Under Seal: Code Section Offense Description

Case 8:20-mj-00832-DUTY Document 1 Filed 12/01/20 Page 1 of 24 Page ID #:1
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Printed name and title
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'DWH December 1, 2020 /s/ Autumn D. Spaeth

Judge’s signature
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Printed name and title
UNDER SEAL
AFFIDAVIT
I, Seth Melling, being duly sworn, declare and state as
follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. I am a Special Agent (“SA”) with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), and have been so employed since January
2017. I am currently assigned to a squad in the FBI Los Angeles
Field Office that investigates national security matters. I am
a law enforcement officer authorized to investigate and enforce
violations of federal criminal statutes. I have received law
enforcement training at the 21-week FBI Academy and through
various other training seminars, lectures and briefings. While
employed by the FBI, I have investigated both criminal and
national security matters, including counterintelligence and
theft of trade secret investigations. I am familiar with
federal laws governing storage, dissemination, and maintenance
of classified information.
2. I make this affidavit in support of a criminal
complaint and arrest warrant for James Robert SCHWEITZER
(“SCHWEITZER”) for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1362
(Communication lines, stations, or systems).
3. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon
my personal observations, my training and experience, and
information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This

affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient
probable cause for the requested warrants and does not purport
to set forth all of my knowledge of the investigation into this
matter. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all
conversations and statements described in this affidavit are
related in substance and in part only and all dates and times
are approximate.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
4. Based on my training and experience with the United
States Code, I know that 18 U.S.C. § 1362 states:
Whoever willfully or maliciously injures or destroys

any of the works, property, or material of any radio,
telegraph, telephone or cable, line, station, or
system, or other means of communication, operated or
controlled by the United States, or used or intended
to be used for military or civil defense functions of
the United States, whether constructed or in process
of construction, or willfully or maliciously
interferes in any way with the working or use of any
such line, or system, or willfully or maliciously
obstructs, hinders, or delays the transmission of any
communication over any such line, or system, or
attempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
III. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Summary of Probable Cause
5. As detailed below, SCHWEITZER is a former contract
employee for a defense contractor (“Cleared Contractor #1”)
located in the Central District of California. He worked as a
software engineer through July 2016 and held a security
clearance through 2014. During his employment, SCHWEITZER
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worked on a Department of Defense (“DoD”) sensor program (“the
sensor program”), portions of which were both classified and
unclassified. In 2014, SCHWEITZER lost his security clearance
due to marijuana use. Thereafter, SCHWEITZER filed a number of
complaints with the DoD Inspector General (“DoDIG”) alleging
Cleared Contractor #1 violated classified information security
handling protocols.
6. When did not receive what he believed was the proper
resolution of his DoDIG complaint, SCHWEITZER began sending
classified national defense information regarding the sensor
project on unclassified systems to DoD employees, Cleared
Contractor #1 employees, and American news media outlets.
SCHWEITZER stated that he would stop sending classified
information if he received a written admission from DoD and
Cleared Contractor #1 that the alleged security violations he
reported had occurred. SCHWEITZER stated that he would use the
admission to sue DoD and Cleared Contractor #1.
7. From 2018 through May 2020, DoD and FBI personnel
repeatedly warned SCHWEITZER against disclosing classified
national defense information and sending classified information
on unclassified communication facilities. On a recorded May 21,
2020 telephone call with the FBI, SCHWEITZER stated, “I will be
contaminating at least a dozen government servers with
classified data.” On May 27, 2020, SCHWEITZER sent an email
containing an attachment to several DoD employees and others,
stating “Be forewarned, each government and [Cleared Contractor
#1] recipient should lose at least a half day of lost
3
productivity (based on the process I was required to follow as a
cleared [Cleared Contractor #1] employee).” DoD determined that
the attachment contained classified national defense
information. Under DoD’s security protocols, as a result of
SCHWEITZER’s email, DoD was forced to remove three computers
from its unclassified network in order to purge them. Four DoD
employees were unable to receive or send email while their
computers were being sanitized. DoD spent in excess of $8,000
to clean the classified information from the unclassified DoD
communication systems.
B. Background and DoD Reports
8. I have reviewed DoDIG, Defense Security Service
(“DSS”), and United States Army Criminal Investigation Division
Command (“USCIDC”) reports and documents pertaining to
SCHWEITZER’s activities and learned the following:
a. From 2003 through July 2016, SCHWEITZER worked as
a contract employee and software engineer on the sensor program
at Cleared Contractor #1. During his employment, SCHWEITZER held
a security clearance.
b. In November 2003, SCHWEITZER signed a
Nondisclosure Agreement prohibiting him from disclosing
classified information unless:
(a) I have officially verified that the recipient has

been properly authorized by the United States
Government to receive it; or (b) I have been given
prior written notice of authorization from the United
States Government Department or Agency . . .
responsible for the classification or information or
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last granting me a security clearance that such

disclosure is permitted. I understand that if I am
uncertain about the classification status of
information, I am required to confirm from an
authorized official that the information is
unclassified before I may disclose it, except to a
person as provided in (a) or (b) above. I further
understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and
regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure
c. During his employment, SCHWEITZER also received
annual security training discussing the proper handling of
classified information. Further, in August 2014, SCHWEITZER
signed a security debriefing document acknowledging he was aware
of his continued responsibilities to comply with the protection
d. In April 2010, SCHWEITZER reported to the Cleared
Contractor #1 facility security officer (“FSO”) his intent to use
medically prescribed marijuana. The FSO told SCHWEITZER that his
security clearance would be unaffected provided that he complied
with state law. In August 2014 after his periodic
reinvestigation for his security clearance, SCHWEITZER’s security
clearance was suspended due to his marijuana use. The Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (“DOHA”) notified SCHWEITZER that
the FSO’s erroneous advice mitigated past use, but that he needed
to stop using marijuana. SCHWEITZER continued to use marijuana
and, as a result, lost his security clearance. SCHWEITZER
resigned from Cleared Contractor #1 in July 2016.
5
e. In June 2016, SCHWEITZER submitted a complaint
regarding his security clearance revocation to DoDIG through an
unclassified online web portal site accusing Cleared Contractor
#1 employees of committing security violations. He also uploaded
a letter explaining his work at Cleared Contractor #1 (“Letter
#1”). Letter #1 contained details regarding his work on the DoD
sensor program. DoD authorities ultimately reviewed Letter #1
and determined it contained national defense information
classified at the SECRET level relating to a DoD sensor program.
f. In July 2018, SCHWEITZER submitted another
complaint regarding his security clearance revocation to the
DoDIG through an unclassified email account again accusing
Cleared Contractor #1 employees of committing security
violations. SCHWEITZER attached a letter explaining his work at
Cleared Contractor #1 (“Letter #2”). DoD authorities ultimately
reviewed Letter #2 and determined it contained national defense
information classified at the SECRET level relating to a DoD
sensor program.
g. A week later, a DoDIG investigator contacted
SCHWEITZER via telephone and told him that his complaint had been
received and to not send classified information through
unclassified networks.
h. That same day, SCHWEITZER sent an email to the
DoDIG and two media outlets, stating that he apologized for
6
“contamination” of the office computers and being “more
aggressive” than the recipient would have liked. He further
stated he was getting nervous about his next “free speech stunt.”
C. SCHWEITZER’s Statements to USACIDC
9. On August 16, 2018, a USACIDC SA interviewed
SCHWEITZER on the telephone. I have reviewed a report of that
interview and learned that SCHWEITZER repeated his complaints
regarding the purported security violations he saw at Cleared
Contractor #1. SCHWEITZER also stated he had desired to work at
Cleared Contractor #1 until he retired, but that became
impossible after he lost his clearance.
D. Law Enforcement Admonished SCHWEITZER
10. On September 18, 2018, a USACIDC SA spoke with
SCHWEITZER on the telephone after SCHWEITZER sent a third letter
containing classified information to DoD employees. I have
reviewed a recording of the call. SCHWEITZER admitted to sending
classified information on unclassified systems and stated he did
so to “bait” the government to respond to his complaints.
11. On September 18, 2018, USACIDC also mailed a letter
to SCHWEITZER advising him that his communications contained
classified information and to cease sending classified
information on unclassified systems.
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E. USACIDC Executed a Search Warrant on SCHWEITZER’s Residence

and Person
12. On November 13, 2018, USACIDC executed two federal
warrants authorizing the search of SCHWEITZER’s person and
residence for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (Gathering,
Transmitting, or Losing Defense Information). USACIDC
provided copies of the search warrants to SCHWEITZER, and
seized several digital devices during the search.
F. SCHWEITZER Sent Emails and Messages Admitting that He Knew

He Was Illegally Transmitting National Defense Information
13. I have reviewed various emails and messages that
SCHWEITZER sent to United States government and Cleared
Contractor #1 employees and learned the following:
a. On March 29, 2019, SCHWEITZER sent an email to
several DoD employees and a media outlet, stating “Back when I
submitted my complaint almost 3 years ago, I would have never
even considered using military secrets as bait. Last summer, it
became my primary tactic. Lordy, how times change.”
b. On April 1, 2019, SCHWEITZER sent an email to
several U.S. federal agency accounts and a media company,
stating “it convinced me to repeatedly and knowingly break the
law . . . I will not stop. You know the truth, stop suppressing
it. Keep threatening me with incarceration. My cause is just
and I will persist regardless of your misguided efforts.”
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c. On April 3, 2019, SCHWEITZER sent an email to a
DoD employee In it he stated:
I will continue to use your classified info as bait.

I will keep pulling stunts until I am vindicated or
incarcerated . . . I personally soiled your inbox with
classified data last year. Has that cleaned that up
yet? I sent it to you on Sept 10, 2018. It’s still in
my email archives, I have waited over 4 months for
instructions how to safely delete it. I will resist
the temptation to re-forward it to you for as long as
possible. That would be a ‘fresh’ violation and that
may land me in court where I get to ask about my named
co-defendants.
d. In August 2019, SCHWEITZER sent private messages
via Social Media Company A to an individual, stating that he
sent a classified “package” to a four media outlets and that he
was hoping for a Top Secret determination.
e. On August 4, 2019, SCHWEITZER emailed various
Cleared Contractor #1 employees stating,
Technically, the attached paper is not classified

because only the US government can declare something
classified. HOWEVER- trust me, it is quite
classified. My goal was is (sic) a Top Secret. On
Monday Aug 5, 7 packages with this paper will be
getting opened up (many on the east coast). More
packages will be showing up through the week.
14. On August 10, 2019, SCHWEITZER emailed Cleared
Contractor #1 and a media outlet. In the email, he stated, “the
attachment should be treated as classified” and “[t]he largest
attachment is most likely classified . . . I would really love
to hear your opinion on the classified items I have been sending
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you over the past year as well. This marks the first time I am
intentionally e-mailing you something classified.”
15. On August 12, 2019, SCHWEITZER again emailed
individuals at Cleared Contractor #1, DoD, and media outlets.
In an apparent reference to his August 10, 2019 email, he wrote
“I intentionally sent you something that should be treated as
classified.”
G. SCHWEITZER Posted National Defense Information on a Public

Website
1. SCHWEITZER Stated that He Posted National Defense

Information Online
16. I have reviewed emails and messages provided to me by
employees of Cleared Contractor #1 and learned the following:
a. On August 31, 2019, SCHWEITZER emailed
individuals at DoD and Cleared Contractor #1. In the email, he
stated, “The paper I sent to you through the mail and e-mail is
now available online. I currently have it as a publication on
my [Social Media Company A] page . . . Over the past 14 months,
I have made at least two dozen transmissions of secret data from
my house . . . I have been leaving classified droppings across
the nation the past year.”
b. On September 6, 2019, SCHWEITZER emailed
individuals at DoD and Cleared Contractor #1. In the email, he
discussed critical military information about the sensor program
10
and stated “I have been illegally exposing illegally obtained
information for more than a year.”
c. On September 17, 2019, SCHWEITZER emailed
individuals at DoD and Cleared Contractor #1. In this email, he
stated:
Did you sell my . . . code to [Foreign Country A]?

Was my code protecting [Foreign Country A’s property]?
[Foreign Country B] is smart enough to harvest your
inboxes, . . . I fully expect that they did not have
time to implement the paper I recently posted, however
my earlier hints may have been enough of a clue for
them. . . . Please stop using them. Because of the
most likely [Foreign Country B’s] action, my paper is
no longer available on the internet.
d. In a Social Media Company A message sent on
September 24, 2019, SCHWEITZER stated he believed there is a 75%
chance the attack on Foreign Country A’s property was the
aftermath of the critical military information that his paper
described.
17. On September 24, 2019, the FBI interviewed
SCHWEITZER’s former colleague who shared social media messages
he received from SCHWEITZER. I have reviewed those messages,
which stated:
I crossed the line. I also am getting ready to push

the paper on WikiLeaks. I have been sending military
secrets to DoD for the past year. . . . I have been
using. . . military secrets as bait. You would have
thought that would have really upset someone by now.
They did raid my house, they even returned classified
files. . . I even had my . . . paper available for
over two weeks. I took the paper down after the
[attacks on Foreign Country A]. . . . If [Foreign
Country B] would have read my paper, they would not
have needed the drones. . . To help accelerate things
- I shot a note to [Foreign Country A] earlier today.
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2. SCHWEITZER Transmitted National Defense

Information
18. I viewed SCHWEITZER’s public Social Media Company A
profile and learned that in October 2019, SCHWEITZER posted an
article (“the Article”). The Article was viewable to the public
through February 2020, seven pages in length, and titled “The
Case Against . . . [.]” The Article contained information
regarding the sensor program SCHWEITZER worked on while at
Cleared Contractor #1 and included the sensor program’s critical
military information. According to the Social Media Company A
site, the number of “connections” increased from 34 to 38
between October 2019 and February 2020. Based on my training
and experience, I know this to mean that SCHWEITZER approved the
requests of four new people to follow his page during that
period.
19. DoD authorities reviewed the Article and determined it
contained national defense information classified at the SECRET
level relating to a DoD sensor program.
20. On December 23, 2019, I viewed SCHWEITZER’s public
Social Media Company B page and learned that SCHWEITZER
referenced the Article on November 11, 2019. SCHWEITZER
appeared to be using the page to cause readers to view the
Article on his Social Media Company A account. Nine individuals
viewed SCHWEITZER’s November 11, 2019 reference to the Article
as of December 23, 2019. I viewed SCHWEITZER’s public Social
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Media Company B page again on March 3, 2020, and determined that
page had been seen by three additional individuals.
21. On December 23, 2019, I viewed SCHWEITZER’s public
Social Media Company C page and learned that SCHWEITZER posted a
link to the Article on October 3, 2019. Additionally,
SCHWEITZER sent a tweet in September 2019 stating,
“Congratulations [Foreign Country #B] Engineers, you defeated
the [sensor].” I observed one retweet, one comment, and one
like to his tweet.
H. SCHWEITZER Told Local Police that He Transmitted Classified

National Defense Information
22. On December 5, 2019, officers of the Huntington Beach
Police Department (“HBPD”) spoke with SCHWEITZER at his
residence. I have reviewed a recording of that interaction and
learned that SCHWEITZER told police he had posted classified
materials online and that he had received a call asking
questions about the Article earlier that day.
23. I reviewed emails provided by the HBPD and learned the
following:
a. On December 5, 2019, SCHWEITZER emailed the HBPD
Chief of Police, stating that his Social Media Company A profile
contained an article describing the sensor he worked on while at
Cleared Contractor #1. SCHWEITZER further stated “I fully
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expect that my paper is classified (I pray it gets a Top Secret
evaluation).”
b. On January 4, 2020, SCHWEITZER again emailed the
HBPD Chief of Police, stating “The article could help enemies of
this country compromise defense systems . . . There is a good
chance I may follow-up with some light technical reading (which
will most likely be classified.)”
I. SCHWEITZER Told the FBI that He Transmitted Classified

National Defense Information
24. On February 13, 2020, FBI SA Andrew Kim and I
interviewed SCHWEITZER at the FBI Los Angeles Field Office. I
invited SCHWEITZER to the office, to which he drove voluntarily.
a. During the recorded interview, SCHWEITZER said,
“I know I have broken a lot of laws, and I will accept whatever
judgement comes” and “I have no idea what this day is going to
bring. I knew it could be . . . me being put in handcuffs.”
SCHWEITZER stated 29 people read the Article on Social Media
Company A and he would see the number increase as he made
additional posts on Social Media Company B or Social Media
Company C referencing the Article. I told SCHWEITZER that DoD
determined that the Article was classified SECRET and that
dissemination or mishandling that information was illegal.
b. SCHWEITZER admitted that reposting the Article
was illegal. SCHWEITZER stated he would remove it from Social
14
Media Company A for six weeks as a sign of good faith, but
stated that he would not stop until DoD admitted that he should
not have worked on the sensor program without a clearance.
SCHWEITZER stated an adversary’s knowledge of the critical
military information in the Article could result in American
casualties abroad or in the United States.
c. SCHWEITZER stated that federal agents missed
digital devices containing classified information during their
search of his residence in November 2018. During the interview,
SCHWEITZER consented to a search of his electronics, but said he
wanted to keep “insurance” copies so he could easily repost the
Article in the future.
25. On February 14, 2020, I confirmed that the Article was
no longer viewable on SCHWEITZER’s public Social Media Company A
page.
26. On February 20, 2020, I met SCHWEITZER in person.
SCHWEITZER handed me various documents. In the documents,
SCHWEITZER explained his efforts since the interview to “cleanup
[the] large classified spill that [he] created over the past 5
years.” SCHWEITZER stated he deleted internet-accessible copies
of the Article, but that he was retaining additional copies.
SCHWEITZER also wrote he sent hard copies of the Article to
various media outlets.
15
27. On March 9, 2020, SA Andrew Kim and I spoke with
SCHWEITZER at his residence. SCHWEITZER stated that he knew
that further dissemination of the information in the Article
could be a chargeable offense and could result in the injury or
death of American equities here and abroad. SCHWEITZER
responded, “I totally totally understand that, and I understand
the ramifications and costs of that as well.” SCHWEITZER stated
it was “agonizing” to post in the first place because he was
fully aware of the “body count” in doing so. During the
interview, SCHWEITZER admitted he had copies of the Article in
physical and digital form in his house. SCHWEITZER gave consent
to search several digital devices and represented that the
devices contained the totality of classified information,
including what he referred to as “insurance copies” that were
then in his possession.
28. On April 28, 2020, I spoke with SCHWEITZER
telephonically. He stated he would repost the Article with
additional details. I asked him if I had all copies of the
Article. He said he “goofed” as he found another copy on a disk
after we left, but stated he shredded it.
29. On April 30, 2020, SCHWEITZER emailed various
government email accounts and media outlets, stating “the next
paper will be distributed electronically and in hard copy
sometime in May 2020. I have waited long enough.”
16
30. In early May 2020, SCHWEITZER sent a letter to the FBI
stating that he had been posting and transmitting classified
information for the past 20 months, he needed to be arrested,
and he had been warned not to commit more felonies. SCHWEITZER
again threatened to post additional classified information.
31. In a call a few weeks later, I told SCHWEITZER that he
could be arrested if he posts classified information.
SCHWEITZER’s responded, “bring on the handcuffs.” He stated
that he wanted a letter from the government stating that he
should not have been working on a classified project, so that he
could take it to a lawyer and sue the government. He stated
that at the moment, no civil lawyer would take his case. He
also stated in the same interview he preferred the issue to be
resolved without having to sue the government.
J. SCHWEITZER Continued to Transmit Classified Information and

Willfully Interfered with Government Communication
Facilities after the FBI Warned Him that Doing So Was a
Crime
32. SCHWEITZER admitted intending to interfere with a
government agent’s use of a computer system. Specifically,
during the interview on February 13, 2020, SCHWEITZER stated,
“And so it was my intent to be a pain in the rear to the man who
told me life aint fair, um and yeah I said make him every so
often have to go through a process of having his computer and
inbox sanitized.”
17
33. On February 20, 2020, SCHWEITZER provided me a
document that stated, “I wasn’t thrilled with the silent
treatment, so I intentionally and incrementally e-mailed the
classified files back to Agent Eckersley. In theory, he should
have lost at least a man-week of productive time as his machine
and inbox was getting sanitized by someone in IT. If he
followed the same procedures I was required to follow, he would
have lost between a quarter and a half man-day with each
transmission.”
34. In a May 21, 2020 telephone call, SCHWEITZER stated,
“I will be contaminating at least a dozen government servers
with classified data.”
35. On May 27, 2020, SCHWEITZER sent an email to Cleared
Contractor #1 and DoD employees with attachments. He stated
that two of the attachments were classified. He also stated
that he posted the classified documents on his Microsoft
OneDrive page accessible to the public.
36. In the May 27, 2020 email, SCHWEITZER wrote, “Be
forewarned, each government and [Cleared Contractor #1]
recipient should lose at least a half day of lost productivity
(based on the process I was required to follow as a cleared
[Cleared Contractor #1] employee).”
3. SCHWEITZER’s Actions Interfered with and Required

Extensive Cleanup of Government Communication
Facilities
37. SCHWEITZER’S various communications of classified
information on or through unclassified government communication
18
facilities has interfered with the ability of DoD employees to
receive emails. I have spoken to DoD employees who work at the
organizations to which SCHWEITZER sent the emails. Those
employees told me the following:
a. SCHWEITZER’s May 27, 2020 email and attachment
contained national defense information classified at the SECRET
level.
b. Due to SCHWEITZER’s May 27, 2020 email, two DoD
commands removed three computers from their unclassified
networks and commenced cleanup procedures. During that time,
the three DoD employee users were not able access their email
for one work day. An additional DoD employee user was not able
to access email for four hours.
c. DoD determined that SCHWEITZER’S May 27, 2020
classified transmission alone caused in excess of $8,000 in
damages. DoD is still calculating the damages from SCHWEITZER’s
other classified transmissions.
K. SCHWEITZER’s Threatened Additional Disclosure of Classified

Information
38. On July 28, 2020, SCHWEITZER sent an email to DoD
employees and American media outlets. DoD determined this email
contained classified information. In the email, SCHWEITZER
wrote, “I am going to start developing materials for the August
2020 classified package. If you want to delay the package (and
feel free to call this extortion), you will need to give me
something real this time.” SCHWEITZER also included a Dropbox
link which he explained would give anyone access to his work. He
19
further wrote, “I’m done playing. If someone finds my postings
and pulls off an attack . . . I will be thrilled that someone
finally took some form of action.” He also expressed an
interest in sending the package to Wikileaks.
39. On July 29, 2020, SCHWEITZER left a voicemail for me
stating that he intended to send his next paper internationally.
40. On July 31, 2020, SCHWEITZER told me that he intended
to send another classified paper to international recipients if
he did not see substantial progress on his complaints by the end
of August 2020. As of September 3, 2020, I have seen no
indication that SCHWEITZER has yet fulfilled that intention.
L. SCHWEITZER Made Conflicting Statements about Mass Violence
41. I have reviewed a report from the HBPD and learned the
following:
a. In November 2018, a minister at SCHWEITZER’s
congregation advised the HBPD of a conversation he had with
SCHWEITZER. The minister reported SCHWEITZER told him he had
thoughts about shooting up government buildings and that it
would help solve his issues and get his message across. Even
after the minister advised SCHWEITZER that he was a mandated
reporter and wanted to confirm whether SCHWEITZER truly meant
what he said or was just venting, SCHWEITZER responded “if push
came to shove” he would use violence to get his message across
so the change in government would happen. The minister advised
20
he had never heard things like this from SCHWEITZER before and
had not had any issues with him in the past.
b. After the minister disclosed this conversation to
the HBPD, officers from HBPD spoke with SCHWEITZER at the
SUBJECT PREMISES. SCHWEITZER stated he did not have any weapons
including guns in his house. SCHWEITZER stated a mass shooting
is a “[expletive] it button,” but said he is far from pushing
it. SCHWEITZER stated he hoped he did not have to push the
button to get attention, but he might do it if “things ever got
so desperate in [his] life that [he] thought there is no way the
government would respond to my request.” SCHWEITZER told the
officers that he had multiple options at the moment and did not
want to do anything to harm anyone. SCHWEITZER stated he had a
dark fantasy of committing violence against a conservative U.S.
political organization (“U.S. Organization 1”) because it sent
out so much hate into the world. He stated he only had a one
percent chance of acting out his dark fantasy, but he felt a
strong temptation to act it out.
42. I have reviewed a November 2018 report from a local
law enforcement agency and learned that SCHWEITZER received a
mental health evaluation from the Orange County Health Care
Agency. The mental health professional declined to place
SCHWEITZER on a mental health hold based on SCHWEITZER’s support
21
system. The mental health evaluator also stated that SCHWEITZER
did not appear to be a danger to himself or society.
43. In December 2019, two officers from the HBPD met
SCHWEITZER at his residence. I reviewed a recording of that
interaction and learned that SCHWEITZER stated that violence was
a “dark fantasy.” SCHWEITZER mentioned he would have some
issues after all the stress he has incurred from the government.
SCHWEITZER also said it was not his intent to hurt anyone and he
was not planning an attack.
44. In my February 13, 2020 interview, SCHWEITZER told me
that his comments about mass violence were a fantasy. He
further stated his support for a national gun registry and said
the best way make a difference is to plan “an event at [U.S.
Organization 1]” because they would have to pay attention.
During this interview he said he had not taken any steps to put
this fantasy into action.
45. In my March 9, 2020 interview, SCHWEITZER stated he
had no plans to commit violence.
46. In the March 21, 2020 telephone call, SCHWEITZER
stated he had no plans to commit violence.
47. In the July 31, 2020 telephone call, SCHWEITZER stated
he had no plans to commit violence.
22
IV. CONCLUSION
66. Based on the foregoing, I request that the Court issue
the requested warrant based on probable cause to believe
SCHWEITZER committed a violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1362.
Attested to by the applicant in

accordance with the requirements
of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 4.1 by telephone on
December 1, 2020.
/s/ Autumn D. Spaeth

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
23

Under Seal: Code Section Offense Description

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Case 8:20-mj-00832-DUTY Document 1 Filed 12/01/20 Page 1 of 24 Page ID #:1

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Code Section Offense Description

Please see attached affidavit.

'DWH December 1, 2020 /s/ Autumn D. Spaeth

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I, Seth Melling, being duly sworn, declare and state as

1. I am a Special Agent (“SA”) with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”), and have been so employed since January

2017. I am currently assigned to a squad in the FBI Los Angeles

Field Office that investigates national security matters. I am

a law enforcement officer authorized to investigate and enforce

violations of federal criminal statutes. I have received law

enforcement training at the 21-week FBI Academy and through

various other training seminars, lectures and briefings. While

employed by the FBI, I have investigated both criminal and

national security matters, including counterintelligence and

theft of trade secret investigations. I am familiar with

federal laws governing storage, dissemination, and maintenance

2. I make this affidavit in support of a criminal

complaint and arrest warrant for James Robert SCHWEITZER

(“SCHWEITZER”) for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1362

(Communication lines, stations, or systems).

3. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon

my personal observations, my training and experience, and

information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This

affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient

to set forth all of my knowledge of the investigation into this

matter. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all

conversations and statements described in this affidavit are

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

4. Based on my training and experience with the United

States Code, I know that 18 U.S.C. § 1362 states:

Whoever willfully or maliciously injures or destroys

III. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

A. Summary of Probable Cause

5. As detailed below, SCHWEITZER is a former contract

employee for a defense contractor (“Cleared Contractor #1”)

located in the Central District of California. He worked as a

software engineer through July 2016 and held a security

clearance through 2014. During his employment, SCHWEITZER

worked on a Department of Defense (“DoD”) sensor program (“the

sensor program”), portions of which were both classified and

unclassified. In 2014, SCHWEITZER lost his security clearance

due to marijuana use. Thereafter, SCHWEITZER filed a number of

complaints with the DoD Inspector General (“DoDIG”) alleging

Cleared Contractor #1 violated classified information security

6. When did not receive what he believed was the proper

resolution of his DoDIG complaint, SCHWEITZER began sending

classified national defense information regarding the sensor

project on unclassified systems to DoD employees, Cleared

Contractor #1 employees, and American news media outlets.

SCHWEITZER stated that he would stop sending classified

information if he received a written admission from DoD and

Cleared Contractor #1 that the alleged security violations he

reported had occurred. SCHWEITZER stated that he would use the

admission to sue DoD and Cleared Contractor #1.

7. From 2018 through May 2020, DoD and FBI personnel

repeatedly warned SCHWEITZER against disclosing classified

national defense information and sending classified information

on unclassified communication facilities. On a recorded May 21,

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'DWH December 1, 2020 /s/ Autumn D. Spaeth

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