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Trump Biden - 25 Novembre 2020 Pennsylvania
Trump Biden - 25 Novembre 2020 Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 25, 2020
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. (Appellant) appeals from the Order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (common pleas) that overruled the
Appellant’s objections to certain absentee and/or mail-in ballots, denied Appellant’s
requested relief, and dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the Bucks County Board of
Elections’ (Board) determination that the challenged ballots were valid and could be
counted in the General Election of November 3, 2020 (Election).1 Appellant argues
the Board violated the Election Code2 (Code) when it did not reject and, over
objection, accepted 2,177 ballots on the basis that they did not comply, in some way,
with Sections 3146.6 or 3150.16 of the Code, 25 P.S. §§ 3146.6 (absentee electors),
1
Others challenged the Board’s decision to common pleas, but only Appellant has filed a
notice of appeal from the common pleas’ Order.
2
Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2601-3591.
3150.16 (mail-in electors). Appellant has since withdrawn some of the challenges,
and of the remaining challenges, all but 69 ballots are resolved by a recent decision
of the Supreme Court; common pleas’ Order with regard to those ballots is,
therefore, affirmed for that reason. The remaining 69 ballots were received with
secrecy envelopes that were “unsealed.” The statute unambiguously requires that
secrecy envelopes shall be “securely seal[ed],” 25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a), and
that the board of elections shall “break the seals” on these envelopes before counting
the ballots. Section 3146.8(g)(4)(iii) of the Code, 25 P.S. § 3146.8(g)(iii).3
Therefore, in future elections, the sealing requirement should be treated as
mandatory and if unsealed secrecy envelopes are received, this will invalidate the
ballots contained therein. However, because of the facts and circumstances in this
case, this interpretation will be applied prospectively. Common pleas’ Order is,
therefore, affirmed with regard to those 69 ballots.
The parties filed a joint stipulation of facts with common pleas setting forth
the following facts relevant to the Court’s resolution of this appeal. On November
3, 2020, the Board met to pre-canvass absentee and mail-in ballots as set forth in
Section 3146.8(g) of the Code. (Stip. ¶ 17.) During the course of the Board’s
canvass meeting on November 7, 2020, and with Authorized Representatives present
and given an opportunity to provide argument, the Board considered whether certain
voter declarations on the outer envelope were “sufficient” to meet the requirements
of Section 3146.8(g). (Id. ¶ 18.) The Board separated the ballots into 10 different
categories, and accepted some of the categories for canvassing and rejected others.
(Id. ¶ 19.) Of the categories accepted for canvassing, Appellant challenged six to
common pleas. Those six categories were:
3
This section was added by Section 11 of the Act of March 6, 1951, P.L. 3.
2
- Category 1: 1,196 ballots whose outer envelopes did not contain a
handwritten date or contained only a partial handwritten date.
- Category 6: 7 ballots whose secrecy envelopes had markings that did not
identify the elector’s identity, political affiliation, or candidate preference.
(Id. ¶ 24.) During the hearing before common pleas, Appellant withdrew its
challenges to Categories 4 and 6, (Hr’g Tr. at 114-15; common pleas’ op. at 6;
common pleas’ November 23, 2020 Order Clarifying the Record.) Therefore, these
challenges will not be discussed further.
The parties stipulated that “[w]hen received by [the Board,] each of the
challenged ballots was inside a [secrecy] envelope, and the [secrecy] envelope was
inside a sealed outer envelope with a voter’s declaration that had been signed by the
elector.” (Stip. ¶ 45.) On the outer envelope “is a checklist for the voter, asking:
“Did you . . . [p]ut your ballot inside the secrecy envelope and place it in here?” (Id.
¶ 10). With regard to Category 5 ballots, the parties stipulated that the Board “could
not determine whether the [secrecy] envelopes were initially sealed by the elector
but later became unsealed.” (Id. ¶ 46.) The electors whose ballots are being
challenged have not been notified. (Id. ¶ 47.) The stipulation clearly establishes that
Appellant does not allege, and there is no evidence of, fraud, misconduct,
impropriety, or undue influence. (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) Further, Appellant does not allege,
3
and there is no evidence, that the Board counted ballots that did not contain
signatures on the outer envelope or “‘naked ballots,’ (ballots that did not arrive in a
secrecy envelope).” (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Last, Appellant does not allege, and there is no
evidence, that the electors who cast these votes were ineligible to vote, that votes
were cast by or on the behalf of a deceased elector, or that votes were cast by
someone other than the elector. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35.)
In addition to these stipulated facts, common pleas held a hearing, at which
Thomas Freitag, the Board’s Director (Director), testified. (Hr’g Tr. at 63-64.)
Director testified about the Board’s process in reviewing the ballots in general, the
challenged ballots, and the Board’s determinations to accept or reject challenged
ballots that were missing information on the outer envelopes. (Id. at 68-96.)
Relevant specifically to Category 5 challenges, Director indicated that “the privacy
of the ballots [were not] jeopardized in any manner[,]” there was no “view of the
ballots” “to his knowledge,” and that there was no “way to determine by the Board
whether or not [the secrecy envelope] had been sealed at one point and became
unsealed.” (Id. at 97-98.) He testified that the Board provided the envelopes,
including the secrecy envelopes, which were the type that had “to be either
moistened by licking or water or glue,” and agreed that people would have to rely
on the type of envelopes provided by the Board as to the quality of the seal. (Id. at
98-99.) Director agreed that the Board discussed the possibility that voters may have
concerns about licking the envelopes, given the pandemic, which appeared to be a
factor in its decisions. (Id. at 99.) He further agreed that the “ballots that were
enclosed within unsealed [secrecy] envelopes” were “enclosed within [the] outer
envelope.” (Id.) Director was subjected to limited cross-examination., but not on
this issue. The parties then provided argument on the various challenges. Following
4
the hearing, common pleas issued an opinion and order rejecting the challenges and
dismissing the appeal of the Board’s decision. Appellant now appeals to this Court.4
As to Categories 1 through 3, which challenged the ballots on the basis of a
deficiency on the outer envelopes, common pleas held that the information missing
was not mandatory under the Election Code, but directory and, therefore, its absence
would not invalidate those ballots. (Common pleas’ op. at 14-19.) Appellant
challenges these determinations before this Court. However, after the filing of the
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected these same legal challenges in
In re: Canvass of Absentee and Mail-In Ballots of November 3, 2020 General
Election (Pa., Nos. 31-35 EAP 2020 and 29 WAP 2020, filed November 23, 2020)
(Philadelphia/Allegheny), slip op. 19-32.5 In doing so, the Supreme Court
“conclude[d] that the . . . Code does not require boards of elections to disqualify
mail-in or absentee ballots submitted by qualified electors who signed the
declaration on their ballot’s outer envelope but did not handwrite their name, their
address, and/or date, where no fraud or irregularity has been alleged.” Id., slip op.
at 3. Appellant acknowledges this holding in its brief, but points out that, per a
majority of the Supreme Court, dating the outer envelope is a mandatory
requirement, but would be applied prospectively. (Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 27.)
4
Common pleas’ decision is reviewed on appeal “to determine whether the findings are
supported by competent evidence and to correct any conclusions of law erroneously made.” In re
Reading Sch. Bd. Election, 634 A.2d 170, 171-72 (Pa. 1993). Issues involving the proper
interpretation of the Code is a question of law, and the Court’s standard of review is de novo and
scope of review is plenary. Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 166 (Pa. 2015.)
5
DNC Services Corporation/Democratic National Committee, an appellee here, filed an
application for extraordinary relief with the Supreme Court requesting the Supreme Court exercise
its extraordinary jurisdiction powers over this appeal, but this application was denied by the
Supreme Court by order dated November 24, 2020.
5
This Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s decision,6 and, applying that decision,
there was no error in common pleas rejecting Appellant’s challenges to Categories
1 through 3.7
The sole remaining issue before this Court is whether the ballots identified in
Category 5, which are those ballots that were enclosed, but did not appear to be
“sealed,” in the secrecy envelope, must be invalidated under the Code. In rejecting
Appellant’s challenge to this category, common pleas explained that the ballots at
issue were not “naked ballots,” which would have been invalid pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d
345, 378-80 (Pa. 2020). Common pleas held that “[t]here is no factual evidence that
supports a conclusion that the envelopes had not been sealed by the elector prior to”
the time of canvassing. (Common pleas op. at 20.) Instead, common pleas pointed
to the parties’ stipulation that “[w]ith respect to Category 5 . . . [the Board] could
not determine whether the [secrecy] envelopes were initially sealed by the elector
but later became unsealed.” (Id. (quoting Stip. ¶ 46).) Accordingly, common pleas
found “there [was] no evidence that the electors failed to ‘securely seal [the ballot]
in the [secrecy] envelope,’ as required by the . . . Code.” (Id. (first and third
alteration added).) It explained that “[t]he elector was provided the envelope by the
government” and “[i]f the glue on the envelope failed[,] that would be the
responsibility of the government.” (Id.) Therefore, common pleas held “[t]here
6
Notably, the Supreme Court referenced common pleas’ decision in this matter and held
that common pleas “appropriately applied th[e Supreme] Court’s precedent” in affirming the
counting of these ballots. Philadelphia/Allegheny, slip op. at 32-33 n.6.
7
To the extent Appellant seeks to “incorporate” Equal Protection arguments into this case
that were raised in other cases, Appellant did not raise such claims before common pleas and,
therefore, the Court will not consider them. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302(a),
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.”).
6
[was] insufficient evidence to determine whether the specific language of the
mandated law was violated” and “it would be an injustice to disenfranchise these
voters when it cannot be shown that the ballots in question were not ‘securely sealed’
in the [secrecy] envelope prior to the canvassing of those ballots,” particularly where
“there ha[d] been no suggestion or evidence that the absence of a sealed inner
envelope in anyway jeopardized the privacy of the ballot.” (Id.)
Appellant, citing Boockvar, argues that the requirements of Sections
3146.6(a) and 3150.16(a) are mandatory, not directory. According to Appellant, the
Supreme Court has recognized that these requirements of the Code “are necessary
for the preservation of secrecy and the sanctity of the ballot and must therefore be
observed -- particularly where . . . they are designed to reduce fraud.” In re Canvass
of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1234 (Pa. 2004)
(Appeal of Pierce). Therefore, Appellant argues, “absentee or mail-in ballots cast in
contravention of the requirements of [Section 3146.6(a) and 3150.16(a) of the Code]
are ‘void’ and cannot be counted.” (Appellant’s Br. at 23 (quoting Appeal of Pierce,
843 A.2d at 1234).)
The Board, as an appellee, argues that the deficiencies set forth in Category 5
are minor technical deficiencies related to the sealing of the secrecy envelopes and
should be treated like other minor mistakes that do not require that the ballots be
stricken. The Board maintains that there is no evidence that these 69 electors did
not comply with the statutory language or that the secrecy of the ballots was in any
way compromised. Boockvar, the Board asserts, requires that the ballots must be
enclosed in the secrecy envelopes or the ballots should be disqualified. 238 A.3d at
380. Here, there is no dispute that the ballots were fully enclosed in the secrecy
envelopes, consistent with the holding in Boockvar, and, as a factual matter, there
7
could be no determination as to whether the secrecy envelopes were sealed by the
electors and later became unsealed. Given that the Court cannot tell whether the
electors made errors in casting their ballots, and the lack of any allegation of fraud,
the Board argues there is no compelling reason to disenfranchise these electors.
Appeal of James, 105 A.2d 64, 66 (Pa. 1954).
Appellee DNC Services Corporation/Democratic National Committee (DNC)
asserts there is no statutory requirement that the voter must seal the secrecy envelope
in order for the ballot to be counted. Further, it asserts that the word “seal” is not a
term of art and is not defined by the Code, is ambiguous and, per a dictionary
definition, commonly means “to close” or “to make secure,” and there is no
allegation that the secrecy envelopes were not closed or the ballots were not secure
in the envelopes. (DNC’s Br. at 16-17.) DNC argues that noncompliance with this
requirement does not justify disenfranchisement because, unlike with “naked
ballots,” the identity of the electors was protected, which is consistent with the
statutory purpose.8
Relevant here are Sections 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a), and 3146.8(g)(4)(ii) and
(iii) of the Code. Section 3146.6(a) states, in pertinent part:
8
DNC argues this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider this matter; however, our
Supreme Court’s order denying DNC’s request for that Court to exercise its powers of
extraordinary jurisdiction confirms this Court’s jurisdiction.
8
district of the elector. The elector shall then fill out, date and sign the
declaration printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be
securely sealed and the elector shall send same by mail, postage
prepaid, except where franked, or deliver it in person to said county
board of election.
(4) All absentee ballots which have not been challenged under section
1302.2(c) and all mail-in ballots which have not been challenged under
section 1302.2-D(a)(2) and that have been verified under paragraph (3) shall
be counted and included with the returns of the applicable election district as
follows:
....
(ii) If any of the envelopes on which are printed, stamped or endorsed
the words “Official Election Ballot” contain any text, mark or symbol which
reveals the identity of the elector, the elector’s political affiliation or the
elector’s candidate preference, the envelopes and the ballots contained therein
shall be set aside and declared void.
(iii) The county board shall then break the seals of such envelopes,
remove the ballots and count, compute and tally the votes.
9
The parties present three legal interpretive approaches to whether these 69
ballots were properly accepted by the Board when they were enclosed, but not
sealed, in the secrecy envelope at the time of canvassing. Appellant argues this
requirement is mandatory and allows for no exception. The Board and DNC argue
that this requirement is directory and noncompliance with that requirement is a
minor defect that should be excused. The Board alternatively argues, in accordance
with common pleas’ reasoning, that as a factual matter, a violation of this
requirement by the electors has not been established, and, in the absence of
compelling reasons, such as allegations of fraud or infringement on the electors’
secrecy, the electors should not be disenfranchised.
“[T]he polestar of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the
General Assembly.” Appeal of Pierce, 843 A.2d at 1230. Generally, “the best
indication of the legislative intent is the plain language of a statute.” Id. (citation
omitted). In construing that language, “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed
according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). The Court is mindful that, “[w]hen the words of
a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. (citation omitted). It is only when the
words of the statute “are not explicit” that the Court may then “resort to other
considerations, such as the statute’s perceived ‘purpose,’ in order to ascertain
legislative intent.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court is likewise mindful that, as our
Supreme Court has explained, “all things being equal, the [Code] will be construed
liberally in favor of the right to vote but, at the same time, we cannot ignore the clear
mandates of the . . . Code.” Id. at 1231.
10
The operative provisions at issue here involve the statutory direction that “the
elector shall . . . fold the ballot, enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope
on which is printed, stamped or endorsed ‘Official Election Ballot.’” 25 P.S.
§§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a) (emphasis added). At canvassing, “[t]he county board
shall then break the seals of such envelopes, remove the ballots and count . . . .” 25
P.S. § 3146.8(g)(4)(iii) (emphasis added).
The provisions that are at issue here are contained within sections that our
Supreme Court has found to contain both mandatory and directory provisions.
However, particularly applicable here, the Supreme Court in Boockvar held that “the
secrecy provision language in Section 3150.16(a) is mandatory and the mail-in
elector’s failure to comply with such requisite by enclosing the ballot in the secrecy
envelope renders the ballot invalid.” Boockvar, 238 A.3d at 380 (emphasis added).
In Boockvar, our Supreme Court considered whether county boards of election
should be required to “clothe and count naked ballots,” that is, place ballots that were
returned to the county board without the secrecy envelopes into an envelope and
count them. 238 A.3d at 374. As here, the Supreme Court was presented with
conflicting assertions that this requirement was directory or mandatory. After
examining the statutory text, the Court concluded that the legislative intent was for
the “secrecy envelope provision” to be mandatory, citing article VII, section 4 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, providing that “secrecy in voting shall be preserved,”
PA. CONST. art. VII, § 4, and Section 3146.8(g)(4)(ii). The Supreme Court explained
that the two statutory provisions, dealing with the same subject, “must be read in
pari materia.” Boockvar, 238 A.3d at 378. Based on that statutory language, the
Supreme Court held that it was clear that the legislature intended “that, during the
collection and canvassing processes, when the outer envelope in which the ballot
11
arrived is unsealed and the sealed ballot removed, it should not be readily apparent
who the elector is, with what party [the elector] affiliates, or for whom the elector
has voted.” Id. (emphasis added). Per the Court, “[t]he secrecy envelope properly
unmarked and sealed ensures that result, unless it is marked with identifying
information, in which case that goal is compromised” and that “[t]he omission of a
secrecy envelope defeats this intention.” Id. at 378, 380 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court in Boockvar found the matter analogous to the issue in Appeal of
Pierce, where there was a challenge to absentee ballots that were delivered to the
county board of election by third persons in violation of the Code’s “in-person”
delivery requirement. Id. at 379. In Appeal of Pierce, the Supreme Court held that
the “so-called technicalities of the . . . Code,” such as the requirement that an elector
personally deliver the elector’s absentee ballot, “are necessary for the preservation
of secrecy and the sanctity of the ballot and must therefore be observed – particularly
where, as here, they are designed to reduce fraud.” 843 A.2d at 1234. Therefore,
the Court in that case, found that the in-person delivery requirement was mandatory
and the absentee ballots delivered in contravention of this mandatory provision were
void. Id.
The Court recognizes that the unsealed envelopes here could be viewed as a
less substantial noncompliance than an elector’s failure to use the secrecy envelope,
as the ballots here were actually enclosed in the secrecy envelope and then in the
sealed outer envelope. However, the language relating to securely sealing the
secrecy envelope is encompassed within the provision directing the use of the
secrecy envelope, which the Supreme Court found mandatory in Boockvar. That the
legislature intended the secrecy envelopes to remain sealed until the ballots are
counted is further evidenced by the directive in Section 3146.8(g)(4)(iii) that “[t]he
12
county board shall then break the seals of such envelopes, remove the ballots and
count . . . .” 25 P.S. § 3146.8(g)(4)(iii) (emphasis added). Such language, when
read in pari materia with Sections 3146.6(a) and 3150.16(a), reflects that the
legislature intended the secure sealing of the secrecy envelope to be mandatory.
Boockvar, 238 A.3d at 378. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that this directive
is mandatory such that an elector’s noncompliance results in a ballot that is not valid
is supported by the statutory language and Boockvar.
The parties stipulated that these challenged ballots were “unsealed” in the
secrecy envelopes when canvassing of the ballots was to begin. The text of the Code
unambiguously states that the elector “shall . . . enclose and securely seal the [ballot]
in the envelope . . . ,” 25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a), and that, at canvassing, “[t]he
county board shall then break the seals of such envelopes, remove the ballots and
count,” 25 P.S. § 3146.8(g)(4)(iii). The legislature did not merely require the
envelope to be sealed, but specified that it be “securely” sealed. 25 P.S.
§§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a) (emphasis added). The Code unambiguously requires the
envelopes remain sealed until the county board of elections can “break the seals” of
the secrecy envelopes. 25 P.S. § 3146.8(g)(4)(iii). When the text of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, those words best reflect the legislative intent, and “the letter
of [the unambiguous language] is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit.” Appeal of Pierce, 843 A.2d at 1230 (citation omitted).
Justice Wecht recently in Philadelphia/Allegheny highlighted that there are
times a Court should give prospective application to a ruling under the Code. Slip
op. at 17-18 (Wecht, J., concurring). Citing In Appeal of Zentner, 626 A.2d 146
(Pa.1993), as precedent, Justice Wecht concurred in the decision of the Court to
count the ballots that were undated, and would prospectively apply a more strict
13
interpretation of the statute favored by three other justices. As did Justice Wecht,
this Court recognizes the tremendous challenges presented by the massive expansion
of mail-in voting, and the lack of precedential rulings on the requirement of a
“securely sealed” secrecy envelope. Moreover, the parties stipulated in this case
reveals that the instructions on the outer envelope for the elector stated only that the
ballot should be placed in the secrecy envelope and did not specify that the envelope
needed to be securely sealed or the consequences of failing to strictly adhere to that
requirement. See Philadelphia/Allegheny, slip op. at 20 (Wecht, J., concurring).
Moreover, in this case, it cannot be established that the electors did not seal the
secrecy envelope. Importantly, the Court must point out that there are absolutely no
allegations of any fraud, impropriety, misconduct, or undue influence, that anyone
voted who was not eligible to vote, or that the secrecy of the ballots cast was
jeopardized. For these reasons, the decision of the Court will be applied
prospectively, and the 69 ballots will not be invalidated.
Accordingly, common pleas’ Order is affirmed.
_____________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ORDER
NOW, November 25, 2020, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED in accordance with
the foregoing opinion.
_____________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
Order Exit
11/25/2020