U.S. v. Orlando Dennis

Case 1:20-cr-00214-CBA Document 39 Filed 11/30/20 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 195
TH:JRS/LRO
F. #2019R01150
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- against - Docket No. 20-CR-214 (CBA)
ORLANDO DENNIS,
Defendant.
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –X
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE
SETH D. DUCHARME
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Jonathan Siegel
Lindsey R. Oken
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
(Of Counsel)
Table of Contents
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................................1
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................1
I. The Smuggling Conspiracy ........................................................................................... 1
II. Additional Evidence of the Defendant’s Drug Trafficking........................................... 3
A. Prior Drug Dealing Conversations ...........................................................................3
B. Evidence of the Defendant’s Unexplained Wealth ..................................................4
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................8
I. The Court Should Preclude the Defendant from Introducing Evidence of His
Prior Self-Serving Statements ....................................................................................... 8
II. The Government Should Be Permitted to Introduce “Other Act” Evidence

Pursuant to Rule 404(b)................................................................................................. 8
A. Applicable Law ........................................................................................................8
B. Discussion.................................................................................................................9
1. History of Prior Narcotics Trafficking .............................................................. 9
2. The Defendant’s Significant and Unexplained Wealth ................................... 11
III. The Defense Should Not Be Permitted to Mention Any Consequences

Attendant to the Defendant’s Conviction, Including His Punishment ........................ 14
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................16
ii
Table of Authorities
Cases
Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974)............................................................................................................ 16
Shannon v. United States,

512 U.S. 573 (1994)............................................................................................................ 15
United States v. Agostini,

184 F. App’x 128 (2d Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................ 10
United States v. Aminy,

15 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1994) ................................................................................................... 9
United States v. Davidson,

308 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) .................................................................................. 8
United States v. Falley,

489 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1973) ................................................................................................. 14
United States v. Gadsden,

300 F. App’x 108 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................................ 10
United States v. Jadusingh,

No. 18-CR-257 (KAM), 2020 WL 207950 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020) ................................. 8
United States v. Johnson,

16-CR-281 (PGG), 2019 WL 690338 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2019) ................................. 12, 13
United States v. Marin,

669 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1982) ................................................................................................... 8
United States v. Martino,

759 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................... 10
United States v. Mejia,

376 F. Supp. 2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ................................................................................ 12
United States v. Mitchell,

502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 8
United States v. Nastri,

No. 13-CR-14-3 (WKS), 2014 WL 2118427 (D. Vt. May 21, 2014) ................................ 10
iii
United States v. Ojeda,

412 F. App’x 410 (2d Cir. 2011) .................................................................................. 11, 13
United States v. Paulino,

445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................... 10
United States v. Pearson,

745 F. App’x 380 (2d Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................... 9
United States v. Pitre,

960 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1992) ......................................................................................... 9, 10
United States v. Scott,

677 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 9
United States v. Tavarez,

No. 13-CR-947 (JGK), 2015 WL 1137550 (S.D.N.Y. March 12, 2015) ..................... 12, 14
United States v. Viserto,

596 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1979) ................................................................................... 11, 12, 13
United States v. Watts,

934 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ................................................................................ 15
United States v. Young,

745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984) ............................................................................................... 11
Other Authorities
Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction 9-1 (2017 ed.) ............................ 15
iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The defendant Orlando Dennis is charged with conspiring to import and
conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.
In advance of trial, which is scheduled to begin on February 16, 2021, the government
respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of its motions in limine (1) to
preclude the defendant from introducing his own false exculpatory statements made to law
enforcement officers after his arrest on January 6, 2020; (2) to permit the government to
introduce evidence of drug trafficking by the defendant beyond the charged conspiracy,
including evidence of prior drug transactions and evidence of the defendant’s unexplained
wealth; and (3) to preclude the defendant from mentioning at trial, including during jury
addresses, cross-examination and direct examination of witnesses, any consequences
attendant to the defendant’s conviction.
BACKGROUND
I. The Smuggling Conspiracy
On June 7, 2019, a brown bag with a purple bandana tied around the handles
(the “Bag”) arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport aboard a flight from Jamaica.
The Bag was sent to the baggage pick-up carousel along with other luggage from the flight,
but was not claimed. The next day, June 8, 2019, officers with United States Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) inspected the Bag. Upon inspection, CBP discovered three bricks
of cocaine inside the Bag, weighing a total of approximately 3 kilograms.
Law enforcement subsequently learned that two airport employees, Ryan
Smalling and William Brown, and a third man, Wayne Stephenson, who is Smalling’s
brother, had agreed to smuggle the Bag into the United States, but that Smalling and Brown
had failed to intercept the Bag when it arrived, leading to its discovery by Customs. While
looking for the Bag at the airport, Smalling called Stephenson, who was then in Jamaica —
the country the cocaine was sent from. The following day, Smalling and Brown texted each
other about missing the Bag and complained that the people they had been working with
were now threatening to kill them. Stephenson, Brown and Smalling were subsequently
arrested and have pleaded guilty to their roles in the conspiracy. See No. 20-CR-214 (CBA),
ECF Dkt. No. 30 (Stephenson); No. 19-CR-445 (CBA), ECF Dkt. Nos. 29 (Smalling); 30
(Brown).
Approximately two weeks before the Bag was sent to the United States, the
defendant traveled to Jamaica for approximately one week. When he returned to the United
States, he sent Stephenson (who was still in Jamaica at the time) several thousand dollars
through an intermediary. Less than an hour after Smalling and Brown missed the Bag,
Stephenson contacted the defendant to let him know there was a “big problem.” The
defendant then reached out to another individual (“Individual-1”). In messages with
Individual-1, the defendant complained that an unnamed individual and his brother — an
apparent reference to Stephenson and Smalling — had lost the defendant’s “food” because of
their carelessness. The defendant also expressed his suspicion that the “food” had not really
been lost but had been stolen.
After the defendant communicated with Individual-1, Stephenson sent
Smalling’s phone number to the defendant. The defendant then called Smalling
approximately ten times each on June 8 and June 9, 2019, and approximately eight times
more over June 10 and 11. On June 11, Stephenson forwarded the defendant a message from
Smalling saying, in part, “If them kill me them kill but I don’t have yall things.”
2
The defendant was arrested for the instant offense on January 6, 2020. The
defendant was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, which he waived. In his
interview with law enforcement, the defendant claimed that his only knowledge of the Bag
was that Stephenson had told him that Smalling had taken a bag belonging to Stephenson and
would not give it to Stephenson. The defendant denied knowing that the Bag contained
drugs. According to the defendant, Stephenson asked him to make a threatening call to
Smalling, claiming to be the owner of the Bag, to help Stephenson get the Bag back. The
defendant stated that he called Smalling approximately 10 times and threatened him, which
he did as a favor to Stephenson.
II. Additional Evidence of the Defendant’s Drug Trafficking
A. Prior Drug Dealing Conversations
The defendant has engaged in prior drug trafficking with others, including
Individual-1, as reflected in conversations between the defendant and Individual-1. For
example, in March 2019, Individual-1 sent the defendant a message containing the word
“Brick” followed by a voice memo inquiring about the “price.” The defendant responded
that one (“1”) costs $35,000 and a half (“1/2”) costs $17,500, prices consistent with the cost
of a kilogram and half-kilogram of cocaine, respectively. The defendant further told
Individual-1, in sum and substance, that those were the prices for Individual-1 and that
Individual-1 would have to sell at a higher price to make money from it.
On another occasion, Individual-1 sent the defendant the following photograph
of a large quantity of marijuana and asked what the defendant thought:
3
The defendant responded, in sum and substance, that the drugs were of low quality.
B. Evidence of the Defendant’s Unexplained Wealth
At trial, the government expects to offer certain of the defendant’s financial
and related records of the defendant’s participation in the charged conspiracies. Specifically,
the government seeks to offer: (1) bank records showing hundreds of thousands dollars’
worth of large cash deposits and withdrawals by the defendant and his wife since at least
2015; and (2) photographs recovered from the defendant’s cellular telephone showing the
defendant’s opulent lifestyle.
Law enforcement has identified at least two Chase Bank accounts belonging to
the defendant. The defendant, a delivery truck driver, reports approximately $25,000 in
income each year, with more than $9,000 withheld from his paychecks to pay his child
support obligations. Bank records reflect weekly deposits from the defendant’s employer of
approximately $190, for a total annual take-home pay of less than $10,000.
The defendant’s financial activity and spending habits, however, paint a
different picture. From 2015 to 2019, the defendant made more than 630 cash deposits into
4
his Chase accounts, totaling over $600,000. The deposits occurred at irregular intervals and
reflect inconsistent sums ranging from $20 to more than $5,000. On average, during those
five years, the defendant deposited over $10,000 in cash each month — more than the
defendant takes home in a year from his reported employment.
The defendant’s and his wife’s financial records also reflect extravagant
purchases from luxury designers and significant, unexplained wealth. For instance, from
June 2018 through December 2019, the defendant spent more than $12,000 at Christian
Louboutin, more than $1,500 at Gucci, more than $1,300 at Burberry, and more than $1,000
each at Louis Vuitton, Moschino, and Prada. The defendant’s wife’s records for 2018 to
2020 include four transactions totaling nearly $7,000 at Christian Louboutin and nearly
5
$9,000 in hair extensions in a single year.1 Photographs recovered from the defendant’s
cellular telephone capture his lifestyle and expensive attire:
In addition, photographs found on the defendant’s phone of posts to his Instagram account,
“therealusetothings,” make explicit references not only to money (“Rich Rich Rich Rich
Rich Rich Real Rich”) but also to narcotics (referring to his clothes as “Cocaine white”)2:
1
The defendant’s wife is a government employee whose reported income does not
explain the couple’s wealth.
2
In several photographs, the defendant is depicted lifting his foot to display the
signature red sole commonly associated with luxury shoe designer Christian Louboutin.
6
7
ARGUMENT
I. The Court Should Preclude the Defendant from Introducing Evidence of His Prior
Self-Serving Statements
It is well-established that “[w]hen the defendant seeks to introduce his own
prior statement for the truth of the matter asserted, it is hearsay, and it is not admissible.”
United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Mitchell,
502 F.3d 931, 964 (9th Cir. 2007) (defendant was properly precluded from eliciting, on
cross-examination of government agents, exculpatory statements that he had made during
interviews with agents, since those statements were inadmissible hearsay); United States v.
Jadusingh, No. 18-CR-257 (KAM), 2020 WL 207950, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020)
(precluding the defendant “from introducing her own post-arrest statements to prove the truth
of the matter(s) asserted” (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Davidson, 308 F. Supp. 2d
461, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (a defendant may not “attempt to get his side of the . . . story in
front of the jury without himself testifying and opening himself up to cross-examination”).
Accordingly, the defendant should be precluded from seeking to introduce his
own false-exculpatory statements to law enforcement, and from seeking to elicit any of his
statements from government witnesses.3
II. The Government Should Be Permitted to Introduce “Other Act” Evidence Pursuant to
Rule 404(b)
A. Applicable Law
Pursuant to Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[e]vidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
3
The government does not intend to admit any of the defendant’s post-arrest
statements in its case-in-chief.
8
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Such evidence may,
however, “be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” See Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b). The Second Circuit follows an “inclusionary” approach to the admission of
other act evidence under Rule 404(b), which “allows such evidence to be admitted for any
purpose other than to demonstrate criminal propensity.” United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72,
79 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1118 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Under the
inclusionary approach to the rule followed by this circuit, such evidence is admissible for any
purpose other than to show a defendant’s criminal propensity.” (internal citations omitted)).
In particular, when a “defendant does not deny that he was present during a
narcotics transaction but simply denies wrongdoing, evidence of other arguably similar
narcotics involvement may, in appropriate circumstances, be admitted to show knowledge or
intent.” See United States v. Aminy, 15 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir. 1994).
B. Discussion
1. History of Prior Narcotics Trafficking
The Court should permit the government to introduce proof of the defendant’s
prior drug dealing to establish knowledge or intent as well as identity.
Evidence of the defendant’s involvement in prior narcotics trafficking,
including messages regarding drug prices and photographs depicting large quantities of
drugs, is probative of his knowledge and intent to import, possess, and distribute large
quantities of cocaine. See United States v. Pearson, 745 F. App’x 380, 383 (2d Cir. 2018)
(evidence of prior drug crimes “speaks directly to [a defendant]’s knowledge of and
intention to commit the charged crimes of conspiring to distribute drugs”). It is well-settled
9
that the government is entitled to offer similar act evidence in order to establish the requisite
specific intent of the charged offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998,
1005 (2d Cir. 1985) (the government is entitled to offer prior similar act evidence “to aid the
jury in assessing [a defendant’s] intentions during his presence on at least three separate
occasions during ongoing drug transactions”); Pitre, 960 F.2d at 1119 (“evidence of [the
defendants’] involvement in prior narcotics transactions was probative of their intent or
knowledge in connection with the crime charged”). Evidence suggesting the defendant’s
prior involvement with drugs is “admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)” in order
to establish the defendant’s “knowledge of the narcotics trade and intent in joining a
narcotics conspiracy.” United States v. Agostini, 184 F. App’x 128, 130 (2d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Gadsden, 300 F. App’x 108, 110 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “[t]estimony
about prior drug sales may be used to establish ‘knowledge’ and ‘intent’” where the
defendant fails to “indicate that the issues of knowledge or intent will not be disputed”)
(internal citations, quotations marks, and brackets omitted). Similarly, evidence of other
drug crimes is “admissible under Rule 404(b)” to prove a defendant’s “identity,” as it
demonstrates the defendant’s “complicity in the scheme.” See United States v. Nastri, No.
13-CR-14-3 (WKS), 2014 WL 2118427, at *3 (D. Vt. May 21, 2014).
The probative value of this evidence easily outweighs any risk of prejudice,
especially because the evidence of other drug dealing does not “involve conduct more
inflammatory than the charged crime.” United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 223 (2d Cir.
2006). And any risk of prejudice that exists can be mitigated by an appropriate limiting
instruction. See United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming
admission of prior acts to prove intent to join drug conspiracy where evidence was
10
“accompanied by a careful and thorough instruction limiting the evidence to relevant Rule
404 grounds”).
2. The Defendant’s Significant and Unexplained Wealth
The government seeks to introduce evidence of the defendant’s significant and
unexplained wealth accumulated in the time period directly leading up to the charged
conspiracy. Such evidence is highly relevant as direct proof of the defendant’s participation
in the charged narcotics conspiracy, as it suggests that the defendant has long-term
involvement in narcotics trafficking and corroborates other government evidence that the
defendant was the true owner of the cocaine imported in the Bag.
It is well-established that “evidence of unexplained wealth is generally
probative in narcotics crimes, and therefore is not relevant simply to propensity.” United
States v. Ojeda, 412 F. App’x 410, 412 (2d Cir. 2011). Rather, “[t]he possession of large
amounts of unexplained cash in connection with evidence of narcotics trafficking on a large
scale is similar to the possession of special means, such as tools or apparatus, which is
admissible to show the doing of an act requiring those means.” United States v. Tramunti,
513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir. 1975). Courts have, therefore, repeatedly rejected the notion
that evidence of a defendant’s unexplained wealth, including “[p]roof of cash expenditures,”
constitutes inadmissible proof of “other crimes.” United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 536
(2d Cir. 1979). The accumulation of “a large amount of unexplained and unreported wealth”
— beyond what is earned through legitimate means — is “highly probative” of a defendant’s
“involvement in narcotics trafficking.” United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 762-63 (2d
Cir. 1984). Accordingly, courts “regularly admit evidence of unexplained wealth, without
11
more, as circumstantial evidence of participation in a drug conspiracy.” United States v.
Tavarez, No. 13-CR-947 (JGK), 2015 WL 1137550, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 12, 2015).
For instance, the Second Circuit has held that “proof of the availability of cash
by defendants with no legitimate occupation is permitted as tending to show that it was
derived from ill-gotten gains.” Viserto, 596 F.2d at 536. Similarly, “[w]here there is no
affirmative evidence that the cash was derived from legitimate business, there is sufficient
relevance in a narcotics case for the cash to be considered by a jury.” United States v.
Johnson, 16-CR-281 (PGG), 2019 WL 690338, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2019) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). A defendant’s suggestion that the funds
may have come from another source “goes only to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
evidence.” Viserto, 596 F.2d at 536.
As detailed above, the defendant has accumulated wealth that far exceeds the
income he derives from his reported employment. The defendant works as a delivery driver,
reports an annual income of approximately $25,000, and pays more than one-third of that
salary directly towards child support. Yet the defendant deposited more than $600,000 in
cash from 2015 to 2019.
Notably, in June 2019 — the month of the failed scheme to import 3 kilograms
of cocaine — the amount of cash the defendant deposited fell far below his monthly average,
at only $5,585. By comparison, the months before and after June 2019 saw an influx of more
than $16,000 (May 2019) and $14,000 (July 2019). Similarly, in June of 2018, the defendant
deposited nearly $17,000 into his accounts — over $10,000 more than he deposited in June
2019.
12
Financial records also suggest a calculated and coordinated effort by the
defendant to carefully structure deposits — i.e., break up large deposits into a number of
smaller deposits — between his and his wife’s accounts, a method often employed to evade
currency reporting requirements. On May 16, 2019, for instance, the defendant’s wife made
two cash deposits of $900 and $3,000. That same day, the defendant made two cash deposits
— both at the same ATM — of $4,000 and $300. The next day, May 17, 2019, the
defendant’s wife made two additional cash deposits, $3,660 and $340, both at the same
ATM. Once again, the same day, the defendant made six successive cash deposits, all at the
same ATM (but a different ATM than that used by his wife), totaling $3,400. In total, during
that two-day period, the defendant and his wife collectively deposited more than $15,000 in
cash. This patterns suggests a calculated — and illegal — effort to evade reporting
requirements.
Moreover, the defendant’s financial records and the photographs found on his
phone reflect luxury expenditures that could not have been financed by his legitimate income
as a delivery driver. The defendant frequently made expensive purchases from designer
boutiques and photographs flaunt the defendant’s lavish lifestyle, prominently featuring
flashy attire and an apparent affinity for designer merchandise. Courts have repeatedly
recognized that this type of evidence is probative and admissible, particularly in narcotics
cases. See Ojeda, 412 F. App’x at 412 (evidence of the defendant’s gambling was “probative
of unexplained wealth” and not “unfairly prejudicial”); Viserto, 596 F.2d at 536 (“[t]he
admission of evidence that [the defendants] made substantial purchases for cash” was
“proper” as “tending to show that it was derived from ill-gotten gains”); Johnson, 2019 WL
690338, at *7 (denying the defendant’s motion to preclude the government from introducing
13
photographs depicting him “in possession of large amounts of cash”); Tavarez, 2015 WL
1137550, at *9 (the defendant’s “financial records and tax returns were properly admitted” as
“evidence of unexplained wealth”); see also United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir.
1973) (“[P]roof that a defendant is living far above the means provided by his disclosed
income is of great probative value in a case involving a crime where the motive is financial
gain.”). Proof of the defendant’s unexplained wealth is admissible as “circumstantial
evidence of [the defendant’s] participation in a drug conspiracy,” Tavarez, 2015 WL
1137550, at *9, particularly where, as here, it rebuts the defendant’s apparent contention that
he was an unwitting participant in the charged drug trafficking conspiracy.
Accordingly, the Court should permit the government to admit evidence of the
defendant’s significant, unexplained wealth, including through photographs, testimony, and
financial records.
III. The Defense Should Not Be Permitted to Mention Any Consequences Attendant to
the Defendant’s Conviction, Including His Punishment
The Court should preclude the defendant from referencing at trial any
consequences of his conviction. While the defense has not suggested that it intends to
introduce any discussion of these consequences at trial, out of an abundance of caution, the
government moves to preclude at trial any discussion of the defendant’s possible
punishments or collateral consequences of conviction.
Evidence regarding possible consequences the defendant may face if convicted
should be precluded because it is not relevant. Pursuant to Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
14
determining the action.” The defendant’s punishment is not a fact “of consequence” to be
determined at trial. Therefore, any evidence of those issues is not relevant. See Shannon v.
United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“Information regarding the consequences of a
verdict is . . . irrelevant to the jury’s task.”).
Such evidence is not only irrelevant, but “invites [jurors] to ponder matters
that are not within their province, distracts them from their fact finding responsibilities, and
creates a strong possibility of confusion.” Id. Indeed, jurors are routinely instructed not to
consider a defendant’s punishment in determining a defendant’s guilt. See generally Sand, et
al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction 9-1 (2017 ed.) (“The question of possible
punishment of the defendant is of no concern to the jury and should not, in any sense, enter
into or influence your deliberations.”); see also Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579 (a jury “should be
admonished to reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed [and] not
to consider the consequences of their verdicts . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); United States
v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[I]t is well-established precedent
that jurors should not be informed about the possible consequences of their verdict due to the
likelihood that prejudice, unfairness, and confusion that would result.”).
15
Therefore, the Court should preclude the defendant from referencing potential
punishment and collateral consequences at trial.4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the government’s motions in limine should be
granted.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York

November 30, 2020
Respectfully submitted,
SETH D. DUCHARME
Acting United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
By: /s/
Jonathan Siegel
Lindsey R. Oken
Assistant United States Attorneys
(718) 254-7000
cc: Clerk of the Court (CBA) (by ECF)

Jason Goldman, Esq. (by ECF)
4
However, if the defendant exercises his right to testify at trial, the
government should be permitted to cross-examine him regarding the potential consequences
of conviction that he faces because, under those circumstances, it is relevant to the
defendant’s credibility as a witness. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)
(discussing use of cross-examination to reveal “possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues . . . in the case at hand. The
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting
the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.” (internal quotation omitted)).
16

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Case 1:20-cr-00214-CBA Document 39 Filed 11/30/20 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 195

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- against - Docket No. 20-CR-214 (CBA)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...............................................................................................1

I. The Smuggling Conspiracy ........................................................................................... 1

II. Additional Evidence of the Defendant’s Drug Trafficking........................................... 3

A. Prior Drug Dealing Conversations ...........................................................................3

B. Evidence of the Defendant’s Unexplained Wealth ..................................................4

II. The Government Should Be Permitted to Introduce “Other Act” Evidence

A. Applicable Law ........................................................................................................8

1. History of Prior Narcotics Trafficking .............................................................. 9

2. The Defendant’s Significant and Unexplained Wealth ................................... 11

III. The Defense Should Not Be Permitted to Mention Any Consequences

Shannon v. United States,

United States v. Agostini,

United States v. Aminy,

United States v. Davidson,

United States v. Falley,

United States v. Gadsden,

United States v. Jadusingh,

United States v. Johnson,

United States v. Marin,

United States v. Martino,

United States v. Mejia,

United States v. Mitchell,

United States v. Nastri,

United States v. Ojeda,

United States v. Paulino,

United States v. Pearson,

United States v. Pitre,

United States v. Scott,

United States v. Tavarez,

United States v. Viserto,

United States v. Watts,

United States v. Young,

The defendant Orlando Dennis is charged with conspiring to import and

addresses, cross-examination and direct examination of witnesses, any consequences

attendant to the defendant’s conviction.

I. The Smuggling Conspiracy

of cocaine inside the Bag, weighing a total of approximately 3 kilograms.

Law enforcement subsequently learned that two airport employees, Ryan

defendant then reached out to another individual (“Individual-1”). In messages with

been lost but had been stolen.

After the defendant communicated with Individual-1, Stephenson sent

he did as a favor to Stephenson.

II. Additional Evidence of the Defendant’s Drug Trafficking

A. Prior Drug Dealing Conversations

Individual-1, as reflected in conversations between the defendant and Individual-1. For

of a kilogram and half-kilogram of cocaine, respectively. The defendant further told

On another occasion, Individual-1 sent the defendant the following photograph

of a large quantity of marijuana and asked what the defendant thought:

B. Evidence of the Defendant’s Unexplained Wealth

At trial, the government expects to offer certain of the defendant’s financial

defendant’s opulent lifestyle.

The defendant’s financial activity and spending habits, however, paint a

defendant takes home in a year from his reported employment.

cellular telephone capture his lifestyle and expensive attire:

It is well-established that “[w]hen the defendant seeks to introduce his own

cross-examination of government agents, exculpatory statements that he had made during

Accordingly, the defendant should be precluded from seeking to introduce his

statements from government witnesses.3