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Ricardo Bacabac v. People of The Philippines G.R. No. 149372, September 11, 2007, J. Carpio Morales Doctrine of The Case
Ricardo Bacabac v. People of The Philippines G.R. No. 149372, September 11, 2007, J. Carpio Morales Doctrine of The Case
From the mode and manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, the conduct of petitioner before,
during, and after their commission, and the conditions attendant thereto, conspiracy, which need not be
proved by direct evidence, is deduced. Petitioner's firing of his armalite could not have amounted to none
other than lending moral assistance to his co-accused, thereby indicating the presence of conspiracy.
Petitioner's failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court's appreciation of
community of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. That it was he who first
officially reported the shooting to the police station does not make him any less a conspirator. Voluntary
surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence. Besides, a conspirator who wants to
extricate himself from criminal liability usually performs an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from
the unlawful plan to commit the felony while the commission of the felony is in progress. In petitioner's
case, he reported the shooting incident after it had already taken place. In legal contemplation, there was
no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated since it had already materialized.
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the appellate court did not err in appreciating the
presence of conspiracy despite its finding that there was no evident premeditation. This Court's
pronouncement that conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation does not necessarily
imply that the converse ─ that evident premeditation presupposes the existence of a conspiracy ─ is true.
In any event, a link between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed only where the conspiracy
is directly established and not where conspiracy is only implied, as in the present case.
Neither did the appellate court err in finding the presence of treachery. Treachery, under Article
14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make."
What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible
for the victim to retaliate." In the case at bar, Petitioner, a policeman, and his co-accused were armed with
two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The victim and his companions were not armed. The attack was
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when he was shot the second
time. Clearly, the victim and his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend themselves or retaliate.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that he not being the trigger man, it is not logical nor legal to hold him
guilty of treachery. This argument falls in the face of the settled doctrine that once conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all even if not all actually hit and killed the victim.
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave
offense," it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree." The offense committed on Edzel was
"hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own
clarification, "he was hit at his ear, not on his head." That act would certainly not be classified as "grave
offense." And Edzel is Petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree"
contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.