TIMOSA, BELLE FRANCES S.

MODULE 5: MARRIAGE: NATURE AND REQUISITIES

1. Duncan vs. Glaxo, GR No. 162994, Sept. 17, 2004, 438 SCRA 343
FACTS:

 Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc.
 He was assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. Upon his employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed
to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies; and if
management found that such relationship posed a possible conflict of interest, to resign
from the company.
 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm Astra
Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator.
 Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise to a conflict of
interest.
ISSUE:

 Whether or Not Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from

competitor companies is valid.

RULING:
 Tecson was aware about the policy imposed by Glaxo company, upon signing the contract, he
voluntarily set his hands to follow the said policies.
 The company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that
may arise out of such relationships. 

2. Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 222

FACTS: 
 In the corporation there were policies that state:
o Applicant won’t be hired if he/she has a relative up to 3rd degree of consanguinity
already employed by the company.
o If the two employees get married, one of them should resign to preserve the
above-mentioned policy.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the policy is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
RULING:
 No. It is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of
employees under the constitution.
 The policy, to be upheld, must establish the requirement of reasonableness.
 In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business necessity. The petitioners failed in
establishing that the marriage between a Sheeting Machine Operator to an employee of
the Repacking Section could be detrimental to its business operations.

3. Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

FACTS:
 Petitioner was born and registered as a make. After undergoing sex reassignment surgery,
he sought to have his birth certificate change from Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex
from male to female.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines
thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioner can change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:
 The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. No law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate. Petition is denied.

4. Republic vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

 Jennifer Cagandahan filed for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male.

 Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare

medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.

 “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.”
ISSUE:

 Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

 It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial.”

 When a person is biologically intersex, the determining factor in the gender classification
would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex.

5. Morigo vs. People, GR. No. 145226, Feb. 6, 2004

FACTS:

 Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.

 In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial

declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.

 Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since
the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.

 Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.

ISSUE:

 Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete
before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

RULING:

 No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the
Bigamy case.

“A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age”.
  The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio.

6. Tenebro vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, Feb. 18, 2004

FACTS:

 Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.

 The two were wed. Years later, Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

 Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that
he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

 On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas.

 Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that
his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He
further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio
due to psychological incapacity. Hence, he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological incapacity as ground for absolution of
bigamy case against him.

RULING:

 No. An individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, even with the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

 A second marriage contracted during the petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,

petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a second marriage contracted
during a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
  Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
with valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover,
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity.

7. Aranes vs. Judge Salvador Occiano AM No. MTJ-02-1390; April 11, 2002; 380
SCRA 402

FACTS:

 Petitioner Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law.
According to the petitioner, the judge has jurisdiction of the Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Orobia at the couple’s
residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and
without the requisite of marriage license.

 It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but
neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the
Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
 Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and
first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the
absence of the marriage license.
 However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they
will provide the license that same afternoon.
 Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid

ISSUE:

 Whether Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without issued marriage license and
conducting his territorial jurisdiction.

RULING:
  Yes. The Court held that Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction. The territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
 His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

8. Republic vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS:

 Petitioner was a certain Marelyn Tanedo Manalo who was married to a Japanese national,
Minoru Yoshino.
 Manalo (not her Japanese husband) filed for and was granted divorce in Japan sometime
in 2011.
 Manalo filed with a Dagupan RTC to have her Japanese divorce recognized in the
Philippines. The RTC denied her Petition, which was subsequently reversed by the CA in
2014.
 The CA recognized the foreign divorce and ruled that Manalo had the right to remarry.
The Supreme Court affirmed this CA Decision.
ISSUE

 Whether or not a Filipino citizen has a capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

RULING:

 The CA ruled that Manalo should have the right to remarry. It applied the amended
Article 26(2) of the Family Code. Former president Corazon Aquino issued an executive
order that amended the provision so that it included this: “Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

9. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario et. al., A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691, APRIL 2, 2013
FACTS:
 This is an administrative case wherein the judicial audit team created by the OCA
reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.
  Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for
instant marriages.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
RULING:

 The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift
marriages. The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to
the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.

10. Marlyn Monton Nullada vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila, Akira Ito, Shin Ito
and all Persons who have or claim any interest, G.R. NO. 224548, January 23, 2019
FACTS:

 In 1997, Marlyn and Akira (a Japanese national) got married in Japan. They later decided
to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce
decree in Japan.
 Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by filing a Petition
for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of
marriage.
 Akira did not file an answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication.
The Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn.
 The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The fact that Marlyn also agreed to
the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a
Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a divorce.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so
as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not
where the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses.
RULING:

 The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which
states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
 valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36,
37] and 38.
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 
 The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country.
 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife.
 A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien-initiated proceeding.