THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 77114. May 27, 1992.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO

LITERADO y PARON , accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF TRIAL

COURT; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — It is settled jurisprudence that the findings of the trial
court as regards the credibility of witnesses are seldom disturbed by this Court unless it is
amply demonstrated that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which
would affect the result of the case (See Medina v. Asistio, 192 SCRA 218 [1990]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]).
2. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; REQUISITES. — In
order that the justifying circumstance of self-defense may be properly invoked, it is
imperative that the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggressions; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11, Revised Penal
Code).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION; INDISPENSABLE. — In People
v. Bausing (199 SCRA 355 [1991]), this Court ruled that: "The first requisite is
indispensable. There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there had been
unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the assailant. If there is
no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel (People v. Malazzab, 160 SCRA
123 [1988]; Ortega v. Sandiganbayan [1990]). In addition, for unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People v. Pasco, Jr., supra;
People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989] and the accused must present proof of positively
strong act of real aggression (Pacificar v. Court of Appeals 125 SCRA 716 [1983]; (People
v. Aquiatan, 123 SCRA 501 [1983]: People v. Aquino, 124 SCRA 835 [1983])."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — According to appellant, the
deceased ran after him with a knife inside the house of Angelina Literado and he squeezed
himself under the bed to avoid the thrusts of the deceased; and that while underneath, he
managed to grab a bolo with which to stab the victim. As found by the court a quo,
however, "it is inconceivable that the accused could have hidden himself underneath the
bed in such a hurried manner when the deceased was following the accused inside the
room. The bed was barely 1 foot in height from the floor such that a person placing
himself under it could hardly squeeze himself in and put up a fight in self-defense. A person
in such a situation could not make a thrusting blow of the bolo without exposing at least
his upper extremities. . . . The accused had no time to place himself underneath the bed.
Once inside the house (after stabbing the accused outside), the accused could have gotten
the bolo nearby and waited for the (deceased) to enter and there deliver the thrusting
blow." (Rollo, pp. 29-30). Further, the unrebutted testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
indicate that it was accused-appellant, and not the deceased, who acted as the aggressor.
Such being the case, appellant's invocation of self-defense cannot be given a scintilla of
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 credibility.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE THEREOF, CANNOT PROSPER ESPECIALLY SO WHERE THE
ACCUSED HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED THE KILLING. — As we have held in People v. Bausing
(supra), "it is thus incumbent upon the accused to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. In such instances,
the accused must proffer strong, clear and convincing evidence of self-defense and
depend not on the infirmity of the prosecution, for even if the latter was weak, the plea of
self-defense cannot prosper especially so where the accused himself has admitted the
killing,. . . (citing People v. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285 [1989]; and other cases.)
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; CONSTRUED. — Treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In other words, the offended party was given no opportunity to defend
himself (Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code; People v. Samson, 176 SCRA 710).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Through its eyewitnesses, the prosecution
has duly established the manner in which accused/appellant dastardly perpetrated the
offense charged without risk to himself as against the victim who was not only unarmed
but was left without means of defending himself from appellant's treacherous attack. As
found by the trial court, appellant was already waiting for the victim and took advantage of
the deceased's position behind the tricycle driver in stabbing him. The mode of attack
ensured a risk-free retaliation from the deceased who had his hands on the tricycle and
could not parry a sudden and unexpected knife thrust by the accused.
8. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — The crime of murder is defined and punished
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty provided thereunder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Within the range of the penalty prescribed, i.e.,
reclusion temporal maximum to death, is the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua is invariably imposed for serious felonies penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. It carries with it imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the
convict becomes eligible for pardon, and also accessory penalties, e.g., perpetual special
disqualification, etc. (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code) Life imprisonment, on the other hand,
does not have any definite extent or duration nor does it carry accessory penalties. It is
imposed as a penalty for serious offenses penalized by special laws. The crime of murder
committed by appellant being penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the proper
imposable penalty should therefore be reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment. It
is necessary to employ legal terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the
substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties (People
v. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; see also People v. Baguio, 196 SCRA 4599 [1991].

DECISION

BIDIN , J : p

This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court ** , Branch IX, Third
Judicial Region, finding herein accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
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 "WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and sentences him to suffer imprisonment for life (sic) with the
accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000, and P20,000 as moral damages, and the amount of
P5,947.00 as actual damages.

"xxx xxx xxx"

(Rollo, p. 33).

The facts, as summarized by the Solicitor General, are as follows:

"On March 29, 1981, between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., witnesses Esperidion B.
Mendoza and Delfin Gonzales, together with companions Jaime Gonzales,
Marcelo Ignacio and Ernesto Andres were standing and conversing along
Mendoza Street, Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, opposite the billiard hall (TSN,
Esperidion B. Mendoza, July 1, 1981, p. 2); outside the house of Delfin Gonzales
where Jaime Gonzales was celebrating his birthday (TSN, Delfin Gonzales, July
17, 1982, p. 2). They went out to get a tricycle to take Ernesto Andres, nicknamed
Nestor, home (Id., p. 2). They flagged down a tricycle and Nestor seated himself
on the motorcycle right behind the driver (TSN, July 13, 1981 at 4). Nestor's two
companions, Marcelo Ignacio and one called 'Ogong', boarded the side car of the
tricycle (Id., at 3-4). When Delfin was flagging down the tricycle, he noticed that
the appellant Bernardo Literado was standing on the other side of the road (TSN,
July 17, 1981, p. 3; TSN, July 13, 1981, p. 4). He had been standing there for
about 20 minutes (TSN, July 17, 1981, p. 3).

"When the tricycle accelerated and had travelled about one and a half meters
(TSN, July 13, 1981, p. 5) and was in front of the place where appellant was
standing, appellant suddenly pulled out a knife and thrust it on Ernesto Andres
hitting the latter on the left side. Ernesto alighted and ran after Literado who ran
inside the house of Angelina Literado (TSN, July 17, 1981, p. 4). After sometime,
Ernesto Andres came out with his breast oozing with blood. Delfin and two
companions helped him and brought him to the Marilao Medical Center but the
doctor told them he was dead on arrival (Id., p. 5). Delfin gave his sworn
statement to the police on April 4, 1981.
"Before the stabbing incident, about 6 or 7 o'clock, there was misunderstanding
between accused-appellant Literado and Nestor (Id., at 3-4). The witnesses were
not clear what was the misunderstanding. Appellant and Nestor were at the store
of Angelina Literado where there was `shouting or loud exchange of words'
between the two (Id., p. 5). Helen Literado shouted at Nestor that Bernardo
Literado was her cousin so Nestor approached Helen to apologize to her `because
on that particular date they stood as sponsors.' After this, Nestor went back to his
companions at the terrace of the house of Delfin Gonzales. After resting for a
while, they went to flag down a tricycle for Nestor Andres (Id.).
"The medical finding has established that Nestor's death was caused by `massive
external hemorrhage, blood that is out of the body, and internal hemorrhage that
are being accumulated inside the body due to stab wound on the left side of the
chest along the mid axillary line at the level of the left nipple.' The weapon used in
inflicting the stab wound penetrated the left lung up to the vertebral bone (TSN,
Dr. Benito Caballero, September 12, 1981, p. 7). The stab wound has a length of
about 2 1/2 centimeters, and it has a depth of more than 10 inches since it
reached the left lung and the vertebral column (Id., at 9). It could have been
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 caused by a sharp pointed object (Id., at 10). The massive hemorrhage and the
concomitant shock resulting from the stab wound caused the death of Nestor
(Id.). It is probable that Nestor was clinically dead after the infliction of the stab
wound (Id.). After the inflicting of the stab wound, Nestor would still survive for
thirty (30) minutes, more or less (Id.).

"Aside from the stab wound, an incised wound was also inflicted on Nestor. The
incised wound, which is caused by a sharpened instrument or object, is located
immediately above the stab wound. Its width is 3 1/2 centimeters, and it
penetrated inside the body. It affected the left lung and the vertebral bone. If
Nestor did not die instantaneously after the inflicting of the first wound, he would
only live for around thirty (30) minutes after the wounding (Id., at 8-9).
"It is clear therefore that both the stab and the incised wounds are fatal although
the stab wound, it appears, is more fatal than the incised wound.
"The evidence for the defense tried to portray the following scene: On May 29,
1981, while appellant Bernardo Literado was standing at the door of his cousin's
house, i.e., the house of Angelina Literado, a person, whom appellant did not
know, approached and mauled him. This incident caused appellant to go inside a
room of his cousin's house. The person who mauled him followed and entered
the room, and appellant saw him holding a knife that was more or less 10 inches
long including the handle (TSN, Bernardo Literado, February 5, 1982, p. 3). When
he saw him holding the knife (Exh. `A'), he went under the bed, and while he was
there, the intruder swayed the knife. Appellant could not run to any place anymore,
and 'on that particular instant, I happened to take hold of the bolo (Exh. `B') and
swayed it towards him, and I was not expecting that the same bolo would kill him'
(Id., at 4). Bernardo made only one thrust of the bolo against the intruder, and
after said thrust, the intruder went out (Id., at 5). He did not know what happened
to the intruder outside. He remained inside the room for five (5) minutes. Then a
policeman entered the room holding a gun telling him to surrender. He
surrendered the bolo, and the policeman brought him to the municipal building
(Id., at 6).

"Another witness for the defense, Isabel Francisco, testified that in the evening of
March 29, 1981, between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m., she was at the house of Angelina
Literado for the purpose of obtaining an advance, a vale, from Angelina, the
employer of Isabel Francisco's husband (TSN, Isabel Francisco, October 16, 1981,
p. 2 and 3). Isabel saw Bernardo Literado, `standing near the road by the side of
the house of Angelina Literado near the door' (Id., at 3). Then, suddenly, Nestor
rushed towards Bernardo and 'boxed him on the left chin' (Id.). Bernardo, in
response, `boxed' Nestor but he was not able `to land the first blow.' Then
Bernardo ran and entered Angelina's house (Id.). He hid under a bed crouching on
his stomach (TSN, Isabel Francisco, November 20, 1981, p. 14). Nestor pursued
Bernardo inside the house. The next thing that Isabel saw was Nestor holding a
kitchen knife (Exh. `A') and 'stabbing Bernardo Literado under the bed' (TSN,
Isabel Francisco, October 16, 1981, p. 3). Nestor, however, did not hit Bernardo
because the latter was under the bed (Id.). She saw Bernardo get hold of the knife
and stab Nestor (Id.). She also saw Bernardo pull `something under the bed and
she saw it was a long bolo (Exh. `B') and he used it in stabbing Ernesto Andres'
(Id., at 4).
"The prosecution presented the rebuttal testimony of a Meralco representative
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 that on March 29, 1981, from 5:20 to 7:20 p.m., there was a pre-arranged
interruption of electric service by Meralco in the area that included Mendoza
Street, Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan where the crime had happened (TSN, Lucito
Santos, June 7, 1982 and July 16, 1982). In other words, there was a brownout in
the place where the crime was committed on March 29, 1981 from 5:20 p.m. to
7:30 p.m. Witnesses for the prosecution and the defense testified that the crime
happened between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. on March 29, 1981. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 4-
9)

After trial, accused/appellant was found guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua).
Not satisfied with the verdict of the trial court, appellant took the instant appeal with the
following assignment of errors, viz.:
I

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE MORE CREDIBLE AND IN DISREGARDING THE
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.

II
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE

CRIME OF MURDER CONSIDERING THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1).

It is settled jurisprudence that the findings of the trial court as regards the credibility of
witnesses are seldom disturbed by this Court unless it is amply demonstrated that the trial
court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would affect the result of the case
(See Medina v. Asistio, 192 SCRA 218 [1990]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]).
While there may be accepted exceptions to the foregoing pronouncement, none exist in the
case at bar. We have gone over the records of the case before us, and contrary to
appellant's protestations, there is nothing therein which would otherwise compel us to
depart from said doctrine.
Appellant likewise seeks to exculpate himself from criminal liability by invoking the
justifying circumstance of self-defense.
In order that the justifying circumstance of self-defense may be properly invoked, it is
imperative that the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggressions; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11, Revised Penal
Code).
In People v. Bausing (199 SCRA 355 [1991]), this Court ruled that:
"The first requisite is indispensable. There can be no self-defense unless it is
proven that there had been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured
or killed by the assailant. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to
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 prevent or repel (People v. Malazzab, 160 SCRA 123 [1988]; Ortega v.
Sandiganbayan [1990]). In addition, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude (People v. Pasco, Jr., supra;
People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989] and the accused must present proof of
positively strong act of real aggression (Pacificar v. Court of Appeals 125 SCRA
716 [1983]; (People v. Aquiatan, 123 SCRA 501 [1983]: People v. Aquino, 124
SCRA 835 [1983])."

According to appellant, the deceased ran after him with a knife inside the house of
Angelina Literado and he squeezed himself under the bed to avoid the thrusts of the
deceased; and that while underneath, he managed to grab a bolo with which to stab the
victim.
As found by the court a quo, however, "it is inconceivable that the accused could have
hidden himself underneath the bed in such a hurried manner when the deceased was
following the accused inside the room. The bed was barely 1 foot in height from the floor
such that a person placing himself under it could hardly squeeze himself in and put up a
fight in self-defense. A person in such a situation could not make a thrusting blow of the
bolo without exposing at least his upper extremities. . . . The accused had no time to place
himself underneath the bed. Once inside the house (after stabbing the accused outside),
the accused could have gotten the bolo nearby and waited for the (deceased) to enter and
there deliver the thrusting blow." (Rollo, pp. 29-30). Further, the unrebutted testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses indicate that it was accused-appellant, and not the deceased,
who acted as the aggressor. Such being the case, appellant's invocation of self-defense
cannot be given a scintilla of credibility.
But what is more important is the fact that accused-appellant admitted the killing of the
accused. As we have held in People v. Bausing (supra), "it is thus incumbent upon the
accused to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court in order to be
relieved of any criminal liability. In such instances, the accused must proffer strong, clear
and convincing evidence of self-defense and depend not on the infirmity of the
prosecution, for even if the latter was weak, the plea of self-defense cannot prosper
especially so where the accused himself has admitted the killing,. . . (citing People v.
Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285 [1989]; People v. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320 [1988]; People v.
Abagon, 161 SCRA 255 [1988]; People v. Tesorero, 71 SCRA 579 [1976]); People v.
Llamera, 51 SCRA 48 [1973]; People v. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105 [1946]; People v. Ansoyon, 75
Phil. 772 [1946])."
The prosecution witnesses also testified that the victim was suddenly attacked by the
accused/appellant while seated behind the tricycle driver. Appellant, on the other hand,
would like this Court to believe that the stabbing incident in its entirety took place inside
the house of Angelina Literado.
The Court finds more worthy of belief the finding of the trial court based on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased was first stabbed by the
appellant while seated on board the tricycle and moments later, appellant while waiting in
ambush inside the house of Angelina Literado, inflicted another stab wound on the hapless
victim. In both instances, the victim was totally defenseless as found by the trial court
which ruled that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
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 specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In other words, the offended party was given no opportunity
to defend himself (Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code; People v. Samson, 176 SCRA 710).

Through its eyewitnesses, the prosecution has duly established the manner in which
accused/appellant dastardly perpetrated the offense charged without risk to himself as
against the victim who was not only unarmed but was left without means of defending
himself from appellant's treacherous attack. As found by the trial court, appellant was
already waiting for the victim and took advantage of the deceased's position behind the
tricycle driver in stabbing him. The mode of attack ensured a risk-free retaliation from the
deceased who had his hands on the tricycle and could not parry a sudden and unexpected
knife thrust by the accused.
A word more. The court a quo sentenced appellant "to suffer imprisonment for life with the
accessory penalties provided by law."
The crime of murder is defined and punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty provided thereunder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Within the range of the penalty prescribed, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum to death, is
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is invariably imposed
for serious felonies penalized under the Revised Penal Code. It carries with it
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon, and also accessory penalties, e.g., perpetual special disqualification, etc. (Art. 27,
Revised Penal Code)
Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does not have any definite extent or duration nor
does it carry accessory penalties. It is imposed as a penalty for serious offenses penalized
by special laws. The crime of murder committed by appellant being penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, the proper imposable penalty should therefore be reclusion perpetua
instead of life imprisonment. It is necessary to employ legal terminology in the imposition
of penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and
accessory penalties (People v. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; see also People v. Baguio, 196
SCRA 4599 [1991].
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
penalty imposed upon appellant is reclusion perpetua and not imprisonment for life and as
to the indemnification which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 conformably with current
jurisprudence. Costs against accused/appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

** Penned by Judge Jesus R. de Vega.

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