[G.R. No. L-28482. January 30, 1971.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO

TAEZA, defendants-appellants.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J p:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra, in its Criminal Case No. 626, finding
the two appellants Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza guilty of murder, and sentencing each to suffer life
imprisonment and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Silvino Daria in the sum of P6,000.00 but
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

An information filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated 16 January 1967 charged the two accused, Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza, with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1966, in the Municipality of Tayum,
Province of Abra, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with firearms of different calibers, by confederating and mutually
helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable motive, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and shot one, Silvino Daria, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds on the different
parts of his body, which wounds caused his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, to wit: (a) treachery and evident premeditation; (b) advantage was taken of superior
strength; and (c) with the use of firearm."
The records of the case show that on 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the evening, the
spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband
was making rope in the annex of their house, while the wife, four meters away, was applying candle wax to
a flat iron. Silvino Daria was using a lamp where he worked. Outside, the night was bright because of the
moon overhead.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She
peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward in the direction
of the house Silvino Daria that was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions
awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the
bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his
wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim
prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she
rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino
Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later,
Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the
killers (Exhibits "B" and "C," respectively).
The cause of the death of Silvino Daria was "Shock due to severe hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wounds at the abdomen and leg," as found by Dr. Isabelo B. Lucas, Municipal Health Officer of
Tayum, Abra, contained in his Medico-Legal Necropsy Report, Exhibit "A.".
The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses Silvino and Susana
Daria of Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to Manila for her to
avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted by Mariano Taeza.
The two accused appealed the conviction and assigned the following errors as committed by the
court a quo:
1. The lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony
and statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the
accused;
2. The lower court erred in disregarding the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Antonio Daria, son of
the deceased, clearing the accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified in
court by the fiscal before whom the same was executed; and
3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty the crime of murder.
The assigned errors are discussed together, being closely inter-related.
 We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. She stated that
she did not see Mariano Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed by. But this brief observation
does not necessarily mean that he was not actually armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he
did was proved when both the said accused were seen pointing their respective gun at the victim and each
subsequently fired once at him, Taeza using a short weapon (t.s.n. Millare, page 17) that could have been
carried concealed in his person.
The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's. The night was
brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for a long time and it is admitted
that they also know her. There could have been no difficulty in identifying the accused under the
circumstances.
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the above-said
accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan
Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement
that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed. The witness also stated that she was hard
of hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged inconsistencies in her
testimony do not detract from the "positive and straight-forward" 1 identification of the accused as the ones
who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria.
It is noteworthy that the trial judge observed witness Bernal closely, warning her several times not
to exaggerate, yet in the decision gave her full credence, being obviously satisfied of her truthfulness. The
general rule, based on logic and experience, is that the findings of the judge who tried the case and heard
the witnesses are not disturbed on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which
have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case, 2 which in this
case have not been shown to exist. Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the
declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This
statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of
his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred
that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death 3 , considering that he died only one
hour after being shot.
The defense of both the accused is alibi Mariano Taeza's own account was that in the evening of 23
December 1966 he was at the barrio clinic of Tiker playing the guitar with Antonio Daria (son of the
deceased), Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais. While in the said place, they heard two gun explosions. Soon
afterwards, Macrino Arzadon and Taurino Flores came running towards them, informing Antonio Daria that
his father was already dead.
Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate Mariano
Taeza's testimony. But while the said affidavit was identified by the Provincial Fiscal as having been
subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated that he did not know Antonio Daria personally and that
was the only time he appeared before him. Exhibit "2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office.
Moreover, the said exhibit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for
the prosecution to cross-examine him. As stated in People Mariquina 4 , affidavits are generally not
prepared by the affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants'
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason,
and for the further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves
are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. In view hereof, We find Exhibit "2" of no probative value,
and that the lower court did not err when it rejected the same. In this connection, it is markworthy that the
prosecuting attorney stated in open court that Antonio Daria had also executed another affidavit (Exhibit
"D") in the Fiscal's office "to the effect that he went to the office of defense counsel, . . . and there affixed
his thumbmark on a statement that was never read to him." Be that as it may, not one of the other persons
who, Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic (Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais) was
produced in court to support his alibi. Mariano Taeza's testimony, therefore, remains uncorroborated. It has
been repeatedly held that in the face of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes
more so if uncorroborated. 5 It is worse if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons
mentioned by the accused but they are not presented. 6
By Mariano Taeza's own admission, he and the other accused, Juan Brioso, are close friends. It
was shown that Mariano Taeza's house is only about two hundred meters from that of Silvino Daria's and
that the barrio clinic is only about eighty to one hundred meters from the said victim's place. Mariano Taeza
himself stated that Silvino Daria died "may be less than thirty minutes, may be five minutes" after his arrival
at the victim's house with the latter's son and other persons. As held in another case 7 the defense
of alibi is so weak that in order to be believed there should be a demonstration of physical impossibility for
the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission . Mariano Taeza was so
near the victim's house that it was easy for him to be there when the shooting occurred.
The other accused, Juan Brioso, stated that he was in sitio Catungawan, barrio Basbasa, Tayum,
on 23 December 1966. He was there upon invitation of his first cousin, Nestorio Flores, to cut and mill
sugar cane. He left his house in Addamay at 8 in the morning of the said day, arriving in Catungawan
 before the noon meal. They cut sugar cane from 4 to 5 in the afternoon. At 6:30, after supper, he, his
cousin, and the latter's son, Felix Flores, started milling the sugar cane which they had cut. The milling
lasted up to 2 in the early morning of the following day. He never left the place where they were milling. He
learned of the death of Silvino Daria only when he returned to Addamay because his parents informed him
of the news. He admitted knowing Cecilia Bernal and that she likewise knows him.
He denied being a close friend of Mariano Taeza (thereby contradicting Mariano Taeza's
testimony) 8 ; denied that he had gone to the house of Angelita Daria, and his having knowledge of the
courtship of Angelita by Mariano Taeza; or that both of them used to drink and go out together. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he went with Mariano Taeza when they attended dances. One
such occasion was during the birthday of his first degree cousin in Addamay way back in 1965.
Nestorio Flores was presented to corroborate the alibi the accused. But while both exhibited
wonderful memory as to what happened between sunset and midnight of 23 December 1966, they
contradict each other as to what happened in the earlier hours or events. As already stated, Juan Brioso
testified that he left his place in Addamay at 8 in the morning and arrived at his cousin's house before the
noon meal of 23 December 1966; but Nestorio Flores asserted that it was 8 in the morning when Juan
arrived. Brioso claimed that they cut sugar cane from 4 to 5 in the afternoon of the said day. His cousin
testified that they cut sugar cane in the morning after Brioso's arrival until lunchtime. Brioso stated that they
milled sugar cane for the third time in that place in 1966, the first occasion being on 29 November and the
second on 8 December Flores denied this, saying that they did not cut sugar cane in November 1966,
although in other years they did. He further stated that it was already in December of the year that Brioso
came. In fact, the same witness showed uncertainty as to the exact date, when he answered even on direct
examination that "may be that was the time when he came." 9 In cases of positive identification of the
culprit by reliable witnesses, it has been held that the defense of alibi must be established by "full, clear
and satisfactory evidence." 10 It is obvious that this witness, who is a close relative of the accused, was
merely presented in court in an attempt to save Juan Brioso from punishment for the crime committed. We
believe the trial court when it found that the witness has an interest in the fate of the accused Juan Brioso,
and, therefore, his testimony should not be given credence.
Evidence also shows that from Tiker to Catungawan is only about nine kilometers and only a two-
hour walk. The place is also accessible by motor transportation, although motor vehicles are allegedly rare
in the said place. As in the case of Mariano Taeza, it was not physically impossible for Juan Brioso to be at
the locus criminis at the time the crime was committed.
It has been clearly and sufficiently proved that the killing of Silvino Daria was qualified by treachery
(alevosia). 11 The victim was quietly making rope in his own house. He was caught off-guard and
defenseless when suddenly and unexpectedly the two accused fired at him. He had no chance either to
evade or repel the aggression. The trial court correctly held that treachery absorbs nocturnity and abuse of
superior strength. 12 But while these aggravating circumstances are always included in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the commission of the crime in the victim's dwelling is not, 13 hence the crime is
murder attended by one aggravating circumstance, which has been held to be present where the victim
was shot inside his house although the triggerman was outside. 14 There being no mitigating circumstance
to offset it, the apposite penalty is death. However, for lack of sufficient votes, the penalty imposable is
reduced to life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the sentence under appeal is affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of
the indemnity is increased to P12,000.00. 15
||| (People v. Brioso, G.R. No. L-28482, [January 30, 1971], 147 PHIL 291-300)
[G.R. No. 45925. June 7, 1938.]

G.R. No. L-20986             August 14, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO
PUESCA alias Big Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE GUSTILO alias Peping, FILOMENO MACALINAO,
JR. alias White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding, and MAGNO MONTANO alias Edol, respondents.

Davao Provincial Fiscal Alejandro B. Ruiz and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Martin V. Delgra, Jr. for petitioner.
No appearance for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo,
Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to
which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao
was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused
Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense
charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to commit the offense, mentioning the name of
each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention
in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo
objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients
were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the
witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the
objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present
petition for certiorari praying that the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous
and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to answer the question in full.

The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely
objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is
nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of
those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the
answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so
named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the
witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding,
however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really
and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.

On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant to
explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned and
investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.

[G.R. No. 74065. February 27, 1989.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NERIO GADDI Y CATUBAY, defendant-

appellant.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO

SATISFY CONVICTION. — Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial
evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity of such conviction that: 1) there be more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
[Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court People v. Modesto, G.R. No. L-25484, September 21,
1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R. No. L-38162, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.] Although no
general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any
case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except that of guilt.
2.ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL COURT GENERALLY
GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT. — As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect since it has the advantage of observing the
demeanor of a witness while on the witness stand and therefore can discern if such witness is telling the
truth or not.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFESSION OF A PERSON TO THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE; EXCEPTION. — This Tribunal had previously declared that a
confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and his conscience [People v. Salvador, G.R. No. L-77964, July 26, 1988 citing People v.
Castaneda; G.R. No. L-32625, August 31, 1979, 93 SCRA 59.] Proof that a person confessed to the
commission of a crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts
which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a
witness regarding the statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI, INHERENTLY A WEAK DEFENSE, REQUIRED TEST TO OVERCOME
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION. — It has been ruled time and again that courts look upon the
evidence of alibi with suspicion and always receive it with caution not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication. To overcome the evidence of the prosecution, an
alibi must satisfy the test of "full, clear and satisfactory evidence" This test requires not only proof that the
accused was somewhere else other than the scene of the crime but clear and convincing proof of physical
impossibility for the accused to have been at the place of the commission of the crime.
5.ID.; ID.; CONVICTION OF ACCUSED MAY BE SUSTAINED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION. — As the culpability of the accused has been established beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution, there is no need to dwell on the admissibility of
appellant's extrajudicial confession. His conviction can be sustained independently of said confession.
6.CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION, NOT APPRECIATED. — In the absence of proof as to how the victim was killed, the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation cannot be properly appreciated. The
killing must be considered as homicide only and not murder since the circumstance qualifying the killing
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself.
7.ID.; CRIME COMMITTED IS HOMICIDE NOT MURDER ABSENT ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE; PENALTY IMPOSABLE. — As the evidence on record does not disclose the existence
of treachery and evident premeditation in the stabbing of the victim, the crime committed is only HOMICIDE
and not murder. Since there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty for homicide
which is reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the range of the imposable penalty is from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
8.CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF REDUCED ACCORDINGLY. — Absent any proof of
actual damages, the heirs of Augusto Esguerra are entitled only to the indemnity of P30,000.00. Hence, the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court should be reduced accordingly.

DECISION

CORTES, J p:
Nerio Gaddi y Catubay was charged with murder for the death of one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro
in an information which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 11th day of December, 1981, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without any justifiable cause, qualified with
treachery and with evident premeditation (sic), did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one AUGUSTO
ESGUERRA y NAVARRO, by then and there stabbing him several times with a knife, hitting
him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the offended party in such amount as maybe awarded under the provision of the Civil
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Rollo, p. 15.]
After arraignment, wherein Gaddi pleaded not guilty, and trial Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of
Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City handed down a verdict of guilt for the crime
charged, the decretal portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused NERIO GADDI y CATUBAY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as charged in the information, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay his
heirs of Augusto Esguerra the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 31.]
On appeal to this Court, Gaddi assigns as errors of the trial court the following:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF ERNESTO GUZMAN AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
BY THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON HIS
WRITTEN STATEMENT (EXH. "F") WHICH IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION [Rollo, p. 38.]
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses before the court a quo, namely: Ernesto Guzman, Pat.
Arturo Angeles, Cpl. Rogelio Castillo, Pat. Jesus Patriarca and Dr. Gregorio C. Blanco. On the other hand,
the accused Gaddi was the sole witness presented for the defense. The prosecution's version of the facts
are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra
drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981, appellant to]d Ernesto
Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet
pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to the
police and reported what appellant told him (pp. 2-3. tsn, September 2, 1982; pp. 2-8. tsn,
August 9, 1983).
At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, December 12, 1981, Corporal
Rogelio Castillo and Detective Rodrigo Salamat arrested appellant at Manrey Subdivision,
Novaliches, Quezon City. Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he killed the victim and where
he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman
and Barangay residents to where the body was — in a toilet pit in the backyard of Ernesto
Guzman. The policeman, with the help of the Barangay residents, dug out the body. The body
of the victim was identified by Ernesto Guzman, his wife, and Jose Esguerra, victim's brother.
Pat. Patriarca took pictures of the body (Exhibits C to C-5), noted the statements of Ernesto
Guzman and Jose Esguerra, (Exhibit D), and took down the confession of appellant (Exhibit
F). Later, the cadaver was subjected to autopsy (pp. 3-13, tsn, August 24, 1983; pp. 3-22, tsn,
January 3, 1984).
A man's T-shirt with collar, colored yellow, red and blue, and red shorts, were recovered from
the pit where the body of the victim was dug out. The T-shirt and shorts were identified by
Ernesto Guzman as those worn by appellant while he was drinking with the victim on
December 11, 1981 (pp. 2-3, tsn, September 2, 1982). A small table, rubber slipper, bottle of
wine and glass were likewise recovered from the same pit. (p. 6, tsn, July 14, 1983). Brief for
the Appellee, pp. 35; Rollo, p. 52.] LLphil
On the other hand, the defense's version of the facts are as follows:
Accused Nerio Gaddi a resident of Novaliches, Quezon City, testified that on December 11, 1981, at
around 2:00 to 5:00 p.m., he was drinking with Augusto Esguerra (Bong Kuleleng) near the house of
Ernesto Guzman. At about 5:00 p.m., he was requested by Ernesto Guzman to buy gin. He left
Ernesto Guzman and Augusto Esguerra (who were allegedly drinking) in order to buy a bottle of gin in
a nearby store, about 200 meters away. At the store, he met an acquaintance and they talked for a
while before returning. Upon his arrival at the place (where they had a drinking spree) he noticed
stain of blood in the place where they had been drinking and Augusto Esguerra, alias Bong Kuleleng
was not there anymore. He inquired from Ernesto Guzman the whereabouts of Augusto Esguerra and
was told that the latter "went home already." He then asked Guzman about the blood and was told
that it was the blood stain of a "butchered chicken." At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, Ernesto Guzman
informed him about the killing of Augusto Esguerra Guzman narrated to him that Bong Kuleleng
(Augusto Esguerra) held his rooster by the neck and that his tattoo mark BCJ (Batang City Jail) will
 be erased by him. He did not report the killing to the authorities. Guzman likewise requested him to
admit the killing but he refused. While in the house, Guzman filed the case ahead. He was later
arrested and investigated while looking for the corpse. When brought to the police station, he was
forced to admit the killing of Augusto Esguerra (TSN, pp. 3-14 August 20, 1984). [Appellant's Brief, p.
4-5; Rollo, p. 38.]
The Court finds the instant appeal unmeritorious.
Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial evidence, as in this case, it is
essential for the validity of such conviction that: 1) there be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt [Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court People
v. Modesto, G.R. No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R. No. L-
38162, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.] Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all that is required is that the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at
the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty [People v. Constante, G.R No. L-
14639, December 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 653; People v. Caneda, G.R. No. L-19132 September 26, 1964, 12
SCRA 9.]
In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently satisfies the
quantum of proof necessary to uphold a judgment of conviction. The following circumstances proven by the
prosecution indubitably point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime committed against Augusto
Esguerra.
1.The fact that said victim was last seen on the day he was killed in the company of the accused,
drinking gin at the back of the house of Ernesto Guzman [TSN, August 9, 1983, p. 1.]
2.The fact that on the day after the drinking spree, December 12, 1981, the accused himself
admitted to Ernesto Guzman that he stabbed his drinking companion and that the latter was "nadisgrasya
niya" so he dumped the body of the victim in a hole being dug out for a toilet, located at the yard of Ernesto
Guzman [TSN. August 9, 1983, p. 7.]
3.The fact that when he was turned over to Pat. Arturo Angeles and Pat. Rogelio Castillo of the
Northern Police District by the barangay people who apprehended him, he admitted the truth of the charge
of the barangay residents that he killed someone and that he dumped the body of the victim in a place
being dug out as an improvised toilet [TSN, July 14, 1983, p. 5; TSN, August 24, 1983, p. 8.] At the time
the barangay people started digging for the body of the victim, the appellant was even instructing them as
to the exact location where the body was buried [TSN, August 24, 1983, p. 6.]
4.The fact that the place where he led the police officers and the barangay residents, i.e. the toilet
pit in the backyard of Ernesto Guzman, was indeed the site where he buried the victim as the body of the
victim was found there after the digging [TSN, January 3, 1984, p. 5.]
5.The fact that the T-shirt and shorts which the accused was wearing during the drinking spree
were later recovered from the place where the victim was buried [TSN, September 2, 1982, p. 3.]
Appellant however disputes the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
as a basis for his conviction. As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect [People v. Valentino, G.R. Nos. L-49859-60, February 20,
1986, 141 SCRA 397; People v. Dagangon, G.R. Nos. L-62654-58, November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 464]
since it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of a witness while on the witness stand and
therefore can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not [People v. Ornoza, G.R. No. 56283, June 30,
1987, 151 SCRA 495.]
Moreover, appellant's claim that Ernesto Guzman's testimony on Gaddi's confession of the crime to
him cannot be given credence for being hearsay is unavailing. This Tribunal had previously declared that a
confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
his conscience [People v. Salvador, G.R. No. L-77964, July 26, 1988 citing People v. Castaneda; G.R. No.
L-32625, August 31, 1979, 93 SCRA 59.] Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can
be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court] which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from other
persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception." Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another
person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it
is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement [People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14,
1965, 14 SCRA 944.] Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his
conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying
to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, he was testifying to the fact that the
appellant told him that he stabbed Augusto Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.
 That the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral confession is competent evidence finds support
in People v. Tawat [G.R. No. L-62871, May 25, 1984, 129 SCRA 431] which upheld the trial court's reliance
on an extrajudicial confession given, not to a police officer during custodial interrogation, but to an ordinary
farmer as the basis for conviction. The Court's pronouncements in the aforesaid case find relevance in the
instant case: LibLex
"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may
be given in evidence against him" (Sec. 29 Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito told
Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.
The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.
An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in its
substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)
"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a
person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of
the conversation or statement made by the accused" [citing Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th
Ed., Niblack, Sec. 278, p. 551] [at pp. 436-437; Emphasis supplied.]
The trial court found no reason to doubt Guzman's credibility as a witness considering his stature in
the community as a member of a religious movement participating in such activities as "mañanita" and
procession of the Fatima and Black Rosary [Rollo, p. 30.] In fact, on the day the killing took place, he left
his house where appellant and his companion, Esguerra, were still drinking and went to the house of Junior
Isla to attend a "mañanita" and participate in the weekly activity of bringing down the crucifix and the image
of the Fatima [TSN, September 2, 1982. p. 2] Besides, there was no showing at all that he was actuated by
improper motives in testifying against appellant so as to warrant disregard of his testimony [People v.
Magdueno, G.R. No. L-68699, September 22, 1986, 144 SCRA 210.] On the contrary, the evidence shows
that even though the appellant is not related at all to Guzman, the latter, as an act of generosity, allowed
the former to sleep in the porch of his house as the former had no immediate relatives in Quezon City
[TSN, August 9, 1983, p. 14.]
As to the testimony of Pat. Angeles and Pat. Castillo, the police officers who apprehended the
appellant, credence should be given to their narration of how the appellant was apprehender and how he
led the police and the barangay residents to the place where he dumped the body of his victim since those
police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence
to the contrary [People v. Boholst, G.R. No. L-73008, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 263 citing People v.
Gamayon, G.R. No. L-25486, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Campana, G.R. No. L-37325,
August 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 271; People v. Rosas, G.R. No. L-72782, April 30, 1987, 149 SCRA 464.].
 Appellant's defense to the prosecution's charge rests on an uncorroborated and purely oral
evidence of alibi. It has been ruled time and again that courts look upon the evidence of alibi with suspicion
[People v. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545 (1950)] and always receive it with caution [People v. Cinco, 67 Phil. 196
(1939); People v. de Guzman, 70 Phil. 23 (1940)] not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but
also because of its easy fabrication [People v. Rafallo, 86 Phil 22 (1950).] To overcome the evidence of the
prosecution, an alibi must satisfy the test of "full, clear and satisfactory evidence" [U.S. v. Pascua, 1 Phil.
631 (1903); U.S. v. Oxiles, 29 Phil, 587 (1915); U.S. v. Olais, 36 Phil. 828 (1917).] This test requires not
only proof that the accused was somewhere else other than the scene of the crime but clear and
convincing proof of physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the place of the commission of
the crime [People v. Pacis, G.R. Nos. L-32957-58, July 25, 1984. 130 SCRA 540; People v. Coronado,
G.R. No. 68932, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250; People v. Ferrera, G.R. No. 66965, June 18, 1987, 151
SCRA 113.]
The testimony of the accused himself believes any claim of physical impossibility for him to be at
the scene of the crime since according to him, the store where he allegedly bought another bottle of gin
was only 200 meters away. He was able to return to Guzman's house only after half an hour since he still
had a chat with an acquaintance at the store. Even granting the truth of appellant's story that he was
ordered by Guzman to buy a bottle of gin at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and that he was back after
thirty minutes, it was not impossible for him to have committed the crime since Guzman and his wife left
appellant alone with the victim at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening to attend the mañanita at the house of
Junior Isla. Thus, his statements on the witness stand, far from demonstrating physical impossibility of
being at the scene of the crime, cast serious doubt on the veracity of his alibi.
As the culpability of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of
the prosecution, there is no need to dwell on the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession [Exh. F
to F-9; Rollo, p. 20, et seq.] His conviction can be sustained independently of said confession. cdrep
However, in the absence of proof as to how the victim was killed, the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation cannot be properly appreciated. The killing must be considered as
homicide only and not murder since the circumstance qualifying the killing must be proven as indubitably
as the killing itself [People v. Vicente, G.R. No. L-31725, February 18, 1986, 141 SCRA 347.] This Tribunal
clearly pointed out in a previous case that
 As heretofore stated, not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by
the prosecution. Thus, the record is totally bereft of any evidence as to the means or method
resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to add that treachery cannot be
deduced from mere presumption, much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of
proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached respecting
the attendance of alevosia [People v. Duero, G.R No. 65555, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 515,
519-520; Emphasis supplied.]
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation be considered, absent a clear
showing of
1.the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2.an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his determination; and
3.a sufficient laspe of time between the determination an d the execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act [People v. Diva, GR. No. L-22946, October 11, 1968,
25 SCRA 468; People v. Pacada, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-44444-45, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 427.].
As the evidence on record does not disclose the existence of treachery and evident premeditation
in the stabbing of the victim, the crime committed is only HOMICIDE and not murder. Since there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty for homicide which is reclusion
temporal should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of
the imposable penalty is from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Absent any proof of actual damages, the heirs of Augusto Esguerra are entitled only to the
indemnity of P30,000.00. Hence, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court should be reduced
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the accused-appellant is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Augusto Esguerra in the amount
of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
||| G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,

RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001.]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPACAL-ARROYO, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional
issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice- President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for
the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were
to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos
Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. 1
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled
"I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred
by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation. 2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security,
then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposé of Governor Singson. On
the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded
the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. 3 Two days later
or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of
the petitioner. 4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded
that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation. 5 Former President Fidel Ramos also
joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department
of Social Welfare and Services 6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation. 7 However, petitioner
strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of
Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister
Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip. 8 On November 2, Secretary Mar
Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. 9 On November 3, Senate President
Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from
the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino. 10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment 11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both
houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar
was unseated by Representative Fuentebella. 12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. 13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started. 14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing
as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker
Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan
Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of
private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon
Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General
and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy
Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to
day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low
points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank.
She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose
Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4,
2000. 15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas.
When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11,
Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged
that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading. 16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 17 the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President. 18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the
streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of
sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their
collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the
impeachment tribunal. 19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the
impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation
of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion. 20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer
line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance.
Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted
more and more people. 21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner
informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary
of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine. 22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and
hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government." 23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. 24 Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. 25 Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelope. 26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang's Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political
Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the
Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez. 27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and
anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations
consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. SIacTE
At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. 28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. 29 He issued
the following press statement: 30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I
leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to
our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same
service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY !
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: 31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
 (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20. 32 Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00
p.m. 33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution
in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief
Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be
sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and
confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an
administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the
twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to
administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may
be filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys. 34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On
January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of
respondent Arroyo. 35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White
House conveying US recognition of her government. 36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives. 37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines." 38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution." 39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. 40 A few days
later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act. 41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President. 42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination
of Senator Guingona, Jr. 43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmeña
voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of
respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert
Barbers were absent. 44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in
Resolution No. 178. 45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later. 46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated. 47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record"
that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to
decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still
qualified to run for another elective post. 48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating
jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001. 49 In another survey conducted by
the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted
President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in
Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very
poor class. 50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are:
(1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and
corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on
November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc.; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by
the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et
al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate
the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with
the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus
and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR
No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629,
1754, 1755,1756,1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner,
on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR
Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon
within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the
consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on
or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr. 51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban 52 recused themselves on
motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel
Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one
side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5)
days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738,
the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001
declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press
statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under
pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public
the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news
reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001,
which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic." 53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner
Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.
 We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
at bar involve a political question
Private respondents 54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and
hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the
cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President
of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by
foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the
Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts
in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and
on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law. 55 In the United
States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by
Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr, 56 viz:
". . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of
which we treat is one of political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. 57 Our leading case is Tañada v.
Cuenco, 58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of
a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. 59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60 With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and
symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid
language to ". . . review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or
the extension thereof . . .."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano
v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. 61 and related cases 62 to support their thesis that since the cases
at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political
question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases,
we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the
sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution 63 declared that the
Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance
of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a
government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that
government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of
respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath
under the 1987 Constitution. 64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused
and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of
EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was
one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion
call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine
quibus non." 65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898,
provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or
opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of
association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to
send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved
when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1966. 66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution, 67 and the 1973
Constitution. 68 These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-
evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of
assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and
fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining
the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 69 In this sense, freedom of
speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society
can take place without destroying the society." 70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by
the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right
of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all." 72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, 73 this Court
similarly stressed that " . . . it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people
who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1
of Article II, 74 and section 8 75 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section
11 76 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, 77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine
of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of
the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from
a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution
which provides:
"SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation
of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the
 President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
xxx xxx xxx."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as
of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is
not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be
express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before
he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow
the succession of events after the exposé of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives.
Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of
Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow.
Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified.
The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to
open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was
over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. 79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the
morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA,
hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,
petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed,
seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)" 80 An hour later
or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be
a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General
Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he
asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation." 81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently. 82 The sky was falling fast on the
petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and
dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad
with enough funds to support him and his family. 83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to
the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. 84 At 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a
week in the palace." 85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a
matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary
Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure
a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power." 86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara
readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m.
of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period
of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family,
and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. 87 Again, we
note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this
fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the
following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"xxx xxx xxx
I explain what happened .during the first round of negotiations.
The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes,
as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this
— it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go." 88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he
said ". . . Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. — Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson)
Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001,
that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will
assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the
new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various
positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination
with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall
function under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective
immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police
authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with
the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with
the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.'
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and
undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which
time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of
their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and
his families are guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the
private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines ('AFP')
through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities — Vice
President (Macapagal).
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment
court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that
the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001
(the "Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing
from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
 During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police ('PNP') shall
function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall
obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and
tenor provided for in 'Annex A' heretofore attached to this agreement."' 89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be
noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during
and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes
and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of
the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the fateful
events, viz: 90
"xxx xxx xxx
11:00 a.m. — Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the
five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a
group he is with. I hear voices in the background
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President-shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which
resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will
assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence
on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various
government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as
approved by the national military and police authority — Vice President. IaAScD
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police ('PNP') shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings
account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
Annex 'B' heretofore attached to this agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
11:20 a.m. — I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement,
signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has
decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldn't you
wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (It's over, sir).'
I ask him: 'Diyung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: 'Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, we're deleting that
part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this
matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and
 faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene
Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the
signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should
be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide
will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon — Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. — The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few
friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at
Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have
already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. — The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada
family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final
statement before leaving Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many
other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent
the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this county, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I
leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to
our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same
service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to
the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to
a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on
this supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give
up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence
due to his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner
sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
 To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. 91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in
the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither
did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes
the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during
the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final
press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was
temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the
time being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from
the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press
release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be
the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to
petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could
not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"SECTION 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this Act under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was
submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands.
However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose
during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is
under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be
allowed to voluntarily resign or retire." 92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was
inserted as section 15:
"SECTION 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be allowed to resign or
retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his
prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency." 93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend even after his
tenure. ICHcaD
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed.
Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision
mainly focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original
bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official
with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to
be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his
constitutional right. 94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction
to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates
of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and
the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner
is only temporarily unable to
act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability
claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability
of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." 95 This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is
only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that
purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175; 96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 97 which
states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS
A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the
 Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support
from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20
January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had
extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a
policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and
development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if
it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an
institution and that of the individual members, thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the
people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing
government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts
to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be
an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the
various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all
the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the
administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive
partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption
into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a
partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178 98 which
states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with
integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines — qualities which merit his
nomination. to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it.
 Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of
Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the
Senate signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for
meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation
needs unity of purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative
measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes and
overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence, and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility
and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice. Senator of the land — which qualities merit his nomination to
the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen.
Teofisto T Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83 101 which
states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
 Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment
Court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday,
January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered
approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the 'second
envelope' be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and
preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof
shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr."
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from
any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, 102 we hold that this Court cannot
"exercise its judicial power for this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr, 103 there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a
co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity
from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the
extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will be
most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In
the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese
citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and
C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
 "The principle of non-liability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary
has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his
office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that
tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying
rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This
does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable
under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply,
that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature,
may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in
the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter
is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-
General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has
been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person,
however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been
invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is
mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his
official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the
contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which
touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the
Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his
power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining
whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is
without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial
faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to
protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably
qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to
act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case,
he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for
the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz: ". . . Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive
spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the
State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as
to the integrity of government itself." 105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity.
Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity.
Section 17, Article VII stated: STHAaD
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders
during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in
Article XVII of this Constitution."
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity And All The
King's Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages," 106 petitioner's learned
counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the modifications effected
by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and
fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only
from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope
so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third,
we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be
they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can
be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense
syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasang Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive
immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of
Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos
violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism "the king can do no wrong." 107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People
Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the
executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J.
Bernas, viz.: 108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee
did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on
immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree
to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit
during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might
be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing
litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by
the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam
President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument
that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." 109 Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet
can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make
it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President,
the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz: 110
"xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against
the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then
his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says,
the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez 111 that "incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has
been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine
qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan 112 and related
cases 113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser. 114
 Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, 115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President,
was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and
advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct
justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in
Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named
an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others,
that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed
from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US
Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the
1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President
from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to
reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones 117 where it held that the US President's immunity
from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a
public trust. 118 It declared as a state policy that "(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." 119 It ordained that
"(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 120 It
set the rule that "(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel." 121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. 122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." 123 The Office of the Ombudsman
was also given fiscal autonomy. 124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's
claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. 125 The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. 126 The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue,  i.e.,
substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials
or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. 127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 128 later reiterated in
the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due
to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we
rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field . . . . The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial
and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our
 communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fiction of life.
For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected
from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. . . . Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their
mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge
due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case.
In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and
adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of
the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden."
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc. 130 and its companion cases, viz.:
"Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process
while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary
investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in
the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet
of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the
principal actors in the case — the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers
— have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a
fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In
the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-
American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws
were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively
open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions
based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic
value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes
of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11,
14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe
such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as
valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf.,
e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the
First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing
freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as
protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the
context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the
public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly
is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a
 catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it
was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the
people generally — and representatives of the media — have a right to be present,
and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms
guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights,
not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of
enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.'
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino,
et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will
prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded
by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record
evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no
instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on
the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis
supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. 131 He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias free decision. Well to note,
the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because
of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the
petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias.
To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of
slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the
mobs." 132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already
prejudged the cases of the petitioner 133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the
petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the
news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in
light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good
faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors. 134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor
can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words,
investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of
probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper
court. ATICcS
VI
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage — the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call
 from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be
more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized
as the "most fundamental of all freedoms." 135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice
and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall
have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient
vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated
by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy,
the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has
proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may
be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander
to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., concurs in the result.
Davide, Jr., C.J., took no part in view of reasons given in open court and in the Extended
Explanation.
Kapunan, J., I concur in the result. I reserve the filing of a separate opinions.
Panganiban, J., took no part per Letter of Inhibition dated Feb. 15, 2001 mentioned in footnote 51
of ponencia.
Pardo, J., concurs in the result. I believe that petitioner was constrained to resign. Reserve my vote
in immunity from suit.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I concur in the result. I reserve the filing of separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., I concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
[G.R. No. L-45470. February 28, 1985.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY", defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DYING DECLARATION; INADMISSIBLE AS SUCH WHERE

DECLARANT DID NOT BELIEVE HIMSELF IN EXTREMIS. — The dying declaration of the deceased
Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to
whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in
extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct," which is the sole basis for
admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMITTED AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE. — It may be admitted, however, as
part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased
Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY, ATTENDANT WHEN
EMPLOYED AS A MEANS OF EXECUTION. — Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery. The victim was apparently shot while his two hands were tied at his back.
Accused, in shooting the victim, obviously employed means or force in the execution of the offense which
tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J p:

Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde, committed as follows: LLjur
 "That on or about November 13, 1972, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a gun and with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Pablo Remonde with said
weapon, inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death."
After the trial, the lower Court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code); to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs."
From the foregoing judgment, accused Gregorio Laquinon interposed the present appeal.
The People's version of the case is as follows:
"On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio
captain of Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short while
he heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to the south of
his house (pp. 4-6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him
that a man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call
the barrio councilman. Thereafter, he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was.
His brother, Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the
man lying on the sand and asked who he was. The man answered, 'I am Pablo Remonde' (pp.
7-10, id.). Remonde's two hands were tied on his back. He was lying face down (p. 10, id.).
"Samama Buat then took the 'ante mortem' statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked
him who he was to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked
'who shot you' and Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde
whether from the gunshot wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim answered
'I do not know' (pp. 11, 19, 21, id.; see also Exh. A, Folder of Exhibits). After that, barrio
captain Buat went to the municipality of Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran
the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked
the victim who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot by
Gregorio Laquinon (pp. 21 A to 23, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Pablo Remonde was placed on a jeep
of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital (p. 23, id.). Pablo Remonde was admitted to the
Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr.
Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body a slug was recovered (pp. 15-
16, tsn, Jam. 26, 1976; Exh. B). Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on November 16, 1972
because of bullet wounds (pp. 17-20, tsn, Jan. 26, 1976; see also clinical chart. Exh. C, Folder
of Exhibits)."
The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. The trial court summarized his
defense, as follows:
"In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member; that he was ordered
by one Noli Cabardo, then their CO, to fetch Pablo Remonde; he requested one Cristino
Nerosa to go with him, and matter of factly, they brought Remonde to the place where said
CO Cabardo with ten companions, was waiting at the riverbank; that before reaching the
place, Nerosa separated from him and he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo. There
Cabardo confronted Remonde why, having been commanded to buy some provisions in
Matanao, he (Remonde) never returned; to which Remonde answered that he spent the
money 'in drinking and gambling', whereupon Cabardo got mad and as Remonde attempted
to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which must have been fired by Cabardo as he was
holding a .38 Cal. revolver; that he (witness) also had that evening a Cal. 22 paltik; that after
the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the ground, and then Cabardo ordered them to go to
the mountain as in fact they did; that two days later during the day, their mountain camp was
raided by the PC and Cabardo and two others were killed while he (witness) was able to
escape and went to Magpet, North Cotabato, and engaged in farming therein with his
relatives; but believing that as a KM member he 'committed something,' he surrendered to the
Davao PC Barracks in May, 1975 (Exhibit '2'), where up to now he is being confined."
The accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground that the lower
court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement attributed to the
deceased Pablo Remonde which reads: llcd
"Q State your name and other personal circumstances.
A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and resident of Pob. this mun.
"Q Who shot you?
 A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the ticket of Liberal last local
election and son of Suelo Maravillas whose name I don't know.
"Q Why you were shot by said persons above?
A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice-Mayor Viran regarding KM.
"Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?
A I don't know sir."
The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem
declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and that the
deceased was not a competent witness.
The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas who turned out as Cristino
Nerosa as one of those who shot him in his dying declaration does not make the deceased an incompetent
witness. Nor does it render said dying declaration incredible of belief. The testimony of the accused that he
and Nerosa separated and that he alone brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not corroborated. It may
be that Nerosa was with the accused when the latter shot the deceased, as stated in the dying declaration,
but that the accused testified that Nerosa was not with him when he brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo
in order to free Nerosa from criminal liability. LLphil
Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the place was dark and that the victim
has told him that he was shot by members of the KM make the deceased an incompetent witness. on the
contrary, it strengthens the statement of the deceased since the accused is a member of the KM.
But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to
show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is
extinct," which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay
rule." 1
It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately
after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the
accused.
On the whole, We are satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the accused was responsible
for the killing of Pablo Remonde. We cite with approval the following observations of the trial court:
"Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing as related by the
accused for the following reasons:
"First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was already
hand-tied at his back, that the place of the shooting was 'covered by thick bushes and beside
the river', and that CO Cabardo was with ten men excluding the accused; under these
circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased, with all those overwhelming handicap,
would attempt to flee.
"Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do would be
to flee away from and not towards Cabardo; in doing the former he would turn to his right or to
his left or towards his back; if he fled to his left or right, or towards his back, he would be
exposing one side of his body, or his back, and when fired upon in that position he would have
been hit on one side of the body or at his back. The evidence — as testified to by Dr. Llanos
— however, shows that the deceased had only one wound, a gunshot wound, in the
abdomen, this shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and through the
intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of his back, that is why the slug
(Exhibit 'B') was recovered. The accused's version, therefore, that the deceased tried to flee is
hard to believe for being against the physical facts.
 "Now, if the accused is innocent, why should he relate such an incredible version?
"Oh what a tangled web they weave when first day practice to deceive."
— Sir Walter Scott
"With these observations, the Court cannot believe that the accused really delivered
the deceased to CO Cabardo and that it was Cabardo who shot him. As testified to by him,
their mountain camp was raided by the PC two days after the incident, as a result of which
raid Cabardo and two of their companions were killed. The accused himself was able to
escape, went to hide in a relative's farm in faraway Magpet, North Cotabato, did farming there
until one day in May, 1975, repentant that, as a KM member, he had 'committed something',
he finally surrendered to the PC Barracks in Davao City. Cabardo, may he rest in peace,
having gone to the other world, and can no longer speak in his behalf, it is not unlikely that the
 accused conceived of this outlandish defense by pointing to CO Cabardo, to free himself from
responsibility.
"Most important to remember on this point is that at the time the deceased made his
'dying' statement, Cabardo was still alive; that per the accused himself, he had no previous
differences with the deceased or with the barrio captain; and that from the prosecution witness
Bo. Capt. Buat, when he took the statement of the deceased, the deceased was feeling
strong, surely, under such circumstances it is hard to believe that the deceased would name
the accused with whom he had no quarrel and Nerosa as his killers if that was really not the
truth."
Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The victim
was apparently shot while his two hands were tied at his back. Accused, in shooting the victim, obviously
employed means or force in the execution of the offense which tended directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. cdll
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is
increased to P30,000.00, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. With costs
against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-26193. January 27, 1981.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. RODULFO SABIO, alias "PAPU", defendant.

SYNOPSIS

Before the Court a quo, the 13-year old accused was charged with Robbery with Homicide for the
death of Catalino Espina, an octogenarian, owner of a small sari-sari store located in his house, who, in the
early morning of October 5, 1965, was found on the second floor of his dwelling wounded on the forehead,
from which injury he died three days later. The merchandise in his store was in a state of disarray and the
tin can containing the cash sales in the amount of P8.00 was found empty. The accused was positively
identified by a neighbor of the victim who saw him running from the scene of the incident that fateful
morning, and by the victim in his ante-mortem statement taken by the police in the presence of the victim's
grandnephew. the accused was found guilty as charged, with the attendant aggravating circumstances or
disregard of respect due to the 80-year old victim and recidivism, and without any mitigating circumstances.
He was sentenced to death but in view of his youth, the trial Court recommended that the penalty be
commuted to reclusion perpetua.
On automatic review, the Supreme Court held that only the crime of homicide had been committed
as the evidence supportive of the charge of robbery was at best circumstantial and did not establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused away personalty belonging to the offended party.
Judgment modified. Accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ROBBERY; MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE NOT

SUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION. — The evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best
circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away
personalty belonging to the offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any
part of the alleged missing objects recovered. The consumation of the robbery cannot be inferred nor
presumed from the circumstances that the accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or
that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash amounting to about P8.00, was seen on the floor, open
and empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the house were in disarray (People vs. Labita, et al,
Phil. 1068, unreported case).
2. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF THE COMMISSION OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE;
NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION. — A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires that the robbery
itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of a crime (People vs. Pacala, 58 SCRA
370 (1974), it not being enough to infer said robbery from mere suspicion and presumption (U.S. vs. Alasa-
as, 40 Phil. 878, 881).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTENT TO ROB MUST BE PROVEN. — "Where there was no eyewitness to the
alleged robbery, and the evidence merely shows that after the killing some of the things inside the house
where the killing took place were missing, it cannot be presumed that the accused killers committed
robbery. It is necessary to prove intent to rob. This necessarily includes evidence to the effect that the
accused carried away the effects or personalty of the offended party. In the absence of evidence that the
accused carried away the missing objects, they cannot be convicted of robbery (Ambahang and Amid, 108,
Phil. 325; Villorente and Bislig, 30 Phil. 59; Barruga, 61 Phil. 318, Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed.,
pp. 1415-1416)
4. ID.; ID.; DYING DECLARATION IN ADMISSIBLE TO ESTABLISH FACT OF ROBBERY IN
CASE AT BAR. — The dying declaration of the victim which points to the accused as the one slashed and
robbed him cannot be admitted to establish the factor of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has
always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of death.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBATIVE FORCE OF VICTIM'S DYING DECLARATION LIES IN THE BELIEF
OF AN IMPENDING DEATH; CASE AT BAR. — The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead
which had affected the brain; his inability to speak until his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of
the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent demise from the direct
effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the victim must have known that his
end was inevitable. The death did not ensue till three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the the dying
declarations admissible.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-CLOSURE THEREOF TO THE ACCUSED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY DOES NOT MILITATE AGAINST THE FACT OF ITS EXECUTION. — The mere failure of
the police to confront the accused with the ante-mortem declaration the first time the latter was arrested
and incarcerated neither militates against the fact of its execution considering that it was evidence that the
police was under no compulsion to disclose.
7. ID.; ID.; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY OF TESTIMONY; DISCREPANCIES REFERRING TO
MINOR DETAILS OR COLLATERAL MATTERS DO NOT DESTROY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR
TESTIMONY; CASE AT BAR. — The alleged divergence between Jesusa's statement at the preliminary
investigation and her testimony at the trial merits no serious consideration since an affidavit, "being
taken ex-parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate." Besides, the discrepancies pointed out
by the defense, to wit: whether or not Jesusa saw what the accused did after leaving the house after the
incident, refer to minor details or collateral matters which do not destroy the effectiveness of her testimony.
Further, the discrepancy as to the exact date when the witness actually disclosed to the authorities her
having seen the accused on the morning of the incident, is also minor detail which does not detract from
the reliability of her identification of the accused. Moreover, the defense had not shown any ulterior motive
on the part of the witness that would make her implicate and testify falsely against the accused, who was a
neighbor and an acquaintance.
8. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; RENDITION THEREOF ONE DAY AFTER THE
CLOSE OF THE TRIAL NOT OBJECTIONABLE. — The defense decries the speed with which the trial
Court decided the case, alleging that the decision was prepared and signed on April 29, 1966, or one day
after the close of trial on April 28, 1966, and was read to the accused on April 30, 1966, without benefit of a
transcript of stenographic notes memoranda of the parties, so that the trial Court not have seriously
considered the merits of the case or must have prejudged even before the trial ended. That contention is
belied by the detailed findings of facts in the decision of the trial Court duly supported by the transcript of
stenographic notes now on record.
9. ID.; EVIDENCE; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED.
— The alibi put up by the accused crumbles under the positive identification by witnesses and the dying
declaration of the victim, aside from the fact that because of the proximity of the house of the accused to
that of the victim, it was not possible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; ONLY HOMICIDE COMMITTED IN THE CASE
AT BAR; PENALTY THEREFOR. — The accused is guilty only of homicide, attended by the aggravating
circumstances of disregard of respect due the offended party on account of his age, and dwelling.
Recidivism is not to be considered because of the finding that the crime or robbery has not been
conclusively established. The penalty imposable for the crime of homicide, attended by aggravating with no
mitigating circumstances, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period or seventeen years, four months and
one day to twenty years. In the case at bar, the accused, guilty of the crime of homicide, is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve years of prision mayor as minimum, to twenty years of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay the
costs.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ROBBERY ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
INSTANT CASE. — Robbery was committed by Rodolfo Sabio. The tin car or "barro" which contained
some P8.00 the night before the incident, was found empty and lying on the ground of the house where the
deceased had his store. It could only have been Sabio who took the money for it was he who entered the
store and hacked Catalino Espina who died as a result thereof. True, Catalino Espina could not state how
much money was lost. But from inability to state the amount lost, it does not follow that nothing was lost.
The two — the loss and the amount of the loss — are two entirely different concepts. Naturally, Catalino
 could not state how much money was lost because he was hacked severely on the forehead before the
money was taken by Sabio. A man mortally wounded who did not hand over any money to his assailant
would not expected to answer an inconsequential question as to the amount of his loss. A man in his
situation would be thinking not how much he had lost but of his impending death. There would be no
motive for the killing if there was no robbery and robbery cannot be discounted after Sabio had entered the
store and attacked its owner.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

Automatic review of the death penalty imposed upon the accused, Rodulfo Sabio alias "Papu", by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Criminal Case No. V-10804 for Robbery with Homicide.
On October 5, 1965, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, in Barrio Looc, Argao, Cebu, Catalino
Espina, 80-years old, single, owner of a small sari-sari store located in his house was found on the second
floor of his dwelling wounded on the forehead, from which injury he died three days later.
 
Prosecution witness JESUSA BIRONDO, a fish vendor, testified that about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of October 5, 1965, as she was preparing to go to the seashore, she heard a shout for help
coming from the house of her neighbor, Catalino Espina, which was located just across the street from her
house. She recognized the voice as Catalino's. When she looked out of the window she saw the accused
Rodulfo Sabio, who is nicknamed "Papu", coming out of the door of the store at the victim house. The
accused was wearing a black shirt with sleeves up to the elbow and dark trousers. She had known the
accused since his birth because his house is located at the seashore in Barrio Looc, just about 40 meters
from her own house, and she is familiar with his appearance because she used to see him everyday
passing by her house or at the seashore from the window. Then she shouted for help. Shortly thereafter,
she saw from her window that many persons, about 50 to 100 neighbors, went to Catalino's house. The
following day after the incident, or on October 6, 1965, Jesusa told Police Sergeant Jesus Alberca about
what she heard and saw. She executed a sworn statement on the same date. 1
CAMILO SEMILLA, a 27-year-old fisherman and grandnephew of the victim, who had lived with the
latter since childhood, left Catalino's house at past 4:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 5, 1965 to
go fishing. At the seashore, he waited for somebody to help him drag his boat to the sea from the elevated
support on which it was hoisted. The first person he saw was the accused, Rodulfo Sabio, who came
running past him about 6 meters away, towards his (Sabio's) house. The accused was wearing a black T-
shirt with sleeves reaching beyond the elbow and long "maong" pants. Witness Camilo demonstrated that
the accused had his two hands tucked inside his shirt in front of the stomach while running. Minutes later, a
certain Enok Calledo arrived and told Camilo to go home because his grand-uncle "Noy Ino" had cried for
help. When Camilo reached home, he saw "Ino" (the victim) lying wounded upstairs. He was moaning and
was able to speak only when his head was raised. When Camilo called the victim's name, the latter
responded and told Camilo to fetch a policeman. Camilo noticed that the merchandise in the store were in
disarray and the tin can called "barro", which he knew had contained the cash sales for Sunday and
Monday of about P8.00 because they counted the money the previous night, was lying empty on the floor.
When police officers Paulino Fuentes and Pedro Burgos arrived, Patrolman Fuentes asked "Manoy Ino"
questions which, together with the answers, he wrote on a page torn from a calendar hanging somewhere
in the room. 2 Patrolman Fuentes then instructed Camilo to take the victim to the town dispensary at
Argao, Cebu, where he was treated. But because the victim's condition was considered serious he was
immediately transferred to the Southern Islands Hospital where he died three days later. 3
PAULINO FUENTES, a policeman assigned at the municipal building of Argao, Cebu, received a
report at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning of October 5, 1965, that "Ino" Espina was hacked in barrio Looc.
He and another policeman, Pedro Burgos, proceeded to the victim's house where he saw the latter lying on
the floor, wounded and bleeding on the forehead. Patrolman Fuentes asked the victim who had hacked him
and the latter answered that it was "Papu" Sabio, son of Menes. According to said Patrolman, the person
referred to was the accused, who, as well as his parents, have been known to the witness for the past
three years. Patrolman Fuentes asked the victim why "Papu" had hacked him and the latter answered that
"Papu" had demanded money from him. Patrolman Fuentes also asked the victim how much money he
had lost but the latter was not able to answer the question. Sensing that the wound was serious since it
was bleeding profusely, Patrolman Fuentes decided to take down the statement of the victim. He detached
a leaf from a calendar and wrote down on it the questions he propounded as well as the answers of the
victim. He then had it thumbmarked by the victim with the latter's own blood as no ink was available.
Present at the time were Pedro Burgos, another police officer, and Camilo Semilla, the grandnephew.
Patrolman Fuentes himself and Pedro Burgos signed as witnesses. Reproduced hereunder in full is the
said statement:
 "Antemortem"
"P — Kinsa may ngalan nimo.
T — Catalino Espina.
P - Taga diin man ikao
T - Taga Looc, Argao, Cebu.
P — Kinsa may nag tikbas kanimo kon nagtulis kanimo?
T — Si Rodulfo (Pafo) Sabyo nga anak ni Menez nga taga Looc.
P — Kon ikao mamatay kinsa may responsabli sa imong kamatayon.
T — Si Pafo Sabyo ro gayod ang responsabli sa akong kamatayon.
P — Imo ba kining permahan o tamlaan sa imong todlo?
T — Oo.
Catalino Espina
(Thumbmarked)
Wit:
1. (Sgd.) Paulino Fuentes
2. (Sgd.) Pedro Burgos" 4
The English translation reads:
"Q — What is your name?
A — Catalino Espina.
Q — From where are you?
A — From Lo-ok, Argao, Cebu.
Q — Who slashed you and robbed you?
A — Rodulfo Sabio (Papu) the son of Menez from Lo-ok.
Q — If you will die, who is responsible for your death?
A — Only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death.
Q — Are you going to sign this or affix your fingerprint?
A — Yes.
Brownish fingerprint mark
and across it is written the word
CATALINO ESPINA.
Wit:
1. (Sgd.) Paulino Fuentes
2. (Sgd.) Pedro Burgos" 5
Thereafter, Patrolman Fuentes advised Camilo Semilla to bring the victim to the hospital. Patrolman
Fuentes observed that the things of Catalino and the store items like canned sardines were all in disarray
while the tin can ("barro") was already opened. 6
On October 5, 1965, DR. MELITA REMOTIQUE AÑO, resident physician at the Southern Islands
Hospital, Surgery Department, found that the victim had suffered "compound fracture on the skull, bilateral
at the front-parietal area" with "laceration and cerebral contusion." From the nature of the injuries, she
opined that the same could have been inflicted by a sharp instrument or by bolo, and although the
laceration was not too deep as to cause instantaneous death, the injury was fatal because it had injured
the brain. 7
The prosecution also offered in evidence and as part of the cross-examination of the accused a
letter dated February 17, 1966 of the Cebu Provincial Warden, 8 showing that the accused had been
previously convicted by final judgment and had served sentence for two previous crimes of Theft
committed in the years 1963 and 1964. cdll
Testifying in his defense the accused RODULFO SABIO, 18 years old, a fisherman, claimed that in
the evening of October 4, 1965, he was at home listening to the radio till past 9:00 o'clock after which he
went to sleep until about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day, October 5, 1965, when he was
awakened by his younger brother who said that certain policemen were looking for him. The policemen
took him to the municipal building and incarcerated him without asking any question. He was released the
next day, October 6, but was arrested again on November 24, 1965 at P. del Rosario Street in Cebu City.
The accused admitted that he knew witness, Camilo Semilla, because they were neighbors but he denied
that Camilo had seen him running by the seashore at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of October 5, 1965
because at that time he was still asleep at home. The accused also admitted knowing witness, Jesusa
Birondo, but alleged that she could not have seen him coming out of the door of the house of "Ino" Espina
at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of October 5, 1965 because at that time he was still asleep at home. 9
Defense witness JACINTO MENDEZ corroborated the accused's defense of alibi by testifying that
in the evening of October 4, 1965, he slept in the house of Hermogenes Sabio, father of the accused,
because he and Hermogenes had planned to go fishing the following morning. In the house he saw the
accused and the other children of Hermogenes. When he woke up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the
following day, October 5, he saw that the accused and the other children were all in the house. He repaired
the nets after waking up, then went out to sea with Hermogenes at about 7:00 o'clock and came back at
past 8:00 o'clock in the morning. 10
In a Decision dated April 29, 1966, the trial Court found the accused guilty of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances of disregard of respect due to the victim, an
octogenarian, and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance, and sentenced him to death; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs. The trial Court,
however, recommended that in view of the youthful age of the accused, the death penalty be commuted to
life imprisonment.
In this appeal, the defense has made the following:
"Assignment of Errors
I. "The lower Court erred in concluding that the felony of Robbery with Homicide,
instead of only Homicide, had been established by the evidence;
II. "The lower Court erred in admitting Exhibit 'A' of the prosecution as an ante-mortem
declaration of the victim;
III. "The tower Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jesusa Birondo,
witness for prosecution;
IV. "The lower Court erred in finding that the defendant-appellant was the perpetrator
of the crime." 11
1. We find merit in the contention that only the crime of Homicide had been committed. The
evidence indicative of robbery consisted merely of the testimony of witness Camilo Semilla who declared
as follows:
"Q. How far was Rodulfo Sabio when he passed by you running that moment?
A. About six meters from me.
Q. Did you notice while he passed by you running, if he was holding anything?
xxx  xxx  xxx
A. Yes, he had his hands inside his shirt."
Q. What did you notice inside the house upon your arrival from the seashore?
 
A. I saw that the 'barro' was already empty, lying on the ground, and the merchandise
items were in disorder.
Q. Do you know what things were placed in that thing or tin can which you call 'barro'?
A. It contained the cash sales.
Q. That 'barro' which you mentioned, where was it before you left the house to go to
the shore that dawn?
A. Beside the bed of Ino.
Q. You said that tin can or 'barro' where the cash sales were kept was beside the bed,
do you know more or less the amount placed therein?
A. About P8.00.
Q. How do you know that tin can had P8.00 inside?
A. Because the previous night we counted the money.
Q. The P8.00 was the sales for how many days?
A. That was the sales for Sunday and Monday." 12
and that of Patrolman Fuentes, to wit:
"Q. When you were inside the house of Catalino Espina, what else did you find in the
course of your investigation?
A. I saw that the things of Catalino Espina and the stands where the items for sale were
displayed were all in disarray.
xxx  xxx  xxx
Q. What other conversation did you have with Catalino Espina after the first question?
A. I asked him why Papu hacked him, and the victim answered that Papu demanded
money from him.
Q. Could we say that the answer of the deceased Catalino Espina was outright after the
question?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Even with the second question, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there a third question you propounded to Catalino?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please let us know the third question?
A. I asked him how much money he lost, and he was not able to answer that question.
Q. Do you know why he did not answer that question?
A. I think he did not answer that because when he was hacked he had not yet given
money to Papu."
xxx  xxx  xxx
Q. You stated in the direct examination that the things in the house of the deceased
Catalino Espina were in disarray, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please state before the Honorable Court the things that were disarrayed
when you went up the house of the deceased?
A. The canned sardines were disarrayed, others had dropped to the ground; the 'barro'
was already opened, and other things in the store were in topsy-turvy state." 13
Plainly, the evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best circumstantial and does not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carried away personality belonging to the
offended party. There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged missing
objects recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot be inferred nor presumed from the
circumstance that the accused was seen running "with his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro",
alleged to have contained cash amounting to about P8.00, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that
the things and merchandise inside the house were in disarray (People vs. Labita, et al., [99 Phil. 1068,
unreported case]). A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires that the robbery itself be proven as
conclusively as any other essential element (People vs. Pacala, 58 SCRA 370 [1974]), it not being enough
to infer said robbery from mere suspicion and presumption (U.S. vs. Alasa-as, 40 Phil. 878, 881).
"Where there was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, and the evidence merely
shows that after the killing some of the things inside the house where the killing took place,
were missing, it cannot be presumed that the accused killers committed robbery. It is
necessary to prove intent to rob. This necessarily includes evidence to the effect that the
accused carried away the effects or personality of the offended party. In the absence of
evidence that the accused carried away the missing objects, they cannot be convicted of
robbery." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
Nor can the dying declaration of the victim which, in part, reads:
"Q. Who slashed you and robbed you?
A. Rodulfo Sabio (Papu) the son of Menez from Lo-ok."
be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly
limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder 15 as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of death. 16
 2. Next, the defense questions the admissibility of Exhibit "A" of the prosecution as an ante-mortem
statement arguing that there is no evidence showing that when the declaration was uttered the declarant
was under a consciousness of an impending death; that, in fact, the victim had hopes of recovery for his
first word to Camilo Semilla was for the latter to fetch the police. Defense counsel argues further that there
are doubts as to when said Exhibit "A" was thumb-marked because, although it was already in existence in
the morning of October 5, 1965, as alleged by Patrolman Fuentes, the accused was never confronted with
the document when he was taken into custody by the police for the first time from the morning of October 5
to October 6, 1965, thereby implying that the document did not yet exist at that time.
The arguments advanced are unavailing. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's forehead
which had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's inability to speak until his head was
raised; the spontaneous answer of the victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his
subsequent demise from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the
victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That death did not ensue till three days after the
declaration was made will not alter its probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of
fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. 17 Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew
Camilo Semilla to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of hopelessness of recovery but
rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. The
mere failure of the police to confront the accused with the ante-mortem declaration the first time the latter
was arrested and incarcerated from October 5 to October 6, 1965, neither militates against the fact of its
execution considering that it was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to disclose.
3. The credibility of witness Jesusa Birondo is also assailed by the defense alleging firstly, that it is
unbelievable that she could have really identified the accused as the person who came out of the victim's
house considering that the distance from her window to that house was 17 meters, and at 5:00 a.m. on
October 5, 1965, it was still dark and raining; secondly, there is a glaring divergence between her testimony
at the trial and her statement at the preliminary investigation, which statement was suppressed and not
made known to the trial Court; thirdly, said witness was uncertain as to when she actually brought to the
attention of the authorities the matter of her having seen the accused and finally, the defense asks, if it
were true that the accused had been identified by said witness to the Chief of Police even before the
accused was taken into custody, why was not the accused confronted with such fact?
For one who has known the accused since the latter's infancy and who is very familiar with the
accused's appearance because she sees him almost everyday passing by her house or at the seashore
where the accused has his house, it is not incredible that Jesusa Birondo recognized the accused, at side
view, even at a distance of 17 meters (which was the trial Court's estimate of the distance between
Catalino Espina's house and that of Jesusa Birondo as described by the accused) at 5:00 o'clock in the
morning and even if it were raining. Besides, Jesusa's description of the clothes that the accused was
wearing was corroborated by Camilo Semilla, who also saw the accused that same morning.
The alleged divergence between Jesusa's statement at the preliminary investigation and her
testimony at the trial neither merits serious consideration since an affidavit, "being taken ex-parte is almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate." 18 Besides, the discrepancies pointed out by the defense, to wit:
whether or not Jesusa saw what the accused did after leaving the house of the victim and whether or not
she went down from her house after the incident, refer to minor details or collateral matters which do not
destroy the effectiveness of her testimony. Further, the discrepancy as to the exact date when the witness
actually disclosed to the authorities her having seen the accused on the morning of the incident, is also a
minor detail which does not detract from the reliability of her identification of the accused. Moreover, the
defense has not shown any ulterior motive on the part of witness Jesusa Birondo that would make her
implicate and testify falsely against the accused, who was a neighbor and an acquaintance.
4. In the fourth and last assignment of error, the defense decries the speed with which the trial
Court decided the case, alleging that the Decision was prepared and signed on April 29, 1966, or one day
after the close of trial on April 28 1966, and was read to the accused on April 30, 1966, without benefit of a
transcript of stenographic notes nor memoranda of the parties, so that the trial Court could not have
seriously considered the merits of the case or must have prejudged it even before the trial ended. That
contention is belied, however, by the detailed findings of facts in the Decision of the trial Court duly
supported by the transcript of stenographic notes now on record.
Finally, the defense contends that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The alibi put up by the accused, however, crumbles under the positive identification by
witnesses Jesusa Birondo and Camilo Semilla and the dying declaration of the victim, aside from the fact
that because of the proximity of the house of the accused to that of the victim, it was not impossible for the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime.
In summation, the accused is guilty only of Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
disregard of respect due the offended party on account of his age, and dwelling Recidivism is not to be
considered because of our finding that the crime of Robbery has not been conclusively established.
 The penalty imposable for the crime of Homicide, attended by aggravating with no mitigating
circumstances, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period or seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years. 19
WHEREFORE, we find the accused, Rodulfo Sabio alias "Papu", guilty of the crime of Homicide
and hereby sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Catalino
Espina, in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Sabio, G.R. No. L-26193, [January 27, 1981], 190 PHIL 178-195)
[G.R. No. 115690. February 20, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY SALISON, JR., * TIRSO ANDIENTE,

RUFINO DIGNARAN and LEONILO FEDILES, accused, REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES; POSITIVE DECLARATIONS PREVAIL OVER

DENIAL. — The uncorroborated testimony of appellant can not prevail over the positive declarations of the
prosecution's witnesses. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given greater weight than
the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
2. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — The simultaneous attacks on the
victim proved the common intent of the accused to inflict fatal blows upon the victim. Direct proof is not
essential to prove conspiracy. A conspiracy may be inferred without need of showing that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. For collective
responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all of them
acted in concert each doing his part to fulfill their common purpose to kill the victim. Very seldom would a prior
agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by
agreements in writing and where a conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the accused
rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent
and the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
3. ID.; ID.; DYING DECLARATION REDUCED TO WRITING IN PHILIPPINE DIALECT;
REQUIREMENT THAT THE SAME MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY TRANSLATION EASED WHEN
ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION AND NO PREJUDICE CAUSE. — What further strengthens the case of
the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed by him right after the incident, as to who
were responsible for the injuries he sustained. While such statement was given, as in the nature of things they
are generally in oral form, they are not thereby rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by
means of signs. If the declarations have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the
writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be produced. More than once, this Court has
taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the required translation
but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused. In those instances, the Court
merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language but we believe that in the
interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here since there was no objection and the
concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appears to be familiar with or
knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to
appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court. Also, the written document was
duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly
questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the defense counsel. The witness was
able to explain and discuss what was written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same.
Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the victim was confirmed by the Government's
eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on a mere technicality
would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the
murder of Valmoria.
4. ID.; ID.; DECLARATION CONSIDERED AS RES GESTAE. — Appellant argues that the declaration
can not be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the
consciousness of an impending death." Assuming it is not, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae. It was
made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH; CASE AT BAR. — The killing was qualified by the circumstance of the accused
having taken advantage of their superior strength. The victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time when
all of the accused mercilessly bludgeoned his back and head with big pieces of wood. The number of
assailants and the nature of the weapons used against the hapless victim show a notorious inequality of force
between the latter and the aggressors, assuring a superiority of strength advantageous to Salison and his co-
accused in the commission of the crime. The accused purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.

DECISION

REGALADO, J p:

Accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr., alias "Loloy," appeals from a judgment in Criminal Case No.
21805-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, which imposed upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the murder of one Rolando Valmoria.
The information filed against appellant and the co-accused Tirso Andiente, alias "Sano", Rufino
Dignaran, alias "Jongjong"; and Leonilo Fediles, alias "Ondoy," alleges:
That on November 30, 1990 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, confederating and mutually helping one another, with abuse
of superior strength and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously mauled and pummeled with hard
wood one Rolando Valmoria. Serious and fatal injuries were inflicted which subsequently caused the death of
Rolando Valmoria on December 4, 1990. 1
Upon arraignment, appellant Rey Salison, Jr., assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of "not
guilty." 2 Trial then proceeded only against him, because his three other co-accused were and, still are, at
large. On November 26, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rey Salison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
circumstance present, the Court has no other alternative but to impose the proper penalty of
"reclusion perpetua", the same being the medium period within the range of the penalty
imposable and to pay the cost(s); to indemnify the offended party (in) the amount P50,000.00
as compensatory damages and P7,270.70 as actual damages. 3 (Corrections in parentheses
ours.)
In the present appeal, herein appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in finding that there was
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired with his co-accused in killing the victim, (2) in not
holding that accused is only responsible for the injuries that he actually inflicted on the victim, and (3) in
admitting in evidence the alleged "dying declaration" of the victim, as well as the "agreement" between the
parents of the accused and the victim. 4
During the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, a picture of the pieces of wood 5 used by
the accused in killing the victim, receipts of expenses incurred in the hospital for the treatment of said
victim, 6 a written declaration of the victim after the incident, 7 and a written agreement between the parents of
appellant and the victim. 8
The evidence of record reveals that at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990,
witness Maria Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando Valmoria, who was then
watching television in a store at Cory Village, Agdao, Davao City. Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's
shoulder and brought him behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree. There,
appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen. 9
During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused Andiente, Dignaran and
Fediles suddenly appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked Valmoria. It was then when
witness Emilia Fernandez approached them that the three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and
Valmoria behind. Fernandez was able to separate Salison from Valmoria. However, the three co-accused
returned and started to maul Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the victim. 10
When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente picked up pieces of wood and
started to hit Valmoria at the back on his nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria fell to the ground
and, upon finding a chance to do so, he stood up and ran towards his house which was a few meters away.
The assailants followed Valmoria but failed to further hit the victim because Valmoria was able to hide inside
his house. All of the accused shouted for Valmoria to come out but the latter refused, causing his four
assailants to hit the walls and windows of the Valmoria residence. During this time, the victim remained seated
inside the house. Shortly thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was
bleeding at that time. 11
Consequently, at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of witness Patricia
Alcoseba, the purok leader. The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident
explaining that if he should die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as
evidence.
 At the trial of the case, Alcoseba presented the written and signed declaration of Valmoria and she
affirmed what was written in the declaration, testifying as follows:
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q Mrs. Alcose(b)a, on November 30, 1990, where were you?
A I was in our house.
Q Where?
A At Cory Village.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you heard that there was trouble in Cory Village, what happened next, if any?
A I noticed that the mother and father of Rolando Valmoria helped Rolando Valmoria in
walking towards my house.
Q When they arrived (at) your house, what happened next?
A When they arrived (at) the house, the father requested that his son be allowed to sit on our
chair.
Q And what happened next after that?
A At that time Rolando Valmoria was sitting on the chair and he was so weak and his neck
and head slumped on the chair and the Valmorias requested me that he has
something to say and requested it to be written and he stuttered in talking.
Q What did you do after the victim requested you?
A I obeyed. I obeyed the request and I got a ballpen and paper.
Q Then what happened next?
A He related to me as to who started the trouble as to who struck him first, the second and the
third.
Q Now Mrs. Alcose(b)a, while the victim was narrating to you, what did you observe about his
condition?
A I observed that he was so weak and he was in pain and I believed at that time he was dying.
Q Did the victim utter the words to that effect that he was dying?
A Yes, sir. He told me by saying "I believe that I will die".
Q What else?
A Because he said that he felt a terrible pain on his head.
Q Did he tell you the reason why he requested you to make a declaration in writing?
A He told me that if anybody will testify regarding my death this declaration of mine could be
utilized as evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Showing to you this statement, what a relation is this one (sic) to the one you said which is
the statement of the victim?
A Yes, this is the one.
xxx xxx xxx
Q There is a printed name. . . a signature over the printed name Rolando Valmoria, "ang
guibunalan/pasyente", whose signature is this?
A That is the signature of Rolando Valmoria.
COURT:
Q When the victim signed that document, was he sitting?
A Yes. sir.
Q After the victim signed that document what happened next?
A They left and they went to the detachment.
 xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened to this piece of paper after the victim signed this?
A I gave it to the mother.
Q So you did not keep that piece of paper?
A No, sir. I gave it to them so they will be able to use it.
Q Before they left your house you gave that piece of paper to the mother?
A At that time I did not give that declaration first to the mother because they were attending to
their son.
Q When did you give that document to the mother?
A When Rolando Valmoria died.
xxx xxx xxx
Q At the time you were taking this statement, from the victim did he tell you the persons who
were responsible for his injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A Rufino Dignaran, Jr. alias Jongjong and the second is Loloy Salison and the third one is
name(d) Tirso and the fourth, I cannot remember the name of the fourth person who
hit the victim . . . yes, now I remember, it's Leonilo Fediles.
Q You wrote that statement (o)n a piece of paper?
A Yes, sir. 12 (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)
After making that declaration in the house of witness Alcoseba, Valmoria and his parents proceeded to
the hospital where he was X-rayed and treated for his head injuries. Subsequently, the victim was allowed to
go home. However, at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he started to convulse and was rushed to the
hospital. After three days there, Valmoria died. 13
The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Edmundo Visitacion, Jr. who had conducted the necropsy
which established the cause of death of Valmoria indicated in the post mortem certificate: He explained that
the head injury sustained by the victim was caused by "a blunt external trauma probably made by a solid object
and this trauma caused the subdular hemorrhage." 14
On December 12, 1990, the parents of the victim and those of the accused Salison and Dignaran
entered into a written agreement for the refund of hospital expenses of Valmoria. However, no reimbursement
was actually made.
On the other hand, the lone defense witness was appellant Salison himself who merely denied having
killed the victim. He testified that on that day, together with his friends Andiente, Dignaran, Fediles and a
certain Andy, he was visiting his girlfriend, a certain Neneng Edpalina, when he heard Valmoria and Andiente
shouting at each other. He tried to pacify the two but the victim told him not to interfere because he had nothing
to do with them. Then he saw Valmoria, Andiente, Dignaran, Fediles and a certain Andy engaged in a fistfight.
He was trying to stop the group from fighting when witness Fernandez came and told him not to interfere.
He then left and while he was on his way home, he heard somebody shout "agay," so he went back
and saw Andiente holding a piece of wood while Valmoria was running towards his house. He had just grabbed
the piece of wood from Andiente when two CAFGU's arrived and arrested him, Andiente, Dignaran and
Fediles. All of them were subsequently released after the investigation. 15
The errors imputed to the trial court may be consolidated and narrowed down to the question of
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime, and the
evidentiary weight of the dying declaration, as well as of the written agreement of the parents of the victim and
the accused.
In the instant case, the lower court held that:
The testimony of the prosecution's witnesses were clear, strong and convincing to
deserve full faith and credence. As against the pure denial of the accused of his direct
participation as a conspirator, the positive, clear and straightforward declaration of the
prosecution's witnesses must prevail. No motive or reason has been shown why they would
falsely impute to the accused the commission of such a grave crime. The accused
Rey Salison has no quarrel or bickering with the prosecution's witnesses. In fact, two of the
prosecution's witnesses are friends of the mother of Rey Salison. These prosecution's
 witnesses declared that they saw (that) the accused Rey Salison together with the other
accused participated in boxing and mauling Rolando Valmoria with pieces of wood. 16
We agree with the findings of the trial court giving full faith and credit to the witnesses for the People.
The uncorroborated testimony of appellant can not prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution's
witnesses. In fact, there were three eyewitnesses, with no ill motives whatsoever, who testified against
appellant and confirmed Salison's direct participation in the commission of the crime.
The defense did not present any evidence to support the denials of appellant. The putative girlfriend
of Salison, who was allegedly with him on that day, was not presented to confirm that fact and thereby prove
that he did not participate in the fight between his co-accused Andiente and the victim. His testimony
pinpointing Andiente as the killer was only a convenient way to avoid liability since Andiente remained at large
and could not refute Salison's testimony imputing the crime to him.
Moreover, denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given greater weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 17 Definitely, therefore, the case of the
Government has outweighed and overwhelmed the evidential ramparts of the defense.
Appellant's assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the eyewitness accounts
submitted by the prosecution. The manner by which the killing was executed clearly indicated a confederacy of
purpose and concerted action on the part of the accused. Prosecution witness Magdalena Ayola, who saw the
entire incident, testified on this point, thus:
Q During that time were they alone? The two of them?
COURT:
A When Salison brought Valmoria under the mango tree, they were only 2 but later, alias
Sano, Fediles and alias Ondoy and alias Jong-jong boxed Valmoria.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR MANDALUPE:
Q In other words aside from accused Salison alias Loloy who first boxed Rolando Valmoria,
other three persons joined Salison and also boxed Rolando Valmoria?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Did you see the 3 come from the bushes?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you during the time when these three appeared from the bushes?
A I was nearby because we were watching them.
Q Were you alone watching them or you had a companion?
A I had some neighbors with me.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR MANDALUPE:
Q After alias Sano, alias Jong-jong and alias Ondoy joined Salison in boxing Rolando
Valmoria, what else did he do against the person of Rolando Valmoria?
A Valmoria fought back and there was exchange of fist(icuffs) and Loloy Salison, alias Ondoy
and alias Sano picked up some wooden pieces of wood (sic).
Q After these three persons you mentioned picked up wood, what did they do after picking up
the wood?
A They struck Valmoria with the piece of wood.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you saw these 4 persons struck Rolando Valmoria many times while still
under the mango tree. Can you tell the Honorable Court what part of the body of
Rolando Valmoria was hit by the striking of wood by the 4 accused, if you can recall?
A He was hit at his back and at the back of his head. 18
xxx xxx xxx
 From the aforesaid testimony, these simultaneous attacks on the victim proved the common intent of the
accused to inflict fatal blows upon the victim.
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. 19 A conspiracy may be inferred without need of
showing that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. 20 For collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the
time of the aggression all of them acted in concert each doing his part to fulfill their common purpose to kill the
victim. 21
Even if there is no direct evidence showing that all of the accused had a prior agreement on how to kill
Valmoria, the doctrine is well-settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement
to commit the crime. Very seldom would such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things,
criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing. 22
It is equally a well-accepted corollary rule that where a conspiracy has been established, evidence as to
who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the intent and the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of
all. 23
What further strengthens the case of the prosecution was the declaration of Valmoria, made and signed
by him right after the incident, as to who were responsible for the injuries he sustained. Appellant, however,
maintains that said written statement, which was reduced into writing by witness Patricia Alcoseba and
purporting to be a dying declaration, is inadmissible as evidence since it was in the Cebuano regional language
and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino.
However, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
The records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of
the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of
its submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is
already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record. 24
Also, while such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are generally in oral form, they are
not thereby rendered inadmissible as they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the declarations
have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the writing is generally held to be the best
evidence, and it must be produced. 25
More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect,
unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the
accused. 26 In those instances, the Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section
33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial
language but we believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here,
especially since no objection thereto was interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that appellant, the
concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or
knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to
appellant and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court.
Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the person who reduced the
victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-
examined by the defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was written in the
declaration and how she came to prepare the same. Significantly, everything written in that declaration of the
victim was confirmed by the Government's eyewitnesses. Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of
the declaration on a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true
facts and give retributive justice in the murder of Valmoria.
Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader can not be
considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an
impending death." As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He
expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence
regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to
testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it
is still admissible as part of the res gestae, 27 since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under
the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
We are in conformity with the verdict of the lower court finding appellant guilty of murder since the
killing was qualified by the circumstance of the accused having taken advantage of their superior strength. The
victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time when all of the accused mercilessly bludgeoned his back and
head with big pieces of wood. The number of assailants and the nature of the weapons used against the
hapless victim show a notorious inequality of force between the latter and the aggressors, assuring a
superiority of strength advantageous to Salison and his co-accused in the commission of the crime. The
accused purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. 28
 Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present in the case at bar, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being the medium period in the range of the imposable
penalty.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Salison, Jr., G.R. No. 115690, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 131-150)
[G.R. No. L-38833. March 12, 1980.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused

whose death sentence is under review.

Mamintal Tamano for the accused.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

DECISION

AQUINO, J p:

This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on
January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later.
Girlie Aling, a relative of Airol Aling, stated in her affidavit of February 21, 1972 that she and Daria
Aling (Norija's daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was
stabbed by her husband (p. 4, Record).
On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling, 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano
dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to
Muslim rites) because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man
and fooling around with other men. He recounted the killing in this manner: LLphil
"At or about one o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1972, I was at the seashore of
Calarian relaxing since I have just arrived from Jolo, Sulu that particular day.
"At that time, I was already running away from the authorities because I am an
escapee from San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm.
"Later on, I proceeded to my father's house which is just near the seashore. Upon
reaching the house, I saw Nori Mohamad but I had no time to talk to her because immediately
after seeing me, Nori ran away, going to the direction of the street.
"Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying with me, I chased after Nori and I
catch up with her at the street where I started stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the
different parts of the body.
"When I saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly left the place and
ran towards the far end of Calarian." (Exh. 2).
Two policemen in their affidavit of March 24, 1972, affirmed that Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio
Macrohon in their presence that he stabbed his wife because she had been going with many men (Exh. 1).
On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City. It was alleged in the information that Airol was a convict serving sentence at the penal
colony for robbery with frustrated homicide.
The case was first called for arraignment on March 15, 1974. The accused signified his willingness
to plead guilty although he had no lawyer. A counsel de oficio was appointed for him. The trial court
granted counsel's motion to transfer the arraignment to March 18.
On that date, by agreement of the parties, the arraignment was transferred to March 29, then to
April 5, and later to April 30, 1974. On that last date, the information was translated into the Tausug dialect
which is spoken by the accused. With the assistance of his counsel, he pleaded guilty.
 Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel. He admitted that
he killed his wife. He declared that after he was informed by his counsel that the penalty for parricide is
death or life imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the killing of his wife because that was the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by pleading guilty
he could be sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.
He described the confrontation with his wife. When he arrived at his home, his wife ran and he
pursued her. He overtook her, stabbed her but she was able to parry the blow, and when she fell on the
ground, he repeatedly stabbed her in the abdomen.
He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that he was a
prisoner in the penal colony. He was a Muslim belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi, Sulu. He killed his wife
because while he was in prison, she did not visit him and she neglected their four children.
He agreed that his father-in-law could have the custody of his children. He was able to leave the
penal colony because he was a "living-out-prisoner". When he went to his house on January 28, 1972, his
purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but when she saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away.
He had information that his wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a grievous offense under
Muslim customs.
He identified his signature in his confession which was sworn to before the clerk of court (Exh. B or
2).
The trial court sentenced Airol Aling to death and to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to
the heirs of Norija Mohamad. It noted that he pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the meaning and
consequences of his plea.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review of the death penalty. LLphil
Counsel de oficio, assigned to present the side of the accused in this review, contends that the
marriage of Airol to Norija was not indubitably proven. That contention cannot be sustained. The testimony
of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a
combination of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" (Sec. 5[bb],
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies
that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure to visit him
in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.
The contention that the accused did not understand fully the nature and effect of his plea of guilty is
belied by the record. The trial judge, a Muslim, took pains to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is
entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the meaning and
consequences of his plea of guilty (People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
In this case, the arraignment was postponed three times in order to enable his counsel to confer
with him and explain to him the consequences of his plea of guilty. The accused testified. His confession
and the affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were presented in evidence.
The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty, lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong and the circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken because he is a
quasi-recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by generic
mitigating circumstances.
The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity
and incorrigibility. His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He
understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high
school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm.
However, only since Justices (Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero,
Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera) voted for the imposition of the death penalty. cdrep
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that, for lack of one vote,
the accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Aling y Majuri, G.R. No. L-38833, [March 12, 1980], 185 PHIL 349-354)
[G.R. No. 28655. August 6, 1928.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO
HOLGADO, defendants. EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.
 C. V. Sanchez, for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE; HEARSAY RULE, ITS EXCEPTIONS;

ADMISSIONS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST IN .SWORN DECLARATION OF PERSON NOW DECEASED
TENDING TO EXONERATE ACCUSED. — H and M engaged in a bolo duel. M was killed almost instantly.
H was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house and from where to the
municipal building. Before the municipal president, H made a sworn statement in which he declared that
when he and M fought there was nobody present About one month later, H died from the wounds received
in the fight. T, a worker of H, was charged with the homicide of M and was convicted in the lower court. It is
held that error was committed in not admitting the verified declaration of H as the statement of a fact
against penal interest. (Opinion of Messrs. Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Hearsay evidence is excluded. One exception concerns the admission of
dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations
of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But by a large preponderance
of authority in the United States, the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to
show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The general rule rejecting evidence of confessions of third parties made out of
court intended to exonerate the accused, examined in the light of its history and policy, and found to be
unjustified. It should not be received in the Philippine jurisdiction where the principles of the common law
have never been followed blindly. A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are
not controlling, for here the fact is that the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under
oath, while they read in such a way as to ring with the truth.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule,
even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec.
1477.)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Wherever the state seeks to fasten criminality upon the party on trial, the
accused had a right to meet and rebut any testimony which may be offered against him in any legitimate
way. Any legitimate fact or circumstance which would meet or tend to meet the state's case and break the
force of criminative facts introduced against the accused is always admissible. (Pace vs. State [1911],
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 135 Southwestern, 379.)
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Where a sworn statement against penal interest is admitted, the question then
is as to the effect to be given such a confession, which is solely one of weight and credibility.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "RES GESTAE." — Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as a part of
the res gestae for it was made by H on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of
sufficient time for reflection. The declaration fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not
the party talking about the facts. The modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting
spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be
procured. (Opinion of Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — Held by all of the members of the court
participating that T should be given the benefit of the reasonable doubt which prevails in their minds and
acquitted.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J p:

This is an appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Mindoro, finding him guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him therefor to imprisonment for
fourteen years, eight months, and one day, reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties,
indemnity, and costs.
Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had had disputes about the occupation of certain land
situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two
men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo
duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also
seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was
taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which
he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died
from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is
whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno
Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno
Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially
corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was
that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only
participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house.
To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The
defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the
municipal president of Pinamalayan.
Counsel de oficio in this court makes the following assignment of errors:
"I. The lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1.
"II. The lower court erred in not finding that accused appellant Eugenio Toledo did not
take part in the fight between accused Sisenando Holgado and deceased Filomeno Morales,
resulting in the death of the latter.
"III. The lower court erred in not giving accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo the benefit
of a reasonable doubt." Exhibit 1 above-mentioned in assignment of error No. 1, made
originally in Tagalog, in translation reads as follows:
"AFFIDAVIT
"I, Sisenando Holgado, married, of legal age, and resident of this municipality of
Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro, P. I., after being sworn in accordance with law, state the
following:
"My additional homestead situated in Calingag was cleaned by me and is at present
planted with palay (rice), on which I also plant hemp, but the hemp planted by my workers is
frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales who claims that said land is his, whereas when I
was cleaning said land nobody objected to it, but now that it is already cleaned, Filomeno
Morales says that one-half of the land occupied by me is his; for this reason I decided to see
Filomeno Morales about this matter and when I talked to him this morning (Wednesday) at
about nine o'clock, at the hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situated in Calingag, he told me
that if I should plant there anything he would cut my neck, and to this I answered that if he was
going to cut my neck we would fight and thereupon he stabbed me with a penknife and then I
slashed at him; after this we separated, and I went to Dalmacio Manlisic's house. When we
fought, there was nobody present.
"Question by president: When you went to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic, did you not
meet anybody before reaching said house?
"Answer: I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to
the house of Dalmacio Manlisic.
"Question by president: How do you know that the hemp you planted on your land
above-mentioned was frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales?
"Answer: Because he said so to my worker named Eulogio Supleo.
"Question by president: Do you have anything more to say about the incident?
"Answer: No more.
"In testimony of all that I stated above, I signed this document in the presence of two
witnesses and then swore to it in the presence of the municipal president here at
Pinamalayan, Mindoro, this June fifteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-seven.
 
 His
 "SISENANDO HOLGADO
 Mark
 
"In the presence of:
 (Sgd.) "ILLEGIBLE
 "HILARION NIEVA
"Signed and sworn to before me, this June fifteenth, 1927.
 
  (Sgd.) "ILLEGIBLE
 "Municipal President"
The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of view among the members
participating, all leading to the same result of acquittal. Under such circumstances, it is, of course, difficult
for the writer of the opinion to do entire justice to those theories which do not conform to his own. However,
an effort will be made to present the various opinions, leaving it for any individual member to enlarge upon
the same, if he so desires.
I
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Villamor would disregard entirely the first assignment of error and
would, therefore, refrain from all discussion relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves
exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The contradictions in the testimony for the prosecution pointed
out by the trial judge do not impress these members of the court so seriously. In reality, there being but one
witness for the prosecution who, on account of her relations with Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles,
might be expected to exaggerate, and there being on the contrary exculpatory evidence for the defense,
even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made out its case. Consequently, on the testimonial facts,
these members vote for acquittal.
 
II
The second view is that for which Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real are responsible, and
is that Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as a part of the ges gestae, and that giving it effect,
in relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. What has heretofore been said
with reference to the state of the record need not here be repeated. It only remains to be stated that Exhibit
1 was made by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of
sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking
through the party and not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the
statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a
suspicion of afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence
of premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward
the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other
evidence of the same fact cannot be procured. (22 C. J., pp. 461 et seq.; U. S. vs. David [1903], 3 Phil.,
128.)
III
The third opinion in court is that held by Messrs. Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand, who would
resolve the first assignment of error by holding that the court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the
statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been received, it is believed that its influence
would have been felt by the trial court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by the appreciation of
the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with little propriety, set aside the findings made by a
learned trial judge. The case calls for an examination of the right of the courts to receive in evidence
documents of the character of Exhibit 1.
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is
excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally
recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the
reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own
pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other
than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on
account of the hearsay doctrine.
Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law of evidence, has attempted to
demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that
the limitation is inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating the principle and is unjustified
on grounds of policy. Professor Wigmore in turn has been answered by no less a body than the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi ([1910], 37 L. R. A., New Series, 345).
The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A., however, comes to the support of Professor Wigmore saying
the unanimity of the decisions "is as complete as the shock which they give the general sense of justice."
The question has likewise in recent years gained attention by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Donnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243). There it was held that the court below
properly excluded hearsay evidence relating to the confession of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of
the crime with which defendant was charged. Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"In this country there is a great and practically unanimous weight of authority in the state courts against
admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out of court, and tending to exonerate the
accused." Mr. Justice Van Devanter concurred in the result while Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom concurred
Mr. Justice Lurton and Mr. Justice Hughes, dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
 ". . . The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common
sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision
by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the
separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of
declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as
a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which
would be let in to hang a man (Mattox vs. United States, 146 U. S., 140; 36 Law. ed., 917; 13
Sup. Ct. Rep., 50); and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of
which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if proved,
commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the arguments against the
English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them
forth at greater length. (2 Wigmore, Evidence, pars. 1476, 1477.)"
In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the principles of the common
law. A reexamination of some of those principles discloses anomalies.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi states, "to
reach those manslayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the
person accused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by
offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again
admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal
interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one
instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been
admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to
exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different ill the first case than in the second.
A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most
of them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as
the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the
crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased
and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When
Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of Just such a
rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I
met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic,"
he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not is
conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the
other proven facts.
We cannot bring this decision to a conclusion without quoting the well considered language of
Professor Wigmore on the subject, the pertinent part of a decision coming from a court which has gained
respect particularly in criminal cases, and an editorial note. Professor Wigmore has said:
"PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact against Penal Interest,
excluded; Confessions of Crime be a Third Person. — It is to day commonly said, and has
been expressly laid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must
be either a pecuniary of a pro prietary interest, and not a penal interest. What ground in
authority there is for this limitation may be found by examining the history of the exception at
large.
"The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in two separate rivulets of rulings,
starting independently as a matter of practice, but afterwards united as parts of a general
principle. . . .
"These lines of precedent proceeded independently tin about the beginning of the
1800s, when a unity of principle for some of them came gradually to be perceived and argued
for. This unity lay in the circumstance that all such statements, in that they concerned matters
prejudicial to the declarant's self-interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he
were deceased) be treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule.
"This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some uncertainty about its
scope; but it was an uncertainty in the direction of breadth; for it was sometimes put in the
broad form that any statement by a person 'having no interest to deceive' would be
admissible. This broad form never came to prevail (post, par. 1576). But acceptance was
gained, after two decades, for the principle that all declarations of facts against interest (by
deceased persons) were to be received. What is to be noted, then, is that from 1800 to about
1830 this was fully understood as the broad scope of the principle. It was thus stated without
other qualifications; and frequent passages show the development of the principle to this
point.
"But in 1844, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not considered
by the judges in the light of the precedents, a backward step was taken and an arbitrary limit
put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to
a criminal liability, and to be confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or
 proprietary interest. Thenceforward this rule was accepted in England; although it was plainly
a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several rulings up to that time such statements had
been received.
 
"The same attitude has been taken by most American courts, excluding confessions of
a crime, or other statements of facts against penal interest, made by third persons; although
there is not wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.
"PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. — It is plain enough that this limitation,
besides being a fairly modern novelty, is inconsistent with the broad language originally
employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante, pars. 1457, 1476)
as well as with the settled principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. 1475).
"But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason
of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring
fabricated testimony to such an admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has
always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of
danger of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it
is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their
lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad
rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
"The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the
sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of
a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the
jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be the true culprit.
The absurdity and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent.
"The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and universal
acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the rulings the declarant was not
shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable as a witness, and therefore the declaration
would have been inadmissible in any view of the present exception (ante, par. 1456).
Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the independent doctrine
(ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's non-commission of
the offense by showing commission by another person, not merely one casual piece of
evidence suffices but a 'prima facie' case resting on several concurring pieces of evidence
must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view, not the present exception to
the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions
of one who is not a co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.
"It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine,
which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the
tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the true
culprit now beyond the reach of justice. Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous
indignation the course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember that, if that
trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle would have been no less shameful if we,
following our own supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court never for
a moment hesitated to admit,—the authenticated confession of the escaped Major Esterhazy,
avowing himself the guilty author of the treason there charged." (3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d
ed., secs. 1476, 1477.)
In the case of Pace vs. State ( [1911], Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 135 Southwestern, 379),
the appellant offered to prove in the trial court by the witness Byron Kyle that on Saturday morning
following the killing of the deceased on the previous Sunday he had a conversation with Dick Cain, one of
the parties to the homicide, in which Dick Cain admitted that he killed the deceased. The court ruled:
". . . Wherever the state seeks to fasten criminality upon the party on trial, the accused
had a right to meet and rebut any testimony which may be offered against him in any
legitimate way. If Cain had been upon trial, his confession to the witness Kyle would have
been admissible beyond any shadow of doubt, and would have been strong evidence to go
before the jury. The state would have been seeking to introduce this and with great
earnestness, and correctly so. If appellant could prove that another party or others committed
the homicide, it might prove his innocence, and would be strong evidence to go before the jury
in his favor. Any legitimate fact or circumstance which would meet or tend to meet the state's
case and break the force of criminative facts introduced against the accused is always
admissible. Appellant's contention was that he did not kill the deceased, but that Cain did. The
state's theory was that appellant shot the deceased, and Cain did not shoot him. Under the
rules of evidence this testimony was clearly inadmissible."
We would like finally to turn attention to what was said by the editor of L. R. A. in his note in volume
37 hereinbefore referred to, viz.:
 "The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is
that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this
purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability
to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as
a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where,
however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements out of court, if not
inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible
by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact
which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest,
and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
xxx xxx xxx
"Again, if, as seems indisputable, the desire to close the door to falsehood which
cannot be detected dictates the exclusion of such testimony, the question as to the effect to
be given to such a confession is solely one of weight and credibility. . . ."
Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned
rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to
be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other
evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to
prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed. Shall Judges trained and experienced
in the law display less discerning common sense than the layman and allow precedent to overcome truth?
JUDGMENT
For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that the defendant-appellant
Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of the reasonable doubt which prevails in our minds.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, and
as it appears that he is now confined in Bilibid Prison, an order will immediately issue directing his release,
with costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdezand Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
 
||| (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 28655, [August 6, 1928], 51 PHIL 825-839)
[G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996.]

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY

INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR DETAILS. — Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner
stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was
stabbed on the left lumbar region. This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was
stabbed to death and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It
must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal
misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill
motives to falsely implicate him. cdll
2. ID.; ID.; DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST, EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. — One of
the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. (Sec. 38
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity
and trustworthiness.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY. — There are three (3) essential requisites for the
admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly
against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent
untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be
said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the
admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to
testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which
Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso
facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of
evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous
statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the
records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Thus, for this case
at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; MANIFEST BY THE
SUDDENNESS OF THE ATTACK WITHOUT ANY PROVOCATION FROM THE VICTIM. — The Court of
Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The
suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of
Malaspina treacherous.
6. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY WHERE NO OTHER MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IS PROVED. — The
court a quo erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder
under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Since aside from treachery qualifying the crime to murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the
medium period of the penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner.
7. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; IN CRIMES AND QUASI-DELICT, DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR ALL
DAMAGES WHICH ARE NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACT. — In crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of.
8. ID.; ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES; ACTUAL AMOUNT OF LOSS MUST BE PROVED WITH
REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY. — To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the
injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PROVED BY MERE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS. — The award by the court a
quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony
of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of
Malaspina. However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to
have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to
have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be granted.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro
Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder. 1
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames,
Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur.
Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you
with a long hair but now you have a short hair." 2 Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with
a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the
victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed
him. 3
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on
24 July 1989, reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar region 1-½ in. in length with
extracavitation of the small and large intestines." 4
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed
Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away
when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the
killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house
where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing
match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the
house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the
morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay. 5
The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by
treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual
damages plus costs. 6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and
categorically identified as the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in holding
petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim.
Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto
Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and
the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region.
This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that
three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that
these witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor
altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate
him. cda
That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioner's own
witness, Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner,
and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and the same person. Thus —
COURT:
Q. Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes?
A. That Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused Alejandro Fuentes. I do not know his
real name but he is called as Joni, sir, . . . 7
On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro
Fuentes, Jr., as "Joni" or "Jonie" Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina occasionally
called petitioner "Junior." 8
Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration
against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was
allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt.
Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation"; that he even showed him the knife he used and
asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives
of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that
petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit. 9
For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for
murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde
then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must
persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was
told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled. 10
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against
interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at
the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or
his successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness. 11
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant;
and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo
Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not unaware of People v.
Toledo, 12 a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration
of third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales
engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a
sworn statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was
nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that
Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated on reasonable
doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard
Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second group considered Exh.
1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to
which Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of
a fact against penal interest.
For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations
against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different.
Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally
admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim
because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of
such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to
prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not
resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore,
"shocking to the sense of justice." 13 Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on
that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon
being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing,
that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is
either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere
absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. 14 For it is incumbent
upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the
acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect
that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort
to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence
that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to
persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is
unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo —
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is
that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this
purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability
to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. 15
The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by
treachery. The suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the
stabbing of Malaspina treacherous. 16 However, the court a quo erred in imposing an
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since aside from treachery
qualifying the crime to murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the medium period of the
penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner. 17
Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for
P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano,
without any tangible document to support such claim. This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. 18 To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
available. 19 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages. 20
The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on
record. We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00
in connection with the death of Malaspina. 21 However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in
court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by
receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since
the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted. 22
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR. guilty of
MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs
is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion
perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Fuentes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111692, [February 9, 1996], 323 PHIL 508-520)