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TERESITA BONGATO, Petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR, Respondents
TERESITA BONGATO, Petitioner, vs. Spouses SEVERO A. MALVAR and TRINIDAD MALVAR, Respondents
FACTS:
Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner Teresita
Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-
16200 belonging to the said spouses and erected thereon a house of light materials.
petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an answer which the MTCC denied
the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration ‘only insofar as to determine
the location of the houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located
on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.
The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge.
respondent Judge disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the court might
consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would be issued.
criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private respondents Malvar against
petitioner Bongato.
petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994 deadline for the submission of the
relocation survey and to move the deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer concerned, Engr. Lumarda,
could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish council member.
On April 7, 1994, respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted and ordered the record of
the case returned to the court of origin for disposal.
The RTC dismissed the case.
The CA affirmed
The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was different from that involved in the
anti-squatting case.
It further ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it did not err in
rejecting petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss.
The appellate court reasoned that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property
merely to determine possession -- an action that did not oust the latter of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged entry
HELD:
The Petition is meritorious.
Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed
only in 1992 or beyond the one-year period provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure
In forcible entry, one employs FISTS to deprive another physical possession of land or building.
Thus, plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until
deprived thereof by defendant. Sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or
materialpossession of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an averment of ownership
by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.
Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to
prove priorpossession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In the present case, the lower court lacked jurisdiction in this case. First, the house of petitioner was
actually situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the spouses. Second,
the house has been in existence prior to the alleged date of forcible entry. Third, the respondents
had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the alleged date of entry.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement
the summary nature of the process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when
entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time plaintiff knew
about it. after the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file
either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right to possession, or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.