Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo
20-A___
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, NEW YORK,
Applicant,
v.
GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
Respondent.
RANDY M. MASTRO
Counsel of Record
AKIVA SHAPIRO
WILLIAM J. MOCCIA
LEE R. CRAIN
LAUREN M. KOLE
AVERY E. MASTERS
DECLAN T. CONROY
SETON H. O’BRIEN
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
(212) 351-4000
[email protected]
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s Executive Order 202.68 limits in-person
without regard to the size of the building and despite allowing numerous secular
businesses to operate without any capacity restrictions. The district court found,
following an evidentiary hearing, that The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New
each step . . . ahead of the curve, enforcing stricter safety protocols than the State
required at the given moment,” and it is undisputed that “there has not been any
COVID-19 outbreak in any of the Diocese’s churches since they reopened.” Ex. C at
3. The district court nonetheless denied the Diocese’s motion to preliminarily enjoin
the fixed-capacity caps in Executive Order 202.68 as applied, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to issue an injunction pending the
businesses to operate without any capacity restrictions, violate the Free Exercise
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), and the Chief Justice’s concurrence in South Bay
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613-14 (2020), require the
i
action taken in response to a public health emergency, even when fundamental rights
Applicant is the Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York and is the Appellant in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
New York. Respondent is the Defendant in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York and is the Appellee in the United States Court of
DECISIONS BELOW
All decisions in this case in the lower courts are styled The Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. Cuomo. The order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, dated November 9, 2020, denying Applicant’s motion
for an injunction pending appeal, over the dissent of Judge Park, is attached hereto
as Exhibit A (the “Second Circuit Order”). The text order of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, dated October 20, 2020, denying
The order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
dated October 16, 2020, denying Applicant’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
which is the order on appeal in the circuit court, is attached hereto as Exhibit C (the
ii
“PI Order”) and is also available at 2020 WL 6120167. The transcript of the district
attached hereto as Exhibit D. The order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, dated October 9, 2020, denying Applicant’s motion for
a temporary restraining order is attached hereto as Exhibit E (the “TRO Order”) and
is also available at 2020 WL 5994954. Both the PI Order and the TRO Order have
been designated for publication in the Federal Supplement, but reporter citations are
not yet available. The docket number in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York is 20-cv-4844, and the docket number in the United
JURISDICTION
Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292. This Court has
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................ iii
iv
II. The Equities Weigh Strongly In Favor Of Injunctive Relief. ...................... 36
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 40
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
In re Abbott,
954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 30
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) ................................................................................................ 32
Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene,
763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) .................................................................................... 35
Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976) ................................................................................................ 36
vi
Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) .............................................................................. 18, 19, 21, 22
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) ...........................................................................................passim
Lucas v. Townsend,
486 U.S. 1301 (1988) .............................................................................................. 18
Murphy v. Lamont,
2020 WL 4435167 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2020)............................................................ 35
vii
Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC,
479 U.S. 1312 (1986) .............................................................................................. 17
Roberts v. Neace,
958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) ......................................................passim
In re Rutledge,
956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2020) ................................................................................ 30
Soos v. Cuomo,
2020 WL 6384683 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2020) .......................................................... 30
Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ............................................................................................ 34
Ward v. Polite,
667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 22, 24
viii
Constitutional Provisions
Statutes
Regulations
Executive Orders
Other Authorities
Laycock & Collins, Generally Applicable Law & the Free Exercise of
Religion, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (2016) ......................................................................... 36
ix
TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN BREYER,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
ACTING CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT:
Pursuant to Rules 20, 22, and 23 of the Rules of this Court, and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651, Applicant The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York (“Applicant”
and 25 people in so-called “red” and “orange” zones, respectively, regardless of the
capacity of the “house of worship,” and thereby effectively shutter all of the Diocese’s
churches in those zones. His Executive Order, moreover, expressly singles out
businesses, and does so in a way that is not narrowly tailored to any compelling
in Brooklyn and Queens will continue to be deprived of their core Free Exercise rights
on a daily basis until the matter is resolved in the lower courts—even though it is
undisputed that the Diocese has complied with all prior public health regulations and
operated safely without any COVID-19 spread since being permitted to reopen
While this Executive Order effectively closes churches and other houses of
1
permitted to remain open without any capacity limitations whatsoever, even in the
most restrictive “red” zones. In “orange” zones, even the vast majority of non-
restrictions, the Governor expressly acknowledged that these rules “are most
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment” is subject to “strict scrutiny.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 546
(1993). And here, the Governor openly admitted that his Executive Order is a “blunt”
injunction pending appeal, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Those applications were denied, as was the Diocese’s
subsequent emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal in the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit’s decision, issued over a written dissent from Judge Michael H.
Park, places that court on the wrong side of circuit conflicts regarding the States’
authority to impose these sorts of restrictions on religious worship during the COVID-
19 pandemic. Specifically, the lower courts in this case: (1) concluded that restrictions
singling out houses of worship for disparate treatment are facially neutral, and
therefore not subject to strict scrutiny, as long as some secular businesses are treated
less favorably than religious institutions, even if many others are treated far better;
and (2) misread this Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
2
(1905), and Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in South Bay Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613-14 (2020), as establishing a blanket rule of rational
evolved over time. Compare, e.g., Second Circuit Order at 3-4, with id. at Dissent 1-
3.
issue of the day (i.e., where to draw the line between fundamental individual rights
The lower courts appear to have disregarded the fundamental principle for
which Jacobson stands—namely, that States’ “discretion” to protect public health and
shall contravene the Constitution of the United States, nor infringe any right granted
or secured by that instrument.” 197 U.S. at 25. Since then, this Court has expressly
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved,” and that
constitutional limitations on the powers of the States “are questions which have
always been, and always will be, the subject of close examination under our
constitutional system.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26
3
(1934); see also Second Circuit Order at Dissent 2-3 (explaining that Jacobson
“specifically noted that ‘even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a state,’ a
public health measure ‘must always yield in case of conflict with . . . any right which
[the Constitution] gives or secures’” (alterations in original) (quoting 197 U.S. at 25)).
South Bay arose during the early days of the pandemic, when there was widespread
confusion about how COVID-19 is transmitted and the practices necessary to combat
its spread, and it involved far less onerous fixed-capacity restrictions on houses of
worship (up to 100 people at a time) than the effective shutdown order at issue
here. In a 5-4 decision, with the Chief Justice concurring, the Court declined to issue
a writ of injunction at the pandemic’s inception. Here, in contrast, there are findings
of fact and an evidentiary hearing record establishing the rigorous safety protocols
implemented by the Diocese that have resulted in the safe operation of the Diocese’s
churches, without any COVID-19 outbreaks, for several months before this latest
shutdown order. And as the pandemic now approaches its ninth month, it is
misguided for lower courts to interpret the Chief Justice’s concurrence in South Bay
as the last word on these issues. See Second Circuit Order at Dissent 2. Rather, as
circumstances have evolved and track records developed, it is incumbent upon courts
to examine closely States’ continuing actions, especially when they impose new
4
duration directed at all “houses of worship,” that in another time would plainly be
Even in denying relief below, the district court acknowledged that the Diocese
“has met its burden to show irreparable harm” because it “adequately alleged that
its churches and preventing its parishioners in Brooklyn and Queens from being able
to attend Mass. PI Order at 9-10. The Governor did not dispute that finding in the
court of appeals, and the Second Circuit acknowledged that “the challenged order
Dissent 3. That irreparable harm grows with each passing day and, absent
The Diocese acknowledges that the State has a clear interest in combatting the
pandemic, and that certain restrictions may be narrowly tailored and hence
permissible, depending upon the circumstances. Indeed, the Diocese voluntarily shut
its doors before the State required it to do so in the early days of the pandemic, when
the virus was surging in New York and little was understood about how to limit the
spread of COVID-19. And the Diocese does not challenge the entirety of the
Governor’s Executive Order, or even the entire portion targeting “houses of worship.”
In fact, the Diocese previously operated safely under a 25% capacity restriction and
implemented what the district court below described as “rigorous safety protocols,”
5
eliminating congregant singing and choirs during Mass) as a condition of injunctive
hearing, the Diocese “[a]t each step . . . has been ahead of the curve, enforcing stricter
safety protocols than the State required,” and it is undisputed that “there has not
been any COVID-19 outbreak in any of the Diocese’s churches since they reopened.”
Id. at 3-4. Thus, the as-applied injunction the Diocese seeks poses no risk to public
health or safety. Nor has the Diocese challenged any prior executive action taken in
response to the pandemic. But this new Executive Order’s discriminatory 10- and 25-
person fixed-capacity caps are a bridge too far—and are not narrowly tailored at all.
See Second Circuit Order at Dissent 3 (“Applying strict scrutiny, there is little doubt
that the absolute capacity limits on houses of worship are not ‘narrowly tailored.’”
(quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546)). As the Sixth Circuit observed in enjoining similar
restrictions as applied to a compliant church: “While the law may take periodic naps
during a pandemic, [courts] will not let it sleep through one.” Roberts v. Neace, 958
The Diocese therefore respectfully requests that the Circuit Justice grant this
application or refer it to the full Court. The Diocese hopes to reopen in time for
Sunday Mass this coming weekend, so it requests that an injunction issue as early as
Friday, November 13, 2020, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and that it remain
in effect until such time as this Executive Order’s 10- and 25-person fixed-capacity
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
comprised of 186 parishes, and 210 total churches, in Brooklyn and Queens, New
York. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 7-2. Those boroughs’ combined population exceeds 4.9
million, 1.5 million of whom identify as Catholics. Ibid. In 2019 alone, the Diocese
1,951 Marriages, and had an average weekly attendance of almost 230,000 spread
across over 1,000 weekly Sunday Masses. Ibid. In light of the diverse, multicultural
upon New York City. At the time, little was known about the virus or its
transmission, and the crisis evolved rapidly. The Diocese acted swiftly in response,
13:12-21, 18:3-5, 21:9-22:14; Ex. L ¶ 13; Ex. M at 1-2; Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 7-6. On March
16, ahead of any government shutdown orders, the Diocese elected to cancel all public
Masses. PI Order at 3. On March 19, the Diocese ordered all of its parishes and
churches shuttered altogether. Ex. D at 13:12-21, 18:3-5, 21:9-22:14; see also Ex. M
at 8.
things, banned all public gatherings. The Diocese strictly complied with this ban—
keeping parishes and churches closed as it had already been doing. PI Order at 3.
7
This period of closure was extremely painful for the Diocese and its faith community.
Ex. L ¶ 7. Among other things, parishioners were denied the ability to attend in-
person Mass, which is “absolutely essential” in the Catholic faith tradition. Ex. D at
Chappetto, Vicar General for the Diocese, this “was the heartbreak of our people
because that’s what defines us as Catholics. . . . We are people of the Mass.” Ex. D at
21:2-16. Catholics believe that, when they attend Mass, “they are listening to the
Word of God and . . . participating in the Lord’s Supper” through the receipt of
consecrated bread and wine; indeed, “receiving the Holy Communion for a Catholic is
[Holy] Communion to every household. It’s impossible.” Id. at 20:22-23. The Diocese
restrictions on its parishes in the best interest of the health and welfare of the
At the same time, the Diocesan leadership worked to ensure that, when the
time came, the Diocese would be able to offer congregants a safe worship space. To
met. PI Order at 3; Ex. D at 34:24-35:14; Ex. L ¶ 8; Ex. P ¶ 10. The commission was
Emergency Management and former Chief of Department of the New York City Police
8
Department. PI Order at 3. Commission members consulted closely with medical
professionals regarding the protocols, which, once finalized, were sent to each parish
(through Bishop Chappetto’s office) via weekly memoranda, posted to the Diocese’s
public website, and transmitted to the public via social media. Ex. D at 35:17-36:2;
Ex. L ¶ 9. The committee met numerous times throughout May and June. Ex. L ¶ 8;
Ex. P ¶ 10.
accordance with the iterative regulations promulgated by New York City and New
York State. Ex. D at 35:17-36:2; see also Ex. P ¶ 11. In so doing, all churches in the
Diocese adopted the commission’s safety protocols. PI Order at 3; see also Ex. D at
39:2-9, 40:11-14, 40:18-41:19; Ex. L ¶ 10; Ex. P ¶ 11. During the initial reopening
period, churches within the Diocese did not offer public Mass. Ex. D at 17:21-22; see
also Ex. M at 31, 36. By June 22, City and State guidelines permitted churches to
commission, the Diocese waited until June 29 to reopen for in-person weekday
services at the 25% capacity limit, and did not reopen for weekend Mass until July 4
(again at 25% capacity), to ensure that all proper protocols had been implemented by
each parish. PI Order at 3; see also Ex. D at 39:20-40:10; Ex. L ¶ 10; Ex. M at 37.
parishes in obtaining all essential items they would need to safely reopen, including
masks, disinfectants, and hand sanitizer. Ex. D at 16:5-17:2, 36:3-37:14; see also Ex.
L ¶ 10; Ex. M at 35. Parishes that were unable to secure supplies or otherwise
9
implement the COVID-19 protocols were instructed to delay their reopenings. Ex. L
¶ 10; see also Ex. D at 16:5-23. Prior to reopening, each church was thoroughly
sanitized. Ex. L ¶ 11; see also Ex. D at 16:18-23. All parishes were advised to report
inform Bishop Chappetto. Ex. D at 18:16-19, 42:3-18; see also Ex. L ¶ 15.
Since reopening in early July, each church within the Diocese has had to
adhere to strict protocols regarding church practices and services. Among other
requirements, churches must: (1) ensure that parishioners wear a mask at all times,
except for a brief moment when they receive a socially distanced Holy Communion
(discussed below); (2) block off every other pew so congregants cannot sit immediately
in front of or behind one another; (3) mark off seats with tape six feet apart within
each open pew to ensure appropriate social distancing; (4) provide hand sanitizer
stations throughout the church; (5) open only for abridged hours, both on weekdays
and for weekend Masses; (6) comply with the 25% capacity restriction, which the
Diocese has voluntarily retained even after the State later increased the cap to 33%;
(7) keep multiple doors open for various points of entry and exit, and direct traffic in
and out of the church, to ensure that worshipers enter and exit in a socially distant
manner; (8) sanitize the church before and after each Mass; (9) require additional
ushers and security guards to enforce compliance with all of the required procedures
and protocols; and (10) post prominent signage about safety protocols. PI Order at 4;
Ex. D at 16:3-17:2, 18:3-5, 36:17-40:10; Ex. L ¶ 12; Ex. M at 31-33; Ex. P ¶¶ 11-13.
Diocesan leadership and members of the committee, including Bishop Chappetto and
10
Commissioner Esposito, conducted site checks to confirm compliance with the
instituted at the outset of the pandemic. Most notably, the Diocese has
fundamentally altered the manner in which its churches distribute the sacrament of
Holy Communion, one of the most central and sacred acts in the Catholic Church.
Ex. D at 22:15-23:18; see also Ex. L ¶ 13. Ordinarily, parishioners are provided a
Communion wafer (or “host”) either in their hand or on their tongue, and at many
churches those parishioners also have the option of receiving wine. Ex. D at 17:3-
churches can no longer be taken on the tongue, and wine is no longer distributed at
all. Ibid. Likewise, priests refrain from greeting congregants in person before or
after Mass, and parishioners no longer shake hands, hug, or kiss when offering the
successful. In all the months since the reopening, there has not been a single reported
New York, Governor Cuomo announced a “New Cluster Action Initiative.” PI Order
at 4-5; Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 7-4. This new initiative—formalized in Executive Order
11
202.38, the order at issue in this case—identified certain purported at-risk areas,
including areas in Brooklyn and Queens. PI Order at 5; see Ex. F. The Executive
Order divided these at-risk areas into “red,” “orange,” and “yellow” zones, with red
zones representing areas that had the highest number of “cluster-based cases of
The Executive Order singles out “houses of worship” for categorically different
treatment. Ibid. In red zones, “houses of worship” are subject to a capacity limit of
“essential” businesses—a broad category that includes everything from grocery stores
to pet shops to accounting and payroll offices—may remain open in red zones without
capacity limitations, while “non-essential” businesses are closed. Ibid.; see also Ex.
Ex. F. Both “essential” and “non-essential” businesses—in other words, almost all
limitations. Ibid.; see also Ex. D at 66:6-9. Only certain “high risk businesses,” such
as spas and piercing parlors, are required to close in orange zones. Ex. F.1
The “house of worship” restrictions do not account for, or make any distinction
based on, the size of a church. For example, a church that typically houses 1,000
1 The Executive Order also imposes various restrictions on restaurants, schools, and an undefined
class of “[n]on-essential gatherings.” Ex. F.
12
parishioners must now reduce in-person attendance to 10 (in a red zone) or 25 (in an
orange zone). Given the seating capacity of the impacted Diocesan churches—
hundreds of people or more—they will all be governed by these fixed caps, rather than
the more flexible percentage caps. Ex. L ¶¶ 18-19; Ex. N ¶¶ 2-5.2 The Executive
and “spiritually harmful” burden on the Catholic community. Ex. L ¶¶ 20-21; see also
admitted that “these new rules are most impactful on houses of worship.” Ex. H at
8. The Governor has repeatedly stated that this latest Executive Order is motivated
that “the issue is with th[e] ultra-Orthodox community,” that “the cluster” where a
and that “Catholic schools are closed because” of their proximity to “that cluster.” Ex.
2 As of the date of the PI Order, there were 14 Diocesan churches in red zones and 12 Diocesan
churches in orange zones, ranging in capacity from 200 to 1,200 people. Ex. L ¶¶ 18-19; Ex. N
¶¶ 3-5. The Governor thereafter modified the zones such that 10 Diocesan churches fell within
red zones and none fell within orange zones. See Ct. App. Dkt. No. 59 at 18-19 ¶ 4. Following two
further modifications to the zone designations, there are currently six Diocesan churches in orange
zones and none in red zones. See Ct. App. Dkt. Nos. 75, 78. Because the zones are regularly
reevaluated, new red and orange zones can be introduced—and the existing zones can expand or
contract—at any time. See Ct. App. Dkt. No. 59 at 18-19 ¶ 5. For this reason, although the
Governor argued in the court of appeals that these rolling modifications to the zones had mooted
parts of the Diocese’s challenge to the restrictions applied to particular churches at different points
in time, all of the issues raised in this case are plainly “capable of repetition, yet evading
review.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). Moreover, as
noted, as of this filing, six Diocesan churches remain subject to challenged orange zone restrictions.
13
synagogues were “not even close” to complying with prior “50% of capacity” rules. Ex.
those areas,” given that it had been “following the rules.” Ibid. During a call with
Jewish community leaders, the Governor conceded that the Executive Order is
C. Procedural History.
On October 8, two days after the Executive Order was issued, the Diocese filed
this action and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
District Judge Eric Komitee, acting as the assigned Miscellaneous Judge, denied the
TRO the next day, but expressly said this was a “difficult decision” and invited the
Garaufis, the case’s assigned judge, so that “the record may be developed more fully.”
TRO Order at 3, 5-6. Judge Komitee acknowledged that this was a “difficult decision”
for at least two reasons: (1) the Order “contains provisions made expressly applicable
executive orders,” and (2) the Governor has “made remarkably clear that this Order
was intended to target a different set of religious institutions,” whereas the Diocese
“appears to have been swept up . . . despite having been mostly spared . . . from the
Judge Garaufis held a multi-hour evidentiary hearing on October 15, 2020. See
Ex. D. Bishop Chappetto and Commissioner Esposito testified regarding, inter alia,
the extensive protocols adopted by the Diocese and the absence of any COVID
14
outbreak in any of the Diocese’s churches. Id. at 16:3-18:5, 18:20-19:6, 36:3-38:10,
42:3-18. Bishop Chappetto also testified to the spiritual harm to parishioners who
are unable to attend Mass and receive the Eucharist. Id. at 21:2-8.
The State called one witness, Mr. Bryon Backenson, an official at the New York
State Department of Health, who repeatedly conceded that the “decisions about
which areas qualified for which zones . . . were made in the Governor’s Office,” not by
the Department of Health or its epidemiologists. Id. at 71:19-22; see also id. at 61:9-
23, 72:22-24.3 Backenson also admitted “there have been no outbreaks” in Diocesan
churches and that the Diocese has faithfully abided by government guidelines. Id. at
76:14-17, 79:18-80:9. He testified that the two key metrics for COVID transmission
are “distance and time,” id. at 91:12-19, and conceded he is aware of no evidence of
COVID spread from the ultra-Orthodox community to the Diocesan community and
that the State had made no attempt to enforce existing COVID regulations against
compliance, id. at 75:3-9, 100:17-22. The next day, the State reported that COVID
positivity rates had dropped significantly in the red zones. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 29 at 2.
doing so, Judge Garaufis acknowledged that the Diocese had “met its burden to show
infringed on its religious practice” by effectively closing its churches and preventing
3 The State’s two other witnesses—declarants Deborah Blog, also of the Department of Health, and
Health Commissioner Howard Zucker—were not made available for cross-examination, over
Plaintiff’s objection.
15
its parishioners from attending Mass. PI Order at 9-10, 24. However, he declined to
apply strict scrutiny to the “house of worship” restrictions in the Executive Order,
and, as a result, concluded that the Diocese was unlikely to succeed on the merits of
its Free Exercise claim. Id. at 9-10. Judge Garaufis also found that, “from the
COVID-19. Id. at 3. “At each step, the Diocese . . . has been ahead of the curve,
enforcing stricter safety protocols than the State required at the given moment” and
only reopening its churches “with rigorous safety protocols”; as a result “there has not
been any COVID-19 outbreak in any of the Diocese’s churches since they reopened.”
Id. at 3-4. He nevertheless held that the “public interest analysis, and accordingly
the balance of equities, cuts in favor of the State” because it is “trying to contain a
On October 19, the Diocese filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit and
moved before the district court for an injunction pending appeal, which application
was denied. Ex. B. On October 21, the Diocese moved for an injunction pending
appeal before the Second Circuit. That motion was considered first by a single judge,
who declined to enter an “administrative stay” and referred the matter to a motions
panel. Ct. App. Dkt. No. 29. The panel heard oral argument on November 3. On
November 9, the court denied the motion, over a dissent from Judge Park. Relying
principally on the Chief Justice’s concurrence in South Bay, the court of appeals held
that the law is generally applicable and thus not subject to strict scrutiny, because,
“while it is true that the challenged order burdens the Appellants’ religious practices,”
16
it has a “greater or equal impact on schools, restaurants, and comparable secular
Judge Park disagreed, finding in dissent that the Executive Order’s “disparate
treatment of religious and secular institutions is plainly not neutral,” that “[t]he
Governor’s public statements confirm that he intended to target the free exercise of
religion,” and that “there is little doubt that the absolute capacity limits on houses of
worship are not ‘narrowly tailored.’” Id. at Dissent 1, 3. Judge Park also found that
the Diocese had “presented unrebutted evidence that the executive order will prevent
[its] congregants from freely exercising their religion,” and that the public interest
favors injunctive relief because the State “may [not] impose greater restrictions only
In light of the severe, ongoing nature of the Free Exercise violation and the
undisputedly irreparable nature of the harm resulting therefrom, the Diocese now
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), authorizes an individual Justice or the
full Court to issue an injunction when (1) the circumstances presented are “critical
and exigent”; (2) the legal rights at issue are “indisputably clear”; and (3) injunctive
relief is “necessary or appropriate in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction.” Ohio Citizens for
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers)
(citations and alterations omitted). The Court also has discretion to issue an
injunction “based on all the circumstances of the case,” without its order “be[ing]
construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits” of the underlying claim.
17
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 571 U.S. 1171 (2014). This
Court has previously granted injunctive relief under the All Writs Act when “[t]he
religious liberty grounds. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958 (2014). A Circuit
Justice or the full Court may also grant injunctive relief “[i]f there is a ‘significant
possibility’ that the Court would” grant certiorari “and reverse, and if there is a
likelihood that irreparable injury will result if relief is not granted.” Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1987) (Blackmun, J.); see also Lucas v.
Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (considering
The First Amendment provides that the government “shall make no law
religious belief, “the ‘exercise of religion’” protected by the First Amendment “often
involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from)
physical acts,” including “assembling with others for a worship service” and
“participating in sacramental use of bread and wine.” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877 (1990). The Free Exercise Clause “bars even ‘subtle departures from
Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S.
at 534). Although the Court has held that religious exercise concerns do not generally
18
“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability,’” Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citation omitted), “[a] law burdening
religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the
most rigorous of scrutiny,” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. “Strict scrutiny is a searching
examination, and it is the government that bears the burden” of proof. Fisher v.
University of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013). Specifically, the government
must establish that the law is “justified by a compelling governmental interest and
This Court’s precedents are clear that, when government actions “target[]
religious conduct for distinctive treatment,” they are neither neutral nor generally
applicable, and strict scrutiny applies. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 546. That is the
case here, as made plain by the Executive Order’s text and effect, and by the
Governor’s surrounding comments: The plain text of the order expressly singles out
apply to many secular businesses, and the Governor has acknowledged that these
new rules “are most impactful on houses of worship.” Ex. H at 8; see also Ex. F;
It is equally clear that the 10- and 25-person capacity limits cannot withstand
strict scrutiny. Given that many secular businesses in the same neighborhoods are
not subject to any capacity restrictions at all, the attendance caps imposed upon
“houses of worship” cannot possibly be the least restrictive means of advancing the
State’s asserted public health interest. Moreover, to the extent the Governor seeks
19
to address alleged non-compliance among certain individuals, see Ex. I, the less
restrictive alternative is self-evident: The Governor can enforce existing law against
the violators. In any event, the undisputed evidentiary record in this case confirms
that the fixed-capacity restrictions are not narrowly tailored at least as applied to the
Diocese and its churches. The lower courts found that the Diocese has been an
[COVID-19] safety protocols” that outpace even those imposed by the State. PI Order
any time since they reopened several months ago. See id. at 4; Ex. D at 76:14-17,
79:18-80:9, 100:17-22; see also Ex. J at 3. The Governor cannot justify an across-the-
geographic areas. See Ex. D at 71:19-22. As the Governor himself has acknowledged,
this Executive Order was not “written by a scalpel,” but instead is a “blunt” policy
This is an indisputably clear violation of the Free Exercise rights of the Diocese
and its parishioners. Yet the courts below held otherwise, and thereby deepened the
widespread confusion among the lower courts on two key constitutional issues—how,
if at all, to apply this Court’s decision in Jacobson in Free Exercise cases and how to
assess whether such a law is generally applicable. Especially given the split among
circuits and lower courts on those questions, which are of immense national
significance in the midst of an ongoing pandemic, it is likely that at least four Justices
of this Court would vote to grant certiorari. Indeed, four Justices would have granted
20
writs of injunction in South Bay and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S.
Ct. 2603 (2020)—even though those cases presenting similar constitutional questions
arose at earlier stages of the pandemic, involved less restrictive capacity caps, and
were decided without the benefit, as here, of a full evidentiary hearing at which a
admissions. And because the lower courts in this case fell on the wrong side of the
circuit splits, it is also likely that a majority of the Court would hold that this
Executive Order impermissibly infringes on the Diocese’s Free Exercise rights here.
applicable,” “we must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality
is that a law must not discriminate on its face.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. The Court
Id. at 536; cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (“[W]here the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious
hardship’ without compelling reason”). Finally, the Court should consider “the
body.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (citation omitted). Here, the
21
Executive Order is subject to strict scrutiny under each of these three independent
tests.4
First, the text of the Executive Order expressly targets religious practice. Ex.
a vast array of secular businesses. Ibid. Using the term “houses of worship”—a term
that, on its face, is “without a secular meaning”—makes clear that the law is neither
neutral nor generally applicable. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. As the district court
recognized below when ruling on the Diocese’s TRO application, the order “applies
of worship” alone, unlike cases involving the “application of facially neutral executive
that it unconstitutionally targets religion. “As a rule of thumb, the more exceptions
discriminatory law.” Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614
(6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an “exception-ridden policy takes on the
neutral and generally applicable policy and just the kind of state action that must
run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny.” Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012).
4 If the Court overrules Smith in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-123, strict scrutiny would
apply simply because the Executive Order substantially burdens religious exercise.
22
The exceptions here are many. Even in the most restrictive “red” zones, the
and grocery stores, hardware stores, convenience stores, pet food stores, banks,
brokers’ offices, and accounting firms—can remain open without any capacity
have hundreds of people shopping there.” Ex. D at 81:12-85:2; Ex. J ¶ 6; Dist. Ct.
Dkt. No. 22-5 at 1. And in “orange” zones, even the vast majority of businesses
designated “non-essential” can open without capacity restrictions. Ex. F; see Ex. D at
66:6-9.
Houses of worship, by contrast, are limited to 10 and 25 people in the “red” and
“orange” zones, respectively. The State has thus made a “value judgment” that
to-five office job, are more worthy of maintaining in times of crisis than is religious
worship. See Fraternal Order of Police Network Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.). The State permits, for example, a local bodega
or hardware store to remain open without “any . . . occupancy limitation,” while the
Diocese “must comply with numerical occupancy caps, no matter how many people
their sanctuaries might accommodate while maintaining six feet of distance between
non-household members.” Denver Bible Church v. Azar, 2020 WL 6128994, at *10 (D.
23
Colo. Oct. 15, 2020).5 And it assumes that “someone [can] safely walk down a grocery
store aisle but not a pew.” Roberts, 958 F.3d at 414; see also Maryville Baptist, 957
F.3d at 614 (strict scrutiny applied where order exempted “life-sustaining operations”
from COVID closures but not “soul-sustaining” ones); Berean Baptist Church v.
Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 661 (E.D.N.C. May 16, 2020) (“These glaring
inconsistencies between the treatment of religious entities and individuals and non-
religious entities and individuals take [the Executive Order] outside the safe harbor
for generally applicable laws.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Tabernacle
May 8, 2020). This “double standard” is not a neutral or generally applicable one.
Third, if there were any doubt that the Governor’s order impermissibly targets
religion for disparate and adverse treatment, this Court need only look to the
Governor’s own words. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. The Governor
has stated, at a public press conference and in no uncertain terms, that his Executive
found, “the Governor of New York made remarkably clear that this Order was
institutions than the Diocese, which has been “swept up in that effort.” TRO Order
5 Although the Tenth Circuit has administratively stayed the injunction in Denver Bible, its order
expressly provides that the stay “has no bearing on the ultimate merits of the motion for stay.”
Order, No. 20-1377 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2020).
24
at 3. Strict scrutiny must therefore be applied to determine this Executive Order’s
constitutionality.
Because the 10- and 25-person attendance caps are subject to strict scrutiny,
the government must prove they are narrowly tailored to a compelling government
interest in order for them to survive. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32. It clearly cannot.
question are not narrowly tailored at all. See Second Circuit Order at Dissent 3
(finding “little doubt” on this point).6 As the Governor himself put it, this Executive
Order is “not a policy being written by a scalpel, this is a policy being cut by a
First, the fact that numerous comparable secular business are not subject to
these are not the least restrictive means of combatting the spread of COVID-19. If
many secular businesses can be trusted to operate safely without onerous capacity
restrictions, so, too, can churches. See First Pentecostal Church of Holly Springs v.
City of Holly Springs, 959 F.3d 669, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, J., concurring in
(emphasis in original)); see also S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting)
6 Because the majority and the district court below did not apply strict scrutiny, they did not conduct
this analysis.
25
(“The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable
distancing is good enough for Home Depot and Kroger, it is good enough for in-person
without capacity restrictions in the red and orange zones, as long as they comply with
COVID testing requirements, while houses of worship remain closed.7 The Diocese
“simply want[s] the Governor to afford [it] the same treatment as . . . non-religious
citizens receive when they work at a plant, clean an office, ride a bus, shop at a store,
or mourn someone they love at a funeral.” Berean Baptist, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 662-63;
restrictions bear no relationship at all to the physical size of the church or synagogue
people (the same as if the church had seated 40)—further belies their alleged
blunderbuss approach is plainly not the ‘least restrictive means’ of achieving the
Although the State argues that the appropriate “comparators” are movie
theaters and event spaces, which are closed in “red” and “orange” zones, the facts
established at the evidentiary hearing prove otherwise (and distinguish this case
7 See https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-releases-guidelines-testing-protocol-
schools-reopen-red-or-orange-micro-cluster.
26
from South Bay and Calvary Chapel, which were decided without a robust evidentiary
record). Specifically, the State’s witness below testified that “distance” and “time”
are the key metrics in evaluating risk of exposure to COVID-19 and, therefore, in
establishing rules for different categories of businesses and uses. Ex. D at 91:14-19.
By those measures, it is clear that the Diocese’s churches are at least comparable to,
if not safer than, a litany of businesses in “red” zones that are permitted to stay open
without any capacity restrictions whatsoever, including mega-stores like Target and
measures in its spacious churches (as well as 25% capacity caps) that ensure an
4. Meanwhile, many secular businesses that can open without restrictions, such as
pet stores and broker’s offices and banks and bodegas, are generally located in much
smaller spaces where distancing is a far greater challenge. As for “time,” even a pre-
mention a nine-to-five office job. Ex. O ¶¶ 2-4. Mass is now even shorter, thanks to
Second, to the extent the impetus for this Executive Order is alleged non-
compliance with existing regulations, the Governor can simply enforce existing law.
See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 12-B (penalties up to $10,000 or one year in prison for
violating public health regulations); N.Y. Gov. Exec. Orders 202.8 & 202.14
(Executive Orders enforceable as violations of PBH § 12-B). As the Sixth Circuit put
27
it in enjoining similar COVID-19 restrictions on religious free exercise, if “[s]ome
government “is free to enforce the social-distancing rules against them for that reason
and in that setting, whether a worship setting or not,” but the government cannot
“assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to
work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings.” Roberts,
958 F.3d at 414. Holding the actual, specific wrongdoers to account under generally
Muslim, Sikh, atheist, or otherwise—is a less restrictive, but more effective, means
by broad-brush orders targeting the entire faith community for effective closure. See
Third, given the Diocese’s adoption of extensive COVID-19 safety protocols and
its proven track record of successfully combatting the virus, application of the fixed-
capacity restrictions to the Diocese cannot possibly be the least restrictive means of
serving the purported public health interest. See Berean Baptist, 460 F. Supp. 3d at
662. As the district court found, after a full evidentiary hearing, “the Diocese has
been an exemplar of community leadership. At each step, the Diocese . . . has been
ahead of the curve, enforcing stricter safety protocols than the State required at the
given moment.” PI Order at 3. The undisputed evidence confirms that there was not
a single COVID-19 outbreak at any of the Diocese’s churches at any time after they
reopened. See, e.g., PI Order at 4; Ex. L ¶¶ 10-15; Ex. M; Ex. P ¶¶ 10-14; Ex. Q. The
28
Governor’s counsel twice conceded the point—first at the TRO argument, see Dist. Ct.
Dkt. No. 16-1 at 31:21-25, and again before the Second Circuit, Ct. App. Dkt. No. 52
at 27—and the State’s witness at the evidentiary hearing likewise admitted that he
was not “aware of any evidence of spread of COVID” from the ultra-Orthodox
community (which the Governor has blamed for the outbreaks) “to the [D]iocese’s
social distancing and personal hygiene safety guidelines. It has even agreed to adopt
¶¶ 10-13—as a condition of any injunctive relief in this action. Holding the Diocese
to these measures is the least restrictive means of advancing the State’s asserted
interest. See Second Circuit Order at Dissent 3 & n.4. The Executive Order’s fixed-
the conclusion that the Free Exercise violation in this case is indisputably clear. But
the lower courts nevertheless denied injunctive relief without applying strict
scrutiny. They did so based on two fundamental legal errors, both of which are the
subjects of circuit splits and increasing confusion in the lower courts that implicate
29
1. Neither Jacobson Nor South Bay Requires Deference To
All COVID-19 Restrictions, Especially When Fundamental
Rights Are At Stake.
The courts below misread Jacobson and Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in
South Bay as calling for heightened judicial deference simply because the Executive
Order seeks to combat COVID-19. Second Circuit Order at 4; PI Order at 20. Courts
applying this “principle,” as the district court called it, have concluded that the
ongoing public health emergency confers on the States broad powers to restrict
individual liberty—no matter the circumstances of the case, the particulars of the law
under review, or the fundamental nature of the constitutional right at issue. See In
re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 783 (5th Cir. 2020) (interpreting Jacobson as the
public health crisis”). Such flawed reasoning is wrong and dangerous, and it has
8 Compare In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1031 (8th Cir. 2020) (interpreting Jacobson broadly), In
re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 783 (same), Soos v. Cuomo, 2020 WL 6384683, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2020)
(applying Jacobson without considering general applicability or neutrality of challenged law at
all), Bimber’s Delwood, Inc. v. James, 2020 WL 6158612, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2020) (“[U]ntil
the Supreme Court overrules Jacobson, it remains good law, and it governs here.”), and 4 Aces
Enterprises, LLC v. Edwards, 2020 WL 4747660, at *9 n.9 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2020) (concluding
Jacobson applies but noting disagreement in this Court and among the circuit courts), with
Roberts, 958 F.3d at 414 (applying traditional Free Exercise jurisprudence), Robinson v. Attorney
Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2020) (declining to stay the district court’s grant of
injunctive relief where the district court read Jacobson “together” with modern constitutional case
law), First Baptist Church v. Kelly, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1086 (D. Kan. 2020) (explaining that
Jacobson involved a law that “did not expressly purport to interfere with rights secured by the
Constitution”), Denver Bible, 2020 WL 6128994, at *8, County of Butler v. Wolf, 2020 WL 5510690,
at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2020) (“[A]n extraordinarily deferential standard based on Jacobson is
not appropriate.”), and Bayley’s Campground Inc. v. Mills, 2020 WL 2791797, at *8 (May 29, 2020)
(criticizing courts that have applied Jacobson as a “rule [that] floats about in the air as a rubber
stamp for all but the most absurd and egregious restrictions on constitutional liberties, free from
the inconvenience of meaningful judicial review”), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 3037252 (D.
Me. June 5, 2020).
30
First, this purported “principle” is a fundamental misapplication of Jacobson,
which itself expressly cautions that a State’s “discretion” to protect public health and
shall contravene the Constitution of the United States, nor infringe any right granted
or secured by that instrument.” 197 U.S. at 25. The plaintiff in that case had alleged
that a generally applicable vaccination law violated his liberty interests under the
Constitution’s Preamble and the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 22, 25-26, 29-30, an
ill-defined claim that did not implicate any fundamental right such as Free Exercise.
See Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “Jacobson
must be read in context” and that “it is a mistake to take language in Jacobson as the
last word on what the Constitution allows public officials to do during the COVID-19
pandemic”). Although generalized liberty interests could not override the lawful
exercise of state police powers, this Court was crystal clear in Jacobson that where,
as here, a law “violate[s] rights secured by the Constitution,” it remains the “duty” of
the courts “to hold such laws invalid.” 197 U.S. at 11; accord Second Circuit Order at
Dissent 2-3 (“Jacobson does not call for indefinite deference to the political branches
Jacobson, then, does not stand for the proposition that the normal modes of
context of an “emergency,” let alone “long-term and open-ended emergencies like the
one in which we currently find ourselves.” Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck,
31
Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial
Review, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. 179, 182-83 (2020). “[T]he better view is that Jacobson
fits within existing constitutional doctrine,” requiring deployment of the normal tiers
of scrutiny. Denver Bible, 2020 WL 6128994, at *7-8 & n.15 (collecting cases). Indeed,
Jacobson was decided before the Free Exercise Clause was even incorporated against
the States. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908) (recognizing certain
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(incorporating Free Exercise Clause). And it was decided decades before the
emergence of the modern “tiers of scrutiny” framework. See United States v. Carolene
Nor should this Court’s denial of an application for an injunction in South Bay
considered the application in South Bay at a far earlier stage in the pandemic, when
less was known about the virus’s spread. See Denver Bible, 2020 WL 6128994, at *7
n.14. Moreover, South Bay was decided without the benefit, as here, of an evidentiary
over several months. More still, the Executive Order in South Bay allowed up to 100
people to attend church at any given time—a far cry from the de facto shutdown order
here. See 140 S. Ct. at 1613. The lower courts are erring now by applying a one-size-
fits-all approach these many months later. See Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2605
(Alito, J. dissenting).
32
Second, the lower courts’ flawed application of Jacobson is dangerous.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). “They knew what
emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew,
too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.” Id. at 650. For this reason, aside
from the Suspension Clause, the Framers “made no express provision for exercise of
extraordinary authority because of a crisis.” Ibid. “We may [] suspect that they
Justice Jackson was not alone. Two decades earlier, in the midst of the Great
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) (upholding
challenged law on its merits, rather than deferring to the government); see also
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (rejecting notion that invocation of
33
Put simply, the federal courts should not be permitted to “distort the
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting),
adopted by a majority of the Court in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
Indeed, “[t]he court of history has rejected [such] jurisprudential mistakes and
2615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Even in times of crisis, the States must be put to
rights like the free exercise of religion by demonstrating that they are the most
The courts below also concluded that strict scrutiny was inapplicable because
the Executive Order purportedly subjects “religious services” to restrictions that are
“similar to or, indeed, less severe than those imposed on” a subset of “comparable
secular gatherings.” Second Circuit Order at 3-4 (emphasis in original); see also PI
Order at 18-19. The courts deemed irrelevant the undisputed fact that many other
secular businesses are treated more favorably, reasoning that they were
“distinguishable from religious services.” PI Order at 20; see also Second Circuit
Order at 3-4. But as the dissent below explained, “the executive order does not impose
capacity by space or time. Instead, the Governor has selected some businesses (such
as news media, financial services, certain retail stores, and construction) for favorable
34
treatment, calling them ‘essential,’ while imposing greater restrictions on ‘non-
strict scrutiny.” Second Circuit Order at Dissent 2. Thus, this case squarely presents
the question whether strict scrutiny applies to a law that “on its face favors or
This issue has created a circuit split and substantial confusion in the lower
courts.9 Contrary to the lower courts’ conclusions in this case, it is immaterial that
the Governor’s Executive Order treats some secular institutions (like theaters) worse
than houses of worship: “The point ‘is not whether one or a few secular analogs are
regulated. The question is whether a single secular analog is not regulated.’” Id. at
church is more akin to a factory or more like a museum” are immaterial to the
law “devalues religio[n],” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537; see Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S.
& Canada v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 193, 197 (2d
Cir. 2014); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir.
9 Compare Roberts, 958 F.3d at 414-15 (applying strict scrutiny where law firms and liquor stores
were treated more favorably), Maryville Baptist, 957 F.3d at 614 (same), Denver Bible, 2020 WL
6128994, at *10-11 (deeming COVID-19 restrictions subject to strict scrutiny even where some
secular businesses are treated worse than houses of worship), and First Baptist, 455 F. Supp. 3d
at 1089-90 (finding likelihood of success on the merits because presence of multiple better-treated
secular businesses “le[d] the court to conclude that [the challenged executive orders] are not
neutral laws of general applicability”), with Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962
F.3d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying rational basis review), Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v.
Newsom, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 5835219, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2020) (finding “lectures and movie
theaters” to be better comparators and denying injunction without mentioning strict scrutiny), and
Murphy v. Lamont, 2020 WL 4435167, at *14 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2020).
35
2002); Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 366. Nor does that inquiry turn on
whether the “value judgment” was motivated by animus toward religion, as the
Governor and the lower courts appear to have erroneously believed. See PI Order at
20-21; Ct. App. Dkt. No. 52 at 25. “The constitutional benchmark is ‘government
(emphasis in original); see also Laycock & Collins, Generally Applicable Law & the
straightforward steps: (1) “does the law create a favored or exempt class of
organizations”; and (2) “if so, do religious organizations fall outside of that class?”
Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Where, as here, the
answers to those questions are “yes and yes,” lower courts should be applying strict
scrutiny. Because the lower courts here did not do so, they failed to protect the
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also Second Circuit Order at Dissent 3. Here,
the district court expressly found that the Diocese “establish[ed] irreparable harm”
arising from the State’s infringement on its Free Exercise rights. PI Order at 10. The
36
Governor did not dispute that finding in the court of appeals, and the Second Circuit
did not disturb it, instead acknowledging “the impact the executive order has had on
houses of worship throughout the affected zones.” Second Circuit Order at 3. The
testified, is “the heartbreak of our people because [receiving Communion is] what
“devastated” by the shuttering of churches, with some literally “crying” “at the front
door” when they were told they could not enter. Ex. D at 43:4-7. And because this
irreparable harm to the Diocese and its parishioners continues to compound with
each passing day, the need for relief here is indisputably “critical and exigent.”10
operating safely and without any COVID-19 outbreaks during the several months
before this latest ban. Pl Order at 3, 24. As a threshold matter, the government
N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation
10 The Executive Order was originally set to expire on November 5, see Ex. F, but the Governor has
extended the restrictions through at least December 3 and retained the authority to order further
extensions, see Ct. App. Dkt. No. 70-2. Thus, absent immediate equitable relief from this Court,
the Diocese and its parishioners will continue to be subjected to these onerous restrictions on their
free exercise rights.
37
marks omitted). And although public health interests are undoubtedly important,
the record is clear that enforcing the 10- and 25-person restrictions against the
Diocese will not advance that interest in any way. The Governor’s witness conceded
that the Diocese’s safety measures prevented any COVID-19 outbreaks stemming
from its churches, and that he is unaware of any evidence of COVID spread from the
the COVID spikes—to the Diocesan community. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 7-10; Ex. D at
The Governor’s arguments below, largely adopted by the lower courts, centered
where even just one asymptomatic parishioner could trigger “infection spikes.” See,
e.g., PI Order at 21-22; Ct. App. Dkt. No. 52 at 26-28. But such arguments, and the
lower courts’ conclusions based on them, cannot be squared with the evidentiary
record in this as-applied challenge. Although both the Governor and the district court
see, e.g., Ct. App. Dkt. No. 52 at 8-9; PI Order at 12-13, the unrebutted evidence
demonstrates that each of these risk factors has been addressed through the Diocese’s
existing safety protocols, which the Diocese is willing to accept as a condition of any
injunction, Ex. D at 16:3-19:6, 37:1-38:10; Ex. L ¶¶ 12-13; Ex. N ¶ 13; Ex. P ¶¶ 11-
13.11 Thus, even the hypothetical asymptomatic parishioner would have to wear a
11 Conversely, the Governor’s purported evidence of public health risks attendant to religious
worship relies on wholly irrelevant COVID-19 incidents in disparate parts of the country (and
around the world) that have nothing to do with the Diocese and did not include its safety protocols.
(Cont’d on next page)
38
mask at all times, socially distance, and abide by all other safety protocols that the
State’s witness admitted prevent the spread of COVID. See Ex. D at 27:21-28:13,
36:3-37:14, 79:18-80:14; Ex. L ¶ 12; Ex. P ¶ 12. And the evidence those protocols work
is the fact that, here, in operating for months under them, the Diocese’s churches
congregant limits inside spacious churches where masks, social distancing, and other
measures are already in place, especially when a huge superstore like Target or
Staples in these same “red” and “orange” zones “can literally have hundreds of people
shopping there.” Ex. D at 83:15-18; see Second Circuit Order at Dissent 4 (“The
question is not whether the State may take generally applicable public-health
measures, but whether it may impose greater restrictions only on houses of worship.
It may not.”). The only equity remaining on the ledger is the right to Free Exercise.
meaningful for thousands of Catholics in the Diocese. The Diocese accepts the
Executive Order’s percentage capacity limitations (indeed, the Diocese had already
voluntarily imposed on itself an earlier 25% capacity limit) and asks this Court to
enjoin, on an as-applied basis, a total of just twelve words in the Executive Order—
See, e.g., Ct. App. Dkt. No. 52 at 27-28; Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 65-68, 87-88; Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 20-
21 at 2 (describing outbreak in Arkansas, at the very beginning of the pandemic, following a
multiday series of activities including children’s competitions and buffet-style food); Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 20-29 at 1-4 (discussing outbreak linked to an event that involved not just a church service—
presided over by a minister who publicly “questioned the wisdom of masks”—but also an over-
capacity indoor reception at which “many attendees didn’t wear masks or socially distance”).
39
“or 10 people, whichever is fewer” in red zones and “the lesser of . . . or 25 people” in
orange zones. Moreover, “the Church, its [clergy], and its congregants [would] adhere
to the [existing] public health requirements mandated” by the State and its own
COVID-19 protocols. Maryville Baptist, 957 F.3d at 616; accord Roberts, 958 F.3d at
416. The Governor’s ability to protect the public will remain unimpeded, as will his
Constitution forbids him from doing—is to “swe[ep] up” compliant parties “in that
effort,” TRO Order at 3, and run roughshod over their Free Exercise rights.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this application, the Diocese respectfully requests
that the Circuit Justice or the Court enjoin the 10- and 25-person capacity limitations
in Executive Order 202.68, as applied to the Diocese and subject to its compliance
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