.

CA
On appeal, the CA modified the RTC’s decision and ruled that the SEPTEMBER 1989 WILL
revoked only the NOVEMBER 1985 WILL insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moises’ real
property was concerned. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.

Ruling:
No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.

Sec. 19 (4) of BP 129 provides that, “RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
Php20,000.00; Sec. 33 (1) of BP 129 provides that, “MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, x x
x x , where the demand does not exceed Php20,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs but
inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be specifically alleged.

Here, the applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over
probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, which value must be alleged in
the complaint or petition to be filed. Significantly, in this case, the original petition docketed before
the trial court contains only the following averments:
 1. That petitioner is of legal age, married, resident of Pasay City and named as DEVISEE in
the Last Will and Testament of MOISES BANAYAD, deceased who died in Pasay City
General Hospital on March 27, 1991;
2. That the said Last Will and Testament is attached in the petition;
3. That the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines and residing at 2237 P. Burgos St.,
Pasay City at the time of his death;
4. That the properties left by the decedent consist of real and personal properties particularly:
a. A parcel of land described under TCT No. 9741;
b. Imahen ng Oracion del Huerto at Pieta, kasama and korona; and
c. All personal belongings;
5. That the testator at the time of the execution of the said Will was of sound and disposing
mind.

In this case, nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises’s
estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error
when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed
before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset,
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said
ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have
dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People cannot be applied because: First, as
a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government. And second,
and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been
made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court.

Additional notes re: Tijam v. Sibonghanoy as discussed in this case:

 The complaint was filed before CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948, barely a month after the
effectivity of RA296 known as Judiciary Act of 1948;
 Said petition is for recovery of sum of Php1,908.00 plus interest against the defendants.
 As prayed for by complainant, writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants’ properties. But the same was dissolved upon the filing of counter-bond by
defendant and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. (Surety)
 After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and upon finality and motion by
plaintiff, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant.
  When said Writ having returned unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved for the issuance of writ of
execution against the Surety’s bond, wherein said Surety opposed contending that NO
DEMAND has been made upon surety. Thus, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion.
 When said demand was made and upon failure of the surety to satisfy judgment, another
motion for issuance of writ of execution was filed. On the date of hearing, counsel for the
Surety moved to file their answer within 5 days, which the court granted. Upon their failure
to file said answer, the court granted plaintiff’s motion and issued a Writ of Execution
against the Surety.
 Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ because it was issued without the
required “summary hearing”, which the trial court denied and CA affirmed it. (as
pronounced by Supreme Court, summary hearing, is a procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal
and regular judicial proceedings" thus, what is essential is that "the defendant is
notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged
upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the
rights of the parties."
 5 days after the Surety received the said CA’s decision of the CA, they file a motion for
extension to file motion for reconsideration, which the CA granted and after 2 days, they
filed a MOTION TO DISMISS on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, contending that CFI lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that under RA296 had become effective and
that it is the justice of the peace and the judge of a municipal court have exclusive
jurisdiction where the value of the demand does not exceed P2,000 and not CFI.
Considering, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all
cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue", the CA certify and forwarded
the case.
 Supreme Court held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction; that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court; Similarly, the Court frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
 The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
 Thus, the CFI’s order and issuance of writ of execution against the Surety was affirmed.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

Devisee – inherits real property

Legatee – inherits personal property
Devise – testamentary gift of real property
Legacy – testamentary gift of personal property.
 CASE 4

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169144               January 26, 2011

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
Facts:
Ruperta Plaganas (Ruperta) is a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. Citizen. She is
childless. She executed a will in California designating her brother Sergio as executor of her will
for she left properties both in Philippines and in the U.S. On November 8, 2001, she died.

RTC
On May 19, 2003, respondent Ernesto (brother of Ruperta) filed before RTC Malolos,
Bulacan a petition, for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. This was opposed by petitioners Manuel and Benjamin (Ruperta’s
nephews) on the ground that it should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where it
was executed; that even assuming it could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid for having
been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of
such act; and that Ernesto is not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime on separate occasions, Gloria and Sergio (foreign-based siblings of Ruperta)
had short time visits in the Philippines. Thus, respondent Ernesto moved to take their deposition
with leave of court, which was granted.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

CA
Petitioners assailed the said Order arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. However, the
CA affirmed the RTC Order. It stressed that under Sec. 2 of Rule 76 of the ROC does not require
prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines; that it is different from “reprobate” which allows a will already probated and
allowed abroad; and that “reprobate” is governed by different rules of procedure. Aggrieved,
petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
Ruling:
Yes, a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it
has not been probated and allowed abroad.

Article 816 of the Civil Code states that “the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.”
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take
cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in
the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

In Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 115, 133 (1973), “Our rules require merely that
the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts;1 (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the
name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it.

Here, our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign
will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

ADDITIONAL NOTES
The Supreme Court’s explanation about petitioners’ contention
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin must have in mind the “re-probate or re-
authentication” of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country under Rule 77 before
admitting it in the Philippines, which is different from probate where the will is presented for the
first time; In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate
court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established; Rule 77 can be applied only on
reprobate, and not in this case.
Petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. Art. 838 of the Civil Code and Rule 75,
Sec. 1 of ROC provides that “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the
will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.” In this case, If the instituted heirs do

1
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province.
not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright
of their inheritance.
Lastly, the RTC’s order is only an initial ruling (it does not finally dispose the case) it only
ruled that: The court can take cognizance of the case2; and that, in the meantime, designating
Ernesto as special administrator of the estate.

Thus, the parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the
testator’s state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of
wills by the laws of California -- This explains the trial court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the
duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and
Probate of Will of California.

2
petition for probate of Ruperta’s will
 CASE 5
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21993             June 21, 1966

Summary:
Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile Petitioners filed
a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a
another court in Rizal. Petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the
settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

Facts:
1. Celistino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in Manila.
a. A month later, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.
b. Days later, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition
for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will.
c. Later on, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.
2. Subsequently, Maria and Angela Rodriguez filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez;
a. They alleged, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque,
Rizal, and died without leaving a will and
b. They also prayed that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the
estate;
3. Subsequently, Rerspondents filed a petition in the CFI Bulacan for the probate of the will
delivered by them on March 4, 1963.
a. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal;
b. that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year
1930 up to the time of his death in 1963;
c. that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite,
Quezon City and Bulacan.
4. Petitioners contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00
A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for probate, citing Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja.
5. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the
case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the
case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
CFI Bulacan:
◊ CFI denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that a difference of a few hours did not
entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants
were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, and that they only
filed the case to prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
◊ Reconsideration was also denied.

Issue:
Whether or not CFI Bulacan has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
Petitioners’ contention:
Petitioners relied on Sec. 1, Rule 73.

Ruling: YES.
Section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. —
When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the
Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause
notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous
to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate
has been filed by the testator himself.

In this case, the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the
will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed
until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps
to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to
what is prescribed by the law.

Addt’l Notes:
◊ The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for
the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere
deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as
yet filed.
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to
relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
◊ Petitioners object, section 3 of Rule 76 speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having
jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent
was domiciled in Rizal province.
We cannot disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy,
Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout
some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply
that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction.
As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law
upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the Court.
Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal
property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan. That is sufficient in the case before us.

◊ The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead
of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts,
even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the
Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that: “The Court first taking cognizance of the
 settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.”
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants
precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.
Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy takes
place only in the absence of a valid operative will. Only after a final decision as to the nullity of
testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted.
 CASE 6
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

Doctrine:
With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original
will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time and accordingly must comply with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice to the known heirs, legatees and
devisees, and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner.

Summary:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens
and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first,
the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in
a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate
probate proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate
in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He
contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He
further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as
such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud
said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with
New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate
court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

Facts:
1. Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan became American citizens.
a. They lived in the US with their children Jocelyn, Jacqueline and Josephine.
2. Dr. Jose Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife “all the
remainder” of his real and personal property at the time of his death “wheresoever situated.”
a. In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children
and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee.
b. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.
“If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances
that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall
be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption”
3. Four days later, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing
the same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
“If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that
there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be
presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and
distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.”
4. Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their
home.
5. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills,
filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York.
 a. These two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in
his favor.
6. Subsequently, Salud Teodroro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn filed with the RTC Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in
New York.
a. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
RTC Bulacan:
1. Letters of administration were issued in Perez’s favor.
2. Perez filed motions praying for certain life insurance companies (Philippine Life Insurance
Company and Philippine American Life Insurance Company) be directed to deliver the
proceeds of the life insurance policy taken by the deceased Cunanan spouses.
a. Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to Petitioner the amount of
P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan.
3. In another motion, Perez asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a
Philippine Trust Company passbook savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time
deposit certificates.
4. Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, namely:
a. Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.,
b. Priscilla Cunanan Bautista,
c. Lydia Cunanan Ignacio,
d. Felipe F. Cunanan and
e. Loreto Cunanan Concepcion.
f. He also manifested that before receiving Petitioner’s motion his clients were
unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, “in the interest of
simple fair play,” they should be notified of the proceedings.
5. Perez then filed a counter manifestation basically alleging that the Cunanan collaterals had
no legal or proprietary interests to protect and no right to intervene.
a. Probate court granted Perez’s motion.
6. Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of,
or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates.
a. They alleged that being the “brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs” of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been “deliberately excluded” in the petition for the
probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the
Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such
“misrepresentation” deprived them of their right to “due process in violation
of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court.
7. In her opposition, Perez asserted:
a. that she was the “sole and only heir” of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to
the exclusion of the “Cunanan collaterals;” hence they were complete strangers to
the proceedings and were not entitled to notice;
b. that she could not have “concealed” the name and address of Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills
but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court;
c. that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the
allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of
 Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same
provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country;
8. In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had
entered into an agreement in the United States “to settle and divide equally the estates,”
and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the “court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and
cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance”.
a. They further asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the
provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs,
executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with.
9. Judge de la Llana issued an order:
a. disallowing the reprobate of the two wills,
b. recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
c. requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her
as special administratrix and
d. declaring all pending incidents moot and academic.
10. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were
executed in accordance with the law of New York.
a. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the
foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
b. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan
spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not
signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
11. A lot of motions and exchanges happened between the parties and along the line the
original Perez Petitioner was substituted by her daughter because she was ailing.
(Guys, di na nako kaya idigest ang nahitabo kay daghan kaayog MR ug orders, unya lisod pa jud
sabton kay dili connect connect huhu)

Issue:
Whether or not the Cunanan heirs should have been notified.
(This is the specpro issue but the main issue was regarding the effectivity of the will here in
the Philippines and the requisites it needed to comply with for it to take effect Also if both wills
should be jointly probated. It dealt more with Conflicts of laws).

Ruling: YES.
Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to
notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall “cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance” means that
with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original
will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.

Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication
and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
 In this case, the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim,
are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed
for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator”.

Addt’l Notes:
◊ Whether or not the wills of the Cunanan spouses may be made effective in Ph.
When are wills executed by aliens abroad effective in RP? 
Art 816: if made with the formalities prescribed
a. by the law of the place in which he resides
a. in his country
a. By NCC
◊ Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
a. Due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws
b. Testator has his domicile in the foreign country (not in RP)
b. The will has been admitted to probate in such country
a. The fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court
a. The laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
In this case, all except first and last were proven by evidence.
◊ Why need to present evidence of the contents of the foreign law? 
Ph courts cannot take jurisdiction of foreign laws
Wills of the Cunanan Spouses should be probated jointly (but it doesn't mean that it's a joint
will):
a. construe rules liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
b. No Joint wills: the Cunanan spouses executed SEPARATE WILLS. Since the
2 wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills
of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are
given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
 CASE 7
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

Facts:
 The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.
 In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar
Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
 Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament’s body
nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
 The petition was also opposed by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of
a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property
could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
 RTC: Admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It held that since it must decide
only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity
of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with
the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
- Petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will
in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix.
- As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private
respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was
completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration
in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by
the testatrix.
 CA: Reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and
814 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or
undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations
and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complied
with.
Ruling: YES.
CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complied with.
A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and
date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be
admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The
lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides
for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). This separation
and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the
NCC – and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the
grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow
a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:
1. Whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
2. Whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. Whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and
4. Whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain these
primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other
formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable
handwritten by the testator.
 RULE 77

Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder

Section 1. Will proved outside Philippines may be allowed here. — Wills proved and allowed in a
foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2. Notice of hearing for allowance. — When a copy of such will and of the order or decree
of the allowance thereof, both duly authenticated, are filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court
shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance.

Section 3. When will allowed, and effect thereof. — If it appears at the hearing that the will should
be allowed in the Philippines, the shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the
judge, and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be
filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proves and
allowed in such court.

Section 4. Estate, how administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any shall be disposed of as is provided
by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country.
 RULE 78

Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. — No person in

competent to serve as executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

Section 2. Executor of executor not to administer estate. — The executor of an executor shall not,
as such, administer the estate of the first testator.

Section 3. Married women may serve. — A married woman may serve as executrix or
administratrix, and the marriage of a single woman shall not affect her authority so to serve under
a previous appointment.

Section 4. Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. — When a will has been proved and
allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor
therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as required by these rules.

Section 5. Where some coexecutors disqualified others may act. — When all of the executors
named in a will can not act because of incompetency, refusal to accept the trust, or failure to give
bond, on the part of one or more of them, letters testamentary may issue to such of them as are
competent, accept and give bond, and they may perform the duties and discharge the trust
required by the will.

Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
 CASE NO. 1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855               August 4, 2009

Facts:
RTC Pasig City, acting as probate court issued an Order granting letters testamentary in
solidum3 to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari directly before the Supreme Court. It was referred to CA, but the same was dismissed
for erroneous appeal. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents,
specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a
number of cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with
questionable integrity.
Meantime, RTC issued an order appointing as joint special administrators of the estate of
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the Undersecretary
of the Department of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for this purpose) and
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to serve as such until an
executor is finally appointed.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand
Marcos.

Ruling:
No, they were competent.

In Ozeata v. Pecson, “It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is
the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application.”

In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, “The courts have always respected the right to
which a testator enjoys to determine who is most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his
solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. After the admission of a will to probate, the
courts will not name a better executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the
widow or friend or other person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the
statutory grounds of incompetency.”

3
As a whole; entirety; exclusive
 Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states: “No person is competent to serve as
executor or administrator who: x x x x (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties
of trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.”

Here, petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda
Marcos have already been reversed by this Court. Hence, the so-called "convictions" against
respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an
executor. On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II
involve four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges
for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1977 (NIRC). It is a matter of record, that the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand
Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for
all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only
ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover,
and as admitted by petitioner, said decision is still pending appeal. Therefore, since respondent
Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section 45 of the
NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of
the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on
affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax
return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
On Moral Turpitude
As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in
Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."
In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, “As a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an
element are looked on as involving moral turpitude.”
The "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere
omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual.

On petitioner’s contention of estoppel

Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and are, therefore,
estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof.
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot be
held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue legal grounds
in opposing the probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later on
overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve as
executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross
abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTC’s discretion.

On respondents’ objection to transfer to the Philippines of Marcos assets

Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the transfer to the
Philippines of the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks.
Supreme Court held that the same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant
consideration. Time and again, this Court has stressed that this Court is a court of law and not a
court of public opinion.
Petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own evidence
and that respondents offered no evidence to show that they were qualified to serve as executors.
It is basic that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence. Consequently, it was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to substantiate the
grounds upon which it claims that respondents should be disqualified to serve as executors, and
having failed in doing so, its petition must necessarily fail.
 CASE NO. 2
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013

Facts:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition
was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon
(Jennifer). Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico. The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. Motion for reconsideration was denied, and the CA affirmed the RTC’s
ruling. Hence, this petition contending that the CA overlooked the fact that Elise Quiazon has
not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration.

Issue:
Whether or not Elise is an interested party.

Ruling:
Yes.

Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides: If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;4

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

4
Please take note that this is in order of preference.
 In Solinap v. Locsin, Jr., 423 Phil. 192, 199 (2001), “An "interested party," in estate
proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers
to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate
as distributees.”

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on
her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to
sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Order of preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78:
1. Husband or wife
2. Next of kin
3. Person selected by number 1 or 2
4. Principal creditor/s
5. Other person as the court may select

As regards petitioner’s contention of improper venue

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death.

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.

Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.

It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.

Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.
 RULE 79

Opposing Issuance Of Letters Testamentary. Petition And Contest For Letters Of

Administration

Section 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for

administration. — Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters
testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the
court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may,
at the time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Section 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of
administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of
the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner
provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration. — Any interested person may, by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person for whom
letters are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and
may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or person named in the
opposition.

Section 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. — At the hearing of the petition, it must first be
shown that notice has been given as hereinabove required, and thereafter the court shall hear the
proofs of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left
no will, or that there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of
administration to the party best entitled thereto.

Section 6. When letters of administration granted to any applicant. — Letters of administration

may be granted to any qualified applicant, though it appears that there are other competent
persons having better right to the administration, if such persons fail to appear when notified and
claim the issuance of letters to themselves.
 CASE NO. 1
G.R. No. 129505           January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 133359           January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V.
GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and
PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents.
Summary:
Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court. He
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the
custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. Petitioner
Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de
Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of
letters of administration in his name.

Facts:
1. Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his
will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati.
2. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that:
a. he had no compulsory heirs;
b. he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.;
c. he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and
d. copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
3. Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the
petition and allowing the will.
4. Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died.
5. Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child
of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-
blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
a. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
b. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name.
6. On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61.
7. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion.
a. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities
in support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his
intervention.
b. Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996.
 c. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose
with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was assigned to Branch 65.
d. Upon private respondent's motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued
an order appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santos's estate.
8. Petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of
private respondent as special administrator.
a. Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on
the ground that it was related to the case in said court.
RTC Ruling:
◊ In Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied Petitioner’s motion for intervention.
CA Ruling:
◊ Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which upheld the denial of Petitioner’s
motion for intervention.

Issue:
WON Petitioner may be considered as an interested person who has a right to intervene
and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

Ruling: NO.
Sec. 1, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. — Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds
why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as
executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon
the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters
of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.

In this case, Petitioner is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de
Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of
the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a
will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can
inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent’s estate is, therefore, not direct
or immediate.
 RULE 80

Special Administrator

Section 1. Appointment of special administrator. — When there is delay in granting letters

testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects. Pending suits. —

When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the deceased, the
powers of the special administrator shall cease, and he shall forthwith deliver to the executor or
administrator the goods, chattels, money, and estate of the deceased in his hands. The executor
or administrator may prosecute to final judgment suits commenced by such special administrator.
 CASE NO. 1
G.R. No. 187879               July 5, 2010
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO
E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners, vs. RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M.
OCAMPO, Respondents.
Summary:
Petitioners are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo who died January
23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings are the legitimate children and only heirs of spouses Vicenta
and Maxima Ocampo who died intestate. Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings
and alleged that upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, Respondents and their brother Leonardo
jointly controlled the estate of their parents. However, when Leonardo died, Respondents took
possession, control and management of properties to the exclusion of Petitioners. Respondents
filed their opposition but was denied by the RTC. Respondents reiterated their prayer for
appointment as joint special administrators of the estate. Petitioners argued that they had been
deprived of their fair share of income of the estate and the appointment of respondents as special
joint administrator would further cause injustice to them.

Facts:
1. Petitioners are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo, who died on
January 23, 2004.
a. Leonardo and his siblings (respondents) are the legitimate children and only heirs of
the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19,
1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively.
b. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna.
c. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.
2. 5 months after the death of Leonardo, Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate
proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and
Leonardo M. Ocampo in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna.
a. The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and
their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of
their parents.
b. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-
third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate.
c. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners.
d. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the
estate of Leonardo.
e. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and
award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.
3. Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition contending that the petition was
defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding.
a. They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same
being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the
settlement of his parents’ estate.
b. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint
administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima.
 4. RTC denied respondents’ opposition to the settlement proceedings but admitted their
counter-petition.
a. The trial court also clarified that the judicial settlement referred only to the properties
of Vicente and Maxima.
5. Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators, respondents reiterated
their prayer for appointment as special joint administrators of the estate, and to serve as
such without posting a bond.
a. Petitioners argued that, since April 2002, they had been deprived of their fair share
of the income of the estate, and that the appointment of respondents as special joint
administrators would further cause injustice to them.
b. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to
serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents and
Dalisay.
6. RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the
deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of ₱200,000.00 each.
7. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and
unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate, considering that she even failed to take
care of her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997.
a. Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to
Submit Inventory and Accounting praying that the RTC issue an order directing
respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to
render an accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the
income of the estate.
b. Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation claiming that they could not yet
be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the income and
assets of the estate inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration
of the order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato.
8. RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with
Erlinda.
a. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of
Vicente and Maxima.
b. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even manifested in open court their desire
for the speedy settlement of the estate.
9. On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents’ appointment as joint special
administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the
Estate,17 reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special administrators, should
be directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate.
RTC:
1. 8 months after appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a
Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial
Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator.
a. Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as the
estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified and
undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of
special administrators.
b. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of
special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due
them.
c. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for
₱2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for
 ₱1,500,000.00, and respondents’ alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed
the estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact,
were not yet paid.
2. RTC granted petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and
Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order,
particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as
special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and of an
income statement of the estate.
a. RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a
bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the
properties and an income statement of the subject estate.
b. RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed
her duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix.
CA:
1. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in:
a. declaring them to have failed to enter the office of special administration despite
lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not entered the office because they
were waiting for the resolution of their motion for exemption from bond;
b. appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and
Maxima, instead of them who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses,
were the next of kin; and
c. declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing and
evidence against them.
2. CA granted the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on
their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix
without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such.
a. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents
could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators,
particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an
income statement thereon.
3. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.
a. The CA, however, denied it.

Issue:
WON it was proper for the RTC to revoke the appointment of Respondents as joint special
administrator.

Ruling: YES.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration
and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative
of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.
 In this case, while the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory
requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon
and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under
Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As
long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice,
and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.
 CASE NO. 2
LUIS L. CO, petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, ELIZABETH RACHEL CO,
ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM, GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO, KEVIN CO, EDWARD CO
and the ESTATE OF LIM SEE TE, respondents.
G.R. No. 160671             April 30, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

Nature of the Case:

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court questioning the October 28, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 72055.
Facts:
1. On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp. Proc.
No. M-4615, appointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the
estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun.
a. However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner’s
appointment as special co-administrator. 
b. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for brevity), for
appointment as co-administrator of the estate. 
c. On August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.
2. Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, issued
its January 22, 2002 Order revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.
a. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust
given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence
to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of
several criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had
provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with
utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.
3. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but this was denied in
the RTC Order of May 14, 2002.
4. Subsequently, petitioner brought the matter to the CA on petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
a. In the aforesaid challenged October 28, 2003 Decision, the appellate court affirmed
the revocation of the appointment and dismissed the petition.
b. Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking and setting aside the
appointment of Alvin.
Ruling:
No, trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as
special co-administrator
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by
the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
higher courts will not interfere with it.   This, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his
judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principles.
Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court
finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.  The special administrator is an officer of the
court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest
of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
In this case, SC find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as special
co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized
by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be
correctible by the writ of certiorari.
In fact, the appellate court correctly observed that given the consideration of the fiduciary
nature of the office of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and
confidence in the person to be appointed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending
such ruling, as it was reached based on the court a quo’s own fair assessment of the
circumstances attending the case below, and the applicable laws
The court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal charges of falsification of
commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding profound duty to defend
himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and qualification to act as special co-
administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only
proper under the attendant circumstances. Such reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual
logic and probability. Without condemning the accused man (sic) as guilty before he is found such
by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely declared that it is more consistent with the
demands of justice and orderly processes that the petitioner’s son, who is already bidden
to defend himself against criminal charges for falsification in other fora be relieved of his
duties and functions as special administrator, to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.

Additional Note:
The Court observes that this prolonged litigation on the simple issue of the removal of a special
co-administrator could have been avoided if the trial court promptly appointed a regular
administrator. We, therefore, direct the trial court to proceed with the appointment of a regular
administrator as soon as practicable.
 CASE 3
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, vs. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA
AVILA PARREÑO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193161               August 22, 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the April 30, 2009
Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-
MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas).
The CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No.
708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas,
Diosdado Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent
Florencia Avila Parreño (Parreño) as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas
and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
Facts:
1. Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas.
a. They had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August
12, 1968.
b. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his
adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
2. Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the
administratrix.
a. She stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino
Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she
acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino Manungas. 
b. Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October
29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of
Engracia Manungas.
c. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia
Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.
3. RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City (Oct. 25, 1995), appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia
Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
4. Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and
damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City.
a. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son
of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary
period and was not considered by the MTC.
b. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas,
ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to Engracia
Manungas.
c. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to the RTC of Tagum, Davao
City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC. 
d. On appeal to this Court, defendants’ petition was denied for having been filed out of
time in a Resolution which became final on April 20, 1998.
RTC:
 1. Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor
before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao.
a. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir
of Engracia Manungas.
b. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging
that
i. Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas
claiming that he was not a Manungas,
ii. that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a creditor of
Engracia Manungas or her estate and
iii. that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia
Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil
Case No. 5196-96.
c. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
2. Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction. 
a. In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreño’s appointment as special administrator
of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the
latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis.
b. He added that Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator having already
been fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian.
c. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreño is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of
Engracia Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
d. On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the
revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.
e. Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA.
CA:
1. The CA issued its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated Parreño
as the special administrator of the estate.
2. Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 15,
2009 which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
3. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled to annul the appointment of Diosdado herein
petitioner as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Parreño.

Ruing:

No, CA did not err in reversing RTC’s order. The RTC acted with Grave abuse of discretion
in its ruling.
Jurisprudence held that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion
of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, it was stated that “it is well
settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section
2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does
not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed,
discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity.
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that “While the
RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators
is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other
than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon
and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do
not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on
reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the
estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice
and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special
administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed as stated in Sec. 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules.
Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. — Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from
such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate
and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.

In this case, the fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of
Engracia. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so
he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. There is no logical reason to appoint a
person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.

On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still
alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of
her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the
decedent’s estate.
Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as
special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power
in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
Additional Notes:
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It
must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino
Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part
of the Estate of Manungas.
In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value.
There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.

Other Issues (Just in case Fiscal Mission asks)

1. W/N the CA erred in disregarding jurisprudence which hold that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. NO.
2. W/N the CA erred in denying petitioner’s MR which grossly violated the rule that once a
decision or order is final and executor, it becomes immutable and unalterable. NO.

Ruling:

RTC order is an interlocutory order and as such certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper
remedy.
● The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the RTC is an
interlocutory order. He alleged that certiorari cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal.
Further alleging that Parreño should have appealed the RTC order to the CA through Rule
45 and having failed to file within the reglementary period, the order cannot be the subject
of review by this court.
● The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or
preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or
intestate proceeding
● Ocampo v. Ocampo
“The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus
interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.”
● Section 1(c) of Rule 41
“Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
 xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.”

● Further, there was no necessity to file for MR

○ G: MR is required before appeal via Rule 65.
○ E (there are several but in this case the court only cited one): Where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
○ This case is purely one of law.