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Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: in Brief: Updated November 10, 2020
Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: in Brief: Updated November 10, 2020
Policy:
In Brief
R45122
Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy:
November 10, 2020
In Brief Clayton Thomas
Afghanistan was elevated as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the Analyst in Middle Eastern
United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military Affairs
campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it.
In the intervening 18 years, the United States has suffered around 2,400 military
fatalities in Afghanistan (including four in combat in 2020 to date) and Congress has
appropriated approximately $141 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. In that time, an elected
Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and most measures of human development have improved, although
future prospects of those measures remain mixed. According to a June 2020 U.S. Department of Defense report,
“The vital U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to prevent it from serving as a safe haven for terrorists to launch attacks
against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, or U.S. allies.”
As of November 2020, U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan appears closer to an end, with U.S. troop levels
decreasing in line with the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement on the issues of counterterrorism and the
withdrawal of U.S. and international troops. Still, questions remain. As part of the agreement, the United States
committed to withdraw all of its then-12,000 forces within 14 months; troops have since been reduced by as much
as two thirds. In return, the Taliban committed to preventing other groups, including Al Qaeda, from using Afghan
soil to recruit, train, or fundraise toward activities that threaten the United States or its allies. The agreement is
accompanied by secret annexes, raising concerns among some Members of Congress. U.S. officials describe the
prospective U.S. withdrawal as “conditions-based,” but have not specified exactly what conditions might halt,
reverse, or otherwise alter the withdrawal timeline laid out in the agreement. Afghan government representatives
were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to conclude that the United States would
prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political,
and humanitarian gains made since 2001.
After months of delays, on September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in
Doha, Qatar to begin their first direct peace negotiations, a significant moment with potentially dramatic
implications for the course of the ongoing Afghan conflict. Even as negotiations proceed, they are complicated by
a number of factors, most notably high levels of violence. While the Taliban entering into talks with Kabul is a
momentous step, negotiations are not necessarily guaranteed to lead to a settlement to end the war. Observers
speculate about what kind of political arrangement, if any, could satisfy both the elected Afghan government and
the Taliban to the extent that the latter fully abandons armed struggle. In any event, it remains unclear to what
extent the U.S. withdrawal is contingent upon the outcome of talks or other contingencies, as U.S. officials give
contradictory visions of the future U.S. troop presence. Alterations to the U.S. military posture in Afghanistan and
related changes in the security environment may in turn influence U.S. policymakers’ consideration of future
levels and conditions of development assistance. Former Vice President Joseph Biden, the presumptive winner of
the 2020 U.S. presidential election, has previously expressed an intention to bring home U.S. combat troops, as
well as skepticism of nation building efforts.
Given the outsized role that U.S. assistance plays in supporting the Afghan government, some experts warn that a
prompt, full-scale U.S. withdrawal and/or aid cutoff could lead to its collapse and perhaps even to the
reestablishment of formal Taliban rule over some or all of the country. By many measures, the Taliban are in a
stronger military position now than at any point since 2001, though many once-public metrics related to the
conduct of the war have been classified or are no longer produced. For additional information on Afghanistan and
U.S. policy there, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. For
background information and analysis on the history of congressional engagement with Afghanistan and U.S.
policy there, as well as a summary of recent Afghanistan-related legislative proposals, see CRS Report R45329,
Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017-2020, by Clayton Thomas.
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Background: U.S.-Taliban Agreement............................................................................................. 4
Intra-Afghan Talks........................................................................................................................... 5
Participants ................................................................................................................................ 5
Major Negotiating Issues .......................................................................................................... 6
Reducing Violence .............................................................................................................. 6
Afghan Governance ............................................................................................................ 7
Prospects ................................................................................................................................... 8
Conflict Status and U.S. Military Posture ....................................................................................... 8
U.S. Military Drawdown: Questions about Timing and Conditionality.................................. 10
U.S. Adversaries: The Taliban, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda ............................................. 11
Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors ..................................................................... 13
Economy and U.S. Aid .................................................................................................................. 14
Outlook and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 15
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 16
Introduction
This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, with a
focus on two interrelated developments:
The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement on U.S. troop withdrawals and
Taliban counterterrorism assurances.
Ongoing intra-Afghan negotiations, which began in Doha, Qatar, in September
2020, aimed at reaching a political settlement to end the war.
The report also provides information on security dynamics related to the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan and related questions about the future of the United States’ military presence and
development and security assistance (which has totaled approximately $141 billion over the past
18 years).
1See, for example, Department of Defense, “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2017.
2Conor Finnegan and Aleem Agha, “US, Taliban reach agreement to reduce violence, opening door to troop
withdrawal deal,” ABC News, February 14, 2020.
members or other groups, including Al Qaeda and the local Islamic State affiliate, to use Afghan
soil to threaten the U.S. or its allies, including by preventing recruiting, training, and fundraising.
U.S. officials said that “there are parts of this agreement that aren’t going to be public, but those
parts don’t contain any additional commitments by the United States whatsoever,” describing the
annexes as “confidential procedures for implementation and verification.”3 Secretary Pompeo
said “every member of Congress will get a chance to see them,” though some Members raised
questions about the necessity of classifying these annexes.4
Intra-Afghan Talks
The U.S.-Taliban agreement envisions the end of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan, but it
does not represent a comprehensive peace agreement among Afghans, which most observers
assess is only possible through a negotiated political settlement between the Taliban and the
Afghan government. Intra-Afghan talks aimed at achieving such a settlement began in September
2020; the commencement of the long-sought talks represents a major step toward resolving the
conflict. Still, the two sides appear far apart on major issues such as future governance and
women’s rights, and some question the Taliban’s motives and intentions.
The February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement committed the Taliban to entering talks with the
Afghan government by March 10, but negotiations remained unscheduled for months amid
complications that included gridlock in Kabul due to the disputed September 2019 presidential
election, delays to a prisoner exchange between Taliban and the Afghan government, and ongoing
violence. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s electoral opponent and
former partner in a unity government, agreed in May 2020 to end their political impasse and
appoint Abdullah as chairman of the newly-created High Council for National Reconciliation
(HCNR) to oversee talks with the Taliban.5 The parties to the conflict completed the prisoner
exchange in early September 2020, removing the main obstacle to intra-Afghan talks, which
began in Doha on September 12, 2020.
Participants
The Afghan government’s 21-member negotiating team, led by former Afghan intelligence
agency head and Ghani-ally Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, includes four women and represents
Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups.6 The Abdullah-chaired HCNR is to oversee the negotiating
3 Kim Dozier, “Secret Annexes, Backroom Deals: Can Zalmay Khalilzad Deliver Afghan Peace for Trump?” Time,
February 15, 2020; Briefing with Senior Administration Officials on Next Steps Toward an Agreement on Bringing
Peace to Afghanistan, February 29, 2020.
4 Juliegrace Brufke, “House Republicans sound the alarm on Taliban deal,” The Hill, March 3, 2020.
5 President Ghani had been declared the victor of the September 2019 presidential election on February 18, 2020,
winning just over 50% of the vote and thus avoiding a runoff with Abdullah, who won about 40%. Abdullah and his
supporters rejected Ghani’s narrow majority count as fraudulent and sought to establish themselves as a separate
government, with Ghani and Abdullah holding separate inauguration ceremonies on March 9, 2020. Overall, the
agreement ended the immediate political impasse, but one analyst argues that its ambiguities may plant the seeds of
future conflict and, more importantly, that “it did not remove the underlying causes of the crisis, notably the
polarization caused by the current political system.” Ali Yawar Adili, “End of the Post-Election Impasse? Ghani and
Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 20, 2020. For more on Afghanistan’s
political system, and accusations that it is overcentralized and fuels conflict, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan:
Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
6 Christine Roehrs, Ali Yawar Adili, and Sayed Asadullah Sadat, “Two Parties Too Wary for Peace? Central Questions
for talks with the Taleban in Doha,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 11, 2020.
team’s work. Abdullah initially rejected Ghani’s August 2020 appointment of HCNR members
and discussions reportedly continue on finalizing the group’s membership.7 These difficulties are
emblematic of enduring disputes among Afghan political elites, who remain divided on ethnic and
other lines.8
The Taliban negotiating team also comprises 21 members (all men), though the Taliban have not
made the list public. On September 5, the Taliban announced as lead negotiator Mawlawi Abdul
Hakim Haqqani, a senior hard-line cleric who is head of the Taliban’s judiciary body and
reportedly close to Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. Some analysts have speculated that
the move represents an attempt by Taliban senior leadership (likely based in Pakistan) to exert
more control over negotiations, which are ostensibly overseen by Doha-based Taliban deputy
political head Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (who met with Secretary of State Michael Pompeo in
Doha), whom analysts view as more moderate.9
U.S. Special Representative Khalilzad said on September 11, 2020, that the United States will “be
engaging each side,” but that it would not be a direct participant in talks, with its role limited to
aiding the negotiations if asked.10 Khalilzad has since made several visits to Doha, where he has
met separately with members of each negotiating team.
Reducing Violence
The U.S.-Taliban agreement commits the Taliban to refrain from attacking U.S. and international
forces–a commitment the Taliban reportedly is observing. It does not, however, address Taliban
operations against Afghan government forces, which continue and have increased in some areas
in 2020.11 The Afghan Ministry of Defense reported Taliban attacks in 18 of the country’s 34
provinces on September 12 as talks began in Doha, and violence has continued apace since, with
hundreds of Afghan forces killed.12 In October 2020, the United States called the ongoing Taliban
offensive against the capital of Helmand province “inconsistent” with the U.S.-Taliban agreement
and launched airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces. The United Nations reports that
while the number of civilian casualties over the first nine months of 2020 was the lowest since
7 Ali Yawar Adili, “Peace Leadership: Power Struggles, Division, and an Incomplete Council,” Afghanistan Analysts
Network, September 6, 2020; “President Ghani meets with Chairman of High Council for National Reconciliation,”
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Presidency, November 5, 2020.
8
For more on ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S.
Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
9 Frud Bezhan, “Why Did the Taliban Appoint a Hard-Line Chief Negotiator for Intra-Afghan Talks?” RFE/FL, Sept.
10, 2020.
10 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay
Amiri and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Violence Plagues Afghanistan as Peace Talks with Taliban Struggle to Take Off,”
Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2020.
2012, the “harm done to civilians remains inordinate and shocking,” with nearly 6,000 Afghans
killed or injured in fighting this year.13
The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected
despite two limited truces in recent years. Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to
abandon violence, arguably their main source of leverage, before a settlement, though targeted
reductions in violence could pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.14
Afghan Governance
Major differences remain in the sides’ visions for the future of Afghanistan, including both the
structure of the Afghan state and what rights the state recognizes for Afghan citizens, especially
women.15
The Taliban, whose main priority has been the withdrawal of foreign forces, have not described
their specific proposals on these issues in detail. In his opening remarks at the talks, Mullah
Baradar said, “We seek an Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and free
— an Afghanistan with an Islamic system in which all people of the nation can participate
without discrimination.”16 Some analysts posit the Taliban are likely to push for clerical oversight
of executive and legislative decision-making.17
Afghan leaders express a determination to preserve Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and its
constitution, which establishes Islam as the state religion. In an interview in Doha, HCNR
Chairman Abdullah said, “For me, one person, one vote — I don’t call anything a red line — but
that’s critical . . . and compromises on these things will not get us to peace.”18 Afghan President
Ghani has promised that his government will not conclude any agreement that limits Afghans’
rights and previously warned that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that did not include
Kabul’s participation could lead to “catastrophe,” pointing to the 1990s-era civil strife following
the fall of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.19 The Afghan
government has rejected speculation about a possible power-sharing arrangement.
Speaking at the opening of talks, Secretary of State Pompeo encouraged Afghans to preserve
democratic gains while highlighting the limits of U.S. influence, saying, “the choice of your
political system is of course yours to make. … the United States doesn’t seek to impose its system
on others.”20 He added that the U.S. government believes “firmly that protecting the rights of all
Afghans is indeed the best way for you to break the cycle of violence.”
13 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Third Quarter Report on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict: 2020.
14 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “Fight and talk: Facing negotiations, Taliban almost took key Afghan city,” Reuters, September
14, 2020.
15 See CRS In Focus IF11646, Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, by Clayton Thomas and
Sarah R. Collins.
16 Ayaz Gul, “Afghan Rivals Begin Historic Peace Talks; US Cautiously Optimistic,” Voice of America, September 12,
2020.
17 Frud Bezhan, “Are the Taliban Seeking A ‘Sunni Afghan Version’ of Iran?” RFE/RL, October 2, 2020.
18 Susannah George, “The Taliban and the Afghan government are finally talking peace: What they’re negotiating and
20 U.S. Department of State, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at Intra-Afghan Negotiations Opening Ceremony, Sept. 12,
2020.
Prospects
It remains unclear what kind of security and political arrangements could satisfy both Kabul and
the Taliban to the extent that the latter abandons its armed struggle. Many Afghans, especially
women, who remember Taliban rule and oppose the group’s policies and beliefs, remain wary.21
Those Afghans doubt the Taliban’s trustworthiness and express concern that, in the absence of
U.S. military pressure, the group will have little incentive to comply with the terms of any
agreement reached with Kabul.22 Some Afghan officials reportedly suspect the Taliban of trying
to “run out the clock on the withdrawal of American troops,” remaining in negotiations long
enough to secure a full U.S. withdrawal, after which they will capitalize on their advantage on the
battlefield to seize control of the country by force.”23
U.S. officials have given differing accounts of the extent to which the U.S. military withdrawal is
contingent upon, or otherwise related to, the Taliban remaining in talks with Kabul or the
outcome of such talks.24 Deputy U.S. negotiator Molly Phee said on February 18, “We will not
prejudge the outcome of intra-Afghan negotiations, but we are prepared to support whatever
consensus the Afghans are able to reach about their future political and governing
arrangements.”25
Still, a December 2019 survey reported that a “significant majority” of Afghans were both aware
of (77%) and strongly or somewhat supported (89%) efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with
the Taliban, while opposing the group itself.26 At least some Afghans support “peace at any cost”
given the decades of conflict through which the country has suffered.27
21 Pamela Constable, “The Return of a Taliban Government? Afghanistan Talks Raise Once-Unthinkable Question,”
Washington Post, January 29, 2019.
22 “Afghans voice fears that the U.S. is undercutting them in deal with the Taliban,” Washington Post, August 17, 2019.
23 Mujib Mashal, “Violent attacks plague Afghanistan as peace talks in Doha slow,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2020.
24 In a February 27 briefing ahead of the agreement signing, one unnamed senior U.S. official said, “If the political
settlement fails, if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the United States to withdraw troops,” while another said,
“The withdrawal timeline is related to counterterrorism, not political outcomes.” Briefing with Senior Administration
Officials.
25 Molly Phee, remarks at “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, Feb. 18, 2020.
26 The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People,” released December 3, 2019.
27 Susannah George and Sharif Hassan, “Faced with the prospect of formal peace talks, Afghans consider what they’re
29 Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Quarterly Report to
officials have assessed as a “strategic stalemate” since at least early 2017.30 Arguably
complicating that assessment, the U.S. government has withheld many once-public metrics of
military progress. Notably, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) reported in April 2019 that the U.S. military is “no longer producing its district-level
stability assessments of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence” because it “was
of limited decision-making value to the [U.S.] Commander.”31 The last reported metrics from
SIGAR in its January 30, 2019, report, showed that the share of districts under government
control or influence fell to 53.8%, as of October 2018. This figure was the lowest recorded by
SIGAR since tracking began in November 2015; 12% of districts were under insurgent control or
influence, with the remaining 34% contested. Conflict dynamics in the past two years do not
appear to have shifted in the Afghan government’s favor.
U.S. air operations escalated considerably under the Trump Administration: the U.S. dropped
more munitions in Afghanistan in 2019 than any other year since at least 2010 and in the first two
months of 2020 alone, U.S. forces conducted 1,010 strikes in 27 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.36
In May 2020, U.S. Air Forces Central Command stated it would no longer release monthly
reports on the number of airstrikes and munitions released, citing “how the report could adversely
impact ongoing discussions with the Taliban regarding Afghanistan peace talks.”37 U.S. air
operations appear to have decreased significantly since the U.S.-Taliban agreement, though U.S.
military spokesmen have highlighted periodic U.S. strikes against Taliban actions which the
United States characterizes as violating the agreement (such as the October 2020 Taliban
offensive in Helmand Province).
30 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Esper and General Milley in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
December 20, 2019.
31 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2019. This information, which was in every
previous Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report going back to January
2016, estimated the extent of Taliban control and influence in terms of both territory and population.
32 Anwar Iqbal, “Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani,” Dawn, January 18, 2018.
34 Ibid.
35 “Report: US Officials Classify Crucial Metrics on Afghan Casualties, Readiness,” Military Times, October 30, 2017.
37 “AFCENT stops releasing airstrike information as Taliban talks continue,” Air Force Magazine, May 4, 2020.
38 In a February 27 briefing ahead of the agreement signing, one unnamed senior U.S. official said, “if the political
settlement fails, if the talks fail, there is nothing that obliges the United States to withdraw troops;” another said, “the
withdrawal timeline is related to counterterrorism, not political outcomes. Office of the Spokesperson, “Briefing with
Senior Administration Officials on Next Steps Toward an Agreement on Bringing Peace to Afghanistan,” U.S.
Department of State, February 29, 2020.
39 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Seeks to Draw Down Its Troops in Afghanistan to 2,500 by Early 2021,”
42 Pamela Constable and Sharif Hassan, “Afghans stunned, worried by Trump tweet to bring U.S. troops home early,”
[will] taper off until we get intra-Afghan negotiations.”44 It is not clear what the basis for that
expectation was; there is no provision in the U.S.-Taliban agreement committing the Taliban to
refrain from attacking Afghan forces, a fact that Khalilzad acknowledged in a May 15, 2020
media briefing.45 U.S. officials have stated consistently since the agreement that Taliban violence
is “unacceptably high.”46 In October 2020, Special Representative Khalilzad announced after a
meeting with Taliban officials in Doha that the sides had agreed to a “reset” and that “we expect
that number [of Afghans dying] to drop significantly.”47
Former Vice President Joseph Biden, the presumptive winner of the 2020 U.S. presidential
election, reportedly opposed the Obama Administration’s decision to increase U.S. force levels in
2009 and expressed skepticism about both U.S. development assistance and troop levels during
the 2020 primary campaign.48 On a number of occasions in 2019 and 2020, he declared his
intention to bring home U.S. combat troops if elected, leaving a small force focused solely on
counterterrorism operations.49
44 Defense Secretary Esper and Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley Hold Media Availability, March 2, 2020.
45 U.S Department of State, Briefing with Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad,
May 15, 2020.
46 See, for example, Morgan Phillips, “US Commander disappointed with Taliban peace efforts: Violence ‘higher’ than
agreement allows,” Fox News, March 10, 2020; “Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison on NATO’s Statement on
Afghanistan,” U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 24, 2020; “As Afghan peace talks stutter,
U.S. says violence levels too high,” Reuters, September 22, 2020.
47 U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad (@US4AfghanPeace), Twitter, October 15, 2020, 9:21 AM.
48 Steve Coll, “Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Penguin Press, 2018),
51 “Red on Red: Analyzing Afghanistan’s Intra-Insurgency Violence,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 11, iss. 1, January 2018.
52 Andrew Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future,” U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2020.
initiated attacks, which SIGAR called “one of the last remaining metrics SIGAR was able to use
to report publicly on the security situation in Afghanistan.”53
Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations have been aimed at the local Islamic
State affiliate, known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K).
Estimates of ISKP strength generally ranged from 2,000 to 4,000 fighters until ISKP “collapsed”
in late 2019 due to offensives by U.S. and Afghan forces and, separately, the Taliban.54 ISKP and
Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of political or other
differences.55 A number of ISKP leaders have been killed in U.S. strikes since 2016, and Afghan
forces arrested and captured two successive ISKP leaders in the spring of 2020. U.S. officials
caution that ISKP remains a threat, pointing to several high profile attacks attributed to the group
in 2020 (including a May 2020 assault on a maternity ward in Kabul and a November 2020 attack
on a university in Kabul), but the United Nations reports that casualties from ISKP attacks have
dropped considerably in 2020 compared to 2019.
Senior Al Qaeda (AQ) leaders, along with fighters of the regional AQ affiliate Al Qaeda in the
Indian Subcontinent, are also assessed to operate in Afghanistan. In May 2020, the United
Nations reported that senior Taliban leaders “regularly consulted” with their AQ counterparts
during negotiations with the United States. 56 Al Qaeda has welcomed the U.S.-Taliban
agreement, “celebrating it as a victory for the Taliban’s cause and thus for global militancy.”57
U.S. officials have differed on the extent to which the Taliban are fulfilling its counterterrorism
commitments with regard to Al Qaeda, with which the Taliban have had close ties. Secretary
Pompeo said on July 1 that he had seen indications that the Taliban are actively combatting Al
Qaeda, while General McKenzie said on July 15 that “right now, it is simply unclear to me that
the Taliban has taken any positive steps” with regard to Al Qaeda.58
It is uncertain what verification mechanisms might be in place to ensure Taliban compliance with
the commitment to prevent Al Qaeda from operating in Afghanistan, and to what extent the U.S.
withdrawal might be paused or reversed based on Taliban action with regard to Al Qaeda. Afghan
forces’ killing of a high-ranking AQ operative in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, where he
reportedly was living and working with Taliban forces, further underscores questions about
Taliban intentions with regard to Al Qaeda.59
53 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2020. SIGAR reports that the U.S. military
“explained its decision by saying ‘EIA are now a critical part of deliberative interagency discussions regarding ongoing
political negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban.’”
54 “ISIS Is Losing Afghan Territory. That Means Little for Its Victims,” New York Times, December 2, 2019.
55 See, for example, “Heavy fighting flares between Taliban, Islamic State in Afghanistan,” Reuters, April 24, 2019;
Shawn Snow, “ISIS loses more than half its fighters from US airstrikes and Taliban ground operations,” Military
Times, February 27, 2020.
56 Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability
and security of Afghanistan, S/2020/415, released May 27, 2020.
57 Ibid.
58 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo with Bret Baier of Fox News Special Report, July 1,
2020; Carla Babb, “VOA Exclusive: CENTCOM chief says US can do job in Iraq with fewer forces,” Voice of
America, July 15, 2020.
59 Jeff Seldin, “US Calls Death of al-Qaida Official a Major Setback for Terror Group,” Voice of America, October 26,
2020.
60 For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by Clayton Thomas.
61 White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. Some
Pakistani officials disputed that charge and noted the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself.
Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018.
62 “Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad,” The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had
been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010.
63 DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2020 (released July 1, 2020).
64 Pashtuns are an ethnic group that makes up about 40% of Afghanistan’s 35 million people and 15% of Pakistan’s 215
million; they thus represent a plurality in Afghanistan but are a relatively small minority in Pakistan, though Pakistan’s
Pashtun population is considerably larger than Afghanistan’s.
65 Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but
Afghanistan does not. See Vinay Kaura, “The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations,”
Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017.
66 Humayun Hamidzada and Richard Ponzio, Central Asia’s Growing Role in Building Peace and Regional
Taliban. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sanction
Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian Supporters, October 23, 2018.
opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful
point of leverage vis-a-vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority
for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.68
68 See, for example, Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Economic Stabilization Efforts in Afghanistan: A New Party to the
Table?” Middle East Institute, January 21, 2020.
69 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S.
71 Interfax (Russia), “Reports Russia Offered Bounties to Taliban Militants to Attack U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Lies –
Peskov,” June 29, 2020; Brendan Cole, “How Russia Reacted to the U.S. Troop Bounty Claims,” Newsweek, July 1,
2020.
72 Zachary Cohen, “US intelligence indicates Iran paid bounties to Taliban for targeting American troops in
74 For more, see CRS Report R45329, Afghanistan: Issues for Congress and Legislation 2017-2020.
75 See Senator Reed’s remarks at Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Central Command, February 5,
2019.
authority (the vast majority of which are State Department or USAID personnel) has declined
steadily under the Trump Administration and significantly since the onset of the pandemic.
Furthermore, U.S. assistance may affect, and in turn be affected by, intra-Afghan talks and a
potential settlement. Special Representative Khalilzad said in September 2020 congressional
testimony that “we are committed for the long term in terms of providing assistance to
Afghanistan,” but that U.S. decisions would depend on the outcome of Afghan negotiations, as
other U.S. officials have emphasized.76 The appropriation of assistance funding remains a
congressional prerogative. It is unclear to what extent (if at all) the prospect of changes to U.S.
and international financial assistance might put pressure on or create U.S. leverage over the
behavior and policies of the Taliban or the Afghan government.77
U.S. and international development assistance could become more critical if a U.S. and allied
military withdrawal further weakens Afghanistan’s already shaky economy. Afghanistan’s gross
domestic product (GDP) has grown an average of 7% per year since 2003, but growth rates
averaged between 2% and 3% in recent years and decades of war have stunted the development
of most domestic industries. The withdrawal of a U.S. force much smaller than that of a decade
ago would seem to have less dramatic second-order economic effects for Afghanistan than the
post-2012 drawdown, which helped spur a “drastic economic decline.”78 Still, the proposed
withdrawal could pose risks for an Afghan economy suffering the effects of the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which has infected tens of thousands of Afghans (a figure
likely understates the scale of the virus in Afghanistan due to extremely limited testing).79
Social conditions in Afghanistan remain challenging as well. On issues ranging from human
trafficking to religious freedom to women’s rights, development assistance has helped
Afghanistan make limited progress since 2001, but prospects in these areas are uncertain,
especially under more unstable future scenarios. Afghanistan’s largely underdeveloped natural
resources and/or geographic position at the crossroads of future global trade routes could improve
the economic life of the country, and, by extension, its social and political dynamics.
Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s economic and political outlook remains uncertain, if not negative, in
light of the prospective decrease in U.S. and international investment and engagement.
76 House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security Holds Hearing on Afghanistan Strategy,
September 22, 2020. For example, Secretary Pompeo told intra-Afghan negotiators in Doha that their “choices and
conduct will affect both the size and scope of United States future assistance.”
77 For more, see Live Event: What Does the Taliban Want?, Wilson Center, October 6, 2020.
78 “The Economic Disaster Behind Afghanistan’s Mounting Human Crisis,” International Crisis Group, October 3,
2016.
79 World Health Organization, “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard,” November 9, 2020.
80 Zalmay Khalilzad, remarks at “The Beginning of an End to Afghanistan’s Conflict?” United States Institute of Peace,
how various parties view both the U.S.-Taliban agreement and the pursuit of intra-Afghan talks
and what their respective commitments and interests are. Furthermore, the unfolding COVID-19
crisis could also affect those dynamics, as well as the capacity and/or willingness of the United
States and other international partners to maintain their engagement, both military and financial,
with Afghanistan. Former Vice President Joe Biden, the presumptive winner of the 2020 U.S.
presidential election, has repeatedly committed to withdraw U.S. combat troops and said that the
use of U.S. military force to pursue goals in Afghanistan other than counterterrorism is not in the
United States’ vital interests.81
Core issues for Congress in Afghanistan include Congress’s role in authorizing, appropriating
funds for, and overseeing U.S. military activities, aid, and regional policy implementation.
Additionally, Members of Congress may examine how the United States can leverage its assets,
influence, and experience in Afghanistan, as well as those of Afghanistan’s neighbors and
international organizations, to encourage more inclusive and effective governance. Congress also
could seek to shape the U.S. approach to the Taliban and/or intra-Afghan talks through oversight,
legislation, and public statements.
In light of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers may
reassess notions of what success in Afghanistan looks like, examining how potential outcomes
might harm or benefit U.S. interests, and the relative levels of U.S. engagement and investment
required to attain them.82 How Afghanistan fits into broader U.S. strategy is another issue on
which Members might engage, especially given competing fiscal priorities in light of the COVID-
19 pandemic as well as the Administration’s focus on strategic competition with other great
powers.83
Author Information
Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
82 The Washington Post’s December 2019 publication of the “Afghanistan Papers” (largely records of SIGAR
interviews conducted as part of a lessons learned project) ignited debate, including reactions from some Members of
Congress, on these very issues.
83 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11139, Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy
Commission, by Kathleen J. McInnis; The US Role In The Middle East In An Era Of Renewed Great Power
Competition, Hoover Institution, April 2, 2019; and Benjamin Denison, “Confusion in the Pivot: The Muddled Shift
from Peripheral War to Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, February 12, 2019.
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