93 Phil.

712 Dismissed in that court on a

motion to quash on the.grounds
"that the facts alleged in the
REYES, J.: information do not sufficiently
On April 1, 1950, the Provincial charge the crime of Direct
Fiscal of Isabela filed with the Bribery," the case has been
Court of First Instance of that appealed to this Court by the
province the following information Solicitor General.
against Eduardo A. Abesamis:
The information denominates the
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal crime charged as "direct bribery"
accuses EDUARDO A. ABESAMIS, under article 210 of the Revised
of the crime of DIRECT BRIBERY, Penal Code presumably under the
provided for and penalized under first and second paragraphs
article 210, of the Revised Penal thereof, which read:
Code, committed as follows:
"ART. 210. Direct Bribery. Any
"That on or about the 13th day of public officer who shall agree to
August, 1947, in the municipality perform an act constituting a
of Echague, province of Isabela, crime, in connection with the
Philippines, and within the performance of his official duties,
jurisdiction of this Honorable in consideration of any offer,
Court, the said accused being then promise, gift or present received
the Justice of the Peace of by such officer, personally or
Echague and Angadanan, Isabela, through the mediation of another,
and as such is a public officer, did shall suffer the penalty of prision
then and there willfully, unlawfully correccional in its minimum and
and feloniously, demand and medium periods and a fine not
receive from Marciana Sauri the less than the value of the gift and
amount of P1,100, with the not more than three times such
agreement that he would dismiss value, in addition to the penalty
the case for Robbery in Band with corresponding to the crime agreed
Rape against Emiliano Castillo, son upon, if the same shall have been
of said Marciana Sauri, which was committed.
then pending in his Court.
"If the gift was accepted by the
"Contrary to law." officer in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer
executed said act, he shall suffer But while the information is
the same penalty provided, in the insufficient to hold the accused for
preceding paragraph; and if said trial for direct bribery under the
act shall not have been first or second paragraph of article
accomplished, the officer shall 210, it is a sufficient indictment for
suffer the penalties of arresto indirect bribery under article 211. 
mayor in its maximum period and And since it is the allegations of
a fine of not less than the value of fact rather than the denomination
the gift and not more than twice of the offense by the provincial
such value." fiscal that determine the crime
charged, the information in the
The crime charged does not come
present case may be sustained as
under the first paragraph.  To fall
one for indirect bribery under the
within that paragraph the act
said article 211 of the Revised
which the public officer has agreed
Penal Code.  Such being the case,
to perform must be criminal.  To
the information in question should
dismiss a criminal complaint, as
not have been dismissed.
the accused is alleged to have
agreed to do in the present case,
Wherefore, the order appealed
does not necessarily constitute a
from is revoked and the case
criminal act, for the dismissal may
remanded to the court of origin for
be proper, there being no
further proceedings, with costs
allegation to the contrary. 
against the appellee.
(U.S. vs. Gacutan, 28 Phil., 100).
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31,
It is possible, under the allegations
1968
of the information to regard the
crime charged as falling within the JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-
second paragraph of article 210.  appellee,
This paragraph, however, vs.
distinguishes between two cases: AMELITO R. MUTUC, as
one in which the act agreed to be Executive Secretary, ET AL.,
performed has been accomplished, defendants-appellants.
but there is telling whether the Facts:
information is for one or the One of the specific provisions of
other.  The information is, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
therefore, defective in that aspect. Practices Act of 1960 is that every
public officer, either within thirty legitimate exercise of police
(30) days after its approval or power, and that Morfe, having
after his assumption of office “and accepted a public position,
within the month of January of voluntarily assumed the obligation
every other year thereafter”, as to give information about his
well as upon the termination of his personal affair, not only at the
position, shall prepare and file time of his assumption of office
with the head of the office to but during the time he continues
which he belongs, “a true detailed to discharge public trust.
and sworn statement of assets
and liabilities, including a Lower court: Law is
statement of the amounts and unconstitutional.
sources of his income, the
Issue:
amounts of his personal and
Whether or not the required
family expenses and the amount
periodical submission of sworn
of income taxes paid for the next
statement of assets and liabilities
preceding calendar: . . .”
is unconstitutional on the grounds
In relation to Morfe’s alleged of it being an unlawful invasion of
accumulation of assets grossly right to privacy, and an insult to
disproportionate to his reported the personal integrity and official
incomes after his assumption to dignity of public officials.
office, plaintiff Morfe alleged that
Held:
the periodical submission of such
No. SC said that such provision of
sworn statement of assets is
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
violative of due process as an
Act is constitutional. It is within
oppressive exercise of police
the State’s police power, and is
power and as an unlawful invasion
not violative of due process and
of the constitutional right to
liberty. It is also not a violation of
privacy, implicit in the ban against
guarantee against unreasonable
unreasonable search and seizure
search and seizure, and is not
construed together with the
against the non-incrimination
prohibition against self-
clause. Furthermore, it is not an
incrimination..
insult to the personal integrity and
On the otherhand, the defendants official dignity of public officials.
Secretary of Justice and Executive
The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was
Secretary contended that it was a
precisely aimed at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for It would be to dwell in the realm
official corruption and maintaining of abstractions and to ignore the
a standard of honesty in the public harsh and compelling realities of
service. It is intended to further public service with its ever-present
promote morality in public temptation to heed the call of
administration. A public office greed and avarice to condemn as
must indeed be a public trust. arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed upon
The State’s inherent police power public officials and employees to
enables it to prohibit all things file such sworn statement of
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and assets and liabilities every two
welfare of society. However, if the years after having done so upon
police power extends to regulatory assuming office. There was
action affecting persons in public therefore no unconstitutional
or private life, then anyone with exercise of police power.
an alleged grievance can invoke
the protection of due process A periodical submission of sworn
which permits deprivation of statement of assets and liabilities
property or liberty as long as such after assumption of office is within
requirement is observed. the power of the government to
impose, even if it will affect the
If due process mandate is not public officer’s liberty, for as long
disregarded, even a public official, as due process is observed. In
to protect the security of tenure subjecting the public officer to
which is analogous to property, such a further compulsory
can protect himself from an revelation of his assets and
infringement of his liberty. liabilities, including the statement
However, liberty, in the interest of of the amounts and sources of
public health, public order, or income, the amounts of personal
safety, of general welfare, in other and family expenses, and the
words through the proper exercise amount of income taxes paid for
of the police power, may be the next preceding calendar year,
regulated. there is no unconstitutional
intrusion into what otherwise
In here, the reasonableness of the
would be a private sphere.
law makes the prohibition valid
and within the ambit of police Other Notes:
power. Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the power to regulatory action
submission of SAL was a affecting persons in public or
reasonable requirement for private life can invoke the
employment so a public officer can protection of due process.
make of record his assets and It has been held that due process
liabilities upon assumption of may be relied upon by public
office. Plaintiff did not present official to protect the security of
evidence to rebut the presumption tenure which in a limited sense is
of validity. analogous to property. Therefore
he could also use due process to
“If the liberty involved were strike down what he considers as
freedom of the mind or the an infringement of his liberty.
person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is Under the Constitution, the
much more rigorous and exacting, challenged provision is allowable
but where the liberty curtailed as long as due process is
affects the most rights of property, observed.
the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.” The standard for due process is
(Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of REASONABLENESS. Test: Official
Manila) action must not outrun the bounds
of reason and result in sheer
Exercise of Police power and oppression.
the defense provided by the
Due Process Clause “It would be to dwell in the realm
“Inherent and plenary power in of abstractions and to ignore the
the state which enables it to harsh and compelling realities of
prohibit all things hurtful to the public service with its ever-present
comfort, safety and welfare of temptation to heed the call of
society” (Justice Malcolm) greed and avarice to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive a
The power of sovereignty, the requirement as that imposed upon
power to govern men and things public officials and employees to
within the limits of its domain file such sworn statement of
(Justice Taney, going beyond assets and liabilities every two
curtailment of rights) years after having done so upon
assuming office.  There was
Anyone with an alleged grievance therefore no unconstitutional
regarding the extension of police exercise of police power.”
Right to privacy or Right to be On April 4, 1975, private
left alone respondents Celestino S. Matondo,
“It cannot be said that the Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M.
challenged statutory provision calls Zanoria, public school officials
for disclosure of information which from Leyte were charged before
infringes on the right of a person the Municipal Court of Hindang,
to privacy. It cannot be denied Leyte for violating Republic Act
that the rational relationship such No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
a requirement possesses with the School Teachers). The
objective of a valid statute goes respondents pleaded not guilty
very far in precluding assent to an and petitioned for certeriori and
objection of such character. This is prohibition with preliminary
not to say that a public officer, by injuction before the Court of First
virtue of position he holds, is Instance of Leyte, Branch VII
bereft of constitutional protection; alleging that:
it is only to emphasize that in a. The Municipal Court of Hindang
subjecting him to such a further has no jurisdiction over the case
compulsory revelation of his assets due  to the correctional nature of
and liabilities, including the the penalty of imprisonment (as
statement of the amounts of state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670)
personal and family expenses, and prescribed for the offense
the amount of income taxes paid b.  Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is
for the next preceding calendar unconstitutional because, (1) the
year, there is no unconstitutional term of imprisonment is unfixed
intrusion into what otherwise and may run to reclusion
would be a private sphere.” perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of the penalty
People vs Dacuycuy of imprisonment being solely left
173 SCRA 90 (1989) to the discretion of the court as if
Petitioner: People of the the latter were the legislative
Philippines department of the Government.
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C.
Dacuycuy, Celestino  S. Matondo, On March 30, 1976, the petition
Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. was transferred to Branch IV
Zanoria where the respondent Judge,
Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A.
Facts: No. 4670 is valid and
 constitutional but cases for its Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED
violation fall outside of the and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
jurisdiction of municipal and city 555 filed against private
courts. respondents herein is hereby
ordered to be remanded to the
Issue:   Municipal Trial Court of Hindang,
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. Leyte for trial on the merits.
4670 is unconstitutional.
 Whether or not the municipal and
city courts have jurisdiction over
the case.
Appellee: People of the
Held: Philippines
 Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is Appellant: Marivic Genosa
unconstitutional. G.R. No. 135981
Section 32 violates the September 29, 2000
constitutional prohibition against Ponente: Panganiban, J.
undue delegation of legislative
power by vesting in the court the
responsibility of imposing a
duration on the punishment of
“Aggression, if not continuous,
imprisonment, as if the courts
does not warrant self-defense. In
were the legislative department of
the absence of such aggression,
the government.
there can be no self-defense –
complete of incomplete – on the
Yes, the municipal and city courts
part of the victim.”
have jurisdiction over the case. 
Republic Act. No. 296, as
FACTS:
amended by Republic Act No.
3828, considers crimes punishable Appellant was married to the
by fine of not more than Php victim Ben Genosa. In their first
3,000.00 fall under the original year of marriage, Marivic and Ben
jurisdiction of municipal courts. lived happily but soon thereafter,
the couple would quarrel often
Decision: and their fights would become
violent. Ben, a habitual drinker,
The decision and resolution of became cruel to Marivic; he would
respondent Judge (Judge
provoke her, slap her, pin her 1.) Whether or not appellant can
down on the bed or beat her. validly invoke the Battered Woman
These incidents happened several Syndrome as constituting self-
times and Marivic would often run defense;
home to her parents. She had
tried to leave her husband at least 2.) Whether or not treachery
five times, but Ben would always attended the killing.
follow her and they would
reconcile. RULING:

On the night of the killing, No, the Court ruled in the negative
appellant, who was then eight on both issues.
months pregnant, and the victim
quarreled. The latter beat her, 1.) The Court held that the
however, she was able to run to defense failed to establish all the
another room. Allegedly there was elements of self-defense arising
no provocation on her part when from the battered woman
she got home that night, and it syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the
was her husband who began the phases of the cycle of violence
provocation. Frightened that her must be proven to have
husband would hurt her and characterized at least two
wanting to make sure she would battering episodes between the
deliver her baby safely, appellant appellant and her intimate
admitted having killed the victim, partner; (b) the final acute
who was then sleeping at the battering episode preceding the
time, with the use of a gun. She killing of the batterer must have
was convicted of the crime of produced in the battered persons
parricide. Experts opined that mind an actual fear of an
Marivic fits the profile of a imminent harm from her batterer
battered woman syndrome and at and an honest belief that she
the time she killed her husband, needed to use force in order to
her mental condition was that she save her life; and (c) at the time
was re-experiencing the trauma, of the killing, the batterer must
together with the imprint of all the have posed probable – not
abuses that she had experienced necessarily immediate and actual
in the past. – grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence
ISSUES: perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these no showing that appellant
circumstances could satisfy the intentionally chose a specific
requisites of self-defense. means of successfully attacking
her husband without any risk to
Under the existing facts of the herself from any retaliatory act
case, however, not all of these that he might make. It appears
were duly established. Here, there that the thought of using the gun
was a sufficient time interval occurred to her only at about the
between the unlawful aggression same moment when she decided
of Ben and her fatal attack upon to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus,
him. In fact, she had already been in the absence of any convincing
able to withdraw from his violent proof that she consciously and
behavior and escape to their deliberately employed the method
children’s bedroom. The attack by which she committed the crime
had apparently ceased and the in order to ensure its execution,
reality or even imminence of the the Court resolved the doubt in
danger he posed had ended her favor.
altogether. Ben was no longer in a
position that presented an actual PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
threat on her life or safety. Plaintiff-Appellee,

2.) The Court ruled that when a vs.

killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-
appreciated as a qualifying Appellant.
circumstance, because the
G.R. No. 187495               April
deceased may be said to have
21, 2014
been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the  
assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of  
assault adopted by the aggressor
must have been consciously and PONENTE: Reyes
deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the TOPIC: Marital rape
unlawful act without risk from any
 
defense that might be put up by
the party attacked. Here, there is
FACTS:                 One night, in the
spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed
                Accused-appellant and into a daster and fixed the
his wife, KKK, were married and matrimonial bed but she did not lie
have four children. thereon with the accused-
appellant and instead, rested
                On February 19, 1999, separately in a cot near the bed.
KKK executed a Complaint- Her reclusive behavior prompted
Affidavit, alleging that her him to ask angrily: “Why are you
husband, the accused-appellant, lying on the cot?”, and to
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of instantaneously order: “You
December 3, 1998 at their transfer here to our bed.”
residence in Cagayan de Oro City,
and that on December 12, 1998,                 KKK insisted to stay on
the accused-appellant boxed her the cot and explained that she had
shoulder for refusing to have sex headache and abdominal pain due
with him. to her forthcoming menstruation.
Her reasons did not appease him
                As to the charge of and he got angrier. He rose from
rape according to the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
KKK, conjugal intimacy did not against the wall causing KKK to
really cause marital problems fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK
between her and the accused- stood up from where she fell, took
appellant. It was, in fact, both her pillow and transferred to the
frequent and fulfilling. He treated bed.
her well and she, of course,
responded with equal degree of                 The accused-appellant
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he then lay beside KKK and not
started to be brutal in bed. He before long, expressed his desire
would immediately remove her to copulate with her by tapping his
panties and, sans any foreplay, fingers on her lap. She politely
insert her penis in her vagina. declined by warding off his hand
His abridged method of and reiterating that she was not
lovemaking was physically painful feeling well.
for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush but he would                 The accused-appellant
threaten her into submission. again asserted his sexual yearning
and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he have property rights over their
pulled them down so forcefully wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse,
they tore on the sides. KKK stayed albeit within the realm of
defiant by refusing to bend her marriage, if not consensual, is
legs. rape.

                The accused-appellant Violation of equal protection

then raised KKK’s daster,41 clause
stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She                 The Court ruled that to
tried to wrestle him away but he treat marital rape cases differently
held her hands and succeeded in from non-marital rape cases in
penetrating her. As he was terms of the elements that
carrying out his carnal desires, constitute the crime and in the
KKK continued to protest by rules for their proof, infringes on
desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do the equal protection clause.
that to me because I’m not feeling
well.”  

                Accused raised the                 The Court found that

defense of denial and alleged that there is no rational basis for
KKK merely fabricated the rape distinguishing between marital
charges as her revenge because rape and non-marital rape. The
he took over the control and various rationales which have
management of their businesses, been asserted in defense of the
and to cover up her extra-marital exemption are either based
affairs. upon archaic notions about the
consent and property rights
ISSUE: incident to marriage or are simply
unable to withstand even the
                Whether or not there slightest scrutiny.
can be a marital rape.
                The Court declared the
  marital exemption for rape in the
New York statute to be
HELD: unconstitutional.

                YES. The Supreme                 Said exemption states

Court held that husbands do not that a husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his
wife. The privilege was personal PEOPLE v. FERNANDO PUGAY Y
and pertained to him alone. He BALCITA, GR No. 74324, 1988-11-
had the marital right to rape his 17
wife but he will be liable when he Facts:
aids or abets another person in
raping her. For the death of Bayani Miranda, a
retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY Y
                Moreover, Section 1 of BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON
RA 8353 penalizes the crime Y MAGDALENA were charged with
without regard to the rapist’s legal the crime of MURDER... poured
relationship with his victim. gasoline, a combustible liquid to
the body of Bayani Miranda and
Implied consent theory with the use of fire did then and
untenable there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously,... burn the whole body
                The Court also ruled of said Bayani Miranda which
against the application of implied caused his subsequent death, to
consent theory which was raised the damage and prejudice of the
by the accused. The accused heirs of the aforenamed Bayani
argued that consent Miranda.
to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and crime was committed with the
wife unless the contrary is proved. qualifying circumstances of
treachery and the aggravating
                According to the Court, circumstances of evident
it is now acknowledged that rape, premeditation and superior
as a form of sexual violence, exists strength, and the means employed
within marriage. A man who was to weaken the defense; that
penetrates her wife without her the wrong done in the commission
consent or against her will of the crime was deliberately...
commits sexual violence upon her, augmented by causing another
and the Philippines, as a State wrong, that is the burning of the
Party to the CEDAW and its body of Bayani Miranda.
accompanying "CONTRARY TO LAW"... trial court
Declaration, defines and penalizes rendered a decision finding both
the act as rape under R.A. No. accused guilty of the crime of
8353.
murder but crediting in favor of and Samson as the authors
the accused Pugay the mitigating thereof.
circumstance of lack of intention
Issues:
to... commit so grave a wrong,...
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year The next question to be
old retardate, and the accused determined is the criminal
Pugay were friends. Miranda used responsibility of the accused
to run errands for Pugay and at Pugay.
times they slept together. With respect to the accused
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the Samson
ferris wheel and reading a comic Ruling:
book with his friend Henry. Later,
the accused Pugay and Samson We find the grounds relied upon
with several companions arrived. by the accused-appellants for the
reversal of the decision of the
They made the deceased dance by court a quo to be without merit.
tickling him with a piece of wood.
he accused Pugay admitted in his
he accused Pugay suddenly took a statement, Exhibit F, that he
can of gasoline from under the poured a can of gasoline on the
engine of the ferris wheel and deceased believing that the
poured its contents on the body of contents thereof was water... and
the former. then the accused Samson set the
Gabion told Pugay not to do so deceased on fire. The accused
while the latter was already in the Samson, on the other hand,
process of... pouring the gasoline. alleged in his statement that he
Then, the accused Samson set saw Pugay pour gasoline on
Miranda on fire making a human Miranda but did not see the
torch out of him. person who set him on fire.
Worthy of note is the fact that
The body of the deceased was still
both statements did not impute
aflame when police officer
any... participation of eyewitness
Rolando Silangcruz and other
Gabion in the commission of the
police officers of the Rosario Police
offense.
Force arrived at the scene of the
incident. Upon inquiring as to who here is nothing in the records
were responsible for the dastardly showing that there was previous
act, the persons around conspiracy or unity of criminal
spontaneously pointed... to Pugay purpose and intention between
the two accused-appellants reckless imprudence defined in
immediately before the Article 365 of the Revised Penal
commission of the crime. There Code, as amended.
was no animosity between the
In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil.
deceased and the accused Pugay
468, 470, this Court ruled as...
or
follows:
Samson. Their meeting at the
"A man must use common sense,
scene of the incident was
and exercise due reflection in all
accidental. It is also clear that the
his acts; it is his duty to be
accused Pugay and his group
cautious, careful, and prudent, if
merely wanted to make fun of the
not from instinct, then through
deceased. Hence, the respective
fear of incurring punishment.
criminal responsibility of Pugay
and Samson arising from different The proper penalty that the
acts directed against the... accused Pugay must suffer is an
deceased is individual and not indeterminate one ranging from
collective, and each of them is four (4) months of arresto mayor,
liable only for the act committed as minimum, to four (4) years and
by him two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Having taken the can from under
the engine of the ferris wheel and here is adequate evidence
holding it before pouring its showing that his act was merely a
contents on the body of the part of their fun-making that
deceased, this accused knew that evening. For the circumstance of
the can contained gasoline. The... treachery... to exist, the attack
stinging smell of this flammable must be deliberate and the culprit
liquid could not have escaped his employed means, methods, or
notice even before pouring the forms in the execution thereof
same. Clearly, he failed to exercise which tend directly and specially
all the diligence necessary to avoid to insure its execution, without
every undersirable consequence risk to himself arising from any
arising from any act that may be defense which the offended party
committed by his companions who might make.
at the time... were making fun of There can be no doubt that the
the deceased. We agree with the accused Samson knew very well
Solicitor General that the accused that the liquid poured on the body
is only guilty of homicide through of the deceased was gasoline and
a flammable substance for he Principles:
would not have committed the act
of setting the latter on fire if it
were otherwise. Giving him the
benefit of doubt, it... can be Criminal Law: People v Orita
conceded that as part of their fun- 184 SCRA 105, April 3, 1990
making he merely intended to set THE PEOPLE OF THE
the deceased's clothes on fire. His PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
act, however, does not relieve him vs.CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito,"
of criminal responsibility. Burning defendant-appellant
the clothes of the victim would
cause at the very least some kind
of physical injuries on his... Facts: Ceilito Orita was accused of
person, a felony defined in the frustrated rape by the RTC. He
Revised Penal Code. If his act appealed to the Court of Appeals
resulted into a graver offense, as for review. The accused poke a
what took place in the instant “balisong” to college freshman
case, he must be held responsible Cristina Abayan as soon as she got
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid into her boarding house early
code provides, inter alia, that morning after arriving from a
criminal liability shall be incurred party. She knew him as a frequent
by... any person committing a visitor of another boarder. She
felony (delito) although the was dragged inside the house up
wrongful act done be different the stairs while his left arm
from that which he intended. wrapped around her neck, and his
right hand poking the Batangas
As no sufficient evidence appears knife to her neck. Upon entering
in the record establishing any her room, he pushed her in and
qualifying circumstances, the got her head hit on the wall. He
accused Samson is only guilty of immediately undressed while still
the crime of homicide defined and holding the knife with one hand,
penalized in Article 249 of the and ordered her to do the same.
Revised Penal Code, as amended. He ordered her to lie down on the
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment is floor and then mounted her. He
affirmed with the modifications asked her to hold his penis and
above-indicated. Costs against the insert it in her vagina, while still
accused-appellants. poking the knife to her. She
followed, but the appellant could
not fully penetrate her in such a accused contends that there is no
position. Next, he laid down on his crime of frustrated rape. The trial
back and commanded her to court erred in disregarding the
mount him, but he cannot fully substantial inconsistencies in the
penetrate her. When Orita’s hands testimonies of the witnesses; and
were both flat on the floor, the trial court erred in declaring
complainant escaped naked. She that the crime of frustrated rape
ran from room to room as was committed by the accused. He
appellant pursued her, and finally was not able to fully penetrate in
jumped out through a window. her. The accused also questions
She went to the municipal building also the failure of the prosecution
nearby and knocked on the back to present other witnesses to
door for there was no answer. corroborate the allegations in the
When the door opened, the complaint. The accused used the
policemen inside the building saw Article 266 of the RPC to show
her crying and naked. She was that he is not guilty of frustrated
given a jacket for covering by the rape, and Article 6 to stress the
first policeman who saw her. The difference of consummated,
policemen dashed to her boarding frustrated, and attempted felonies.
house but failed to apprehend the
accused. She was brought to a
hospital for physical examination. Contention of the People: The
Her PE revealed that she is still a victim's testimony from the time
virgin, with abrasions on the left she knocked on the door of the
breast, left and right knees, and municipal building up to the time
multiple pinpoint marks on her she was brought to the hospital
back, among others. The trial was corroborated by Pat.
court convicted the accused of Donceras. Rather than discredit
frustrated rape. the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, discrepancies on minor
details must be viewed as adding
Crime Committed: Frustrated Rape credence and veracity to such
Issue: Whether or not the spontaneous testimonies. The
frustrated stage applies to the accused committed rape.
crime of rape?

Ruling: The decision of the RTC is

Contention of the Accused: The hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty Consti II case digest: ANTONIO A.
beyond reasonable doubt of the LAMERA, petitioner, vs. THE
crime of rape [consummated] and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as and THE PEOPLE OF THE
well as to indemnify the victim in PHILIPPINES, respondents.
the amount of P30,000.00. Double Jeopardy
Same “Offense”
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from
the moment the offender has
carnal knowledge of his victim he G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991
actually attains his purpose and,
from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing
more is left to be done by the FACTS:
offender, because he has At around 8:30 o'clock in the
performed the last act necessary evening of 14 March 1985, along
to produce the crime. Thus, the
Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro
felony is consummated. [Art. 266
Manila, an owner-type jeep, then
and Art. 6]
We have set the uniform rule that driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit
for the consummation of rape, and bumped" a tricycle then
perfect penetration is not driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting
essential. Any penetration of the in damage to the tricycle and
female organ by the male organ is injuries to Ernesto Reyes and
sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips Paulino Gonzal.
of the female organ, without
As a consequence thereof, two
rupture of the hymen or laceration
of the vagina is sufficient to informations were filed against
warrant conviction petitioner: (a) an Information for
reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple
physical injuries under Article
365 of the Revised Penal
Code and (b) an Information for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article
275 of the Revised Penal Code
on Abandonment of one's ISSUE:
victim.
Whether or not prosecution for
negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig
prosecution for abandonment
rendered its decision in finding the
under Article 275 of the same
petitioner guilty of the crime of
Code because it constitutes double
Abandonment of one's victim as
jeopardy.
defined and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
RULING:
appealed from said Decision to the
RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on No, the SC affirmed that the
27 April 1989, petitioner was Articles penalize different and
arraigned for violation of Article distinct offenses. The rule on
365. He entered a plea of not double jeopardy, which petitioner
guilty. has, in effect, invoked, does not,
therefore, apply pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. Hence, the
He filed a petition for review in the petition should be dismissed for
CA but which was denied. He lack of merit.
raised before the SC that that he
cannot be penalized twice for an
“accident” and another for Legal jeopardy attaches only (a)
“recklessness.” He maintained that upon a valid indictment, (b) before
since he is facing a criminal charge a competent court, (c) after
for reckless imprudence, which arraignment, (d) a valid plea
offense carries heavier penalties having been entered, and (e) the
under Article 365 of the Revised case was dismissed or otherwise
Penal Code, he could no longer be terminated without the express
charged under Article 275, par. 2, consent of the accused.
for abandonment for failing to
render to the persons whom he
has accidentally  injured. He is charged for two separate
offenses under the Revised Penal
Code. In People vs. Doriquez, the
SC held that it is a cardinal rule Quasi offenses under Article 365
that the protection against are committed by means of culpa.
double jeopardy may be Crimes against Security are
invoked only for the same committed by means of dolo.
offense or identical
offenses.  Where two different
laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy Where the offenses charged are
as to one of them is no obstacle to penalized either by different
a prosecution of the other, sections of the same statute or by
although both offenses arise from different statutes, the important
the same facts, if each crime inquiry relates to the identity of
involves some important act which the offenses
is not an essential element of the charged. The constitutional
other.  protection against double jeopardy
is available only where an identity
is shown to exist between the
The two informations filed against
earlier and the subsequent
petitioner are clearly for separate
offenses charged
offenses. The first, for reckless
imprudence (Article 365), falls
under the sole chapter (Criminal TIMONER VS. PEOPLE ET. AL. -
Negligence) of Title Fourteen NOVEMBER 25, 1983 (G.R. NO. L-
(Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of 62050)
the Revised Penal Code. The
FACTS: Jose Timoner, the
second, for Abandonment of one's
petitioner, was convicted by the
victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls Municipal Court of Daet with the
under Chapter Two (Crimes crime of Grave Coercion, as
Against Security) of Title Nine penalized under Art. 286 of the
(Crimes Against Personal Liberty Revised Penal Code, because of
and Security) of Book Two of the the complaint by Pascual Dayaon,
same Code. Lourdes Rabustillos and others.
Timoner, then Mayor of Daet,
together with two uniformed
policemen, Samuel Morena and
Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, the authority of the law. As the
was acting on the then Mayor of the City, Timoner
recommendation of Dra. Allegre, had the authority to act on behalf
the Municipal Health Officer, to of the recommendation and his
close among other structures that constituents’ right to public order
were along the sidewalk, the and safety, and that such stalls
barbershop of Dayaon and store of along the sidewalk affected the
Rabustillos. Timoner filed a community and general public, as
complaint in the CFI of Camarines it is in a public place, and was
Norte against Rebustillos and annoying to all who come within
others for judicial abatement of its sphere. The Supreme Court did
their stalls, alleged that the stalls contend that the barbershop did
constituted public nuisances as constitute a public nuisance, as
well as per se. The petitioner defined under Article 694 and 695
appealed to the Court of Appeals, of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
which was the Intermediate Furthermore, it had been
Appellate Court then, however, recommended for closure by the
the CA affirmed in full the Municipal Health Officer.
judgment of the trial court.
Petitioner claimed that their No. For it to exist there should be
actions was done in abatement of plurality of acts performed
a public nuisance and, therefore, separately during a period of time;
under lawful authority. unity of penal provision infringed
upon or violated; and unity of
 ISSUES: Whether or not Timoner criminal intent or purpose, which
committed Grave Coercion. means that two or more violations
Whether or not the structures of the same penal provision are
among the sidewalk are united in one and the same
constituted as public nuisances, intent leading to the perpetration
and nuisances per se. Whether or of the same criminal purpose or
not Timoner was within his aim. In the instant case the last
authority to close the structures. unity does not exist, because as
already stated the culprits
HELD: The petitioner was perpetrate the crime in every
acquitted of the crime charged. He sexual
did not commit Grave Coercon as intercourse and they need not do
the elements of Grave Coercion another or other adulterous acts
required that he acted not under to consummate it. After the last
act of adultery had been at the time of the commission of
committed as charged in the the crime charged in the second
first complaint, the defendants complaint, he already knew that
again this codefendant was a married
committed adulterous acts not woman and yet he continued to
included in the first complaint and have carnal knowledge of her
for which the second complaint No. For it to exist there should be
was filed. It was held by plurality of acts performed
the Supreme Court of Spain separately during a period of time;
that another crime of unity of penal provision infringed
adultery was upon or violated; and unity of
committed, if the defendants, after criminal intent or purpose, which
their provisional release during the means that two or more violations
pendency of the case in of the same penal provision are
which they were later on united in one and the same
convicted, had sexual intercourse intent leading to the perpetration
up to the time when they were of the same criminal purpose or
sent to aim. In the instant case the last
prison to serve the penalty unity does not exist, because as
imposed upon them. already stated the culprits
2. No. If the second complaint perpetrate the crime in every
places the defendants twice in sexual
jeopardy of punishment for the intercourse and they need not do
same another or other adulterous acts
offense, the adultery committed to consummate it. After the last
by the male defendant charged in act of adultery had been
the second complaint, should committed as charged in the
he be absolved from, or acquitted first complaint, the defendants
of, the first charge upon the again
evidence that he did not know committed adulterous acts not
that included in the first complaint and
his codefendant was a married for which the second complaint
woman, would remain or go was filed. It was held by
unpunished. The defense set up the Supreme Court of Spain
by that another crime of
him against the first charge upon adultery was
which he was acquitted would no
longer be available, because
committed, if the defendants, after JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON,
their provisional release during the JR. being the Judge of the
pendency of the case in RTC, Branch 139, Makati City,
which they were later on respondents
convicted, had sexual intercourse G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
up to the time when they were
sent to FACTS:
prison to serve the penalty
imposed upon them. The petitioner filed a petition for
2. No. If the second complaint nullity of marriage on
places the defendants twice in the ground of psychological
jeopardy of punishment for the incapacity. In her Answer to the
same said petition, petitioner’s
offense, the adultery committed wife Charmaine Felix alleged that
by the male defendant charged in it was petitioner who abandoned
the second complaint, should the conjugal home and lived with
he be absolved from, or acquitted a certain woman named Milagros
of, the first charge upon the Salting. Charmaine subsequently
evidence that he did not know filed a criminal complaint for
that concubinage. The petitioner, in
his codefendant was a married order to forestall the issuance of a
woman, would remain or go warrant for his arrest, filed a
unpunished. The defense set up Motion to Defer Proceedings
by Including the Issuance of the
him against the first charge upon Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
which he was acquitted would no case. Petitioner argued that the
longer be available, because pendency of the civil case for
at the time of the commission of declaration of nullity of his
the crime charged in the second marriage posed a prejudicial
complaint, he already knew that question to the determination of
this codefendant was a married the criminal case. Judge Alden
woman and yet he continued to Vasquez Cervantes denied the
have carnal knowledge of her foregoing motion. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE ISSUE:
PHILIPPINES, and HON.
Whether or not the pendency of
the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage.

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds

the contention of the petitioner
without merit. The pendency of
the case for declaration of nullity
of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case
to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending
the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be
determined.