Political Law Rev Case Digests

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172 & 207563
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista
& Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose
C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon
Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael
C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael
Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves
and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah
Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE
OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio
Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY
LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented
in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to
satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer." It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their
affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions
for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120)
days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy;
2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination.
REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of
the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes
a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.
POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent- to act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the
law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is
the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is
not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain
as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her religious beliefs;
6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
and
8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
G.R. no. 101083, July 30, 1993
[ EN BANC ]
Oposa v. Factoran
Facts: A civil case as filed before the RTC of Makati by their respective parents and Phil Ecological
Network Inc., as a taxpayer’s class suit, as they represent their generation as well as generation yet
unborn against Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran Jr., then Secretary of Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving accepting processing, renewing or approving new TLA. Petitioners
alleged that the continued allowance by the respondent of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs – especially, minors and
successors – who may never see, use, benefit from the enjoyment the rare and unique natural resources
treasure and thus the act of the respondent constitute a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the petitioners – minors and succeeding generations
that the plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the Parens Patriae. Respondent moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the Plaintiffs has no cause of action and that the issue raised by
the plaintiff is a political question which properly pertain to the legislative or executive branch of the
government, RTC granted the motion. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for certiorari before the SC; they
contend that their action contain sufficient allegation concerning their right to a sound environment based
on Sec. 16 Art. 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issue: WON the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a justiciable question?
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a justiciable question,
though it is to be found under the declaration of Principle and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the Civil and Political Right in the latter.
Such right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation – as stressed by the petitioners – The advancement of which may even
be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist for the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
that unless the right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come – generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
XXX
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country’s forest. “Without such forest, the ecological and environmental balance would be irreversibly
disrupted.”
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
III LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
WHO MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE POWER?
PROSCRIPTION ON IRREPEALABLE LAWS
Abas Kida v. Senate

G.R. No. 196271, G.R. No. 196305. G.R. No. 197221, G.R. No. 197280, G.R. No. 197282, G.R. No. 197392, G.R. No.
197454
Ponente: Arturo D. Brion
Court: Supreme Court En Banc
Promulgated: Oct. 18, 2011
Facts:
Pursuant to the provision of the Constitution, several laws were enacted to carry the automony granted to the regions of
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. R.A. 6734 was enacted to provide for organic Act for the Autonomous region of
Muslim Mindanao and scheduled the first election of its regional officials. Subsequently, R.A. 9054 was enacted to
strengthen and expand the mentioned Organic Act which also scheduled the regular regional official election to the 2nd
Monday of Sept. 2001. Later on R.A. 9140 was enacted and reset the first regular elections to Nov. 26, 2001. R.A. 9333
was then enacted. The law reset the election to 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Based on this law, the next ARMM election should be held on August 2011. Comelec begun their preparations
for the coming election.But before the said election date, R.A. 10153 was enacted resetting the same to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local election in the country. Thus, Comelec stopped the preparations.
Of all the mentioned Acts, only R.A. 6734, R.A. 9054, and R.A. 9140 were ratified in a plebiscite.
Petitions were then filed assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 10153. Petitioners argued that since R.A. 9140, R.A. 9333
and R.A. 10153 amend R.A. 9054, said laws must comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirement provided
in R.A. 9054 to become effective.
Court then issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of R.A. 10153 and ordered the incumbent officials to continue their
functions if the case is not resolved at the end of their term.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 10153 is unconstitutional for not satisfying the supermajority voting requirement and plebiscite
under R.A. 9054.
Held: No.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will
show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it
did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the
latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections.
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is
generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this
2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is
in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of
repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation
upon existing statutes.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires
on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for
action and flexibility.
SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APPORTIONMENT AND REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE

Aquino III V. Comelec GR 189793
Apr. 7, 2010
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines
Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of
and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
SEMA VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177597
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 178628
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
CARPIO, J.:
DECISION
These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
FACTS:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734),
as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the
ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan,
bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting
its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the
status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No.
07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27
February 2007 provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of
the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1 district is now only made of Cotabato
st
City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while
awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1 st
district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom
should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he
won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically
gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived
of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created,
the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units’ province, city, municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in
the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject
to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there
must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s
contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first
creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested
solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Aldaba v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078, January 25 2010
En Banc
Ponente: Justice Carpio
Doctrine: A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city
shall have a district representative.
FACTS: On May 1, 2009, RA 9591 has lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, thereby creating a new
legislative district for the city. The passage of said law relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the
year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.” Herein petitioners as taxpayers, registered
voters and residents of Malolos City, filed a petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the City of Malolos has the required population of at least 250,000 in time for the May 10, 2010 elections
for the purpose of creating a new legislative district. – NO
HELD: There is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected,
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population.
Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under the Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The Certification of the Regional Director does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared
official by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). The records of this case do not also show that the
Certification of the Regional Director is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The
Certification, which states that the population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010,” violates the requirement that
the intercensal demographic projections shall be “as of the middle of every year.” In addition, there is no showing that
Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic
projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be
given credence by this Court.
A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a
district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained a population of
250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766, 02 April 2013
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court
now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory
prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so
through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system
which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the
people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
“well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they
do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of
elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
BANAT VS. COMELEC, G.R Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
PETITIONER: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (Banat)
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers)
INTERVENORS: Arts Business and Science Professionals,
Aangat Tayo,
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens)
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
PETITIONERS: Bayan Muna, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
towards Educational Reforms, Inc., and Abono
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, assails the Resolution promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT
for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, assails
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The
COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number
of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
(Veterans).
================================================================================
FACTS: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC). In its petition, BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution

On 9 July 2007, The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaiming thirteen (13)
parties as winners in the party-list elections. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC
considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to
3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for
the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88. Atty. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of
Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation to declare the petition moot and
academic. The same was approved and adopted by the COMELEC En Banc. BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. No motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88
was filed.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to
use the Veterans formula because it is violative of the Constitution and of R.A. No. 7941. It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
II. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
III. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is
constitutional
IV. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
V. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not,
can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
RULING:
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August
2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional
the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the
Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are
disallowed from participating in party-list elections. The Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
I.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of
the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
II.
YES. It is Constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
III.
NO. It is Unconstitutional. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is
where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion
to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
IV.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
A. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
B. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
C. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
D. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats"
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats
given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists
were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2%
of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
V.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party"
that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
G.R. No. 189600

MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
Facts:
This case involves the appointment of herein public respondent Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, the representative of
Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC for Brevity). Petitioner Amores is assailing his appointment on account of his
qualifications, because as the time of filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already over the age
of 30 (31 years old).
The court a quo dismissed the case because It found the petition which was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time,
the reglementary period being 10 days from private respondent’s proclamation.
Public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.
Issue
1. WON the quo warranto was filed out of time
2. WON Section 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply to private respondent.
Held
No, it was filed seasonably.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged.
Yes, Section 9 applies to herein public respondent, and he is hence should not allowed to take office as the
representative.
The law states that: Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall
be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 applied only to those nominated
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000]
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romeo G. Jalosjos, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
Ynares-Santiago
Facts: Romeo Jalosjos, is a Congressman who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and act of lasciviousness is pending appeal. He filed a motion that he be allowed to attend at the legislative session
and committee meetings despite having been convicted of a non-bailable offense, on the ground that he being elected as
a Congressman by the sovereign electorate of 1 district of Zamboanga Del Norte, he has the duty to perform the
st
functions of a Congressman with his constituent, and according to him such duty cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Issue: WON the petitioner be allowed to perform his duties as a Congressman while his conviction in a criminal case is
pending appeal?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that “a Congressman like the accused-appeallant, convicted under Title Eleven of
the Revised Penal Code (statutory rape and act of lasciviousness) could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He
was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.”
The court citing Sec. 9 Art. VIII, of the 1973 Philippine Constitution which provides that “a Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.” Hence, the court ruled that “for offenses
punishable by more than SIX years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.”
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH
EN BANC
G.R. No. L17144
October 28, 1960
Sergio Osmeña, Jr.

Versus
Salipada K. Pendatun, et.al, in their capacity as members of Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59
Bengzon, J.
Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
Facts:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled :A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he
disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the
lower house to in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to
be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates
his parliamentary immunity for speech delivered in congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he
averred that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and congress has the power to discipline its members.
Issue:
Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated.
Held:
No, Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without the fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before courts or any other forum outside the
Hall of Congress.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.
THIRD DIVISION
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,- versus - Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 7399
Present: CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Acting Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,* VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated: August 25, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but
not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre
asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. In her comment on the
complaint dated April2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court,
like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House
of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Issue: WON the speech delivered on the Senate floor dated December 2006 by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago is
covered by the Priviledge of Speech as stated in Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution?
Ruling :
Yes. A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that
represents them. To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric
and offensive personalities. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any
sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition. The lady senator questions
Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public
welfare. SC cannot agree with her more. SC cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean
and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. Finally, the
Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to
say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said
making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to
Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
356 SCRA 636 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – Violations of RA
3019
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal
and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified
aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were
filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from
a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago
from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes.
It is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss if benefuts- any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement of gratuity benefits under any law, but he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is
quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the
Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of
the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on
the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal
on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the
Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of
those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the
Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted
its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9,
1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s
protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
ISSUE
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier
resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
GUTIERREZ JR., J
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the
candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Whether or not Jose Ong Jr. is a citizen of the Philippine
HELD:
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole
emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review
the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the
HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the
Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory
and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took
his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Also, there is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not
have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to
have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one
who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed
by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often
corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical
traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to
enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A
more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. SO ORDERED.
Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal & Angelito Jett P. Reyes
G.R. No. 185401
July 21, 2009
CORONA, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito Jett P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of
congressman in the 2 legislative district of Taguig City for the 2007-2010 congressional term. After the canvass of votes,
nd
petitioner was proclaimed the winner.
Private respondent filed an election ad cautelam with HRET, praying for a revision/recount of protested precincts in the
said legislative district, on the ground of electoral frauds and anomalies.
HRET proceeded with the complete revision of all the protested precincts. Shortly thereafter, HRET ordered the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining unrevised precincts to ascertain the true will of the electorate.
Petitioner submits that there was no point in continuing with the revision of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested
precincts because, notwithstanding the revision of 100% of the protested precincts and 25% of the counter-protested
precincts, petitioner’s margin over private respondent was still more than a thousand votes.
Issue:
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in ordering the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining unrevised precincts.
Ruling:
NO. The Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET. The HRET could continue or
discontinue the revision proceedings ex propio motu, that is, of its own accord. The only prerequisite to the exercise by
the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules was its own determination that the evidence thus far
presented could affect the officially proclaimed results.
HRET is granted the constitutional authority as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. The jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is
exclusive and exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides:
RULE 8. Express and Implied Powers. The Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are vested in it by the
Constitution or by law, and such other powers as are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its
purposes and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving
its members, the Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether
the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the
continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate.
Awareness of the proper scope of its power of judicial review in cases involving the HRET, an independent body with a
specific constitutional mandate, behooves the Court to stay its hands in matters involving the exercise of discretion by that
body, except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the HRET so that revision proceedings may promptly continue, precisely to
determine the true will of the electorate in the 2 legislative district of Taguig City for the 2007-2010 congressional term.
nd
Harlin C. Abayon vs. House of Representatives and Raul Daza

G.R. Nos. 222236 and G.R. No. 223032, May 3, 2016, 791 SCRA 242
Justice Mendoza
Facts: Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in a legislative district in Northern Samar
during the May 13, 2013 elections. After the elections, Abayon emerged as the winner with 72,857 votes while Daza lost
with 72,805 votes, a margin of 52 votes. Thus, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Abayon as the duly elected
member of the House of Representatives.
Consequently, Daza filed his election protest challenging the election results in 25 clustered precincts. He said that there
was massive fraud, vote-buying, intimidation, enjoyment of illegal and fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and
after the elections benefiting Abayon and that terrorism was committed by the latter and his unidentified cohorts, agents
and supporters. Abayon filed his verified answer raising special and affirmative defenses as well as his counter-protest.
He challenged the results in all 332 precincts alleging the results obtained by Daza were questionable in view of the
frauds and anomalies committed by the latter and his supporters during the elections.
The HRET issued a resolution finding Daza’s protest and Abayon’s counter-protest to be sufficient in form and substance.
Thus, revision proceedings were conducted. As a result of it, the votes for Abayon increased by 28 and the votes for Daza
decreased by 14.
Daza filed an Urgent Manifestation and Omnibus Motion. He moved for the withdrawal of his cause of action for the
recount, revision and reappreciation of the ballots in the clustered precincts. He likewise prayed that the validity and
legitimacy of his separate and distinct cause of action for the annulment of election results in certain identified precincts
on the ground of terrorism be upheld. The HRET granted his motion and directed the Hearing Commissioner to continue
with the reception of Abayon’s defense on the issue of terrorism and to hold in abeyance the proceedings relative to his
counter-protest.
G.R. No. 222236

In this case, Daza filed his urgent manifestation and motion praying that Abayon’s counter-protest be dismissed as a
consequence of the withdrawal of his cause of action for the recount, revision and reappreciation in the concerned
clustered precincts. The HRET issued a resolution granting Daza’s motion and dismissed Abayon’s counter-protest.
Abayon moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. Aggrieved, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
with prayer for the urgent issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante order and/or preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the
HRET proceeded with the reception of evidence with the regard to the issue of terrorism. After the parties submitted
memoranda, the HRET decided the election protest in Daza’s favor and declared him as the winning candidate.
G.R. No. 223032

In this case, the HRET found that Daza has adduced convincing evidence to establish that fear was instilled in the minds
of voters in the protest clustered precincts. The HRET ratiocinated that there was clear and convincing evidence to
warrant the annulment of the elections in the concerned precincts because the terrorism affected more than 5-% of the
votes cast in the said precinct and it was impossible to distinguish the good votes from the bad. Albayon moved for
reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to annul the elections in the contested precincts.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the elections on the ground of terrorism.
3. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the counter-protest filed by Abayon.
Ruling:
Election Protest
An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and
the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between them
has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.
HRET vs. COMELEC as regards the power to annul elections

The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the COMELEC to
declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election
contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue
of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive the HRET the
prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election contests. The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contestee’s title. Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET’s constitutional
mandate to determine the validity of the contestee’s title.
HRET the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives
The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud,
terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its
constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast.
R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise of its sole and
exclusive authority conferred by the Constitution
The passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise of its
sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution. It must be remembered that the COMELEC
exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), the
Court expounded, to wit: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and
to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and
to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to
the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-
A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
COMELEC’s Jurisdiction
The COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial function when it decides election contests not otherwise reserved to other
electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however, does not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it
declares a failure of elections pursuant to R.A. No. 7166. Rather, the COMELEC performs its administrative function when
it exercises such power. R.A. No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be most effective in the performance
of its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections. Further, a closer perusal of Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line with the COMELEC’s administrative function of ensuring that
elections are free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible, and not its quasi-judicial function to adjudicate election
contests. The said provision reads:
“Sec. 6. Failure of elections. —If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.”
Distinguish annulment of elections by electoral tribunals from the declaration of failure of elections by the
COMELEC
The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of failure of elections by the
COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter
is in the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results
connected with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to
the entire election in the concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to
determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand,
declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were
suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special
elections will have to be conducted. Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a
failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative
capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of
their quasi-judicial functions.
The power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised with utmost care
It must be remembered that “[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised with utmost care and only
under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so
persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at
any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and
threats from exercising their franchise.” Consequently, a protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest must establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the will of the majority has been muted by violence, intimidation or threats.
The annulment of elections should be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional
circumstances
The testimonies of a minute portion of the registered voters in the said precincts should not be used as a tool to silence
the voice of the majority expressed through their votes during elections. To do so would disenfranchise the will of the
majority and reward a candidate not chosen by the people to be their representative. With such dire consequences, it is
but expected that annulment of elections be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional
circumstances.
Moot and academic case
Daza cannot claim that the issue had been mooted by his assumption to office because the same is premised on the fact
that the HRET had correctly ruled Daza to be the duly elected representative. A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. In the present case, there is still a justiciable controversy — who between Daza and Abayon was
truly chosen by the majority of voters of the First Legislative District of Northern Samar to be their representative.
Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE, the February 3, 2016 Decision and the March 7, 2016 Resolution of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Harlin C. Abayon is DECLARED to be the lawfully elected
Representative of the First Legislative District of Northern Samar in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
POWER OF CONGRESS
INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L.
ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioners,
- versus -
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, and and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 174105

April 2, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.
Facts:
Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation with the subject matter “P.S.
Resolution No. 537, entitled: Resolution Directing The Labor Committee To Investigate, In Aid Of Legislation, The Liability
For Plunder Of The Former President Ramos And Others, For The Illegal Investment Of OWWA Funds In The Smokey
Mountain Project, Causing A Loss To OWWA Of P550.86 Million and P.S. Resolution No. 543, entitled: Resolution
Directing The Committee On Labor And Employment, In Its Ongoing Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation, On The Alleged OWWA
Loss Of P480 Million To Focus On The Culpability Of Then President Fidel Ramos, Then OWWA Administrator Wilhelm
Soriano, And R-Ii Builders Owner Reghis Romero Ii.”
The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent
provisions of R.A. 8042, the Migrant Workers Act and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject
matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions. By virtue of the power vested in Congress by Section 21, Article
VI of 1987 Constitution regarding inquiries in aid of legislation, Romero was invited to a hearing together with the other six
petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc.,
Petitioner claim that: (1) the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition;
(2) since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid of
legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-incrimination; and (4)
unless the Court immediately issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and
forced to give testimony against their will.
Respondents made a distinction between the issues raised in Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate resolutions,
nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners raised at every possible turn. Respondents averred that the subject matter
of the investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the
Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting
laws to protect OWWA funds in the future.
Issue:
1. W/N the proposed resolutions were a proper subject of legislative inquiry;
2. W/N Petitioners right against self-incrimination was well-protected and could be invoked when incriminating questions
were propounded.
Ruling:
The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition.
The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub Judice. Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the
legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez petition. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court. At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such
circumstance would not bar the continuance of the committee investigation.
Inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and,
thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or
remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not
preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the
Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection
with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The importance of the duty of
those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked.
The Court refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota of
the controversy. Indeed, the matter of the constitutionality of the assailed Committee invitations and subpoenas issued
vis--vis the investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable
controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore indicated. In short, there is no
more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more investigation the constitutionality of which
is subject to a challenge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Neri v Senate
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a hotly, even
acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of government. On September 26, 2007,
petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the
National Broadband Project (the “NBN Project”), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications (“DOTC”) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (“ZTE”). Petitioner disclosed that then
Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval
of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) of the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo
and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” To be
specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear
and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued an Order citing Neri in
contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. Denied.
Petition for certiorari and Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction)
granted by the SC court.
This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project. During the hearings, former
NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his conversations with President Arroyo on the
ground they are covered by executive privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed
a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and
upheld the claim of executive privilege.
Issue:
WON there is Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure?
Ruling:
No. No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our
prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the
role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up
with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions
of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations
conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no
Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a
possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate
agency or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption
cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As
discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the information covered by the
three (3) questions subject of the petition. Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in
Senate v. Ermita, requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for
the inquiry" along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum. On the contrary, the Court sees the
rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like
an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has
been abused (or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times. Constant exposure to congressional
53
subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita
are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to
permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson. 54
Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are
to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind,
these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the
immensity of its power of inquiry.
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Brion, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion - C.J. Puno
Separate Opinion on the Motion for Reconsideration - J. Quisumbing
Separate Dissenting Opinion - J. Azcuna
Separate Opinion - J. Reyes
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita
Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took
effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: “That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%)”
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which can’t be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no
guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of
the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to
the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment.
It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its
delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement
and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12%
rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-
operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by
the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The
use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December
31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred,
the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance
is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is
to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
ONE TITLE-ONE SUBJECT RULE

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the legislative’s decision that
prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for
the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify
and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the
RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.
ISSUE:
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to certain provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.*

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for
Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati and Pasay, Metro Manila ALFREDO C. FLORES, and
Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
85, QUEZON CITY and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President, REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by
themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners, vs. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and
the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject
and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory
and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of
the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our
ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of
the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No.
720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be
deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege
in the discharge of their own public functions.
Tolentino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 115455. October 30, 1995
Ponente: Justice Mendoza
Doctrine: The exclusivity of the prerogative of the HOR means simply that the House alone can initiate the passage of a
revenue bill, such that, if the House does not initiate one, no revenue law will passed. But once the House has approved
a revenue bill and passed it on to the Senate, the Senate can completely overhaul it, by amendment of parts or by
amendment by substitution, and come out with one completely different from what the House approved.
Following US practice, amendments germane to the purpose of the bill could be introduced even if these were not in
either original bill.
FACTS: The petitioners – Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association (CREBA) – assailed that RA No. 7716 or otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law
did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. Although they admit that H.
No. 11197 was filed in the HOR where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where it was
referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version, S. No. 1630, which is approved thereafter.
ISSUE: WON S. No. 1630 should necessarily pass three readings in the Senate before it became an enrolled bill. – NO
HELD: The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the Eight Congress, the
Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills earlier passed, became enrolled
bills.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment
of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three readings. It was
enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR 127255 August 14, 1997
Doctrine:
Facts
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents charging violation
of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although
until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Held
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments
of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic
theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle
and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators,
the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”
POWERS OF CONGRESS
INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTION
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on banks, Financial

Institutions and Currencies
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
FACTS:
The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1)
proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling
petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further
hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing any
hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that
judgment be rendered (1) annulling the subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to
petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the
inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 166.
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in
his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to
prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an
initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly
involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the
privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed
by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said
speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of
the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly
evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities
may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation
for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with
the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial
agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender
Garcillano vs. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008
Justice Nachura
Facts: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of
the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The
tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the
2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing
the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no
effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
Issue: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.
Ruling:
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no
effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution; The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The
Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The
organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Statutes; Internet; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.
The recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the
instant petitions.
Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial
notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be
prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the “Hello
Garci” tapes.
SO ORDERED.
INFORMING POWERS
IMPEACHMENT
CJ CORONA vs. SENATE
G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona assailing the
impeachment case initiated by the respondent members of the House of Representatives and trial being
conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines. Petitioner was impeached through the mode
provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished with undue haste
and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the
Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by
some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding
the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not
concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the
Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases and that unless there is a clear transgression
of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review
over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge
when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the
witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial, therefore, petitioner thus failed to prove any
semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. Respondents further claimed that whether
the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s
power of expanded judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents
arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to
due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
HELD:
YES. In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggolng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., the Court ruled that the power of judicial review in
this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the
question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner
Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one year bar provision.
However, in the instant case, due to the reason that the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner
immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar
Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the
Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among
those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had
been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so
that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.
Ernesto Francisco
vs.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,
GR 160261, 10 November 2003
Carpio Morales (J).
Facts: The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
inform," but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance. Four months
and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section
5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section
3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Held: The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.

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EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title

POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law

G.R. no. 101083, July 30, 1993

III LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

WHO MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE POWER?

PROSCRIPTION ON IRREPEALABLE LAWS

Abas Kida v. Senate

SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APPORTIONMENT AND REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE

Requisites for Creation. –

SEMA VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009

G.R. No. 189600

No, it was filed seasonably.

PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

Sergio Osmeña, Jr.

Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity

Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated.

Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Whether or not Jose Ong Jr. is a citizen of the Philippine

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

petitioner was proclaimed the winner.

Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides:

Harlin C. Abayon vs. House of Representatives and Raul Daza

G.R. No. 222236

G.R. No. 223032

HRET vs. COMELEC as regards the power to annul elections

INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

G.R. No. 174105

BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

ONE TITLE-ONE SUBJECT RULE

THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.*

Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate Committee on banks, Financial

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