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Cruz Vs Tuazon Inc. 76 SCRA 543
Cruz Vs Tuazon Inc. 76 SCRA 543
*
No. L-23749. April 29, 1977.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION
544
has already fulfilled his part of the bargain to induce the Deudors
to amicably settle their differences with defendants as, in fact, on
March 16, 1963, through his efforts, a compromise agreement
between these parties was approved by the court. In other words,
the agreement in question has already been partially
consummated, and is no longer merely executory. And it is
likewise a fundamental principle governing the application of the
Statute that the contract in dispute should be purely executory on
the part of both parties thereto.
Same; Quasi-contract; A presumed quasi-contract cannot
emerge as against one party when the subject matter thereof is
already covered by a contract with another party.—From the very
language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed quasi-
contract cannot emerge as against one party when the subject
matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with
another party. Predicated on the principle that no one should be
allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another,
Article 2142 creates the legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely
because of the absence of any actual agreement between the
parties concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having
enriched somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a
third party, his cause of action should be against the latter, who
in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, seek relief against
the party benefited. It is essential that the act by which the
defendant is benefited must have voluntary and unilateral on the
part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, “The act
is voluntary, because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by
any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it arises
from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any
reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The reason why the law creates
a juridical relation and imposes certain obligations is to prevent a
situation where a person is able to benefit or take advantage of
such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said
actor.” (Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In
the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer and more direct
recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an
agreement regarding the improvements and expenditures made
by him on the land of appellees, it cannot be said, in the sense
contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been enriched
at the expense of appellant.
Appeal; A pro forma motion for reconsideration does not
suspend running of the period for appeal.—We cannot see
anything in said motion for reconsideration that is substantially
different from the above oppositions and rejoinder he had
previously submitted and which the trial court had already
considered when it rendered its main order of dismissal.
Consequently, appellant’s motion for reconsideration did not
suspend his period for appeal.
545
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order dated August 13, 1964 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-7751,
Faustino Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Gregorio
Araneta, Inc., dismissing the complaint of appellant Cruz
for the recovery of improvements he has made on appellees’
land and to compel appellees to convey to him 3,000 square
meters of land on three grounds: (1) failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action; (2) the cause of action
of plaintiff is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds;
and (3) the action of the plaintiff has already prescribed.
Actually, a perusal of plaintiff-appellant’s complaint
below shows that he alleged two separate causes of action,
namely: (1) that upon request of the Deudors (the family of
Telesforo Deudor who laid claim on the land in question on
the strength of an “information posesoria”) plaintiff made
permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 on said
land having an area of more or less 20 quiñones and for
which he also incurred expenses in the amount of
P7,781.74, and since defendants-appellees are being
benefited by said improvements, he is entitled to
reimbursement from them of said amounts; and (2) that in
1952, defendants availed of plaintiff’s services as an
intermediary with the Deudors to work for the amicable
settlement of Civil Case No. Q-135, then pending also in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and involving
50 quinones of land, of which the 20 quinones
aforementioned form part, and notwithstanding his having
performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement
entered into on March 16, 1963 between the Deudors and
the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have
refused to convey to him the 3,000 square meters of land
occupied by him, (a part of the 20 quinones above) which
said defendants had promised to do “within ten years from
and after date of signing of the compromise agreement”, as
consideration for his services.
Within the period allowed by the rules, the defendants
filed separate motions to dismiss alleging three identical
grounds: (1) As regards the improvements made by
plaintiff, that the complaint states no cause of action, the
agreement regarding the same having been made by
plaintiff with the Deudors and not with the defendants,
hence the theory of plaintiff based on Article 2142 of the
Civil Code on unjust enrichment is
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
547
548
“A R G U M E N T
“O R D E R
xx xx xx
549
‘ART. 2142. Certain lawful voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the
juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.’
‘ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.’
550
“O R D E R
xx xx xx
‘On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same is
applicable to the instant case. The allegation in par. 12 of the complaint
states that the defendants promised and agree to cede, transfer and
convey unto the plaintiff, 3,000 square meters of land in consideration of
certain services to be rendered then. It is clear that the alleged
agreement involves an interest in real property. Under the provisions of
Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil Code, such agreement is not
enforceable as it is not in writing and subscribed by the party charged.’
551
“C O M P L A I N T
xx xx xx
552
553
‘15). That in or about the middle of 1963, after all the conditions stated in
paragraph 12 hereof had been fulfilled and fully complied with, plaintiff
demanded of said defendants that they execute the Deed of Conveyance
in his favor and deliver the title certificate in his name, over the 3,000 sq.
ms. but defendants failed and refused and continue to fail and refuse to
heed his demands.’ (Par. 15, Complaint; Italics Ours).
Plaintiff’s Cause of
Action has NOT Pres
cribed:
“With all due respect to this Honorable Court, we also submit
that the Court committed error in holding that this action has
prescribed:
“ORDER
x x x x x x
‘On the issue of the statute of limitations, the Court holds that the
plaintiff’s action has prescribed. It is alleged in par. II of the complaint
that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the plaintiff to
prevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. Q-135 and allied cases. Furthermore, pars. 13 and 14 of the
complaint alleged that plaintiff acted as emissary of both parties in
conveying their respective proposals and counter-proposals until the final
settlement was effected on March 16, 1953 and approved by the Court on
April 11, 1953. In the present action, which was instituted on January
24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the supposed agreement
entered into between him and the defendants in 1952, which has already
prescribed.’ (at p. 3, Order).
554
“PRAYER
556
Case dismissed.
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