Critical Essay: The Narcissism of Minor Difference
Critical Essay: The Narcissism of Minor Difference
Grace Pfeffer
POL1101-C
In March of 1993, Michael Ignatieff visited the Croatian village of Mirkovci, which had
been cut into two as a result of the Serb-Croat War. Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia and
ensuing wars, the various ethnic groups in the area co-existed and shared a neighbourly
relationship, “they had been to the same schools, worked in the same garage, went with the same
girls” (Ignatieff 27). Nearby villages had “ethnic intermarriage as high as 30 percent” (27) and
“nearly a quarter of the population claimed their nationality as Yugoslav [as opposed to Serbian
or Croatian]” (27). In just a few short years, these exact same men would come to regard each
other as their adversaries with all previous similarities siphoned away. The community of peace
and cohabitation had morphed into one of fear and antagonism, with ethnic nationalism being the
guiding ideology on both sides. This abrupt and puzzling metamorphosis is one Ignatieff
witnessed several times before, including in “Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland” (28).
In “The Narcissism of Minor Differences”, Ignatieff seeks to answer a specific question – “how
neighbors are turned into enemies, how people who once had a lot in common end up having
comes in three parts. The first is that the community must be gripped by some sort of social,
political, and/or economic crisis which is then capitalized on by the media and politicians who
use the anxiety and discontentment of the populace to drum up support for nationalistic regimes
or leadership. These nationalistic movements result in the creation of stark divides when none
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previously existed. The second is that in order to be successful, nationalism must be narcissistic
where members see their own identity as glorious and all-important, casting others away as
inferior or even evil. This sense of self-importance and grandiose is extremely powerful,
influencing every aspect of how an individual understands themselves and people with differing
identities or viewpoints. The last is a specific type of narcissism, which Sigmund Freud coined as
the “narcissism of minor differences” (41). Essentially, differences between groups that were
once relatively minor become all-encompassing and “the basis for oppression” (43). Groups
must feel like there is some meaningful distinction between “us and them”, differences which
both justify and perpetrate the cycle of ethnic nationalism and conflict. From these three
processes, communities are radically altered, with violent confrontations eventually providing
each group with legitimate reasons to despise each other. In specific regards to Mirkovci,
Ignatieff’s analysis is accurate, and the first two steps (emergence, general narcissism) are
believe that Ignatieff overstates the importance of the narcissism of minor differences, which
seems to occur mostly in fragmented societies with competing ethnic groups, both with influence
and power in their own right, fighting for control. The psychological phenomena cannot be so
easily extended to all, or even most, transformations of communities. This, coupled with the
conflation of general feelings of superiority with the narcissism of minor differences, means that
despite excellent insights, Ignatieff’s conclusion leaves something to be desired should he want
In times of prosperity, “people center their identities on their individuality, rather than on
their ethnicity” (45). But when a society experiences challenges, nationalist sentiments often gain
popularity. Ignatieff hypothesizes that nationalism is not a random or inevitable condition, but
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one that requires specific preconditions for it to thrive. The most fertile grounds are fragmented
societies experiencing considerable economic or social turmoil, particularly ones with several
ethnic groups. Such a description fits Ignatieff’s case study of the area that was Yugoslavia
during the limbo following Tito’s death. Serbians were burdened with a “deepening economic
crisis” (36) and the collapse of Yugoslavia, a federation that successfully unified several Slavic
states and was considered the most democratic and liberal government in Eastern Europe (34). It
is almost cliché at this point to mention that nationalistic sentiments gain traction in the times of
crises and upheaval, such as the aforementioned environment in Serbia. For perhaps the most
famous example, the Nazi Party gained popularity in Germany during a time of economic
turmoil where the country was suffocated by reparations from the First World War and a global
financial depression (“Adolf Hitler”). During tumultuous periods, the population is feeling great
anxiety and self-pity, making nationalism’s “politics of fantasy” (36) a tempting diversion.
Political disintegration leads to nationalist sentiments among common people, often espousing a
contempt for “the interethnic accommodation that made it [disintegration] possible” (38).
Ignatieff is particularly focused on this fear that emerges during a crisis, where the question
“who will protect me now?” (38) is answered by “my own people” (38). At this point,
opportunistic politicians and media outlets harness the pre-existing negative emotions of the
populace to direct towards a common evil, often an ethnic group. This provides value to both the
citizens and the leaders. People need something to cling onto and believe in during challenging
times, and a national identity is as good as any. They are comforted by nationalism’s warm
embrace, and the downtrodden are energized by pride and feelings of superiority. On the other
hand, the leaders now have a zealously patriotic crowd that is willing to go to any extreme in the
name of the nation. Slobodan Milosevic saw the potential in this arrangement and was able to
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“tap into deep reservoirs of Serb self-pity […] and frustrated dreams of historical grandeur” (35-
36). In Serbia and other places undergoing a nationalist movement, “a glorious past is gilded and
refurbished for public consumption, and a people who might not have thought of themselves as a
people at all suddenly begin to dream themselves a nation” (45). A fearful population
experiencing turmoil is prone to retreat back into their mythic past, and savvy politicians and
pundits have an instrumental role in fortifying the narrative. Going back to Serbia, we now have
irate Serbians, a leader that plays into the rage, and media in both Croatia and Serbia “readying
their population to think of the other side as vermin, insects, dogs, and other noisome creatures”
(49). The stage is set for an ethnic conflict, and a small village in Eastern Croatia that once
shared a united culture and values is seeing polarization and animosity that would not be thought
The previous paragraph outlines why nationalism emerges and communities are
transformed, but how is it maintained and internally justified? Such an inquiry leads invariably to
psychology, which is likely why Ignatieff went to great lengths to explore this dimension.
believers see their simple ethnic, religious, or territorial attributes transformed into glorious
attributes and qualities” (45). Ignatieff is borrowing a very infamous psychological term, which
was an inspired choice. In human psychology, it refers to “a mental condition in which people
have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for excessive attention and
admiration, troubled relationships, and a lack of empathy for others” (“Narcissistic personality
disorder”). It is desirable and healthy to have self-confidence and focus on your wellbeing, but it
becomes detrimental and narcissistic when this ego swells to a point where the person cannot
empathize with others or function without constant attention. Similarly, there is nothing
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intrinsically wrong with taking casual pride in one’s national or ethnic heritage, such as
participating in national holidays or cheering them on during the Olympics. But it becomes
problematic, even dangerous, when one’s national ego is inflated to the point where they see that
identity as their most foundational one, taking precedent above the individual. Not only is it the
most important, it is also the ‘best’ in whichever vague way that implies. With this unearned
superiority, any criticism of the government amounts to a personal, offensive affront because the
identity of the individual is inextricably linked to the country. If an extreme nationalistic party
takes power, it is almost a certainty that dissenting opinions will be met with hostility and the
public discourse will be greatly coarsened. It also justifies the “us versus them” dichotomy,
where the only allies that can relied on are fellow countryman, with the rest of world being
untrustworthy. That is why nationalist paranoia seemingly inevitably leads to the dehumanization
and villainizing of “outsiders” within the country’s borders, whether it be on an ethnic, religious,
narcissism to explain why communities can so rapidly become exclusionary and hostile. Ignatieff
proposes that this transition occurs and is maintained due to the “narcissism of minor
differences” (41). He borrows this term from Sigmund Freud, who explains, “it is precisely the
minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness
and hostility between them” (41). In settings where ethnic nationalism is beginning to thrive, this
sort of narcissism causes groups (in this case, national identities) to grossly exaggerate
characteristics that separate one group from another, therefore further justifying their mutual
revulsion and opposition. It actualizes the fears of each group, making their differences seem like
“impassable frontiers” (52) and resists all attempt to humanize anyone who does not share the
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same identity. As “less and less distinguishes you from anybody else, the more important it
becomes to wear the differentiating mask” (50). In the Serb-Croat conflict, one of the only
characteristics that separated the two groups before it began was religion. However, Ignatieff
rejects that theological differences, in of themselves, were even remotely responsible for the
conflict. Under a united communist regime, Yugoslavia underwent secularization and neither the
Orthodox Serbians nor the Catholic Croatians were particularly religious in any significant way.
Even so, “ethnic paramilitaries went to war wearing either Orthodox or Catholic crosses as
personal jewelry” and “gunners on each side made a particular point of targeting churches,
minarets, mosques, and burial grounds on the other sides” (48). Ignatieff argues that religion did
not trigger deep feelings, but “triggered inauthentic ones, [and] that it helped to unleash such a
tumult of violent self-righteousness” (48). A Serbian who “hadn’t been to an Orthodox service
since his own christening” now remembers “‘we’ are Orthodox; ‘they’ are Catholic” (37). In this
way, the narcissism of minor differences is able to rationalize stripping the individuality from
people and seeing them as a monolith, which makes dehumanization considerably less
challenging.
Though I find the use of Freud’s term as a political theory fascinating, I hesitate to apply
it to very many contexts outside of the very specific one he’s analyzing. The narcissism of minor
differences is a solid hypothesis as to why the Serbians and Croatians harbour such resentment
towards each other and seems applicable to situations where people who once co-existed or
belonged to the same state understand their identity after a schism. However, this scenario is not
terribly prevalent. Ignatieff also conflates narcissism in general with the narcissism of minor
differences, muddying his points. He uses Nazi Germany as an example of the narcissism of
minor differences, when what is explained can be much better comprehended as simple
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narcissism and de-humanization. The Nazi example also points to an adjacent inconsistency. The
Serb-Croat conflict included two groups of comparable power fighting for control of a particular
region. However, the Jews were an ethnic minority in Germany who already experienced
centuries of overt anti-Semitism in Europe. The Germans did not persecute the Jews because
their similarities caused anxiety, they did so because they made convenient scapegoats in an area
that was already hostile towards them (“Anti-Semitism”). Both these hatreds involve a great deal
of nationalist paranoia and narcissism, but there is not sufficient evidence to suggest the
important insights into how ethnic nationalism can grow and fester, and what psychological
mechanisms are inadvertently performed in response to the discomfort that occurs after
committing atrocities. Humans are relatively similar, with no characteristic being of crucial
movements can be productive or helpful is another question entirely, but it is imperative to know
“no human difference matters much until it becomes a privilege, until it becomes the basis of
oppression” (43).
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Works Cited
Ignatieff, Michael. “The Narcissism of Minor Difference.” The Warrior’s Honour, Ethnic War
and the Modern Conscience, edited by Editor Name, Penguin Books, 2006, pp. 26-65.
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/narcissistic-personality-