8.de Mesa v. Mencias

De Mesa v. Mencias, GR No.
24583 Nov 14
Case: De Mesa vs Mencias G.R. No. L-24583 October 29, 1966
Facts: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal
in the 1963 elections. De Mesa won the election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office.
Meanwhile, the defeated candidate Argana, filed an election protest against De Mesa charging him of the
perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts. De Mesa, on the other hand
filed a counter-protest and sought to shift responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his
followers. However, while the case is pending Mayor De Mesa was assassinated.
Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots. Accordingly, the court a
quo required the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be
substituted for said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however, comply. Proceeding ex parte, on
June 11, 1964, the protestant Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on
revision of ballots,
And so, without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative — as indeed none had thus far
been named — the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. With the constitution of the committee on
revision of ballots in which, incidentally, Ramon Antilon Jr. was motu proprio named and then served as
commissioner for the deceased protestee, the trial court, in its decision of August 10, 1964 adjudged the
protestant Maximino Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, in the 1963 elections.
De Mesa’s widow and local chapter of the LP which deceased was member filed a petition which include
among others for the reconsideration of the August 10, 1964 decision upon the ground that, for failure to
order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
protestee after his widow and children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for the trial court to have proceeded ex parte with the election
case
The trial court denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee, and order
stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of
appeal. The movants elevated the case to CA on a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction.
Issue: WON Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a directory or mandatory compliance.
Held: Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed
against him, it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final
judgment despite the death of the protestee. With the death of De Mesa, however, contingency not
expressly provided for by the Revised Election Codewas ushered in.
Nevertheless, precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules of Court, said rules, though not
generally applicable to election cases, may however be applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient."
SEC. 17. Death of party.— After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to produce the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. . . . (Rule 3.)
The trial court, it will be recalled in its order of May 6, 1964, required the widow and children of the
deceased protestee to appear and be substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the
case. But when they failed to comply at the instance of the protestant, declared said widow and children
nonsuited, proceeded with the case ex parte, and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or
substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee.
It is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies to election contests to the
same extent and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that
unless and until the procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court in
the absence of a duly appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken
down as null and void.
Considering that, in the case at bar, the trial court failed to order the protestant to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after the latter's widow and children had
failed to comply with the court order requiring their appearance to be substituted in lieu of their
predecessor, but instead — in derogation of the precepts of the Rule in question and in the total absence
of a legal representative of the deceased protestee. It is no argument against this conclusion to contend
that the requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the
permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall."
While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the ascertainment
of the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and inflexible
criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its
nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the
convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory
construction.
"Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where
it invests a public body, municipality or public officer with power and authority to take some action which
concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be construed as
mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty" (Black, Interpretation of Laws,
pp. 540-543).

8.de Mesa v. Mencias

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De Mesa v. Mencias, GR No.

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