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Jadewell Parking Systems V Lidua G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
Jadewell Parking Systems V Lidua G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
FACTS
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate
and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City and to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Respondents are two sets of individuals found by
Jadewell on separate occasions to be parking illegally, prompting Jadewell to place metal clamps on a
wheel of each car. Respondents, in both cases, dismantled the clamp and carried it away on the vehicle.
Jadewell filed charges of robbery but was dismissed due to lack of probable cause. On May 23, 2003,
Jadewell filed an affidavit-complaint charging respondents of violation of the city parking ordinance. On
October 2, 2003, the prosecutor filed an information charging the respondents. Respondents filed with the
MTC Baguio City a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that criminal action has already
prescribed after two months from the discovery of the crime pursuant to Act No. 3763. The motion to
quash was granted. Jadewell filed a petition for review before the RTC Baguio averring that Act No. 3763
does not apply in this case and that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prescription was
interrupted when they filed a complaint on May 23, 2003, days after the prescription period commenced.
ISSUE
Whether or not the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the
RULING
No. In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the
same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which
provides that only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance. The Rules on Summary Procedure prevail the over Rules of Criminal Procedure
because the former is a special law.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. The running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. This is in consonance with Act No. 3326.
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had
already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal
of the case against respondents.