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JUDGEMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, D.I.KHAN BENCH


(Judicial Department)

W.P No. 1075-D/2019 with


C.M No.1194-D/2019

Asif Raza Masih


Vs
Mst. Sofia alias Pinky etc

For petitioner Muhammad Taqqi Jan Sappal, Advocate

For respondent Muhammad Abdullah Baloch, Advocate

Date of hearing: 14.9.2020

JUDGMENT

Sahibzada Asadullah, J.- Through the instant petition under

Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,

1973, the petitioner Asif Raza Masih has called in question the

order dated 29.7.2019, rendered by learned Judge Family Court-I,

D.I.Khan, whereby marriage between the spouses was dissolved by

invoking the provision of West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964.

2. The following statement of facts will assist in the

disposal of this writ petition that the respondent No.1 filed a suit

against petitioner for dissolution of marriage under Christian

Personal Law, detail whereof fully described in the headnote of the

plaint. The petitioner appeared before learned Family Court and

contested the suit by filing his written statement wherein he prayed

for restitution of conjugal rights. After failure of Pre-trial

reconciliation, learned Family Court-I, D.I.Khan passed the

following order:-
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Keeping in view the present fact and


circumstances, coupled with statement of the
parties, as reconciliation is not possible between
the parties, therefore, marriage between the
parties dissolved.

Feeling disgruntled from the said order, the petitioner

filed the present constitutional petition.

3. Heard. Record perused.

4. At commencing stage of the arguments, learned

counsel for the petitioner, took a preliminary objection regarding

jurisdiction before the Family Court and stated that the learned

Family Court under Section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts

Act, 1964 (“Act”) has no jurisdiction to entertain the matters of

non-Muslims. Whereas on the question of jurisdiction under

Section 5 of the “Act”, learned counsel for the respondent

submitted that it extends to non-Muslims also and that the said

provision is religion neutral.

5. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel

for the parties and after going through the case law cited, this Court

found that two important questions of public important arise in the

case.

The meaning and scope of “subject to the


provisions of Muslim Family Law
Ordinance, 1961” in Section 5 of the Family
Courts Act, 1964. Does it, therefore, restrict
jurisdiction to matters cover under the
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Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961 or does


it allow matters belonging to other
religions/personal laws to be entertained by
the Family Court which is a Court of special
jurisdiction.
ii) If the personal law of the parties is not
codified as in the case of Ahmadies, can the
matter be heard by the Family Court?

From the plain reading of above, it is crystal clear that

on the question of jurisdiction of the Family Court being “subject

to” “MFLO” the jurisdiction of the Court only in cases of Muslims

is subject to “MFLO” but not for non-Muslims and therefore, the

jurisdiction of the Family Court is not affected by the subjection

clause mentioned above.

6. The question is to determine the meaning of the term

“subject to” employed in Section 5(1) of the Act. For ready

reference, Section 5(1) is reproduced hereunder:-.

“5. JURISDICTION.--- (1) Subject to

provisions of the Muslim Family Laws

Ordinance, 1961, and the Conciliation Courts

Ordinance, 1961, the Family Courts shall have

exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and

adjudicate upon matters specified in Part of the

Schedule.”
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7. A close examination of the provisions of the Family

Courts Act, 1964 and those of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,

1961 shows that they do not operate exactly in the same field and

that the scope of the Family Courts Act, 1964 is wider than that of

the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. In our view, the affect

of the words in section 5 that the Family Courts shall have the

jurisdiction to entertain suits relating to dissolution of marriage,

jactitation of marriage etc. but subject to the provisions of the

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 imply only that where there

is an inconsistency between Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961

and the Family Courts Act, 1964, the provisions of the Muslim

Family Laws Ordinance will prevail and shall be given effect to in

their pristine form and no more. They do not have any other effect

and the provisions of other laws are not affected thereby.

Accordingly, suits of this nature filed by the parties other than

Muslim citizens of Pakistan if otherwise competent under any

other law can be entertained but will be heard and tried not in

accordance with the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws

Ordinance but by the proper law applicable to them.”

8. It is settled position that “MFLO” applies only to

Muslims as has been clearly provided in Section 1 Subsection (2)

of the said Ordinance which provides that the said Ordinance

extends to the whole of Pakistan and applies to Muslim citizens of

Pakistan. Reliance is placed on Ahmed vs. Mehr Khan (PLD 1982

FSC 48).
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9. Reverting to the instant case, it is discernable from

order dated 29.7.2019 passed by learned Judge Family Court-I,

D.I.Khan that she was influenced by the provisions of Muslims

Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 while deciding the case of the

respondent/plaintiff. There is no provision in the nature of the

‘Khula’ in the divorce Act, 1869 and as such the mere statement of

the petitioner that she was not willing to live as a wife with

petitioner, is not sufficient for the purpose of dissolution of

Christian marriage. In this regard reference is made to section 10 of

the Divorce Act, 1869, which relates to the grounds when wife

may ask for the dissolution of marriage and further reference is

also made to section 22 of the same Act, which lays down the

grounds when judicial separation is obtainable by wife.

10. The bond of marriage between Christian husband and

wife is of a permanent nature and as such the wife has to prove her

case on the concrete facts after leading reliable and cogent

evidence to the facts on which the claim of dissolution of marriage

is based. Only then the Court can grant a decree for a judicial,

separation within the meaning of section 22 of the Divorce Act,

1869 or to dissolve the marriage under section 10 of the same Act.

Therefore, mere assertion of the wife that she is not ready to live

with the husband is not sufficient for dissolving the marriage

between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 under Christian laws.

11. In view of what has been discussed above, the instant

petition is allowed, consequently, the order impugned herein

passed by learned Judge Family Court-I, D.I.Khan is set aside and


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the case shall stand remanded to the learned Judge Family Court-I,

D.I.Khan who shall proceed with the case from the stage on which

the respondent/wife made her statement and after framing of issues

and recording evidence regarding those issues, shall decide the

matter, after issuing notice to the parties. The case be decided

preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt

of this order.

Announced.
Dt:14.9.2020
Hasnain/*
JUDGE

JUDGE

(D.B)
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abdul Shakoor
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah

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