SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 143013-14. December 18, 2000.]

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW and

individual union members DANILO G. MADARA and ROMEO L.
MANAYAO , petitioners, vs . THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, as Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICROELECTRONICS, (PHILS.), INC. ,
respondents.

Lagman Mangali & Associates and Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manalastas for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Ermitaño Sangco Manzano & Associates for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners employees of private respondent, an industry indispensable to the

national interest, led a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) due to a deadlock in the negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the latter. The Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article
262, par. (g), of the Labor Code, as amended, and issued an order enjoining any strike or
lock-out. The union struck despite issuance of assumption orders, and the immediate
return-to-work order was ignored by them. Subsequently, workers who failed to report
back to work were served with letters of termination. Meanwhile, hearings were
conducted to determine the legality of the strike and both parties were required to
submit their respective position papers. The company adduced evidence, while the
union did not, although it manifested that it would le a motion to dismiss for failure of
the company to prove its case. A decision was, thereafter, rendered nding the strike
illegal, ordering payment of backwages and other bene ts to striking employees. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals a rmed the ndings of the Secretary of Labor except as
to the award of backwages and nancial assistance. Hence, their recourse to this Court
by way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It is held that only questions of law are raised in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and does not involve the evaluation of ndings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies; that factual ndings by quasi-judicial agencies such as the
Department of Labor and Employment supported by substantial evidence are entitled
to great respect; that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over
labor disputes automatically enjoins any intended or impending strike and that de ance
thereto as well as of the return to work order of the Secretary of Labor are valid
grounds for loss of employment; and the award of backwages is granted only where
there is a finding of illegal dismissal.

SYLLABUS

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 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; APPEAL UNDER RULE 45 OF RULES OF
COURT; ONLY ISSUE IS QUESTION OF LAW; JUDICIAL REVIEW DOES NOT INVOLVE
EVALUATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. — We take this occasion to emphasize
that the o ce of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual ndings by quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by
substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their
respective elds. Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
su ciency of evidence on which the labor o cial's ndings rest. It is not our function
to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the ndings of both the trial
court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in
this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of
errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. Here, petitioners would have
us re-calibrate all over again the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of
evidence submitted by the Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45.
Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless
lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court be amply
demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR DISPUTES;
ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY SECRETARY OF LABOR, AUTOMATICALLY
ENJOINS INTENDED OR IMPENDING STRIKE. — It is clear from [Article 263, Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended] that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes
jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such
assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order
directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the
Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the
directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. However,
petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on
September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly
directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to
immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale of this prohibition is that once
jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent
authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the
coercive processes of a strike.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFIANCE TO ASSUMPTION AND RETURN-TO-WORK
ORDERS, VALID GROUND FOR LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT. — We have held in a number of
cases that de ance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary of
Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment
status of any striking union officer or member.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NLRC MANUAL ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; SECTION 1,
RULE IX THEREOF ON SERVICE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION NOT APPLICABLE TO
ASSUMPTION AND RETURN-TO-WORK ORDERS ISSUED BY SECRETARY OF LABOR. —
To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two Orders issued by the
Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section 1, Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on Execution
of Judgment which provides for the time and day of service of a writ of execution.
However, the above-cited rule is not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as Sections
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 1 and 4, Rule III of the same NLRC Manual provide that such "Execution shall issue only
upon a judgment or order that nally disposes of an action or proceeding ." The
assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor in the case at
bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the immediately cited rule of the NLRC
because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did not yet nally dispose of the labor
dispute.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; APPEAL UNDER RULE 45 OF RULES OF
COURT; DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN MERALCO V. SECRETARY OF LABOR (302 SCRA
173), NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — As regards the third assigned error,
petitioners contend that a resolution of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court should include the correction of the Secretary of Labor's evaluation of
the evidence and factual ndings thereon pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Meralco
v. The Honorable Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing . That contention is
misplaced. In that case, we ruled that: "The extent of judicial review over the Secretary
of Labor's arbitral award is not limited to a determination of grave abuse in the manner
of the secretary's exercise of his statutory powers. This Court is entitled to, and must —
in the exercise of its judicial power — review the substance of the Secretary's award
when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the appreciation
of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented." However, this
Court's "review (of) the substance" does not mean a re-calibration of the evidence
presented before the DOLE but only a determination of whether the Secretary of
Labor's award passed the test of reasonableness when he arrived at his conclusions
made thereon. Thus, notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion, unless
it can be amply demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor's arbitral award did not pass
the test of reasonableness, his conclusions thereon shall not be disturbed, as in the
case at bar.
7. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF JURISDICTION OR
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, ABSENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The main thrust of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However, for this Court to properly exercise the power of judicial review
over a decision of an administrative agency, such as the DOLE, it must rst be shown
that the tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the absence of
any showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, judicial review may not be had over an administrative agency's decision. We
have gone over the records of the case at bar and we see no cogent basis to hold that
the Secretary of Labor has abused his discretion. To get the true intent and meaning of
a decision, no speci c portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to but the
decision must be considered in its entirety.
8. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS; SATISFIED
WHERE PARTIES TO A LABOR CASE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT POSITION
PAPERS. — A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position paper
cannot claim to have been denied due process. The requirements of due process are
satis ed when the parties to a labor case are given the opportunity to submit position
papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their
claim in the event it will be decided that no further hearing should be conducted or that
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 hearing was not necessary. aDSIHc

9. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR DISPUTES;

BACKWAGES; GRANTED ONLY IN CASES OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. — With respect to
petitioners' claim of backwages, we nd that the ratiocination of the appellate court in
its assailed Decision is in accord with law and settled jurisprudence, to wit: "On the
issue of the award of backwages and nancial assistance to the striking workers, the
well-entrenched doctrine is that it is only when there is a nding of illegal dismissal that
backwages are granted.

DECISION

DE LEON , JR. , J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 23,
1999 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54227 and 54665 and its Resolution 2 dated April 19, 2000,
denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals granted the petition of
private respondent TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICROELECTRONICS, (Phils.), INC., (Company,
for brevity) in CA-G.R. SP No. 54227 reversing and setting aside the Secretary of
Labor's: (1) Decision dated May 28, 1999; and (2) Resolution dated July 16, 1999,
insofar as the Company was directed to pay backwages and grant nancial assistance
to the striking workers. ScCEIA

In CA-G.R. SP No. 54665, on the other hand, the petition of TELEFUNKEN

SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW (Union, for brevity) and individual union
members DANILO G. MADARA and ROMEO L. MANAYAO was dismissed on a nding
that the Secretary of Labor did not abuse his discretion nor acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when he declared illegal the strike staged by the Union, its o cers and
members on September 14, 1995, and that as a result thereof, those who participated
therein have lost their employment status.
The petition is not meritorious, and the same should be as it is hereby dismissed.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
The labor dispute started on August 25, 1995 when the Company and the Union
reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. On
August 28, 1995, the Union led a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB).
On September 8, 1995, 3 the then Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment, Jose S. Brillantes, intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute pursuant to Art. 263, par. (g), 4 of the Labor Code, as amended. Thus, the Order
5 of the said Acting Secretary of Labor enjoined any strike or lockout, whether actual or
intended, between the parties. His Notice of the Assumption Order 6 was personally
served on the representatives of the Company, namely, on Atty. Allan Montaño, counsel
of the Union-FFW, on September 9, 1995 at 1:25 p.m. and twice on Ms. Liza Dimaano,
Union President, rst on September 8, 1995 at 7:15 p.m. and again on September 11,
1995 at 9:30 a.m. but both union representatives refused to acknowledge receipt
thereof.
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 Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck on September 14, 1995. Two (2)
days later, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued an Order 7 directing the striking
workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours and for the Company to admit
them back to work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. Notice
8 of the Return-to-Work Order 9 dated September 16, 1995 of the Acting Secretary of
Labor was sent to the striking Union members but still some of them refused to heed
the order and continued with their picket. The Federation of Free Workers (FFW)
received and acknowledged receipt of the said Return to Work Order on September 18,
1995. On September 23, 1995, violence erupted in the picket lines. The service bus
ferrying non-striking workers was stoned, causing injuries to its passengers. Thereafter,
complaints for threats, defamation, illegal detention and physical injuries were led
against the strikers.
On October 2, 1995, the Company issued letters of termination for cause to the
workers who did not report back to work despite the Notice of Assumption and Return-
to-Work Orders issued by the Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On October 27, 1995, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued another Order 10
directing the Company to reinstate all striking workers "except the Union O cers, shop
stewards, and those with pending criminal charges, . . ." while the resolution of the
legality of the strike was pending. This exclusion Order was rea rmed with some
modifications in an Order 11 dated November 24, 1995.
On December 5, 1995, the Union led with this Court a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 122743, questioning the exclusions made in the aforesaid Orders.
On June 27, 1996, while the said petition in G.R. No. 122743 was pending, then
Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing 12 for the physical reinstatement of the
remaining striking workers who were not reinstated as contained in the thirty-two (32)
page list 13 attached to the aforesaid writ.
Accordingly, on July 3, 1996, the Company led a Motion to Quash, Recall or
Suspend the Writ of Execution 14 issued by Secretary Quisumbing. This motion was
denied 15 by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE, for brevity) for lack of
merit and, in the same Order, the DOLE directed the issuance of an Alias Writ to enforce
the actual and physical reinstatement of the workers, or in case the same was not
feasible, to effect payroll reinstatement. On November 21, 1996, the Company's motion
for reconsideration was also denied. 16
On December 9, 1996, the Company led with this Court a petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 127215, questioning the denial of its motion for reconsideration
and the Alias Writ issued by the DOLE to enforce the actual and physical reinstatement
or the payroll reinstatement of the workers (including the Original Writ of Execution of
June 27, 1996). DaScHC

After we consolidated 17 the petitions for certiorari of the Company and the
Union in G.R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, respectively, we rendered a Decision therein on
December 12, 1997. The Company's petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 127215 was
dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 122743, we granted the Union's petition and
ordered the reinstatement of all striking workers without exception. We also directed
the Secretary of Labor and Employment to determine with dispatch the legality of the
strike as well as the liability of the individual strikers, if any.
After receipt of our said Decision in G.R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, the DOLE
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 issued an Alias Writ of Execution on August 26, 1998. Thereafter, the Company moved
to quash the Alias Writ which was, however, denied 18 by the DOLE. The motion for
reconsideration led by the Company was similarly denied. 19 Aggrieved by the
preceding rulings of the DOLE, the Company elevated this case to this Court via another
petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 135788.
On December 7, 1998, we resolved 20 to dismiss the said petition in G.R. No.
135788 for (a) failing to state the place of service by registered mail on the adverse
party; (b) failing to submit a certi cation duly executed by the president of the
petitioning Company or by its representative which shows its authority to represent and
act on behalf of the Company; and (c) for lack of the requisite certi cate of non-forum
shopping. We denied this petition with nality on our March 15, 1999 Resolution 21
where we held that the Secretary of Labor did not abuse his discretion in denying the
Company's motion to quash the execution of our Decision dated December 12, 1997.
In compliance with our order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment "to
determine with dispatch the legality of the strike," marathon hearings were conducted
22 at the DOLE O ce with Atty. Lita V. Aglibut as hearing o cer. On September 22,
1998, both the Union and the Company complied with the order to submit their
respective position papers. The Company adduced evidence and submitted its case for
decision. The Union did not adduce evidence. Instead, the Union manifested that it
would le a motion to dismiss for failure of the Company to prove its case with the
request that it be allowed to present evidence should its motion be denied.
During the subsequent hearings 23 conducted by the hearing o cer of DOLE, the
Union insisted that a ruling should rst be made on the Demurrer to Evidence it
previously led notwithstanding repeated reminders by the Hearing O cer that the
technical rules of evidence and procedure do not apply to proceedings before DOLE.
Thereafter, an exchange of pleadings, reiterating their respective — positions, ensued
between the Company and the Union.
On May 19, 1999, the Union led a motion before the DOLE praying for the
issuance of another Alias Writ of Execution in connection with our March 15, 1999
Resolution in G.R. No. 135788. The Union contended that this Resolution has declared
the dismissals of the striking workers as illegal and therefore a writ should be issued
for the physical reinstatement of the workers with full backwages and other bene ts
reckoned from June 27, 1996.
On May 28, 1999, the Secretary of Labor and Employment resolved the matter in
a Decision. 24 The Secretary of Labor declared therein that in hearings and resolutions
of labor disputes, before the DOLE, his O ce is not governed by the strict and technical
rules of evidence and procedure observed in the regular courts of law, and that it will
resolve the issues based on the pleadings, the documentary evidence and other
records of the case. The dispositive portion of the said Decision dated May 28, 1999
reads:
"WHEREFORE, PRESSED ON THE FOREGOING, this Office hereby:
a. Declares the strike conducted by the Telefunken Semiconductors
Employees Union-FFW on 14 September 1995 as illegal for having
been waged in open, willful and knowing de ance of the
assumption order dated 8 September 1995 and the subsequent
return-to-work order dated 16 September 1995 and consequently,
the striking workers are declared to have lost their employment
status;
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 b. Directs the payment of backwages and other bene ts to the striking
workers corresponding to the temporary reinstatement periods (1)
from 27 June 1996 to 28 October 1996, (2) from 21 November 1998
up to the date of this Decision;
c. Directs the Telefunken Micro-Electronics (Phils.), Inc. to grant
nancial assistance equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service to the striking workers conformably with its grant of the
same bene t to other strikers as manifested by the Company to the
Supreme Court on 20 November 1997. HcSETI

In this connection, the Bureau of Working Conditions, this Department, is

hereby directed to compute the total award herein made and to submit its report
of computation to this Office within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED." 25

Dissatis ed, both the Company and the Union together with individual union
members Nancy Busa and Arnel Badua, led motions for reconsideration of the said
Decision of the Secretary of Labor. On July 16, 1999, 26 the Secretary of Labor denied
the said motions.
The Company and the Union led their respective petitions for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54227 and 54665 with the Court of Appeals and these
were later on consolidated. On December 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
now assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the COMPANY's Petition in CA-G.R. No. SP 54227 is
GRANTED. The Secretary of Labor's Decision dated 28 May 1999 and his
Resolution dated 16 July 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in so far as they
direct the company to pay backwages and grant nancial assistance to the
striking workers. The said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other
respects. The Union's Petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 546654 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."

On January 24, 2000, only the Union sought reconsideration 27 of the said
Decision of the appellate court. However, it was denied for lack of merit by the Court of
Appeals on April 19, 2000 in its Resolution. 28
In the petition at bench, petitioners Union, Madara and Manayao submits the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED:
I

. . . IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF

LABOR IN FINDING THE STRIKE STAGE BY THE UNION ILLEGAL WHICH WAS
FEEBLY BASED ON THE COMPANY'S POSITION PAPER AND THE MATERIALS
AND PICTORIALS ATTACHED THERETO WHICH ARE BEREFT OF PROBATIVE
VALUE BECAUSE THEY ARE PATENTLY INADMISSIBLE AND INCOMPETENT.
II
. . . IN SUSTAINING THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY'S DECISION
EFFECTING THE WHOLESALE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE
STRIKING TEMIC WORKERS WITHOUT ANY DETERMINATION OF THEIR
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 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY, IF ANY, AS ORDERED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ILLEGAL ACTS COMMITTED BY THE
STRIKERS ATTENDANT TO THE STRIKE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT "THE SOLE OFFICE OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION INCLUDING THE COMMISSION
OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION," DOES NOT
INCLUDE CORRECTION OF HEREIN PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF
LABOR'S EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS THEREON.
IV
. . . IN RULING IN A MANNER ABSOLUTE "THAT TECHNICAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE PREVAILING IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY HAVE NO ROOM
IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND/OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS."
V
. . . IN UPHOLDING THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR'S RULING
THAT THE NON-APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE IN
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR BARS THE
PETITIONERS FROM ADDUCING EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE UNION'S
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
VI

. . . IN NEGATING THE PETITIONERS' VESTED RIGHT TO BACKWAGES. CcAHEI

The petition has no merit.

As to the rst and second assigned errors, herein petitioners contend that
according to the Constitution 29 and jurisprudence, 30 strikes enjoy the presumption of
legality and the burden of proving otherwise rests upon the respondent Company; that
the case should not have been decided on the basis of the position paper method
because in several instances 31 this Court has looked with disfavor on the position
paper method in disposing labor cases; that due to the transcendental issues involved,
a hearing should have been conducted to avoid the impression of denial of due process
considering the dearth of evidence submitted by respondent Company; and that the
pieces of evidence submitted by respondent Company are wanting in probative value.
Herein petitioners also argue that for a union o cer to lose his employment
status it must be proved that he knowingly participated in an illegal strike; and that in
the case of an ordinary member, it must not only be demonstrated that he actually
participated in the illegal strike but also that he has committed illegal acts during the
strike and which respondent Company allegedly failed to prove.
We do not agree. Despite petitioners' vain attempt to structure the case to show,
on its surface, a question of law, nevertheless, the case essentially involves a question
of fact. The issues raised basically boils down to a determination of whether or not the
position paper and the pieces of evidence adduced by the Company before the DOLE
are su cient in probative value to overthrow the constitutional presumption of the
legality of the strike. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, 32
"it . . . (the rst and second assigned errors) essentially involve questions of fact." It
calls for a "re-evaluation of facts and a re-examination of the evidence."
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 We take this occasion to emphasize that the o ce of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions
of law. 33 The factual ndings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of
Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great
respect in view of their expertise in their respective elds. 34 Judicial review of labor
cases does not go so far as to evaluate the su ciency of evidence on which the labor
o cial's ndings rest. 35 It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal,
particularly where the ndings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the
appellate court on the matter coincide, 36 as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that
function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and not to a second
analysis of the evidence. 37 Here, petitioners would have us re-calibrate all over again
the factual basis and the probative value of the pieces of evidence submitted by the
Company to the DOLE, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45. Thus, absent any showing
of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the
conclusions made by the appellate court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb
such factual findings.
Although we have ruled against the reliability of position papers in disposing of
labor cases, in the cases of Batongbacal v. Associated Bank 38 and Progress Homes v.
NLRC, 39 this was due to certain patent matters that should have been tried by the
administrative agency concerned, such as certain factual circumstances which,
however, are unavailing in the case at bar.
I n Batongbacal, we withheld judgment on the case due to the absence of a
de nitive factual determination of the status of petitioner therein as an assistant vice-
president of therein respondent Bank. It has not been established by the Labor Arbiter
whether the petitioner therein was a managerial or a rank-and- le employee, noting that
there are different causes of termination for both the managerial and rank-and- le
employees. Thus, the need to remand the case was necessary.
In Progress Homes, on the other hand, we found that despite the absence of any
evidence to establish and support therein private respondents' claim that the
petitioners therein were their immediate employers, the Labor Arbiter forthwith
concluded the illegal dismissal of the private respondents. Also, there was the apparent
failure of the Labor Arbiter to justify why the private petitioner therein should be held
solidarily liable with Progress Homes. There was a clear absence of evidence to show
that petitioner therein had engaged the services of private respondents therein and that
petitioner therein had acted maliciously and in bad faith in terminating the services of
private respondents.
The herein petitioners dismally failed to show that there really existed certain
issues which would necessitate the remand of this case at bar, or that the appellate
court misapprehended certain facts when it dismissed their petition for certiorari. STcHEI

The need to determine the individual liabilities of the striking workers, the union
o cers and members alike, was correctly dispensed with by the Secretary of Labor
after he gave su cient opportunity to the striking workers to cease and desist from
continuing with their picket. Ensconced in the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, is the rule that:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
xxx xxx xxx
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 (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause
a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment m a y assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption per certi cation shall have the
effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as speci ed in the assumption or certi cation order. If one had
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer
shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same. (Italics Ours)
xxx xxx xxx

It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national
interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue
another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption
order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even
if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. 40
However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on
September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly
directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to
immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore. In
this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly provides that:
Article 264. Prohibited Activities.
(a) ...
No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction
by the President or the Secretary or after certi cation or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

. . . . Any union o cer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and

any worker or union o cer who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute su cient ground for termination of his employment even if
a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
(Italics Ours)

The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been
properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered
with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. 41 We have held in a
number of cases that de ance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the
Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the
employment status of any striking union officer or member. 42
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 Furthermore, the claim of petitioners that the assumption and return-to-work
Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor were allegedly inadequately served upon them
is untenable in the light of what have already been clearly established in this case, to
wit:
. . . , the reports of the DOLE process server, shows that the Notice of Order
of 8 September 1995 was actually served on the Union President. The latter,
however, refused to acknowledge receipt of the same on two separate occasions
(on 8 September 1995 at 7:15 p.m. and on 11 September 1995 at 9:30 a.m.). The
Union's counsel of record, Atty. Allan Montano, similarly refused to acknowledge
receipt of the 8 September 1995 Order on 9 September 1995 at 1:25 p.m. caTESD

Records also show that the Order of 16 September 1995 was served at the
strike area with copies left with the striking workers, per the process server's
return, although a certain Virgie Cardenas also refused to acknowledge receipt.
The Federation of Free Workers o cially received a copy as acknowledged by a
certain Lourdes at 3:40 p.m. of 18 September 1995.
The foregoing clearly negate the Union's contention of inadequate service
of the Orders dated 8 and 16 September 1995 of Acting Secretary Brillantes.
Furthermore, the DOLE process server's discharge of his function is an o cial act
carrying the presumption of regularity in its performance which the Union has not
disproved, much less disputed with clear and convincing evidence.
Likewise, it would be stretching the limits of credibility if We were to believe
that the Union was unaware of the said Orders during all the conciliation
conferences conducted by the NCMB-DOLE. Speci cally, in the conciliation
meetings after the issuance of the Order of 8 September 1995 to settle the
unresolved CBA issues and after the issuance of the Order of 16 September 1995
to establish the mechanics for a smooth implementation of this O ce's return-to-
work directive, the Union — with its o cers and members in attendance — never
questioned the propriety or adequacy by which these Orders were served upon
them.

We are not unaware of the di culty of serving assumption and return-to-

work orders on striking unions and their members who invariably view the DOLE's
process servers with suspicion and hostility. The refusal to receive such orders
and other processes is, as described by the Supreme Court in an analogous case,
"an apparent attempt to frustrate the ends of justice." ( Navale, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, 253 SCRA 705)
Such being the case, We cannot allow the Union to thwart the e cacy of
the assumption and return to work orders, issued in the national interest, through
the simple expediency of refusing to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Having thus resolved the threshold issue as hereinabove discussed, it

necessarily follows that the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but
illegal for having been staged in open and knowing de ance of the assumption
and return-to-work orders.The necessary consequence thereof are also detailed by
the Supreme Court in its various rulings. In Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Brillantes
(254 SCRA 595), the High Tribunal stated in no uncertain terms that —
"by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or
certi cation for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be readmitted to
work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be validly
replaced."
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 Again, in Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC (258 SCRA 724), the Supreme
Court ruled that:

". . . . However, private respondents failed to take into consideration

the cases recently decided by this Court which emphasized on the strict
adherence to the rule that de ance of the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor would constitute a valid ground for dismissal. The
respective liabilities of striking union o cers and members who failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled out in
Article 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a
strike or lock out after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act.
Therefore, any worker or union o cer who knowingly participates in a
strike defying a return-to-work order may as a result thereof be considered
to have lost his employment status."

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, We have no alternative but to con rm

the loss of employment status of all those who participated in the strike in
de ance of the assumption order dated 8 September 1995 and did not report
back to work as directed in the Order of 16 September 1995. 43

To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two Orders issued
by the Secretary of Labor, petitioners cite Section 1, Rule IX of the NLRC Manual on
Execution of Judgment which provides that: HSIaAT

Section 1. Hours and Days When Writ Shall Be Served. — Writ of Execution
shall be served at any day, except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, between the
hours of eight in the morning and five in the afternoon. . . .

However, the above-cited rule is not applicable to the case at bar inasmuch as
Sections 1 4 4 and 4, 4 5 Rule III of the same NLRC Manual provide that such "Execution
shall issue only upon a judgment or order that nally disposes of an action or
proceeding." The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of
Labor in the case at bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the immediately
cited rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did not yet nally
dispose of the labor dispute. As pointed out by the Secretary of Labor in his Decision,
petitioners cannot now feign ignorance of his official intervention, to wit:
The admissibility of the evidence presented by the Company, however, has
been questioned. The Union's arguments are less than convincing. The numerous
publications of the subject DOLE Orders in various newspapers, tabloids, radio
and television cannot be considered hearsay and subject to authentication
considering that the subject thereof were the lawful Orders of a competent
government authority. In the case of the announcements posted on the Union's
bulletin board, pictures of which were presented by the Company in evidence,
su ce it for us to state that the bulletin board belonged to the Union. Since the
veracity of the contents of the announcements on the bulletin board were never
denied by the Union except to claim that these were "self-serving,
unveri ed/unveri able and thus utterly inadmissible," We cannot but admit the
same for the purpose for which it was presented. 46

As regards the third assigned error, petitioners contend that a resolution of a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should include the correction
of the Secretary of Labor's evaluation of the evidence and factual ndings thereon
pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Meralco v. The Honorable Secretary of Labor
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 Leonardo A. Quisumbing. 47 That contention is misplaced. In that case, we ruled that:
"The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labor's arbitral award is
not limited to a determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretary's
exercise of his statutory powers. This Court is entitled to, and must — in the
exercise of its judicial power — review the substance of the Secretary's award
when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the
appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence
presented."

However, this Court's "review (of) the substance" does not mean a re-calibration of the
evidence presented before the DOLE but only a determination of whether the Secretary
of Labor's award passed the test of reasonableness when he arrived at his conclusions
made thereon. Thus, we declared in Meralco, that:
"In this case we believe that the more appropriate and available standard
and one does not require a constitutional interpretation — is simply the standard
of reasonableness. In layman's terms, reasonableness implies the absence of
arbitrariness; in legal parlance, this translates into the exercise of proper
discretion and to the observance of due process. Thus, the question we have to
answer in deciding this case is whether the Secretary's actions have been
reasonable in light of the parties positions and the evidence they presented." 48

Thus, notwithstanding any allegation of grave abuse of discretion, unless it can be

amply demonstrated that the Secretary of Labor's arbitral award did not pass the test
of reasonableness, his conclusions thereon shall not be disturbed, as in the case at bar.
The main thrust of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, for this Court to
properly exercise the power of judicial review over a decision of an administrative
agency, such as the DOLE, it must rst be shown that the tribunal, board or o cer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 49 In the absence of any showing of lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, judicial review
may not be had over an administrative agency's decision. We have gone over the
records of the case at bar and we see no cogent basis to hold that the Secretary of
Labor has abused his discretion.
In the fourth and fth assignment of errors, petitioners would have us believe
that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision ruled in a manner absolute that
prevailing technical rules of evidence in the courts of law and equity have no room in
administrative and/or quasi-judicial proceedings; and that the non-application of
technical rules of procedure in proceedings before the O ce of the Secretary of Labor
should not have barred herein petitioners from adducing evidence after their demurrer
to evidence was denied. aHTcDA

We do not agree. That declaration of the Court of Appeals should be taken in the
context of the whole paragraph and the law and the jurisprudence cited in the assailed
portion of its decision. We do not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision to
advance ones case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no speci c
portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to but the decision must be considered
in its entirety. 50 The portion of the Court of Appeals assailed Decision reads, to wit:
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 . . . , it cannot be gainsaid that technical rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity have no room in administrative and/or quasi-judicial
proceedings (Lawin Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 273 SCRA 132; Valderama v. National Labor Relations Commission ,
256 SCRA 466; De Ysasi III v. National Labor Relations Commission , 231 SCRA
173). In fact, Article 221 of the Labor Code expressly mandates that in
proceedings before "the (National Labor Relations) Commission or any of the
Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling . . . ." This provision is also applicable to proceedings before the
O ce of the Secretary of Labor and Employment which, under the said Code, is
empowered to hear and resolve matters arising from the exercise of its plenary
power to issue assumption or (sic) jurisdiction and return-to-work orders, all in
keeping with the national interest (Article 263(g) and Article 264 of the Labor
Code)." 51

The contention of petitioners that they should have been allowed to present
evidence when their demurrer to evidence was denied by the Secretary of Labor, is
untenable. The record shows that in the hearing of September 22, 1998 attended by the
parties, Atty. Lita V. Aglibut, Hearing O cer, of the public respondent's o ce, who
presided over the hearing directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers together with the a davits and documentary evidence within ten (10) days. 52
While the Company submitted its position paper together with supporting evidence and
rested its case for resolution, herein petitioners, however, submitted only its position
paper but without attaching thereto any supporting documentary evidence. Petitioners
chose to rely on the Rules of Court by ling a demurrer to evidence in the hope of a
favorable decision and disregarded our resolution in G.R. No. 127215 ordering the
Secretary of Labor to determine with dispatch the legality of the strike. On the other
hand, the petitioners argued merely on the presumption that the strike was legal. The
fact that the Hearing O cer of DOLE admitted their demurrer to evidence is not a valid
excuse for herein petitioners not to comply with her said directive for the petitioners to
submit their position paper and to attach thereto a davits and documentary evidence
within ten (10) days. Petitioners' non-compliance with that directive by failing or
refusing to attach a davits and supporting evidence to their position paper should not
be ascribed as the fault of the Secretary of Labor when he denied their demurrer to
evidence and forthwith rendered decision on the illegality of the strike. Petitioners have
only themselves to blame for having de ed the order of the said Hearing O cer of
DOLE to submit position papers with supporting evidence. A party who has availed of
the opportunity to present his position paper cannot claim to have been denied due
process. 53 The requirements of due process are satis ed when the parties to a labor
case are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to
attach all the documents that would prove their claim in the event it will be decided that
no further hearing should be conducted or that hearing was not necessary. 54
The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of the
Labor Code, as amended, makes it incumbent for him to bring about soonest, a fair and
just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees so that the
damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized
as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lagging
of the activities of the industry or the possibility of these contingencies which might
cause detriment to such national interest. 55 Accordingly, he may adopt the most
reasonable and expeditious way of writing nis to the labor dispute. Otherwise, the
result would be absurd and contrary to the grant of plenary powers to him by the Labor
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 Code over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest.
And nally, with respect to petitioners' claim of backwages, we nd that the
ratiocination of the appellate court in its assailed Decision is in accord with law and
settled jurisprudence, to wit:
"On the issue of the award of backwages and nancial assistance to the
striking workers, the well-entrenched doctrine is that it is only when there is a
nding of illegal dismissal that backwages are granted ( St. Theresa's School of
Novaliches Foundation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 111;
Industrial Timber Corporation-Stanply Operations vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 253 SCRA 623; Jackson Building Condominium Corporation, 246
SCRA 329), and nancial assistance or separation pay allowed ( Mabeza v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 670; Capili v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 270 SCRA 688; Aurora Land Projects Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 266 SCRA 48).
Since, as correctly found by the Secretary of Labor, the strikers were not
illegally dismissed, the COMPANY is under no obligation to pay backwages to
them. It is simply inconsistent, nay, absurd, to award backwages when there is no
nding of illegal dismissal (Fil ex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation, 286
SCRA 245). . . . when the record shows that the striking workers did not comply
with lawful orders for them to return to work during said periods of time. In fact,
the Secretary of Labor observed that while "it was obligatory on the part of both
parties to restore, in the meantime, the status quo obtaining in the workplace," the
same "was not possible considering the strikers had de ed the return-to-work
Order of this O ce" (p. 8, Ibid). With such blatant disregard by the strikers of
o cial edicts ordering their "temporary reinstatement," there is no basis to award
them backwages corresponding to said time frames. Otherwise, they will recover
something they have not or could not have earned by their willful de ance of the
return-to-work order, a patently incongruous and unjust situation (Santos v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 154 SCRA 166). DcCEHI

The same view holds with respect to the award of nancial assistance or
separation pay. The assumption for granting nancial assistance or separation
pay, which is, that there is an illegally dismissed employee and that illegally
dismissed employee would otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement, is not
present in the case at bench. Here, the striking workers have been validly
dismissed. "Where the employee's dismissal was for a just case, it would be
neither fair nor just to allow the employee to recover something he has not earned
or could not have earned. This being so, there can be no award of backwages, for
it must be pointed out that while backwages are granted on the basis of equity for
earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal, where
private respondent's dismissal is for just cause, as is (sic) the case herein, there is
no factual or legal basis to order the payment of backwages; otherwise, private
respondent would be unjustly enriching herself at the expense of petitioners."
(Cathedral School of Technology v . National Labor Relations Commission, 214
SCRA 551). Consequently, granting nancial assistance to the strikers is clearly a
"specious Inconsistency " supra. We are of course aware that nancial assistance
may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and
as an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that nancial assistance is
allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or those re ecting on his moral character
(Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA 689).
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 However, the attendant facts show that such exceptional circumstances do not
obtain in the instant cases to warrant the grant of nancial assistance to the
striking workers. To our mind, the strikers' open and willful de ance of the
assumption order dated September 16, 1995 constitute serious misconduct as
well as re ective of their moral character, hence, granting nancial assistance to
them is not and cannot be justi ed ( Philippines Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 282 SCRA 536, citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, 164 SCRA 671)." 5 6
In ne, there is no reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated December
23, 1999 and the Resolution dated April 19, 2000 of public respondent Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., took no part, former DOLE Secretary.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and concurred in by Justice Delilah Vidallon-

Magtolis, Chairman, Special Fifteenth (15th) Division, and Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir,
Jr.; Rollo, pp. 170-190.
2. Rollo, pp. 191-193.
3. Rollo, pp. 200-201.
4. Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.

xxx xxx xxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest; the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption per certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same.
xxx xxx xxx

5. See note 3.

6. Rollo, p. 199.
7. Rollo, pp. 203-205.
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 8. Rollo, p. 202.
9. Ibid.
10. Rollo, pp. 207-227.
11. Rollo, pp. 229-236.
* Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
12. Rollo, pp. 237-238.
13. Rollo, pp. 239-270.
14. Rollo, p. 411.
15. Order dated October 17, 1996; Rollo, pp. 274-275.

16. Rollo, pp. 282-287.

17. Rollo, p. 414.
18. Order dated September 16, 1998; Rollo, pp. 340-342.
19. Order dated October 12, 1998; Rollo, pp. 406-407.

20. Rollo, pp. 532-533.

21. Rollo, pp. 535-541.
22. September 10, 15, 22, 1998, and on October 13, 1998.

23. March 8 and 16, 1999.

24. Rollo, pp. 550-559.

25. Ibid., pp. 558-559.
26. Rollo, pp. 591-593.
27. Rollo, pp. 594-614.
28. Rollo, pp. 191-193.
29. 1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3, par. 2.
30. Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47, 60 [1993].
31. Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, 168 SCRA 600 [1988]; Progress Homes v. NLRC, 269
SCRA 274 [1997]; and Meralco v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173 [1999].
32. Rollo, pp. 631-663, 642.
33. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
34. Labor Congress of the Philippines v. NLRC, 292 SCRA 469, 476 [1998] citing
Association of Marine Officers and Seamen of Reyes and Lim Co. v. Laguesma, 239
SCRA 412 [1994], Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA 179
[1990], Gubac v. NLRC, 187 SCRA 412 [1990].

35. Austria v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 293, 300 [1999] citing Fernandez v. NLRC, 281 SCRA 423
[1997].
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 36. Olan v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 504, 509 [1998] citing South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co. v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 744 [1995].
37. Caoili v. CA, 314 SCRA 345, 353 [1999].
38. 168 SCRA 600 [1988].
39. 269 SCRA 274 [1997].

40. Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 192 SCRA 396, 411 [1990].
41. Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, 178 SCRA 482, 491 [1989].
42. Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC, 258 SCRA 724 [1996]; Marcopper Mining
Corporation v. Brillantes, 254 SCRA 595 [1996]; St. Scholastica's College v. Torres, 210
SCRA 565 [1992]; Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, 208 SCRA 157 [1992]; Union of
Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines Inc., supra; Asian Transmission Corp. v. NLRC,
179 SCRA 582 [1989]; and Sarmiento v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676 [1988].
43. Rollo, pp. 555-556.
44. Section 1. Execution Upon Final Judgment or Order. — Execution shall issue only upon
a judgment or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding, except in specific
instances where the law provides or execution pending appeal.

45. Section 4. Issuance of a Writ. — Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or
decision that finally disposes of the actions or proceedings . . . .

46. Rollo, p. 557.

47. 302 SCRA 173, 217 [1999].

48. Id., p. 192.

49. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

50. Valderama v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 466, 472 citing Policarpio v. P.V.B. and Associated Ins. &
Surety Co. Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131 [1959].
51. Rollo, pp. 184-185.
52. TSN, September 22, 1998, pp. 58-59; Rollo, pp. 399-400.

53. Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 576 [1999].

54. Mark Roche International v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 356 [1999].
55. See Manila Cordage Company v. CIR, 37 SCRA 288, 300 [1971].
56. CA Decision, pp. 17-20; Rollo, pp. 186-189.

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