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G.R. No. 173319. December 4, 2009.*

FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES, petitioner, vs. HON.

DANILO A. BUEMIO, in his capacity as pairing presiding
judge of Branch 22 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SAMIR
MUHSEN and ROWENA MUHSEN, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8493);

The exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized
principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily
involves a degree of flexibility.—Petitioner argues, however, that
the lapse of 253 days (from arraignment to October 23, 2003) was
not justified by any of the excusable delays as embodied in the
time exclusions specified under Section 3 of Rule 119. The
argument is unavailing. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
Judge How, 338 SCRA 511 (2000) the Court stressed that the
exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized
principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and necessarily
involves a degree of flexibility.
Same; Same; The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 do not thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays
when so warranted by the situation.—The time limits set by the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not thus preclude justifiable
postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. To
the Court, the reasons for the postponements and delays
attendant to the present case reflected above are not
unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner
nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to
October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by
oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not
prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux pas was
acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest
warrant it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief
that petitioner had been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-
trial setting.
Same; Same; Balancing Test; Due Process; Courts are
summoned to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of
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due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and
the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of
criminals on the other.—Reiterating the Court’s

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that “speedy

trial” is a relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr.,
482 SCRA 396 (2006) summons the courts to maintain a delicate
balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of
speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to
prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused
has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors
such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion
or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused
resulting from the delay, the Court does not find petitioner to
have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the “delay” in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
    The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Vicente E. Eduardo for private respondents.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico
Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by
Information1 dated June 28, 2002 which was raffled to
Branch 22 thereof. On October 28, 2002, petitioner posted
bail and was released.Denying petitioner’s motion to defer
or suspend his arraignment in light of his pending petition
for review before the Department of Justice from the City
Fiscal’s Resolution finding probable cause to hale him into
court, Judge Hipolito dela Vega proceeded with petitioner’s
arraignment on February 12, 2003 in which he pleaded not
guilty to the charge.2 Pre-trial was thereupon set to May
28, 2003 which was, however, declared a non-working day
due to the occurrence of typhoon “Chedeng.” The pre-trial
was thus reset to October 23, 2003.3

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1 Rollo, p. 42.
2 Records, p. 217.
3 Rollo, p. 43.

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At the scheduled pre-trial on October 23, 2003, petitioner

failed to appear, prompting the trial court to issue a
warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later
recalled on discovery that neither petitioner nor his counsel
was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset to
January 21, 2004.4
Before the scheduled pre-trial on January 21, 2004 or on
November 3, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss5 the
Information on the ground of violation of his right to a
speedy trial under Republic Act No. 84936 or the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998 and Supreme Court Circular (SCC) No.
38-98.7 He argued that “considering that [he] was not—
without any fault on his part—brought to trial within 80
days from the date he was arraigned, this case should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 98 in relation to
Rule 119, Section 6 of the Rules.”9
The trial court, through pairing Judge Danilo A. Buemio
(respondent judge), denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss
by Order10 of December 5, 2003, holding that petitioner
played a big part in the delay

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4 Id., at p. 56.
5 Id., at pp. 44-46.
6 An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
7 Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493 (effective
September 15, 1998).
8 Sec. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the
time limit.—If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit
required by section 1 (g), Rule 116 and section 1, as extended by section 6
of this Rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused
on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have
the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of
time under section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the
rules on double jeopardy.

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Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall

constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section. (sec. 14, cir.
38-98).
9 Vide Motion to Dismiss, Rollo, pp. 44-46.
10 Id., at pp. 55-56.

339

of the case, and that technical rules of procedure were

meant to secure, not override, substantial justice.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the December
5, 2003 Order was denied by Order11 of March 3, 2004 after
respondent judge noted that during petitioner’s
arraignment on February 12, 2003, he interposed no
objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003.
Besides, respondent judge held, strict compliance with the
Speedy Trial Act was improbable, given the volume of cases
being filed with the MeTC. Additionally respondent judge
held that the term “speedy trial” as applied in criminal
cases is a relative term such that the trial and disposition
of cases depended on several factors including the
availability of counsel, witnesses and prosecutor, and
weather conditions.
Petitioner challenged respondent judge’s orders via
certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, alleging that not only was he (petitioner)
not brought to trial within 80 days from the date of his
arraignment as required under Section 6, Rule 119, but the
prosecution had failed to establish the existence of any of
the “time exclusions” provided under Section 312 of the
same Rule to excuse its failure to bring him to trial within
the 80-day period.

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11 Id., at pp. 71-73.

12 SEC. 3. Exclusions.—The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning
the accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and
mental condition of the accused;
(2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other
criminal charges against the accused;
(3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders;
(4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that
the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;

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(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings

relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

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By Decision13 of January 31, 2006, the RTC denied the

petition, holding that Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case
just because trial has not commenced within 80 days from
arraignment; that the proceedings before the MeTC were
not attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays; and that the concept of a speedy trial is not a mere
question of numbers that could be computed in terms of
years, months or days

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(6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a

prejudicial question; and
(7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed
thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the
accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be
considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his
whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. He shall be
considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence
or physical inability of the accused to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the
prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for
the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as
to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for
trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired
jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial has not run and no
motion for separate trial has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by
any court motu proprio, or on motion of either the accused or his
counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance on
the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
13 Rendered by Assisting RTC Judge Manuel M. Barrios; Rollo, pp. 34-
39.

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341

but is understood according to the peculiar circumstances

of each case, citing SPO1 Sumbang, Jr. v. Gen. Court
Martial PRO-Region 6.14
The RTC further held that in “determining whether
petitioner’s right to speedy trial was violated,”15 the
circumstances that respondent judge was the pairing judge
of Br. 22 of the MeTC who “may be assumed also [to]
preside over his own regular court and devotes limited time
to his pairing court” and that first level courts in Manila
have an excessive load of cases should also be taken into
consideration.His motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the RTC,16 petitioner lodged the present petition
for review which, in the main, faults the RTC

I
. . . IN AFFIRMING THE MTC-MANILA JUDGE’S RULING
THAT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 119, SECTION 9 OF THE
RULES IS NOT MANDATORY. THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT THAT
CANNOT BE DISREGARDED.
II
. . . IN AFFIRMING THE MTC-MANILA JUDGE’S RULING
THAT THE ENUMERATION OF ALLOWABLE TIME
EXCLUSIONS UNDER RULE 119, SECTION 3 IS NOT
EXCLUSIVE, AND THAT THE FAILURE TO BRING
PETITIONER TO TRIAL WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED
UNDER RULE 119, SECTION 6 WAS JUSTIFIED.
x x x x,17

errors which raise a question of law.

Petitioner argues that his right to speedy trial is a
substantive right and that, contrary to the RTC ruling,
Section 9 of Rule 119 is mandatory in character, having
been taken from SCC No. 38-98,

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14 391 Phil. 929.

15 Vide note 13 at p. 38.
16 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
17 Id., at p. 13.

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strict compliance with which is urged to remove any

attempt on the part of judges to exercise discretion with

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respect to the time frame for conducting the trial of an

accused; that the last paragraph of said Section 9 clearly
indicates that it is the right of an accused to move for
dismissal of the Information should the prosecution fail to
prove the existence of the time exclusions under Section 3
of Rule 119; and that the enumeration of the allowable
time exclusions under Section 3 is exclusive, hence, the
RTC erred in considering the excessive caseload of
respondent judge, as a mere pairing judge, to be an
allowable time exclusion under the Rules.
In its Comment,18 the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), counters that “speed alone is not
the chief objective of a trial” such that mere assertion of a
violation of the right to speedy trial does not necessarily
result in the automatic dismissal of an Information; that
the time exclusions referred to in paragraphs (a) to (f) of
Section 3, Rule 119 are not exclusive and admit of other
exceptions; that petitioner himself contributed to the delay
in the proceedings when he filed a frivolous motion to
suspend proceedings and failed to appear during the
scheduled pre-trial; and that the RTC statement about
respondent judge being a mere pairing judge was not an
apology for the court’s congested dockets but a mere
statement of fact as to the impossibility of setting the case
for pre-trial at an earlier date.Furthermore, the OSG
asserts that respondent judge’s denial of petitioner’s
motion to dismiss was in order as he correctly applied the
principles of relativity and flexibility in determining
whether petitioner’s right to speedy trial had been
violated.19
Respondents-private complainants, on the other hand,
maintain in their Comment20 that several Supreme Court
decisions21 dealing with the issue of the constitutional
guaranty of a speedy trial, the Speedy Trial Act of 1998,
and SCC No. 38-98 have held that the right is

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18 Id., at pp. 229-241.

19 Id., at pp. 239-240.
20 Id., at pp. 205-208.
21  People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521; 395 SCRA 419 (2003); Gonzales v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298.

344

deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by

vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, which did not

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obtain in the present case, petitioner himself having been

instrumental in the delay in the prosecution of the case.
The petition does not impress.
Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days
from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the first
pre-trial setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148
days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial setting
on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days—a clear
contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-day time
limit from arraignment to trial.
It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on
February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no objection to the
setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as
earlier stated, later declared a non-working day.
Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on
that date was beyond the control of the trial court.
Petitioner argues, however, that the lapse of 253 days
(from arraignment to October 23, 2003) was not justified by
any of the excusable delays as embodied in the time
exclusions22 specified under Section 3 of Rule 119. The
argument is unavailing.In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
v. Judge How,23 the Court stressed that the exceptions
consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized
principle that “speedy trial” is a relative term and
necessarily involves a degree of flexibility. This was
reiterated in People v. Hernandez,24 viz.:

“The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under

Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. In
1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the
“Speedy Trial Act of 1998.” The law provided for time limits in
order “to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases

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22 Vide at note 12.

23 393 Phil. 172, 182; 338 SCRA 511, 520 (2000).
24  G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688, 708-710;
Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 429; 452 SCRA 312, 332 (2005).

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before the Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court,

Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.” On
August 11, 1998, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 38-98,
the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 8493. The provisions of said
circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. As to the time limit within which trial must commence

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after arraignment, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

states:
Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.—Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1,
for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity
on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the
period from arraignment to trial imposed by said
provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the
second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred
twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the
time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain reasonable delays
as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits.
They also provide that “no provision of law on speedy trial and no
rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any
charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section
14(2), of the 1987 Constitution.” Thus, in spite of the
prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt
the view that the concept of “speedy trial” is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. In Corpuz
v. Sandiganbayan, we held:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. x x x
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential
ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be
definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays
and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused,
but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must
be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;
hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

345

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the

rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived
of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of
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delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.”
(citations omitted) (underscoring supplied)

The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do

not thus preclude justifiable postponements and delays
when so warranted by the situation.25 To the Court, the
reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the
present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While
the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel
was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23,
2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by
oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does
not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux pas was
acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the
arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under the
mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified of
the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.26
Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc.27 that “speedy trial” is a relative and
flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr.28 summons the
courts to maintain a delicate balance between the demands
of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one
hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid
society of criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an
accused has been denied his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into
account several factors such as the

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25 Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166606, November 29, 2005,

476 SCRA 496, 504.
26 Vide Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the RTC Manila;
Rollo, p. 79.
27 Supra at note 23.
28 G.R. No. 164953, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 396, 409.

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length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or

non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused
resulting from the delay,29 the Court does not find
petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced
by the “delay” in the proceedings, especially given that he
had posted bail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against Petitioner.
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SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J.), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villa-

rama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Note.—The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the

right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried; In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
(Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200 [2002])
——o0o——

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29  Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, supra at note 25 citing Gonzales v.

Sandiganbayan, supra note 21 at 307.

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